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PREFACE.
The Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted by the
Legislature of Michigan at its 1905 session and on this
16th day of September, 1905, becomes a law of the State.

Soon after the approval of the Act—June 16, 1905,—I
undertook the work of annotating the statute and of ex
plaining its origin, scope and purpose in such particu
lars as seemed to invite explanation.
It has been my purpose to point out what changes the
Statute has made in existing law, to what extent and
how it and the Bills of Exchange Act upon which it is
modeled have been construed by the courts, and wherein
it has settled the law and removed conflict in the authori

I

To these ends,
have cited under the several
propositions of the statute the Michigan cases pertaining
ties.

to the particular

proposition and such English, Federal

and other state cases as seemed to me good illustrations

or clear explanations of the proposition involved and
every case which has arisen under this statute and under

Bills of Exchange Act tending in any way to explain,
illustrate or construe the statutory provision or to eluci
the

date the general proposition covered thereby.

I

submit

hope that

the result

it might

of my work—undertaken in the

help the profession and the bankers

and business men in dealing with this statute—to all who

iii

*

PREFACE.

*

may find occasion to make use of

for

it,

iv

with regret, however,
its completion was neces

sarily

limited and with the assurance that

I

time available

so

that the

could not

of

this behalf

most gratefully

I

of

gan, whose assistance
acknowledge.

in

of

of

E.

at

it

all within the stipulated time but for the
energetic, efficient and intelligent aid
Mr. Oscar
Waer
the Law Department
the University
Michi
have done

the plan and

the enforced hurry

of

found

in

in

this work

be

fault may
to

cution

of

whatever

of

of

to

I

of

crave the courteous indulgence
all who may have
attributing something
occasion
consult these pages

exe
prepa
its

ration.
ROB'T E. BUNKER.

Ann Arbor, Michigan,
September 16, 1905.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.

TITLE I. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL.
Article.

I.

II.
III.

Form and interpretation.
Consideration.
Negotiation.

IV. Rights of
W.

VI.
VII.

VIII.

holder.

Liabilities of parties.
Presentment for payment.
Notice of dishonor.
Discharge

of negotiable instruments.

TITLE II. BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
Article.

I. Form

II.

III.
IV.
W.

VI.

and interpretation.
Acceptance.
Presentment for acceptance.
Protest.

Acceptance for honor.
Payment for honor.

VII. Bills
TITLE

III.

in

a set.

PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS.
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THE NEGOTIABLE

LAW.

INSTRUMENTS

INTRODUCTION.
The negotiable instruments law.—The Negotiable In
struments Law is the name applied to a statute now en
acted, in terms and in language almost identical, in twen
ty-nine States and the District of Columbia, the primary
purpose of which is to make the law relating to nego
tiable instruments uniform throughout the United
States. Uniformity could not be secured without codifi
cation; therefore the negotiable instruments law is a
codification of existing law.
1—States having adopted the
negotiable instruments law:
Arizona; Revised Statutes 1901,
title xlix, 3304, 3491. In effect
September 1, 1901.
Colorado;
Laws of 1897, chap.
64, approved April 20, 1897.
Connecticut;
Laws of 1897,
chap. 74, approved April 5, 1897.
District of Columbia;
U. S.
Stats., 1899, chap. 47, approved

Kansas:

1904, chap.

24, 1904.
enacted 1905.

Louisiana;
Maryland; Laws of

1898,

chap,

119, approved March

29, 1898.
Laws of 1898,

Massachusetts;
chap. 533, in effect

January

1,

Laws of 1899, chap. 130,
in effect March 6, 1899.
Michigan; approved June 16,
1899.

1905.

Missouri; enacted 1905.
Montana;
Laws of 1903, chap.
121, approved March 7, 1903.
Nebraska;

86.

1

1905.

102, approved March

January 12, 1899.
Florida; Laws of 1897, chap.
4524, approved June 1, 1897.
Idaho; Laws of 1903, Sen. Bill
Iowa; Laws of 1902, chap.
approved April 12, 1901.

enacted

Kentucky; Laws of

130,

83,

1

Laws

in effect August

of 1905, chap.
1, 1905.
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the subject,

of

of in

is,

in

The Statute of Michigan, printed in the following
pages,
designation
all respects, save
divisions
of

to

in

in

of of

sections, and
heads
an immaterial clause
section 72, an exact copy
the New York statute, the first negotiable instruments
law enacted.
omission

in of

to

if

of

is

it

of

The negotiable instruments law emanated directly
from the American Bar Association, but its enactment
was indirectly induced by the English Bills
Ex
change Act,
1882, upon which
modeled
sub
stance and in form.
The desirability,
not the absolute necessity,
uni
relating
paper
long
form laws
commercial
had
been
to

apparent

lawyers

and

laymen.

The situation

in

of

duced by conflicting decisions and statutes embarrassed
business and interrupted that free circulation
com

its distinguishing characteristic.
1902.

Tennessee;

1899, chap.
Laws
effect May 15, 1899.
Utah; Laws of 1899, chap. 83,

of

1902,

94,

1898.

866, approved March

in

North Carolina; Laws of 1899,
chap. 733,
effect March 28,

Washington;
chap.

149,

1899.
1897-8, chap.

of

1,

Laws

Laws
effect

29, 1898.
of 1899,

March

January

Bill

1903.

effect

July

1, of

in

of

Oregon; Laws
1899, Sen. Bill
27, approved Feb. 16, 1899.
Pennsylvania;
Laws of 1901,
chap. 162, approved May 16, 1901.
1899,
Rhode Island;
Laws
chap. 674,

Wisconsin;
356,

22,

1899.

Laws of 1899, chap.

in effect May

Wyoming;

15, 1899.
Laws of 1905, chap.

43.

The bill was introduced but
failed to pass in the following
Arkansas, Indiana, New
States:
Hampshire, South Carolina, South
Dakota and Vermont.
The bill
pend
has been introduced and
ing in Georgia.
is

1899,

1899.
1902, Sen.
1,

effect

of

7,

Laws

of

North Dakota;
approved March
Ohio; Laws
in

July

1899.

1899.

10,

effect

Virginia;

in

in

in

of

1897, chap.
New York; Laws
612,
effect May 19, 1897; 1898,
chap. 336,
26,
effect April

in

4,

New Jersey: Laws
of
chap. 184, approved April

in

is

mercial paper which
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What was a promissory note in one State was a simple
contract in another. What was a contract of an in
dorser in New York was a contract of a maker in
Michigan, or of a guarantor or indorser or maker in
Vermont, as oral proof of the circumstances attending
the making of the contract might determine. What was
an indorsement in one jurisdiction was only an assign
ment in another. The maturity of the obligation, in the
absence of special stipulation in the instrument, fell
upon one day in one State, and upon a different day in
another State, if one State had abolished the grace of
the law merchant

and the other

had

not.

Time of

and notice of dis
confusing,
honor was rendered
if not uncertain. Paper
payable on demand or at sight created the same obliga
tion in one State and a different obligation in another,
according to whether grace had been abolished or pre
presentment

and

demand, protest

served.

of the American Bar Association,
and through its coöperation, commissioners for the pro
motion of uniformity of legislation in the United States

At

the suggestion

were from time to time appointed by the several States.
In 1895 twenty-seven States had appointed such com
missioners, and in August of that year the commis
met in conference at Detroit, Michigan, nine
teen States being represented in the conference.
At
adopted
requesting
that conference a resolution was
the
sioners

committee on commercial law to procure, as soon as
practicable, a draft of a bill relating to commercial
paper, based on the English statute on that subject and
on such other sources of information as the committee

might deem proper to consult.

The matter was

re

4
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ferred to a sub-committee consisting of Lyman D. Brew
ster, of Connecticut, Henry C. Willcox, of New York,
and Frank Bergen, of New Jersey. The sub-committee
employed Mr. John J. Crawford of New York, who had
made a special study of the law relating to commercial
paper, to make a draft of the proposed law. The draft
was prepared by Mr. Crawford and submitted to the
conference of commissioners which met at Saratoga in
August, 1896. The commissioners in attendance, being
twenty-seven

in all and representing fourteen different
States, went over the draft, section by section, making
amendments therein, most of which were changes in the
existing law which Mr. Crawford had not felt at liberty
to incorporate into the original draft. The bill as thus
amended was subsequently enacted as the statute of
New York, and has since been enacted and is now the
law in two-thirds of the States of the Union. The bill
has been introduced in other states but has failed of
passage

for reasons which do not appear.”

This statute

presents within narrow compass the law of negotiable
bills of exchange, promissory notes and checks. It is
the result of two purposes; the first and controlling pur
pose was to make the law uniform, and whatever
changes were necessary to be made to accomplish that
purpose were accordingly made. The second purpose
was to preserve the law as nearly as possible as it then
existed.
The work was committed to competent and
experienced persons, well versed in the law relating to
2—See note 1.
Report of commissioners on uniformity of laws to the Senate of
New Jersey, session of 1896.

Preface
to
Crawford's
Anno
Negotiable
tated
Instruments
Law, New York, 1st ed.
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the subject. They were aided by the able work of those
to whom had been entrusted the preparation of the
Bills of Exchange Act. These facts are a guaranty
that we have in the negotiable instruments law the
legislative expression of the law theretofore determined
by the courts, through a long series of years and in a
multitude of decisions, barring, of course, those con
flicting decisions and diverse statutes which had led to
embarrassment and confusion in the administration of
the law of commercial paper. It may be said probably
without serious question that in the enactment of this
statute no essential feature of the law of negotiable in
struments as theretofore

determined has been eliminated.

What business needs is fixed and uniform rules to
govern

commercial paper.
Such rules are now to be
negotiable
found in the
instruments law.
exchange
The bills of
act.—In 1882 the British Par

liament passed an act entitled “An Act to codify the
law relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques, and Prom
issory Notes;” better known by its authorized short
title as the “Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.” This act
is with certain exceptions declaratory of the common
law of England, or rather of the Law Merchant, as ex
pounded by the authority of English law. The bill
was drawn by Judge Chalmers, author of the excellent
Digest of the law of bills, notes and checks, an ac
knowledged expert on the subject, and submitted to rec
ognized authorities on English commercial law and
practice and finally settled by strong committees in
3–See
page

Bills of Exchange

Act,

4—Chalmers'

of

Digest of the Law

of Exchange,
Prom
Notes, and Cheques.

Bills

issory

235.
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Parliament. And so the act may be regarded for the
main part and so far as the propositions contained in
it are directly applicable as an authoritative declara
tion, under the sanction of the Legislature, of the Eng
lish law.” The act was not intended to be merely a code
of existing law. It was designed to alter and did alter
the law in some respects." The act has been adopted
English

Ruling

The draftsman comes across doubt
ful points of law which he must
6–Bank of England V. Vag decide one way or the other.
though our
liano (1891), App. Cas. 144. See Again,
voluminous
Introduction to 3rd ed. ChalmerS' case law is, there are occasional
Bills of Exchange, from which gaps which a codifying bill must
the following extract is taken in bridge over if it aims at any
thing like completeness. Still in
explanation of the purpose, mode
of preparation, and enactment of drafting the Bill of Exchange
the Statute.
bill my aim Was to reproduce as
exactly as possible the existing
propo
part
“For the most
the
Sitions of the act Were taken law, whether it seemed good, bad
The
word for word, from the propo Or indifferent in its effects.
sitions of the Digest. The Bills idea of codifying the law of ne
instruments
was first
of Exchange Act, 1882, was the gotiable
codifying
any suggested
first enactment
to me by Sir Fitz
Stephen’s Digest of the
branch of the common law which
James
found its way into the statute Law of Evidence, and Sir F. Pol
* *
***
book.
lock's Digest of the Law of Part
The success of the Bills of nership. Bills, notes and cheques
Exchange bill depended
on the Seemed to form a Well isolated
wise lines laid down by Lord Subject, and I therefore set to
Herschell.
He insisted that the Work to prepare a digest of the
bill should be introduced in a law relating to them.
I found
form which
did nothing
more that the law was contained in
than codify the existing law, and Some twenty-five hundred cases,
statutory
that all amendments should be and seventeen
enact
left to Parliament.
A bill which ments. I read through the whole
merely improves the form with of the decisions, beginning with
out altering the Substance of the the first reported case, 1603. But
law creates no opposition, and the cases on the subject were
gives very little room for contro comparatively few and unimport
Versy.
Of course codification pure ant until the time of Lord Mans
and simple is an impossibility.
field.
The general principles of

5–See

vol. 4, p. 132.

Cases,
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by two-thirds of the total number of the various colo
nies and dependencies of the British Empire and by
all the most important of them, but not without changes
the law were then settled, and
Subsequent decisions, though Very
numerous, have been for the most
part illustrations of, or deduc
tions from, the general proposi
tions then laid down. On some
points there was a curious dearth
of authority.
As regards such
points I had recourse to Ameri

can decisions and to inquiry as
to the usages among bankers and
merchantS.
As the result, a
good many propositions
in the
Digest, even
points of fre
on
quent occurrence, had to be stated
with a (“probably”) or a (“per
haps”). Some two years after the
publication of my digest I read
a paper on the question of codify
ing the law of negotiable instru
ments before the Institute of
Bankers.
Mr. John Hollams, the
well known commercial lawyer,
who was present, pointed out the
advantages of a code to the mer
cantile community, and mainly, I
think, on his advice, I received
instructions
from
the Institute
of Bankers and the Associated
Chambers of Commerce to
pare a bill on the subject.
draft of the bill was first
mitted to a sub-committee of

pre
The
Sub
the

Council of the Institute of Bank
ers, who carefully
tested
such
portions of it as dealt with mat
ters of usage uncovered by au

thority.

The bill was then intro
duced by Sir John Lubbock, the
president of the Institute.
After

it

had been

read a second time

in the Commons it was referred
to a Strong Select committee of
merchants, bankers and lawyers,
With
Sir Farrer Herschell
as
chairman.
As the Scotch law
of negotiable instruments differed
in certain particulars from Eng
lish law, the bill was originally
drafted to apply to England and
Ireland only. The first work of
the select committee was to take
the evidence of Sheriff Dove-Wil
Son, Of Aberdeen, a Well known
authority
on Scotch commercial
law.
He pointed out the partic
ulars in which the bill, if ap
plied to Scotland, would alter the
law there. With three exceptions
the points of difference were in
Significant.
The committee there
upon resolved to apply the bill
to Scotland, and Sheriff Dove-Wil
Son undertook the drafting of the
necessary amendments.
Eventu
ally the Scotch rules were in
three cases preserved as to Scot
land, while on the other points
the Scotch rule was either adopt
ed for England
or the English
rule applied to Scotland. A few
amendments in
the law were
made when the Committee was
unanimous
in their favor, but
Very wisely no amendments were
pressed on which there was a dif
ference of opinion.
Sir Farrer
Herschell reported the bill to the
House and it was read a third
time and sent up to the Lords
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which, though trifling in themselves, are destructive
complete uniformity."
codes.—The
law of bills,
checks has been codified in most of the

Continental

of

notes and
continental

The French code (code de commerce 1807,
1818) was enacted nearly a century ago, and no sub
stantial alteration has been made in it by subsequent
legislation.
The German General Exchange Law was
adopted in 1849, and slightly modified in 1869. It is
an international and not merely a national code.
All
including
adopted
the German states
Austria have
it
adoption
and the terms of its
are that each State is at
liberty to supplement it by additional laws of its own,
but such laws are not in any way to override
Other
it.

countries.

continental codes have been modeled upon either
French Code de Commerce or the German General

the

Ex

of

or

in

to

to

change Law, the later tendency being
follow the
preference
German code
the French.”
eighteenth
century the law
In the first half
the

in

of

of

England and France was uniform on the
subject
exchange. The French law was then
bills
embodied
the code “Ordonnance de 1673,” which
was amplified but substantially adopted by the “Code
of

practice

verton.)

it

Burleigh,

A

of

to
a

four

few

and Lord Wolamendments

was two
at

were there inserted, mainly
Lord Bramwell's suggestion. These
by the Commons,
were agreed
passed
and the bill
without oppo
Sition.
7-Jurid. Rev., vol.
329. Ar
ticle by
Dove Wilson.
8,

alteration.
In the House
was again referred
select committee, with Lord
Bramwell
for chairman.
(The
committee included the Lord Chancellor (Selborne),
Lord
Bramwell, Lord Fitzgerald, Lord Balwithout

of Lords

it

in substance what

to

remains

Its development was thus ar

J.

of

1818.

8-Introduction
to
Chalmers'
Exchange, 3rd ed., supra.
Bills
of

rested and

it

de Commerce,”
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hundred years ago. English law has been developed
piecemeal by judicial decisions founded on custom. The
result has been to work out a theory of bills widely dif
ferent from the original. The English theory may be
called the Banking or Currency theory as opposed to
the French or Mercantile theory. A bill of exchange in
its origin was an instrument by which a trade debt
due in one place was transferred in another.
The

French law keeps this theory steadily in view. The
English law has developed bills into a perfectly flexible
paper currency.
In France a bill represents a trade
transaction; in England it is merely an instrument of
credit. English law gives full play to the system of
French law endeavors to stamp
it out. In England it is not necessary to express on
the bill that value has been given. The law raises a

accommodation

paper.

to that effect. In France the nature and
value must be expressed and a false statement of value
avoids the bill in the hands of all parties with notice.
In England a bill may be drawn and payable in the
presumption

same place; in France the place where the bill is drawn
must be so far distant from the place where it is pay
able that there may be a possible rate of exchange be

In England

bill may now be drawn
payable to bearer, though formerly it was otherwise;"
in France it must be payable to order. In England a
bill originally payable to order becomes payable to
bearer when indorsed in blank; in France an indorse
ment in blank merely operates as a procuration. In
England, if a bill be refused acceptance, a right of
tween the two.

9–Hodges

v. Steward,

12 Mod.

a

36

(1692.)
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action at once accrues to the holder; in France no cause
of action arises unless the bill is again dishonored at

maturity.

The holder in the meantime is only entitled
to demand security from the drawer and indorsers.
In
England a sharp distinction is made between current
and overdue bills; in France no such distinction is
made. In England no protest is required in the case of
inland bills; in France every dishonored bill must be
protested."
Law merchant.—The Law Merchant or Lex Merca
toria is a term employed to designate the usages of
merchants and traders in the different departments of
trade ratified by the decisions of the courts of law.
which, upon such usages being proved, have adopted
them as settled law with a view to the interests of
trade and the public convenience, the court proceeding
on the well known principle of law that with reference
in the different departments of trade,
in giving effect to the contracts and
dealings of the parties will assume that the latter have
dealt with one another on the footing of any custom
or usage prevailing generally in the particular depart
ment. By this process what before was usage only,
unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted
upon or incorporated into the common law, and may
thus be said to be a part of it." When a general usage
has been judicially ascertained and established it be
comes a part of the law merchant which courts of justice
are bound to know and recognize.” The law merchant

to transactions
courts of law,

10–See

introduction
3rd ed.
Exchange.
Chalmers’ Bills of
11–Goodwin V. Robarts, L.

R.

10

Ex.

337.

12—Brandoa
&

Fin.

805.

V.

Barnett,

12

Cl.
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is the source of the codifying statutes,—the Bills of
Exchange Act and the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Before their enactment it appeared scattered through
thousands of decisions and hundreds of statutory en
actments.”

It

is not a fixed and stereotyped body of law, but is
capable of expansion and enlargement to meet the
wants and requirements of trade in the varying cir
cumstances of commerce.”
As a matter of legal his
tory, it cannot be definitely stated when or where those
usages arose which form the basis of the law govern
ing negotiable instruments.
Some writers assign them
to one place and one time and others to others. But
notwithstanding the number and the diligence of the
laborers in this interesting field of inquiry, it cannot
now be stated with certainty by whom bills and notes
were invented or when they were first used.” The mat
ter is of no practical importance at this time. Every
one is now fully assured that those usages, whatever
their origin or whenever they were employed in the
affairs of trade, have long since been engrafted upon or
become a part of the common law. The general body
of the law merchant embraced many branches other
than that pertaining to bills and notes, for example
partnership, joint stock companies, agency, insurance,
bankruptcy, bottomry and respondentia, stoppage in
transitu, lien, contracts with carriers, and the contract
13—See note 4, supra. Vol. 7
Digest,
Century
ed.,
American
which is almost exclusively devoted to a digest of decisions on
the law of Bills and Notes.
14–Goodwin v. Robarts, supra.

urged
One of the criticisms
against
Negotiable
the
Instru
ments Law is that codification ar
rests expansion and enlargement.
15—Daniel, Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
Sec. 3.
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a

of

to

of

it.

of affreightment," but such branches of the law mer
chant became so far incorporated into the common law
as wholly to lose their identity as separate and distinct
from
The branch
the law merchant relating
part
bills and notes has likewise become
the com
of to

is

as
a

law,” by which no more was meant than that
free from certain

technical

it

of

a

of

of

a

it

if

as

it

to

it

quite usual
mon law, despite the fact that
refer
separate and distinct body
were
law.”
The law merchant has been spoken
branch of
private international
nations,—as
the law
form

was

rules of the common law.

it

of

of

of

in

a

part

law.”

it

to

far assimilated to it, that the fact

1.

merchant
(the
branch
which
deals With the law of bills, notes
and checks) has retained through
out its life,
the present day,
characteristics,
its
essential
clearly marking
off from the
common law, while other branches
have differed so little from the
common law or have become so

all but forgotten that they are
not Of the common law Stock. The
result
that the term law mer
chant at the present time usu
ally suggests the law of bills,
Bigelow,
cheques.”
notes and
Bills, Notes and Cheques, 2d ed.,
18–Blackstone's Com., Cooley's

4th ed., 273.
19—Blackstone's Com., Cooley's
4th ed., 75; Christian's note, same
page.
“The laws relating
bills of
exchange, insurance and all mer
to

16—Introduction
to
Smith's
Law, 10th ed., Mac
Mercantile
donnell.
17—“This
branch Of the law

is

the common

to

English
incorporated
was
into and became

is

it

origin foreign

was based were
their
usages, but, all speculation

it

cause the usages on which
aside,

of

it

of

it

a

it

in

a

of

England,
The law merchant was not
native
was
England when its use was there demanded
adopted
by trade,
part
England be
became
the law
cause
was the law of other nations and because the
merchants of other nations traded with the merchants
England. Nor was
England be
less the law

cantile contracts are as much the
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The law merchant as here used embraces, and the
Negotiable Instruments Law deals with negotiable bills,
of exchange, promissory notes and checks, and the con
tracts of the several parties thereto. “Bills of Ex
change,” says Cockburn, C. J.,” “are known to be of
comparatively modern origin, having first been brought
into use, so far as is at present known, by the Floren
tines in the twelfth, and by the Venetians about the
thirteenth century. The use of them gradually found

its way into France, and, still later and but slowly, into
England.” The bill of exchange was the earliest form
Originally it was used ex
of negotiable instrument.
clusively for the purpose of foreign trade. It was not
in use in England earlier than 1600, certainly not as an
instrument of trade and commerce. A statute of 3 Rich.

II,

c. 3 (1379) makes indefinite reference to
exchange as a means of conveying money
realm and forbids such practice.
The first
found in the English books on the subject

the

bill of

out of the
case to be

of bills of
exchange is Martin v. Boure” decided in 1603. “Up to
this time the practice of making these bills negotiable
by indorsement had been unknown, and the earlier bills
general laws of the land, as the
laws relating to marriage or mur
der.”
Dunlop v. Silver, 1 Cranch, ap
pendix, 367. This is an instruct
ive case because of its exhaustive
review of the authorities.
From
those authorities the conclusion is
reached that the law merchant is
part of the common law and par
ticularly that a promissory note
was negotiable, according to the
custom, prior to the enactment of

the statute of Anne (see infra.)
The value of the case lies in its
comprehensive historical
account
Of the introduction
of the law
merchant into England, and its
development in the courts of the
Common
law.
See Mandeville V.
Riddle, 1 Cranch 290, wherein a
conclusion is reached contrary to
the conclusion in Dunlop v. Sil
Wer.

20-Goodwin v. Robarts, supra.
21-2 Croke's Rep. 6.
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are found to be made payable to a man and his assigns,
though in some instances to bearer.
But about this
period, that is to say, at the close of the sixteenth or
the commencement of the seventeenth century the prac
tice of making bills payable to order and transferring

them by indorsement took its rise.”
But because
involving
subject
paper
cases
the
of commercial
do not
appear in the English reports prior to the opening of
the seventeenth century,

it is not to be concluded that
there were no cases involving commercial transactions.
The law merchant, at one time distinct from the com
mon law, underwent three stages of development in
England.

The first stage embraced the period from its
earliest introduction in England down to the time
when Coke became Chief Justice in 1606. The second

stage embraced the period from 1606 to 1756 when Lord
Mansfield became Chief Justice, the third stage em

During
braced the period from 1756 to the present.”
the first stage of development, the law merchant was
administered
in special informal courts called pie
powder, pied poudre, pepoudrous, or dusty foot courts,
so named either because litigants came to the trial of
their causes with feet dusty from participating in the

fairs in connection with which and as an incident

of

which these courts were held, or because the courts
were so prompt in their judgments that justice was
administered “while the dust fell from the feet.”
22—Goodwin V. Robarts, supra.
23–Preface to Smith's Mercantile Law, Macdonell, p. 82.
Elements of Mercantile Law, chap. 1.
Thomas

Edward

Scrutton.

24—The greater part of the
foreign trade of England, and in
deed of the whole of Europe at
that time, was conducted in the
great fairs, held at fixed places

15
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Promptness
enforcement

of decision and a strict adherence to and
of the customs of merchants were the

characteristic features of the dusty foot courts.
As
long as submission was yielded to their judgments they
were adequate to the times and to the discharge of the
duties imposed upon them by custom. But there came
a time when submission to their judgments
was not
and they were without power to compel obe
dience to their mandates.
A power stronger than per
suasion or pressure was needed to compel of the re

yielded

fractory loser of a cause compliance with the judgment
of the court. And because that power was lacking the
involving
dusty foot courts died out.
Controversies
the customs of merchants were transferred to the com
law courts.”

mon

The second stage of development

fixed times in each year, to
which merchants of all countries
came; fairs very similar to those
which meet every year at the
present time in Novgorod in Rus
sia and at other places in the
East.
In England also, there
were then the great fairs of Win
chester and Stourbridge
and the
fairs of Besançon and Lyons in
France, and in each of those fairs

and

sat to administer Speedy
by the law merchant to
merchants who congregated

a court

justice
the

in the fairs and in case of doubt
and difficulty to have that law de
clared on the basis of mercantile
customs by the merchants who
were present.
The Elements of
Mercantile Law, supra, q. V. for
pleadings and forms of actions in
these courts.
25—“But the custom applied for

admission at the hands of com
mon lawyers,
to common
law
judges at the common law courts;
and the applicant could not hope
for success except by putting on
the common law garb.
Fictions
were accordingly
resorted to in
the pleadings by which it was
made

to seem that the custom
after all nothing but a sis
ter of the common law.
Suit
Was brought in assumpsit upon a
foreign bill of exchange, alleg
ing in effect, by a fiction of fac
torage or agency, that the defend
ant, acceptor of the bill, had, at
the hands of his foreign factor,
received money from the plain
tiff, in consideration whereof he
now, in accepting the bill drawn
by his factor for the purpose,
promised to repay the same. Here
Was

were both consideration

and

priv

16

THE NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

LAW.

of the law merchant dates from the time when the com

involv

mon law courts began to deal with controversies

ing the customs of merchants. They determined these
controversies according to the common law procedure
and thus the customs of merchants became engrafted
upon or incorporated into the common law. The law
merchant was administered at first by the courts of
common law as a custom and not as law” and the
custom applied only to cases wherein one of the parties
was a merchant. In every action on a bill of exchange
it was necessary to count upon the promise according to
the use and custom of merchants and so the old pleas
ran “secundum usum et consuetudinem mercatorum.”

1698,

in

“Bills

he says:

wherein

of v.

Loyd,” decided

in

J.,

The stages by which the bill of exchange was developed
is well explained by Treby C.
Bromwich

or

to in

to

to

to

at

Exchange
first extended only
merchant strangers
trafficking with English merchants, and afterwards
inland bills between merchants trafficking the one with
England; and afterwards
the other
all traders,
not; and
and then
all persons whether traders

of

a

a

3.

ed.,

Silver, supra.

See

also

Dunlop

a
v.

a

of

of

26-The

Elements of Mercantile
supra.
Lutwyche's Reports 1585.

27-2

28–Oaste
306.

Taylor,

1

Law, Scrutton,

v.

of

to

contract
the common
law.
The courts winked at the
allegations, accepted the fictions
as not
be traversed and called
for proof only
what was left.”
Bigelow Bills, Notes and Cheques,

was held not

merchant
2d

and not

a

a

of

ity

gentleman

of

was

a

In

a

a

of

to

of

allege any custom
there was then no need
mer
plea that an acceptor
chants.” In 1613
bill
exchange was not
good answer.”
merchant was held
plea that the acceptor
exchange
1692
bill

Cro. Jac.
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good defence,” the court holding that if gentlemen took
it upon themselves to accept bills they ought to pay
them.
the second stage of development the negotiability
of instruments was declared and established in this

In

order: first, the foreign bill; second, the inland bill;
third, the promissory note. The law in respect to these
instruments became well settled within the second stage
of development of the law merchant. Foreign bills and

inland bills were put upon the same footing except in
the matter of protest. “All the difference between for
eign and inland bills,” said Lord Holt, “is that foreign
bills must be protested before a public notary before the
drawer can be charged; but inland bills need no pro
test,” and in this distinction there survived the only
trace of the former history of bills of exchange.
Promissory notes were declared to be negotiable in

in 1680. The first case which recognized
their negotiability was Shelden v. Hentley” wherein
the court said that “it was the custom of merchants
that made these good.”
This case was followed for
more than twenty years” but was overruled by Clarke
struments

Martin” in

v.

1702,

in which it was held that a promis

sory note payable to J. S. or order is not a negotiable
instrument within the custom of merchants.
“Holt C.

J.

was totis viribus against the action and said that this
note could not be a bill of exchange. That the main
29-Sarsfield

v.

Witherly, Carth.

3 Lev.
1

82.

30–Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29.
31–2 Showers 160.
32–Duke of Norfolk v. Howard,
2 Showers 235;
Horton V. Coggs,
2

Salk

Carth.
2

299;
132;
269;

Hill

et al. v. Lewis,

Williams

v.

Bromwich

Lut. 1582.
33–2 L'd Raym.

758.

Williams,
v.

Loyd,
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taining of these actions upon such notes, were innova
tions upon the rules of the common law, and that it
amounted to setting up a new sort of specialty, un
known to the common law and invented in Lombard
street, which attempted in these matters of bills of ex
change to give laws to Westminster Hall.
That the
continuing to declare upon these notes upon the custom

of merchants
ativeness.’”

proceeded

from obstinacy

and

opinion

The same question was before the court two years
later in Buller v. Crips, supra, note 33. Again Lord Holt
declared against the negotiability of promissory notes
and denied that they were in the nature of bills of ex
change and affirmed that they were “an invention of
the goldsmiths of Lombard street.” He learned from
the merchants of London that it was very frequent
with them to make such notes and that they looked
upon them as bills of exchange and had used them for
a matter of thirty years, and had transferred them and
indorsed them as bills of exchange. The court did not
decide the case but in the language of the reporter
“took the vacation to consider of it.” But the law
had been thrown into confusion and conflict.
Parlia
ment intervened and passed the statute of Anne,” de
34–Clarke

V.

Martin

Was

fol

lowed in Potter V. Pearson, 2 Ld.
Raym. 759; Burton v. Souter, Id.
774; Williams v. Cutting, Id. 825;
Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29.
35—Statute of Anne, 3 & 4,

IX, 1704. An act for giv
ing like remedy upon promissory
notes as is now used upon bills
of exchange.

chap.

Whereas it hath been held, that
notes in writing, signed by the
party
same,
who
makes the
whereby such party promises to
pay unto any other person, or
his order, any sum of money
mentioned, are not as
therein
signable or indorsable over, with
in the custom of merchants, to
any other person; and that such
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claring promissory notes assignable or indorsable over
in the same manner as inland bills of exchange accord
ing to the custom of merchants. Whether promissory
person to whom
the
sum of
money mentioned in such note is
payable, cannot maintain an ac
tion, by the custom of merchants,
against the person who first made
and signed the same; and that
any person to whom such note
indorsed,
or
shall be assigned,
payable, could not, within
said custom of merchants,
maintain any action upon Such
note against the person who first
drew and signed the same; there
fore to the intent to encourage
made

the

commerce, which will
advanced, if Such notes
shall have the same effect as in
land bills of exchange, and shall
be negotiated in like manner; be
it enacted by the Queen's most ex
cellent majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the lords
spiritual and temporal, and com
mons, in this present parliament
assembled, and by authority of
trade and

be much

same that all notes in Writ
ing, that after the first day of
May in the year of Our Lord, One
Thousand seven hundred and five
shall be made and signed by any
the

person or persons, body politick
or corporate, or by the servant
corporation,
any
or agent of
banker, goldsmith, merchant, or
trader, who is usually intrusted
by him, her or them, to sign such
promissory notes for him, her, or
whereby such person or
them,
persons, body politick and cor
porate, his, her, or their servant

agent, as aforesaid, doth or
shall promise to pay to any other
person or persons, body politick
and corporate, his, her, or their
order, or unto bearer, any sum
of money mentioned in such note,
or

be taken and construed to
by virtue thereof, due and
payable to any such person or
persons, body politick and cor
porate, to whom the same is made
every such
payable;
and also
person or
any
payable
to
note
persons, body politick and cor
porate, his, her, or their order,
shall be assignable, or indorsable
over, in the same manner as in
land bills of exchange are or may
be, according
to the custom of
merchants;
and that the person
or persons, body politick and cor
porate to whom Such sum of
money is or shall be by such
note made payable, shall and may
maintain an action for the same,

shall
be,

manner as he, she, or
might do, upon any inland
bill of exchange, made or drawn
according to the custom of mer
chants against the person or per
sons, body politick and corporate,
who, or whose servant or agent,
signed the same;
as aforesaid,
and that any person or persons,
body politick and corporate,
to
whom such note that is payable
to any person or persons, body
politick and corporate, his, her,

in

Such

they

or their order, is indorsed or as
signed, or the money therein men
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notes were negotiable by the custom of merchants after
the manner of bills of exchange or were made so by the
statute of Anne became a question of little importance.

But it has long

the custom to refer to the
authority
Statute of Anne as
for the negotiability of
promissory notes.
been

The third stage of development of the law merchant
began when Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench in 1756. Before his time there had
been no established system in England of Mercantile
law, no successful effort to find some certain general
principle which should serve as a guide for future cases
as well as for a determination of the particular case
under consideration.
Lord Mansfield found the gen
eral principle and created a system and his administra
tion of the law for thirty years earned for him the title,
Founder of the Commercial Law of England.”

People were wont to deposit their money, their coin
and their valuables with the goldsmiths and bankers
who gave their promissory notes therefor payable on
demand.

Such notes came to be called bank notes.

these the custom of merchants

To

speedily

attached and
negotiability
the
of bank notes was declared in the lead
ing case of Miller v. Race.” In 1764 checks—then
tioned ordered to be paid by in
thereon,
dorsement
shall and
may maintain his, her, or their
action for such sum of money,
either against the person or per
sons, body politick and corporate,
who, or whose servant or agent,
as aforesaid, signed such note,

or against

any of the persons
that indorsed the same, in like
manner as in cases of inland bills
of exchange. * * *
36—Lickbarrow
v. Mason, 2 T.

R.

73.

37–1
Leading

Burr,
Cases,

452,

1

Smith's

9th ed., 490.
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called cash notes—were declared to be negotiable in
struments.”
At the close of Lord Mansfield’s career

Judge, the principles of the law of negotiable in
struments were firmly established and settled.
Since
principles
materially
that time those
have not been
changed or enlarged but their application has been ex
tended to fresh usages, provided they are the usages of
English merchants,” and to instruments other than
bills, notes and checks, namely exchequer bills, coupon
bonds, bills of lading, certain foreign bonds, on proof
that bonds of that description were sold in the English
market and passed from hand to hand daily like ex
chequer bills, foreign scrip though not payable
in
as

money but exchangeable for other securities.” The law
merchant, offspring of that body of customs and usages

which prevailed wherever

trade became active among
men, has expanded and enlarged “so as to meet the
wants and requirements of trade in the varying circum
stances of commerce.”
38–Grant
1516;

39—Picker

County

Vaughan,

V.

Bank,

3

v. Robarts,

Goodwin
v.

v. Robarts, supra;
v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45;
Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.

40–Goodwin
Gorgier

and
B. D. 515.

Daniels

The London

18 Q.

Burr.
supra.

1488.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
(Act

P. A. 1905.)

265,

AN ACT relating to negotiable instruments.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Short title.—This act shall be known as
the “Negotiable instruments law.”"
Section

1.

1—See Introduction.
The statute deals solely with
negotiable instruments.
An in
strument which is not negotiable
by the terms of the statute is ex
cluded from its operation. In de
termining whether a given instru
ment is within the statute it is
necessary
to
aScertain
first
whether the instrument is nego
tiable according to the terms of
the Statute. If Such instrument be
not negotiable according to the
terms of the statute it is governed
by the rules of the common law.
This manifest distinction must be
carefully observed.
The statute makes this radical
change:
Heretofore
one
would
have consulted the cases to deter
mine the law of negotiable instru
ments, now he must consult the
Statute.
Cases decided before the
act are law only in So far as they

are in harmony with its provi
Sions or are correct and logical
deductions from its propositions.
The proper course now to be pur
Sued by one who seeks to find out
what the law of negotiable instru
ments is, is to examine the lan
guage of the statute and to ask
what is its natural meaning un
influenced by any considerations
derived from the previous state of
the law.
If a provision of the
Statute be found of doubtful im
port, a resort to the cases to de
termine the previous state of the
law will be proper for the pur
pose of aiding in the construc
tion of the statutory provisions,
but the first step to be taken is to
interpret the language of the stat
ute.
Bank of England v. Vagli
ano, L. R. [1891], App. Cas. 144
(a case under Bills of Exchange

Act).

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

and meaning

of terms.–Person
primarily liable on instrument.—Reasonable time, what
constitutes.—Time,
how computed; when last day falls
Sec. 2.

Definitions

23
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on holiday.—Application of the act.—Law merchant,
when governs.—In this act, unless the context otherwise
requires: “Acceptance” means an acceptance completed

“Action”

by delivery or notification.

includes counter
claim and set-off. “Bank” includes any person or as
sociation of persons carrying on the business of banking,
whether incorporated or not. “Bearer” means the per
son in possession of

“Bill”

bearer.

bill or note which is payable to
means bill of exchange and “note”
a

“Delivery” means
means negotiable promissory note.
transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one
person to another.

“Holder”

the payee

it,

means

or en

of

it

or

a

a

whether incorporated

the

form,

“Person”

holder.”

first delivery

the
person who takes
body
persons,
includes

means

in

complete

means negotiable

to
a

“Issue”

instrument.
instrument,
as

“Instrument”

of

completed by delivery.”

or

dorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of
the
bearer thereof.” “Indorsement” means an indorsement

not. “Value” means valuable
“Written” includes printed, and “writ
ing” includes print. The person “primarily” liable
who by the terms
absolutely required
pay the same."

In

or

to

of

particular case." Where

done

a

Sunday,

on

done, falls

or

for doing any act herein re
on

be be

business day."

the

the next succeeding

The provisions

of

or

holiday, the act may
secular

All

determining

if

to

be

to

permitted

to

or

or

trade
instruments, and the facts
the day,
the last day,
quired

liable.

the

an “unreasonable time,”
had
the nature
the instrument, the
business,
any, with respect
such

time”

“reasonable

or

usage

of is a

is

what
regard

of

is

instrument
other parties are “secondarily”

to

of

the person

on

instrument

is

an

on

consideration.

this act do
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not apply to negotiable instruments made and delivered
prior to the passage hereof.” In any case not provided

for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall gov

ern.”
1—Referred

Bank

v.

Snow

to in:

Mass. Nat.

(Mass.)

72

N. E.

959.

2—Referred

to in: New Haven

Mfg. Co.

v. N. H.
Co. 76 Conn. 126.

3—Referred

to

Coal Mining Co.
Trust Co. (Col.)

Pulp and Board
in:
v.

Louisville

International

71 Pac. 898.

4—Referred to in: Clutton V. At
tenborough [1897] A. C. 90.
(A
case under the corresponding pro
visions of the Bills of Exchange

Act.)
5—This provision is to be con
strued in connection with sections
20, 129 and 191.
No person is
liable on the instrument
whose
signature does not appear thereon
(Sec. 20); the drawee is not liable
on the bill unless and until he
accepts the same (sec. 129); the
bank is not liable to the holder
unless and until it accepts or cer
tifies the check (sec. 191). These
are not, by the terms of the in
absolutely required to
strument
pay the same, unless they shall
have signed, accepted, or certified.
Referred to in: Nat. Citizens
Bank v. Toplitz, 81 N. Y. Supp.
422, 81 App. Div. 593.
6-Referred to in: Merritt V.

Jackson,

181 Mass. 69.
7—According
to the law mer
chant when the last day of grace
fell upon a non-secular day the
paper matured on the next preced
ing secular day. Capital etc. Bank

v. American
etc. Bank, 51 Neb.
707;
Bartlett v. Leathers, 84 Me.
241.

This provision changes the rule
of the law merchant, but affirms
the previous statutory
rule in
Michigan. C. L. '97, Sec. 4880, as
amended, Laws 1903, p. 420.
8–The words “prior to the pas
sage hereof” are legally equivalent
to the words “prior to the taking
effect hereof”.
The words “pas
Sage of the act” and similar ex
pressions in statutes have legal
reference to the time of their tak
ing effect. Rogers V. Vass, 6 Iowa
405.
Followed
in: Schneider V.
Hussey, 2 Idaho 12, 1 Pac. 343.
The term “passage of the act”
as used in a statute which provides
that the State Board of Medical
Commissioners within ninety days

after the passage of the act shall
receive, through its president, ap
plications for certificates and ex
aminations,
taken in connection
with Const. Art.

5 sec. 19, which
that no act shall take
until ninety days after its

provides

effect
passage,

unless in case of an emer
gency, is to be construed, in the
absence
of an emergency clause,
as meaning, after the act goes
into effect.
Words and Phrases,

Vol.

6, p. 5218,

People,

10 Col.

citing Harding
387,

v.

Pac. 729.
To same effect is: State V. Be
mis, 45 Neb. 724, 64 N. W. 348.
15
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An act must be understood as
beginning to Speak at the moment
when it takes effect and not be
Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich.
fore.
369; Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich.
125; Carleton v. People, Id., 250;
Price v.
Fosdick

Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318;
V. Van Husan, 21 Mich..

567;
Mich. Mut. Ben. ASS'n. V.
Rolfe, 76 Mich. 146.
Mr. Crawford in his note to this
provision of the statute seems to
construe “passage” as having ref
erence to the enactment of the
statute and its approval. The New
York statute was approved May

By its terms it was to
take effect October 1, 1897.
He
says: “But while the law did not
go into effect until then, its appli
cation is not limited to instru
ments made after that date.
An
instrument
made and delivered
after the passage of the act was
equally within its operations after
October 1st.
For example, if a
note payable four months after
date was dated and delivered on
July 15, 1897, it must, at maturity,
have been presented for payment
in the manner prescribed by the
statute;
and if dishonored, the
statutory rules as to giving notice
19, 1897.

of dishonor must have
plied with.
But in the

Sentment must be made and notice
given, says Mr. Crawford, in ac
cordance with the statute.
note in the second example
made and delivered before
enactment and approval of
statute, it matured October

The
was
the
the
15,

the statute was in ef
fect. None of the provisions ap
ply, says Mr. Crawford.
The
distinction is not apparent, ex
cept upon the mistaken
notion
that “passage of the act” has, as
employed in this connection, a
different meaning from “taking
effect of the act.”
One who, before the Statute
1897, after

ir

into effect becomes an
regular indorser (see sec. 66), of
paper maturing after the Statute
is in effect will be liable as maker,
and neither presentment and de
mand nor notice will be necessary
to fix his liability.
Grace will
attach to a bill or note made and
delivered before the statute goes
into effect, but maturing after the
statute is in effect, unless the in
strument be drawn without grace.
goes

After the statute is in effect, it
Will govern every step then neces
sary to be taken in respect to a

negotiable

instrument.

com
9-The language of this provi
case of a sion seems to admit of no other
note dated and delivered April 15, construction than that cases not
1897, and payable six months af provided for in the act are to be
ter date,
none of the provi governed by the rules of the Law
sions of the statute apply.” The Merchant and that in the deter
note in the first example was mining of such cases no resort is
made and delivered after the en to be had to any former statute
actment and approval of the stat even though it stands unrepealed
ute but before it went into effect; by the provisions of sec. 192, as
it matured November 15, 1897, af not being inconsistent with this
ter the statute was in effect. Pre act.
been
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Article

1.

Form and Interpretation.
Sec.

Form

of

instru

negotiable

ment.

Certainty as to Sum;
tional.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

constitutes.
promise
When

what
18.

is

IN GENERAL.

uncondi
19.

Determinable
future time;
what constitutes.
Additional provisions not af
fecting negotiability.
Omissions;
seal; particular
money.
When payable on demand.
When payable to order.
When payable to bearer.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Terms;

24.

when sufficient.
presumption as to.
Ante-dated and post-dated.
Date; when may be inserted.
Date;

25.

Blanks; when may be filled.
Incomplete instrument not de
livered.
Delivery;
effectual;
When
when presumed.

Construction
where
instru
ment is ambiguous.
Liability of person signing in
trade or assumed name.
Signature by agent; author
ity, how shown.
Liability of person signing as
agent, etc.

Signature by procuration; op
eration of.
Indorsement by infant or cor
poration;
effect of.
Forged signature; effect of.

Sec. 3. Form of negotiable instrument.—An instru
ment, to be negotiable, must conform to the following
requirements:"

First, It must

be

in writing” and signed" by the

maker or drawer;
Second, It must contain an unconditional

promise or

order * to pay a certain" sum in money;"
Third, It must be payable on demand" or at a fixed or
determinable future time; *
Fourth,

It must

be payable to order or to bearer;" and
27
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Fifth, Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee,
or otherwise indicated therein with
certainty.”
reasonable

he must be named

1—These are the essential re
quirements of the Law Merchant.
Daniel Neg. Inst. 5th ed., Sec. 27,
28, 1566.

2—The writing may be in pen
cil. Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. 234
(1826); Brown v. Butchers Bank,

Hill (N. Y.)

6

443.

instrument
in the form
of a bill of exchange Without date
and without drawer's name but
3—An

with acceptance by the drawee is
neither a bill of exchange nor a
promissory note. It is only an in
choate instrument.
The bill or
note must be signed.
M’Call v.
Taylor, 34 L. J. R. C. P. 365;
Reg. v. Harper, L. R. 7 Q. B. DiV.
78 and cases cited.
Signing by rubber stamp is Val
Cadillac State Bank V. Cadil
lac Stave & Heading Co., 129
Mich. 15.

id.

A person may become bound by
any mark or designation he thinks
proper to adopt, provided it be
used as a Substitute for his name
and he intend to bind himself. If
the name is not signed the holder
is required to show that what was
Written was intended to answer
purpose
the
of a signature.
Brown v. Butchers Bank, supra.
In this case the indorsement WaS
made with lead pencil and in fig
ures thus: “1, 2, 8;” no name be
ing written.

In such a case evi
that the party could write
is immaterial. See Rogers v. Coit,
dence

6

Hill

Mich.

322;

Brown v. McHugh, 35

50.

A

person though able to Write
his name may nevertheless sign
by his mark. The legal effect is
the same as if the party had writ
ten his name.
Bliss v. Johnson,
162 Mass. 323.
4—The statute is but the ex
pression of the uniform rule of
the law merchant that, to consti
tute a negotiable instrument, the
promise or order must be absolute
and Without any contingency that
would embarrass the circulation
of the instrument. White V. Cush
ing, 88 Me. 339. In this case suit
was brought by the indorsee of an

order in the following form:
Piscataquis Savings Bank.
$120.
Pay James Lawler, or order,
one hundred and twenty dollars
and charge to my account On book
No.
J. N. Cushing.
Witness.
The bank book of the depositor
must accompany this order.
Held: That without the Words
italicized the order is payable ab
solutely and there is no apparent
uncertainty affecting its negotia
bility; with them, the order is
payable only upon contingency, or
condition, and that is upon pro
duction of the drawer's bank book.
* * * The drawer has it in his
power to defeat its payment by
withholding
the bank book.
It
was the necessity of certainty and
precision in mercantile affairs and
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which would
result if commercial paper was
incumbered With conditions and
contingencies, that led to the es
tablishment of an inflexible rule,
that to be negotiable, paper must
be payable absolutely and without
2ny conditions or contingencies
to
embarraSS
its
circulation.

“Mr. William Tebo will please

to R. J. Torpey
or order
two hundred and fifty dollars and
charge to my account. Due Oct. 1.
“John Ryan.”

same effect,
Iron City Bank
McCord,
139
Penn. St. 52.
The order or promise must be to
pay out of the general account
of the drawer or maker.
An order or promise to pay out
of a particular fund is not uncon
ditional.
This is the well Settled
rule of the law merchant.
Wor

Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307
(a case under the statute).
5–It is the rule of the law
merchant that the Sum Ordered Or
promised to be paid must be cer
tain, else the instrument will not
be negotiable.
Daniel’s Neg. Inst.,

v.

Traver, 73 Mich.
A bill reading:

493.

5th ed., Sec. 53.
The maxim “id certum est quod
Certum
reddi potest” applies; SO

159.

An instrument in form of a
promissory
note but
made ex
pressly subject to the conditions
of a mortgage not payable abso
lutely but only on certain contin
gencies is not negotiable.
Good
enow v. Curtis,
33
Mich. 505;
Humphrey v. Beckwith, 48 Mich.
Struthers,
151;
Brooke
v.
110
Mich. 569; Dilley v. VanWie, 6
Wis. 206.
See
also
Lamb V.
Story, 45 Mich. 488; Chandler v.
Wright v.
Carey, 64 Mich. 237;
See sec. 5.

Pay Julius C.
Cable or order three hundred dol
lars, or what may be due on my
deposit book number E.

(Signed)
John Edwards
is not negotiable, because payable
out of a particular fund and the
amount to be paid being made
to depend upon the adequacy of a
Savings
specified
Nat.
fund.
Bank v. Cable, 73 Conn. 568; 48

29

pay

To

4 Denio

GENERAL.

Atl. 428 (a case under the Stat
ute).
An instrument in the following
form is negotiable:

the inconveniences

den V. Dodge,

IN

if

.

the amount can be ascertained
itself, the
the instrument
rule as to certainty is Satisfied.
Clopton, 4 Tex. 109;
Smith
V.

from

Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 440.
In the former case the promise
was to pay $1.50 per acre for
each and every acre of land lying

within

certain described bound
Subsequently there
aries.
Was
added to the instrument the fol
lowing, which was signed by the
maker:
“Since the Within Was
Written, the land has been Sur
veyed and found to be sixty five
acres, which will make the with
in, call for $97.50.” The note was
made April 15, 1848;
the addi
tion November 10, 1848.
It was
held that the note was a nego
tiable instrument from the date
of the addition, to-wit:
Nov. 10,
1848. In the latter case the action
was on bonds reciting that the
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Vicksburg,

Shreveport

and Texas

Railway Company is indebted to
John Ray or bearer, for value
received, in the sum of 225 l
sterling, or $1,000, lawful money
of the United States of America,

to-wit: 225 l sterling, if the prin
cipal and interest are payable in
London, and $1,000 lawful money
Of the United States of America,
if the principal and interest are
payable in New York or New
Orleans, etc.
Each bond further

INSTRUMENTS
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Plymell, 23 Kan. 402; Smith v.
Crane, 33 Minn. 144.
A promise to pay a named sum
premium
“with such additional
may
as
arise or become due on
policy No. 50” renders the note
non-negotiable.
Dodge V. Emer
son, 34 Me, 96; Marrett V. Equi
table Ins. Co. 54 Me. 537; Pal
mer V. Ward, 6 Gray (Mass.)
340.

A promise to pay a named sum
“or what might be due after de
ducting
all advances and ex
penses,”
renders the note non-ne
gotiable. Cushman V. Haynes, 20

on its face declares that “the pres
ident of Said Company is author
ized to fix, by his indorsement,
the place of payment, of the prin
cipal and interest in conformity
with the terms of this obligation.
On the back of the bonds is en
dorsed a printed blank in the
following words, to-wit: “I here
by agree that the within bond
and the interest coupons thereto
payable
attached
shall
be
in
.” The uncertainty of the
amount payable, in the absence of
the required indorsement
is of
itself a defect which deprives
these instruments of the charac
negotiability.
ter of
As they
stand they amount to a promise
to pay so many pounds, or So
many
dollars,
without Saying
which.
And so it was held that
Without
Such
indorsement
the
bonds were not negotiable by rea
son of the uncertainty
of the
sum. It is quite obvious that had
the indorsement of place of pay
ment been completed, in the man
ner contemplated, the sum to be
paid would thereby have been

hensive term.
It is not a syno
nym of coin.
It includes coin
but is not confined to it.
It in
cludes whatever is lawfully and
actually current in buying and
selling, of the value and as the
equivalent of coin. By universal
consent under the Sanction of all
everywhere,
courts
or
almost
everywhere, bank notes lawfully
issued, actually current at par in
lieu of coin, are money.
The
common term, paper money, is in
a legal sense quite as accurate
as the term coined money. Klau
ber v. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis., 557.
An
instrument
wherein
the
maker promises to pay to A or

made
Jones,

order $1,000 in cotton is not a
promissory note according to the

Knight V.
certain.
See
161;
21
Mich.
Parker v.

Pick.

132.

See Sec.

4.

6–The

rule of the law mer
chant is thus stated by Mr. Dan
iel: “It is essential to the nego
tiability of a bill or note that it
purport to be only for the pay
ment of money.”
Daniel's Neg.
Ins., 5th ed., sec. 59.
Money is a generic and compre
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Auerbach V. Pritch
NOr is One
wherein the promise is to pay a
Inamed Sum in carpenter’s work.
Quincy v. Merritt, 11 Hump. 439

law merchant.
ett, 58 Ala.

451.

IN GENERAL.
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gotiable, because it does not ap
pear that the bank promises to
pay any money. First Nat. Bank
v. Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex.
40.

An order to pay quarterly rents
as they may become due is not a
bill of exchange, because (a) it
is payable out of a particular
fund, (b) it is not on its face
payable in money. Rents may be
due in wheat, fowls or services as
well as in money.
Morton V.
Naylor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 583.
In Some states, as for example,
IOWa. and Georgia, certain instru
ments are declared by statute to
be negotiable, though they pro
vide that payment is to be made
in goods or merchandise. In New
York, warehouse receipts issued
by certain corporations are de
of Such an instrument cannot de clared to be negotiable. See Han
mand in payment thereof the Over Nat. Bank V. American Dock
Sum named,
in money plus the & Trust Co., 148 N. Y. 612; Corn
cost of exchange; for the maker Exchange Bank v. Same, 149 N.
is not bound to discharge his ob Y. 174; Crawford's Annotated Ne
ligation except by means of in gotiable Instrument Law, 2d ed., 9.
land bills on New York or Chi
Certain scrip issued by the au
thority of the Russian govern
cago, nor can the maker tender
in payment the sum named in ment and certain
other scrip
money;
for his promise is to issued by the authority of the
make payment by inland bills, Hungarian government, the essen
which he must purchase in the tial part of which was as fol
“Received
the Sum
of
market. To same effect: Chand lows:
ler v. Calvert, 87 Mo. App. 368. twenty pounds, being the first in
But see Bradley V. Lill, 4 Biss. stallment of 20 per cent upon
pounds stock, and
473, Fed. Cas. No. 1783; wherein
One hundred
exchange”
payment
it is held that “in
is On
of the remaining in
equivalent to “with exchange.”
stalment at the period specified
An instrument in the form of the bearer will be entitled to re
an ordinary
certificate
of de ceive a definitive bond or bonds
posit, but reciting that T. W. for one hundred pounds, after re
“has deposited in this bank $2180 ceipt thereof from the imperial
in cl:S., payable,” etc., is not ne government,” was held to be a
(30 Tenn.). Nor is an instrument a
bill of exchange which orders the
payment of 1,000 l in good East
India bonds. Buller N. P. 272.
A promise to pay by or in New
York or Chicago exchange is not
a promise to pay in money.
An
containing
instrument
such
a
promise is not a promissory note
Within the law merchant.
First
Nat. Bank v. Slette, 67 Minn. 425.
The promise is not to pay a
given number of dollars “with,”
that is, plus the current rate of
exchange, but is to pay the sum
named in the note by New York
or Chicago exchange. The holder
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negotiable

security for money so
the transfer of it by a per
Son not being the true owner, to
a bona fide holder for value, con
ferred a good title on the latter,
despite the fact that the scrip
did not correspond to any of the
forms of Securities for money
which had been theretofore held
to be negotiable by the law mer
chant and did not contain a di
rect promise to pay money but
only a promise to give security
for money. Goodwin V. Robarts,
L. R. 10 Ex. 337.
Equivalents of money.—The word
“money” has been used for SOme
purposes in a very wide sense,
and for others in a restricted
sense.
When questions have come
up in considering negotiable pa
per it has never been extended
beyond coin and paper at par
Value.
Black V. Ward, 27 Mich.
that

A

made and indorsed in
and payable in Canada
in “Canadian currency” is pay
able in money and is negotiable.
Id.;
Oliver v. Shoemaker, 35
Mich. 464.
The following have been judi
cially determined to be equivalent
to money:
“The bank notes current in the
191.

note

Michigan

city of New York.” Judah v. Har
ris, 19 Johns. 144.
“Current bank notes.”
Pardee
v. Fish, 60 N. Y. 265; Fleming v.
Nall, 1 Tex. 246.
“Current bank notes of Cincin
mati.”
Morris V. Edwards, 1 Ohio
Swetland v. Creigh, 15 Ohio

189;
118.

“Current
Co.

v.

funds.”
Phoenix Ins.
11 Mich. 501; Phoe
Co. v. Gray, 13 Mich.

Allen,

nix Ins.
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Bull v. Bank, 123 U. S. 105;
Lacy v. Holbrook, 4 Ala. 88; Tel
ford v. Patton, 144 Ill. 611; White
v. Richmond, 16 Ohio 6; Citizens'
Nat. Bank v. Brown, 45 Ohio St.
39; contra, National
State Bank
v. Ringel, 51 Ind. 393; Johnson
v. Henderson, 76 N. C. 227; Wright
Administrator, 44 Pa.
v. Hart's
St. 454; Texas Land & Cattle Co.
48;
Bank V. Carroll, 63 Tex.
Platt V. Bank 17 Wis. 230; ex
plained and criticized in Klauber
V. Biggerstaff,
47 Wis. 551.
Currency. — Currency means
money, coined money, and paper
money equally.
But it means
money Only; and the Only prac
paper
tical
distinction
between
money and coined money, as cur
rency, is that coined money must
generally
received,
paper
be
money may generally be specially
refused, in payment of debt; but
a payment in either is equally
made
in money, -equally good.
191;

in the cases ap
pears to have arisen for want of
proper distinction between money
money
which
is current
and
legal
which is
tender. The prop
erty of being legal tender is not
necessarily inherent in money; it
generally belongs no more to in
ferior coin than to paper money.
Klauber v. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis.

The confusion

561.

Currency the equivalent of mon
ey:
Phelps v. Town, 14 Mich.
374;
Swift v. Whitney, 20 Ill.
144; Butler v. Pine, 8 Minn. 284;
Mitchell v. Hewett, 13 Miss. 361;
Frank v. Wessels, 64 N. Y. 155;
Dugan v. Campbell, 1 Ohio 115;
Howe v. Hartness, 11 Ohio St.
449; Wright v. Morgan,
(Texas)

NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

S. W. 627. Contra:
Bank of
Mobile V. Brown, 42 Ala. 108;
Dillard V. Evans, 4 Ark. 175;
Rindskoff v. Barrett, 11 Iowa 172;
Huse V. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501;
Chambers V. George, 5 Litt. (Ky.)
335.
But otherwise as to “Ken
tucky currency.” Hicklin v. Tuck
er, 2 Yerg. 448.
Chrysler V. Ren
Gold dollars.
37

43 N. Y. 209.
Hogue
Mexican silver dollars.
Williamson,
v.
85 Tex. 553.
See
note 5, sec. 8.

Ois,

7–See

Sec. 9.

8-Brooks

Mich.

V.

Hargreaves,

21

254.

A clause attached to a promis
sory note and providing that the
payee or his assigns may indefi
nitely extend the time of payment
destroys its negotiability.
Smith
V. Van Blarcom, 45 Mich. 371.
The provision in a promissory
note “that the payee or holder of
this note may renew or extend
the time of payment of the same
from time to time as often as
required without notice, and with
out prejudice to the rights of
such payee or holder to enforce
payment against the makers, Sure
ties and indorsers and each of
them, parties hereto, at any time
when the same may be due and
payable,” destroys the negotiabil

ity of the

note. Second Nat. Bank
v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546. To same
effect Glidden V. Henry, 104 Ind.
278, 54 Am. Rep. 316.
But an option indorsed upon
the back of a negotiable note for
its extension for a definite time

by giving a new note at the op
tion of the makers and indorsers
3

IN GENERAL.
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to the original does not
destroy its negotiability.
Annis
ton Loan and Trust Co. V. Stick
ney, 108 Ala. 146; 31 L. R. A. 234.
9—A note made payable to the
order of M's estate is negotiable.
Peltier v. Babillon, 45 Mich. 384.
An instrument in the form of a
certificate of deposit acknowledg
ing receipt of five hundred dol
lars from Z., and reciting “and
on five days’ notice will pay in
current funds the like amount
with interest to the said Z or her
assigns,” is not a negotiable in
strument in that it is not payable
to order or bearer. Zander V. N.
Y. Security & Trust Co., 81 N.
Y. Supp. 1151 (a case under the
statute); Westberg V. Chicago L.

similar

& C. Co., 117 Wis. 589 (a case
under the Statute).
The North Carolina and Wy
oming
“Must be
acts read:
payable to the order of a speci
person or
The
fied
bearer.”
words, “specified person” are real
ly unnecessary inasmuch as sec
tion 10 provides that an instru
ment is payable to Order where
it is drawn payable to the Order
of a specified person.
10-It is essential to the Valid
ity of a bill of exchange that
there be a clear designation of
the person upon whom it is
drawn.
There cannot be a bill
without a drawee. Peto V. Rey
nolds, 9 Exch. 410; Watrous V.
Halbrook, 39 Tex. 572.
It is not necessary that the
drawee be named.
He may be
by
identified
some other designa
tion than his name.
For example,
a bill addressed to Steamer C. W.

34
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Dawrence and owners was held
a sufficient designation
of the
drawee.
Alabama Coal Mining
Co. v. Brainard,
35 Ala. 476.
concerning
The same
a
bill
which contained no address, but

that it was to be “pay
able at number one West Street,
Gray V. Milner, 8 Taunt.
etc.”
739, 4 E. C. L. 361.
The fact that the bill does not
designate a drawee will not vitiate
Specified

it after it has been accepted.
Acceptance is an admission that
the party accepting it was the
party intended. Wheeler v. Web
ster, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 1.
This case is in conflict with Peto
V. Reynolds, supra.
In Funk V. Babbitt,
156
Ill.

408

it

Was

held

that

in the form fol
lowing “Thirty days after date
pay to the order of E. D. Babbitt
$350 for value received.” (Signed)
Funk and Lackey, but not ad
instruments

dressed to any person as drawee,
were to be regarded, in legal ef
fect, as addressed to the drawers
themselves as drawees, and that
the signatures of such drawers to
such instrument bound them as
drawers and acceptors; that the
firm sustained to the bills the
triple relation of drawers, draw
acceptors;
ees,
and
that
the
drawers and drawees being the
same, the bills were in legal ef
fect promissory notes and might
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as such, or as bills,
option.
In For
Thompson,
ward v.
12 U. C. Q. B.
103, a similar instrument
was
held not to be a promissory note
inasmuch as it lacked the very
essence of a promissory note,—a
promise in terms by the maker
be

treated

at the holder's

which makes him primarily liable
to pay the money.
The Wisconsin
act adds the
following: “But no order drawn
upon or accepted by the treasurer
of any county, town, city, Village,

or school district, whether drawn
by any officer thereof, or any oth
er person, and no obligation or
by any such
instrument
made
corporation or any officer thereof,
by
unless expressly
authorized
laW to be made negotiable Shall
be, or shall be deemed to be nego
tiable according to the custom
of merchants in whatever form
they may be drawn Or made.
Warehouse receipts, bills of lad
ing, and railroad receipts, upon
the face of which the Words “not
negotiable’ shall be plainly writ
ten, printed, or stamped, shall be
negotiable, as provided in section
statutes,
1676 of the Wisconsin
1878, and in section 4194 and 4425
of these statutes, as the same
have been construed by the Su
preme Court.”
In Michigan village Orders are
not negotiable.
Miner V. Vedder,
66 Mich. 101.

Sec. 4. Certainty as to sum; what constitutes.—The
Sum payable is a sum certain within the meaning of
this act, although it is to be paid:

First, With interest; or
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Third, By stated installments, with
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Second,

provision that
upon default in payment of any installment or of in
terest the whole shall become due;” or
a

Fourth, With exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at
the current rate; or

Fifth, With costs of collection or an attorney’s fee,
in case payment shall not be made at maturity.”
1—A note providing for interest
at 7 per cent and containing this
“if not
additional stipulation:

when due I agree to pay
per cent interest from date
until paid” is negotiable. Crump
v. Berdan, 97 Mich. 293;
See
Chamberlain,
Flanders
V.
24
paid

10

Mich.

305;

Mo. 338;

Hope

Barker, 112
v. Duncan, 57
Parker v. Plymell, 23
Smith v. Crane, 33
v.

Dinsmore

N. Y. 573;
Kan. 402;
Minn. 144.
An instrument

containing

a
promise to pay a certain sum to
gether with any interest that may
accrue thereon (the rate of inter
est not being specified) is not ne
gotiable in that it lacks certainty
as to sum. Lamberton V. Aiken,
2 F 189, [1899]
Ct. of Sessions
(a case under the corresponding
provision of the bills of exchange

act).
An

instrument

does

not

fall

short of being a bill or note
merely because it contains a stip
ulation for the payment of inter

est, but the interest must be as
certained from the face of the docu
ment or it must be capable of
being ascertained by numerical

calculation
from materials
con
tained in the document.
This
would be the case where the docu
ment in question specifies the
rate of interest, and date of pay
ment, for then one could by sim
ple
calculation
ascertain
the
amount of interest due.
2-A note for $1500 to be paid
20 per cent a month from July 1,
Wright v.
1871 is negotiable.
win, 33 Mich. 32.
A note providing for payment
of the principal sum, with the

Ir

reserved right on the part of the
maker expressed in the body of
the note to pay the same before

maturity in installments of not
less than 5 per cent of the prin
cipal,
is negotiable.
Riker V.
Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 402.
An instrument wherein the de
fendant promises in writing to
pay the plaintiff 1701 with in
terest at 5 per cent as follows:

first payment, to-wit:
401
more to be made on the 1st
of February, 1873, and 51 on the
first day of each month following
the
Or

until the note shall be fully sat
isfied, is a valid promissory note.
Cooke v. Horn, 29 L. T. (n. s.)
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overruling

Kirkwood

The objection to the note was
that if the first payment Were
more than 401, which the note
provided it might be, the subse
quent instalments and the final
time for payment would be indefi
Blackburn, J., said:
nite.
“The
amount of the note, however, is
certain and any variation in the
time will depend only upon the
defendant. * * * I do not see
why a stipulation which enables
a maker of a note to reduce his
liability for interest should pre
vent the instrument containing it
from being a promissory note.”
3—Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich.
Struthers,
184;
Brooke
v.
110
Mich. 562; Wilson v. Campbell, id.
580;
Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21
Mich. 25.4; Rice V. Rankans, 101
Mich. 378; Cox V. Cayan, 117
Mich. 599; Clark v. Skeen, 61

369.

Kan.

526, 49 L. R. A. 190; Carlon
Kenealy,
139;
12 M. & W.
Thorpe v. Mindeman (Wis.) 101
V.

N. W. 417 (a case under the
statute). See also First Nat. Bank
v. Carson, 60 Mich. 432; Choate
v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28.
An instrument in the form of
joint and several promissory
note and providing for payment
in instalments and that upon de
fault in the payment of any One
of the instalments
the whole

a

remaining unpaid should
due and payable is a ne
gotiable promissory note within
the meaning of the bills of ex
change act.
Kirkwood v. Car

amount
become

roll,

51 W. R. 374; 88 L. T. R.
(1903) 52, approving
Yates v.
Evans, 61 L. J. Q. B. 446, (1892),

J.

L.

Q.

B.

4-Smith
241;
286;

v. Smith, 65

408 (1896).

Kendall,

V.

Johnson
Bullock

v.
v.

Frisbie,
Taylor,

9

Mich.

15

Mich.

39 Mich.

Second Nat. Bank v. Basu
Fed. 58; Whitle v. Fond du
Lac Nat. Bank (Tex.) 26 S. W.
Hastings V. Thompson, 54
1106;
137;

ier,

6.5

Minn.

184, 55 N. W. 968;

Culbertson
187.

v.

Nelson,

See note 6, Sec.

Contra:
Iowa

93

3.

5—This provision changes the
rule in Michigan as established
by the following cases:
Bul
lock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137; Myer
V. Hart, 40 Mich. 517; Cayuga Co.
Bank V. Purdy, 56 Mich. 6; Alt

man v. Rittershofer, 68 Mich. 287;
Altman v. Fowler, 70 Mich. 57;
Wright v. Traver, 73 Mich. 493;
Second Nat. Bank V. Wheeler, 75
Mich. 546; Rice v. Rankans, 101
Mich. 378; Conrad Seipp Brewing
Co. v. McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191;
Strawberry
Point Bank V. Lee,
117 Mich. 122; People v. Bennett,
but affirms the rule
sustained by the weight of author
ity.
The reason of the rule in
Michigan is based upon the prop
osition that the requisite of cer
122 Mich. 281;

tainty

must continue until the
discharge of the instrument.
In
supra, the
Altman v. Fowler,
court said: “The certainty requi
site to the negotiability of the in
Strument must continue until the
obligation is discharged, and any
provision which before that time
removes such certainty prevents
the instrument from being nego
tiable at all.”
The rule in Michigan is the
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rule of the following courts: John
Speer,

Pa. St. 227;
Bynum, 84
Nat.
Bank
V.
First
N. C. 24; First Nat. Bank v. Gay,
71 Mo. 627; Jones V. Radatz, 27
Minn. 240; Morgan V. Edwards,
Maryland
Fertiliz
53 Wis. 599;
ing Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 584;
Carroll County Savings Bank V.
Strother, 28 S. C. 504; Findlay v.
rule
The
Pott, 131 Cal. 385.
adopted by the act is sustained
Oppenheimer v. Bank, 97
by:
Tenn. 19; 36 S. W. 705; Chicago
R’y Equipment Co. v. Merchants
Bank, 136 U. S. 268; Farmers'
ston

V.

92

Nat. Bank V. Sutton Mfg Co. 6
U. S. App. 312; 52 Fed. 191;
Dorsey v. Wolff,
142
Ill. 589;
Tyler v. Walker, 101 Tenn. 306,
47 S. W. 424; Benn V. KutzSchan,
24 Ore. 28, 32 Pac. 763; Shenan
doah Nat. Bank V. Marsh, 89 Iowa
273, 56 N. W. 458;
First Nat.
Bank v. Slaughter, 98 Ala. 602,
14 So. 545; Chandler V. Kennedy,

N. W. 439; Stark
v. Olsen, 44 Neb. 646, 63 N. W.
437; Clifton v. Bank of Aberdeen,
75 Miss. 929, 23 So. 394; Trader
41
Ark. 242. The
v. Chidester,
8 S. Dak. 56, 65

of

rule
of these
upon the proposi
tion that the requisite of cer
tainty need not continue beyond

reason
cases

is

the

based

the maturity of the instrument.
It is expressed in Oppenheimer V.
Bank, supra, wherein it is said
“Upon a careful review of the
authorities
we can perceive no
reason why a note otherwise en
dowed with all the attributes of
negotiability is rendered non-nego
tiable by a stipulation
which is
entirely
inoperative
until after

IN GENERAL.
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the maturity of the note and its
by the maker.
The
dishonor
paid
is certain dur
amount to be
ing the currency of the note as
and it
a negotiable
instrument

only

uncertain after it
to be negotiable by the
fault of the maker in its pay
ment.
It is eminently just that
the creditor Who has incurred an
expense in the collection of the
debt should be reimbursed by the
debtor by whom the action was
rendered necessary and the ex
pense entailed.”
In Morrison V.
Ornbaun, 30 Mont. 111, 75 Pac.
953 (a case under the statute)
becomes

ceases

the note contained this provision:
“With interest from date at the
rate of 12 per cent per annum
until paid, and reasonable attor
neys fees.”
The note was not
paid at maturity.
It was placed
attorney for
an
in the hands of
collection but Suit had not been
brought upon it.
It was held
that the holder could collect Such
reasonable attorney's fees.

The conflict of authority on the
matter covered by this provision
of the act has resulted in four
First, the stip
distinct holdings.
and
enforceable
ulation is Valid
and does not affect the negotia
Dorsey
bility of the instrument.
Second, the stip
v. Wolff, supra.
ulation is valid and enforceable
but it destroys the negotiability
Jones v. Rad
of the instrument.
atz, 27 Minn. 240; Johnston Har

vester Co. v. Clark, 30 Minn. 30.8;
First Nat. Bank v. Larson, 60
Wis. 206. Third, the stipulation
is void and as it may therefore
be disregarded it does not affect
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the negotiability
of the instru
ment. Gilmore v. Hirst, 56 Kan.
626; Chandler V. Kennedy, supra.
Fourth, the stipulation is void but
nevertheless it destroys the nego

tiability of the instrument.
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lock v. Taylor, supra; Altman V.
Tinsley v.
Rittershofer,
supra;
Hoskins,
111 N. C. 340;
First
Nat. Bank v. Bynun, 84 N. C.
24; Huffcut's Neg. Inst. 218.

Bul

When promise is unconditional.—An unquali
fied order or promise to pay is unconditional within the
meaning of this act, though coupled with:
First, An indication of a particular fund out of
which reimbursement is to be made, or a particular ac
Sec. 5.

count to be debited with the amount; or
Second, A statement of the transaction
rise to the instrument.”

But an order or promise to pay out of
fund is not unconditional.”
1—An indication of a particular
fund out of which the drawer is
to reimburse himself or a direc
tion to charge the amount to a
particular account has never been
regarded as a qualification of the
general order to pay.
The re
quisite of a valid bill of exchange
is an unconditional order to pay
on the general account of the
drawer.
That order may be
coupled with a direction to charge

the amount to a particular fund
without invalidating the bill. For
example; an order in the follow
ing terms: Pay to the order of
A one thousand dollars out of the
dividends on my bank stock is
a non-negotiable bill, but an order
in the following terms: Pay to the
order of A one thousand dollars
and reimburse yourself
out of
my bank
dividends
On
Stock

which
a

gives

particular

or charge

to dividends on my
bank stock, is a negotiable bill.
The real test to be applied is,
is the order to pay uncondition
al and absolute?
If it is, then
any subsequent statement indi
cating a mode of reimbursement
does not make it conditional and
does not destroy negotiability. If
the drawee is confined to a par
ticular fund, the bill is not nego
tiable.
If he is directed to pay

absolutely and to look to a par
fund for his reimburse
ment, the bill is negotiable; Mun
ger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251;
Schmittler
v. Simon, 101 N. Y.

ticular

This case involved the nego
tiability of a draft drawn upon
and accepted by an executor. The
draft contained the Words “and
554.

charge the amount against me
and Of my mother's estate.”
It
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was held that the reference to
the estate was not an order to pay
Out of it but that the estate was
referred to simply as a means of
reimbursement.
In Macleed V. Snee, 2 Stra.
762, the plaintiff declared upon a
bill wherein. A requested the, de
fendant to pay plaintiff or order
a principal sum “as my quarterly
half pay to be due from 24th
June to 27th of September next,
by advance.”
The court held
that the mention of half pay
was only by Way of direction
how the drawee Should reim
burse himself.
The instrument
was held to be a bill of ex
change.
Adams,
Redman
V.
51
Me.
429,
is a leading case.
The
bill involved in this case Was as
“For Value
received
follows:
please pay to order of G. F. and
C. A. Tilden $40 and charge the
same against whatever may be
due me for my share of fish
caught on board Schooner “Morn
ing Star, for the fishing Season
of 1860.”
It was held that this
was an order to pay absolutely
and without contingency and that
the last clause merely indicated
the means of reimbursement, and
the payment of the order was
not made to depend upon his hav
ing any share of the fish, nor
was the call limited to the pro
thereof.
To the same ef
fect, Whitney v. Eliot Nat. Bank,
ceeds

137 Mass. 351;
Nichols v. Rug
gles, 76 Me. 27; Corbett v. Clark,
45 Wis. 403; Ellett v. Britton, 6
Tex. 229; Griffin v. Weatherby,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 753. See Shepard
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V. Abbott,

179 Mass. 300, in which
the order read: “and charge the
Same to the $1800 payment.”
It
was held that the negotiability
Of the draft was not affected by
this provision (this case was de
cided after the statute went into
effect in Massachusetts, but no

reference is made to it).
In Crofton V. Crofton, 33 Ch.
D. 612, the bill involved was
as follows: “At sight pay to my
order the sum of 7,000l sterling,
which sum is on account on the
dividends and interests due on the
capital and dividends registered
in the books of the governor and
of the Bank of England and
Company, in the name of Col
clough and Boyse, which you will
please charge to my account and
credit according to a registered
letter I have addressed to you.”
The instrument was held to be a
good bill of exchange under the
corresponding
provision
of the
exchange
act, section 3,
bills of

(3).
2-Beardelee
560; Littlefield

p

v. Horton,

Mich.
Hodge, 6 Mich.
326; Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich.
260;
32;

3

v.

Wright v. Irwin,
Howry v. Eppinger,

33

Mich.

34 Mich.

Hudson v. Emmons, 107 Mich.
Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich.
184; Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich.
28; Siegel V. Chicago Trust and
Savings Bank, 131 Ill. 569; Wells
v. Brigham, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 6;
Hereth v. Meyer, 33 Ind. 511;
29;

549;

Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597.
The transactions for which the
notes in the foregoing cases were
generally

given involved the pur
chattels, or the

chase of goods,
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performance of Some contract. AS
an illustration;
in Preston V.
Whitney there was added at the
foot of the note this provision:

ett's Admr. V. Booker, 15 Gratt.
163; Kelly V. Bronson, 26 Minn.
359; Hoagland V. Erck, 11 Neb.
580;
West v. Foreman, 21 Ala.

“this note is to

400.

be Valid as part
pay of a pianoforte of me at a
retail price.” In Siegel V. Chi
cago Trust and Savings Bank the
promise was to pay three hundred
dollars “for the privilege of one
framed advertising sign etc.” But
See Post V. Kinzua Hemlock R’y
Co., 171 Pa. St. 615.
3-The reason for this is that
in such a case the payment de
pends upon the Sufficiency of the
particular fund indicated which
may prove inadequate.
Munger
v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251; Aver

But see Corbett v. Clark,
45 Wis. 403; Price v. Jones, 105
Ind. 543.
In Nat. Savings Bank V. Cable,
73 Conn. 568, 48 Atl. 428 (a case

under the statute) it was held
that an order to pay A or order
$300 “or what may be due on
Imy deposit book” was not nego
tiable.
This order would appear to
be in contravention
of Section
3 subdivision
2 and non-negotia
ble in that it is not an order for
the payment of a sum certain.

Determinable future time; what constitutes.—
An instrument is payable at a determinable future time,
within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be
Sec. 6.

payable:

First, At

period after date or sight; or
Second, On or before a fixed or determinable future
a fixed

time specified therein;”

or

Third, On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of

a specified event, which is certain to happen, though the
time of happening be uncertain.”
An instrument payable upon a contingency is not ne
gotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure
the defect."
1—Where the parties insert a
specific date of payment the in
strument is payable then at all
events,—and this although in the
same instrument an uncertain and
different time of payment may be

mentioned, as, that it shall be
payable upon a particular day or
upon the completion of a house
or the performance of other Con
Siegel V.
tracts and the like.
Chicago Trust and Savings Bank,

NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

Ill.

The Wisconsin act
569.
provision
Special
for a con
makes
tingency of this sort. See note 4.
2–In such a case the legal
rights of the holder are clear
The instrument is
and certain.
due at a time fixed and it is not
due before. True, the maker may
131

pay sooner if he choose, but this
option if exercised would be a
payment in advance of the legal
liability to pay and nothing more.
Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421;

Helmer V. Krolick, 36 Mich. 371;
Smith v. Ellis, 29 Me. 422; Bu
chanan v. Wren (Tex.), 30 S. W.
1077; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa
166; Jordan v. Tate, 19 Ohio St.
586;
Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa.
St. 13; Albertson v. Laughlin, 173
In this case the
Pa. St. 525.
note was made payable twelve
months after date or before, if
the money was made out of the
sale of a machine.
3—The requirement is absolute
that the event is sure to happen
at some future time. So, if the
event might not happen, no mat
ter how probable its happening
may be, it is not, according to
the weight of authority, and it
would seem of reason, a nego

Thus, if it is
tiable instrument.
payable when X shall come of age
it is not a good bill or note, be
cause X may die before he comes
Rice v. Rice, 43 App.
of age.
Div. N. Y. 458, 60 N. Y. Supp.
If payable at or within a
97.
certain time after one's death it
is good, because death is some
thing sure to occur.
Cooke v.
Colehan, 2 Str. 1217; Bristol v.
Warner,

19

Conn.

7;

Shaw

v.
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Camp, 160 Ill. 425, 43 N. E. 608;
Hegeman v. Moon, 60 Hun 412,

N. E. 487. For further illus
trations See Chandler V. Cary, 64
Mich. 238; Brooks V. Hargreaves,
255;
Smith v. Wan
21 Mich.
371;
Blark.com, 45 Mich.
First
Nat. Bank V. Carson, 60 Mich. 432;
30

Pearson v. Garrett, 4 Mod. 242;
Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill. 172.
A note payable at a certain time
after peace between the Confed
erate States and the United States
peace
Since
is not contingent,
time,
Mortee
must come at some
20
La. Ann. 236.
V. Edwards,
There are some cases to the
as
effect that moral certainty,
distinguished
from absolute cer

tainty is sufficient to satisfy the
rule. Thus, it has been held that
an instrument payable at a cer
tain time after a government ship
is paid off, would be negotiable,
the government is sure
because
pay.
Andrews V. Franklin, 1
to
24;
Evans v. Underwood, 1
Str.
But this holding has
Wils. 262.

distrusted.
and
criticized
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 46.
Mr. Bigelow says that the doc
trine should be taken with hesi
tation because it cannot be found
ed on any custom. Bigelow's Bills,
Notes and Cheques, 2nd. ed., 36.
Certain expressions falling short
of absolute certainty have been
interpreted to mean a reasonable
loaded
And instruments
time.
with such expressions have been
For example: a
held negotiable.
payable
as soon as collected
note
my
at P was held
accounts
from
negotiable and payable in a rea
Sonable time.
Ubsdell V. Cun
been

42
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ningham, 22 Mo. 124.
So of a
note payable “as soon as I re
ceive the sum mentioned from
the government, or as soon as
Otherwise convenient.”
Jones W.
Isler, 3 Kan. 128.
4-Where
an
instrument
is
made payable when a certain per
Son
shall
become
of age, his
actually coming of age does not
make the instrument negotiable.

LAW.

Goss v. Nelson, 1 Burr 226; Kel
ley v. Hemmingway, 13 Ill. 604;
First Nat. Bank V. Alton, 60
Conn. 402; Duffield V. Johnston,
96 N. Y. 369; Carlos V. Fancourt,
5 T. R. 482.
The Wisconsin act contains an
additional subdivision, number 4.
“At a fixed period after date or
sight,
although
payable before
then, on a contingency.”

Additional provisions not affecting negotia
which contains an order or
promise to do any act in addition to the payment of
money is not negotiable." But the negotiable character
of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected
by a provision which:
First, Authorizes the sale of collateral securities in
case the instrument be not paid at maturity,” or
Second, Authorizes a confession of judgment if the
instrument be not paid at maturity;” or
Third, Waives the benefit of any law intended for
the advantage or protection of the obligor; or
Fourth, Gives the holder an election to require some
thing to be done in lieu of payment of money.”
But nothing in this section shall validate any provi
sion or stipulation otherwise illegal.”
Sec.

7.

bility.—An instrument

1–In determining whether pa
per is negotiable it alone can be
looked to.
First Nat. Bank V.
Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex. 40.
The instrument must not contain
an order or promise to do any
act in addition to the payment
of money; otherwise it will be
Hum
non-negotiable.
rendered

phrey v. Beckwith, 48 Mich. 151;
Davies v. Wilkinson, 10 A. & E.
98; Leonard v. Mason, 1 Wend.
522;
Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow.
108; Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan.
310; Bunker v. Athearn, 35 Me.
364.

Agreement
instrument

to pay taxes:
An
non-negotiable
is
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which contains a promise to pay
a Specified amount and all taxes
assessed against
the land de
Scribed in a mortgage given to

Secure Such instrument Or against
the mortgagee's interest in said
land. Walker V. Thompson, 108
Mich. 686. And this, even though
at the time of the execution of
the note there is no statute au
thorizing an assessment upon the
interest of the mortgagee. Car
mody v. Crane, 110 Mich. 508.

And
of a

so, too, where the interest
mortgagee in lands was tax
able as Such under the law in
force at the time of the execu
tion of the mortgage; since the
amount payable to or on behalf of
the mortgagee is thereby rendered
uncertain.
Brooke V. Struthers,
110 Mich. 562.
But a mortgage
note is not rendered non-nego
tiable by a provision in the mort
gage requiring the mortgagor to
pay all taxes and assessments
upon
premises,
the mortgaged
where the same obligation rested
upon him by law at the time the

instruments were executed, inde
pendent of any such stipulation.
Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich.
580.
Accord: Cox v. Cayan, 117
Mich. 599. On the general import
of this provision see Thorpe v.

Mindeman (Wis.), 101 N. W. 417
(a case under the statute).
2—An instrument does not lose
its negotiable character because
of a recital that the maker has
deposited collateral security for
its payment which he agrees may
be sold in a specified manner. Cox
v. Cayan, supra; Goss v. Emerson,
23 N.

H. 38; Valley Nat. Bank v.
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Pa. St. 284, 23 Atl.

1068.

A

provision authorizing

the Sale
of non-pay
ment does not render the note non
negotiable.
Wise V. Charlton, 4
786;
A. & E.
Towne v. Rice, 122
Mass. 67; Perry v. Bigelow, 128

of collateral

in

case

Mass. 129; Arnold V. Rock River
Co., 5 Duer. 207;
Heard v.
Bank, 8 Neb. 16; Kirkwood V.
Carroll, 72 L. J. K. B. 208 (a
case under the corresponding pro
Vision of the bills of exchange
act). But a note on the margin
Of Which are Written the Words
“given as collateral security with
agreement” is not negotiable; Cas
tello v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293.
3-This provision, says Mr.
Crawford,
who drew the New
York act, was inserted in the act
requirements
to meet
the
in
&c.

of the states where judg
ment notes are in use. It changes
the law of Michigan as declared
in Conrad Seipp Brewing Co. v.
McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191. It may
be questioned, however, whether
the Court declared the note in
that case non-negotiable by rea
Son of the following provision:
“And to secure the payment of
said note I hereby authorize
revocably any attorney
of any
court of record to appear for me
in such court in term time or
Vacation, at any time hereafter
and confess a judgment without
process,
in favor of the holder
of this note, for such amount as
may appear to be unpaid thereon,”
or by reason of the further pro
vision “together with costs and
usual attorney's fees.”
It ap
Some

ir
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pears that Judge Champlin based
his holding “that the instrument
is not a promissory note” upon
which had held instruments
non-negotiable by reason of a stip
ulation therein for the payment
cases

of

costs

ney's

of collection

and

attor

feeS.

In Pennsylvania
it was held
that a warrant of attorney ren
non-negotiable.
dered
a
note
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. St. 346;
Sweeney V. Thickstun, 77 Pa. St.
131.

Mr.

Daniel
States that
the
later cases maintain that such a
provision
does
not render the
note non-negotiable. Daniel's Neg.
Inst. 5th ed. Sec. 61; Osborn V.
Hawley, 19 Ohio 130; Clements v.
Hull, 35 Ohio St. 141; Gilmore v.
Hirst, 56 Kan. 626, 44 Pac. 603;
Mumford v. Tolman, 157 Ill. 258,
N. E. 617.

41

In

ing

Yearly
Wisconsin
Meet
Babbler,
&c.
V.
115
Wis.

(a case under the statute)
power
was
held
that
a
of attorney contained in a note
“to confess judgment any time
after the date of the note wheth
er due or not” destroyed its nego
289

it

tiability, as the statute authorized

a confession only at maturity.

4—This
designed

provision

of the act is

the practice,
of the States,
in promissory notes
a waiver of the benefits of home
stead and exemption laws. It has
generally been held that the pro
vision in a negotiable instrument
waiving such benefits does not im
pair the negotiable character of
to

common in
of inserting

meet

some
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Hughitt v.
the instrument.
son, 28 Fed. 865; Lyon v.

tin,

In Zimmerman
Pa. St. 421, the
Court said that a provision of
this kind instead of clogging the
negotiability
of the instrument
adds to it and gives additional
31

Kan.

John
Mar

411.

V. Anderson,

67

Value to the note.
Accord: First
Nat. Bank v. Slaughter, 98 Ala.
602; Zimmerman
v. Rote, 75 Pa.
188;
St.
Walker v. Woollen, 54

Ind.

164.

negotiable quality of an
instrument
is not affected by a
provision
which leaves a choice
With the holder to receive some
thing other than money, but
leaves no election to the debtor
to pay in anything
less than
money. For example, the holder's

5-The

right to elect to take stock of a
corporation in lieu of a payment
in money. Hodges V. Shuler, 22

Hosstatter V. Wilson,
36 Barb.
Dinsmore v. Dun
can, 57 N. Y. 573; Mosley v.
Walker,
84 Ga. 274;
Owen v.
Barnum, 7 Ill. 461.
6—The full significance of this
provision can be understood only
by taking into consideration the

N. Y.

114;

307;

fact that this statute was drawn
a view to ultimate adoption
throughout the United States. See
Introduction.
The object of this
provision is to rebut the infer

with

ence of an intent to make Valid
any agreement or stipulation made
invalid by the settled policy of
the state or by any statute, such
for example as the “Bohemian
oats” statute, so called, Mich. C.

L.

'97, secs.

11370-11372.

NEGOTIABLE

Sec. 8.

INSTRUMENTS

IN GENERAL.

seal; particular money.—The

Omissions;

45

val

idity and negotiable character of an instrument are not
affected by the fact that:
First, It is not dated; or
Second, Does not specify the value given, or that any
value has been given therefor;” or

Third, Does not specify the place where it is drawn
or the place where it is payable;” or

Fourth, Bears a seal," or
a particular kind of current money
in which payment is to be made.”
But nothing in this section shall alter or repeal any
statute requiring in certain cases the nature of the con
sideration to be stated in the instrument."

Fifth, Designates

1-It

has never been deemed
necessary to the validity of a
negotiable
instrument
that
it
Husbrook
V.
should be dated.

Wilder,
Ins. Co.

Pin. (Wis.)

643; Mich.
Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11.
When an instrument is dated the
date expressed
is only presump
tive evidence of the actual time
of execution.
When an instru
ment is not dated the time of its
maturity should
computed
be
Cowing v. Alt
from its delivery.
man, 71 N. Y. 435.
As between immediate parties
parol evidence is admissible
to
show the true date of a misdated
Biggs v. Piper, 86 Tenn.
note.
589.
But not as between remote
parties, if an innocent purchaser
or indorser would be prejudiced
by the correction.
Almich V.
Downey, 45 Minn. 460, 48 N. W.
197; Huston v. Young, 33 Me. 85.
See

Sec.

1

v.

19,

subdivision

3.

2-The words “value received,”
invariably ex
although
almost
pressed in bills and notes, are not
necessary. Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 108; Mehlberg v. Tisher,
24 Wis. 607.
In Edgerton v. Ed
gerton, 8 Conn. 6; and Bristol v.
Warner, 19 Conn. 7, it was held
that a promissory note not pur
porting on its face to be for value
received did not import considera
tion.
In Missouri, under a statute,
the words “value received” were
necessary in notes: Taylor v. New
man, 77 Mo. 263.
Likewise in
certificates
of deposit; Savings
Bank v. Nat. Bank of Commerce,
38 Fed. 800.

The omission of the words “for
value received” does not impair
the note, affect its legal import,
or weaken the presumption that
it was given for value. McLeod
v. Hunter, 29 N. Y. Misc. 558, 61
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N. Y. Supp 73 (a case under the
Statute.)
3-This affirms the general rule.
Mehlberg v. Tisher, supra.
4-This changes the rule of the
law merchant. The presence of a
seal on an instrument destroyed
its negotiable character, and ren
dered it a covenant, governed by
the rules relating to instruments
under seal. Rawson v. Davidson,
Hopkins V. Rail
49 Mich. 607;
way Co., 3 Watts & Sarg. 410;

LAW.
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is not deprived of its nego
tiability by being executed under
seal. Chase Nat. Bank V. Faurot,
149 N. Y. 532; Marine Mfg. Co.
tion

v. Bradley, 105 U. S. 175; Mercer
County v. Hacket, 1 Wallace 83;
Bank V. R. R. Co., 5 S. C. 156;
Weeks v. Esler, 143 N. Y. 374.
The paper of a corporation is de
prived of its negotiability by be

ing

under Seal.

executed

Conine

Junction & B. R. R. Co., 3
Houst. (Del.) 289.
Before this statute Was enacted
V.

McKim, 1 Pin
Parkinson v.
(Wis.) 214; Muse v. Dantzler, 85 it was provided in many states
Laidley's
Ala. 359;
Admr.
V. that a promissory note under seal
Bright's Admr., 17 W. Va. 779; was negotiable.
Clark v. Farmers Mfg. Co., 15
5—Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11
Wend. 256; Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Mich. 501; Smith V. Kendall, 9
Minn. 135. Whether the seal of Mich. 241; Phelps v. Town, 14
Mich. 374; Johnson V. Frisbie, 15
a corporation destroyed the nego
tiability of its note has been dif Mich. 286; Black v. Ward, 27
ferently
courts.

decided

by

The paper of

different
a

corpora

Mich.

191;

see

6–See note

note 6, sec. 3.
6, sec.

7.

Sec. 9. When payable on demand.—An instrument is
payable on demand:
First, When it is expressed to be payable on demand,

or at sight, or on presentation; or
Second, In which no time for payment is expressed.”
so

as

in

v.

28

v.

v.

is

L.

the additional
force of the sta
tute; C.
'97, secs. 4871-72.
The
rule of the law merchant
illus
Dart, 12 Wis.
trated by Walsh
Ladew,
709; Lucas
Mo. 342;
Smith, 15 Ala. 807; Cribbs
Hart
Adams, 13 Gray, 597; Thorn
burg
Emmons, 23 W. Va. 325;
v.

rule in
By the law merchant
all instruments payable at sight
were entitled to grace;
instru
ments payable on demand were
not entitled to grace.
Daniel’s
Neg. Inst., secs. 617-619, and cases.
Michigan by
This rule prevails

1—This changes the

Michigan.

V.

or

it,

is,

Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed
issuing,
regards the person
when overdue, it
indorsing
accepting,
payable on demand.”

NEGOTIABLE
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The distinction is abolished by
the statute. By this provision “at
sight,”
“on demand,”
and “at
presentation,”
synonymous
are
terms.
“On demand,” “when de
manded,” “on call,” “at any time
for,” are equivalent
called
ex
pressions. Bowman V. McChesney,
22 Grat. 609.
Paper payable on demand is
due forthwith and suit may be
brought without demand. Palmer
V. Palmer, 36 Mich. 487;
In re

Estate
of King, 94 Mich. 411;
Beardsley v. Webber, 104 Mich.
88; Peninsular Savings Bank v.
Hosie, 112 Mich.
351;
Citizens
Savings
Bank V. Vaughan, 115

Mich. 156.
The statute of limitations runs

against

demand paper from the
time of its date, if that is coin
cident with delivery.
Palmer V.
Palmer, supra; In re Estate of
King, supra; Curran v. Witter,
68

Wis.

16.

on a demand note pro
viding for interest after maturity
Interest

begins to run from the time de
mand is made.
In re Estate of
King, supra.
express
2—Instruments
which
payment
payable
no time of
are
on demand. This is the rule of
the law merchant.
Aldous
V.
Cornwell, L. R. 3 Q. B. 573; Col
lins v. Trotter, 81 Mo. 278; Hall
v. Toby, 110 Pa. St. 318; Mess
more v. Morrison,
172 Pa. St.
300, 34 Atl. 45; Porter v. Porter,
Me. 376; Bowman v. McChes
ney, supra; Keyes v. Fenstermak
er, 24 Cal. 329; Herrick v. Ben
nett, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 374; Ray
51

mond

V.

Sellick,

10

Conn.

485;

IN GENERAL.
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Jones v. Brown, 11 Ohio St. 601;
Bank v. Price, 52 Iowa 570; Lib
by V. Mikelburg,
28 Minn. 38;
Easton,
Mitchell v.
37 Minn. 335,
sub nom. Mitchell v. Wilkins, 33

N. W. 910; Sheldon v. Heaton, 88
Hun 535; McLeod v. Hunter, 29
N. Y. Misc. 558 (a case under the
Statute).
3—Where there is an indorse
ment after maturity, a note or
bill as to the indorser becomes
payable within a reasonable time
upon demand.
Leavitt V. Put
nam, 3 N. Y. 494. Where a note
protested
was
and
afterwards
sold by the indorsers
without
erasing their indorsement
they
were held liable for the payment
Of the same Without further no
tice. St. John v. Roberts, 31 N.
Y. 441. See Bills of Exchange
act, sec. 10 (2). Chalmers, com
menting on this provision, says:
“Before this enactment the En
glish law on the subject dealt
with was very obscure; but it had
been held in the United States
that where a bill Was indorsed
after maturity the indorser was
entitled to have it presented for
payment and to receive notice of
dishonor in the event of non-pay
ment within a reasonable time,
citing Patterson v. Todd, 18 Pa.
St. 433; Eisenlord V. Dillenback,
15 Hun
(N. Y.) 23; aliter, if
the indorser take up a dishonored
on his original
indorsement, if his liability was
then already fixed, citing St. John
v. Robert, 31 N. Y. 441.
This provision of the statute ex
presses the American rule. The in
dorsement of a bill or note which

bill and reissue it
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is overdue is the equivalent of
drawing a new instrument paya
Bishop V. Dexter,
ble at sight.
2 Conn. 219; Mudd V. Harper, 1
Md. 110. In such cases, present
ment for payment must be made
and notice of dishonor given as
in Other instances of instruments
Berry V.
payable on demand.
Robinson, 9 Johns. 121; Rosson V.

INSTRUMENTS
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Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90. Where a
note negotiated before due is fur
ther negotiated, after it has been
dishonored, the holder takes the
legal title and can maintain
a
Suit upon it in his own name in
the same manner as if he had
received it before due. French V.
Jarvis, 29 Conn. 353; Crawford's
An. Neg. Inst. Law, 18.

Sec. 10. When payable to order.—The instrument is
payable to order where it is drawn payable to the order
of a specified person or to him or his order." It may
be drawn payable to the order of:
First, A payee who is not maker, drawer, or drawee;
Or"

Second, The drawer or maker,” or

Third, The drawee,” or

£ourth, Two or more payees jointly; or
Fifth, One or some of several payees;" or
Sixth, The holder of an office for the time being.”
Where the instrument is payable to order, the payee
must be named or otherwise indicated therein with
reasonable

certainty."

1—This is a change from the
similar provision in the Bills of
Exchange Act, which provides that
“a bill is payable to order which
is expressed to be so payable or
which is expressed to be payable
to a particular person and does
prohibiting
not
contain
words
transfer or indicating
an inten
tion that it should not be trans
ferred.”
See Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 8 (4).
The American
statute affirms the rule of the
common law on this point, that

an instrument payable to a speci
person is not negotiable
fied
Smith V. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 1
Esp. 231; Bank V. Apperson, 4
Fed. 25; Maule v. Crawford, 14
Hun 193; Carnwright V. Gray, 127

N. Y.

92.

payable to
2—An
instrument
the drawer or maker is without
legal inception
until it is in
dorsed by the payee.
Moses v.
Bank, 149 U. S. 298; Pickering
v. Cording, 92 Ind. 306, 47 Am.
Rep. 145; see sec. 186. In Cham
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berlain v. Young, 1893, 2 Q. B.
206 (a case under the Bills of
Exchange Act) the material part
of the bill was as follows: “Five
months after date pay to
order the sum of etc.”
It was
held that this must mean: pay
to my order, and hence it was
a Valid bill.
3—The validity of a bill is not
destroyed by the fact that the
drawee and payee are identical.
Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story 22, Fed.

Cas. No. 7653; Witte v. Williams,
S. C. 290, 28 Am. Rep. 294;
Commonwealth
v. Buttrick, 100
Mass. 12. See Bills of Exchange
8

Act, Sec. 5 (1).
4—A note payable to two or
more

tively

persons

imports

presump

joint and coequal inter
est, but this does not preclude
proof
that
the
consideration
moved from them in separate and
a

unequal amounts and values. Tis
dale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40; Gor
don V. Anderson, 83 Iowa 224. The
note in this case reading “pay
to Charles R. Whitsell et al or
order” was held non-negotiable.
5—Mr. Crawford illustrates the
meaning of this subdivision by
the following example: “A draft
payable to A, B & C or either
of them or any two of them.”
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. LaW,
19.

If

rectly

this

illustration

cor

interprets the meaning of
this Subdivision—and
Mr. Craw
ford's construction is entitled to
great consideration,-the existing
law has been changed because the
statute recognizes an instrument
payable to two payees in the al
ternative as negotiable whereas,
4

under
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law

merchant

an

in

strument payable to two persons
in the alternative is not negotia
ble.
Musselman V. Oakes, 19 Ill.
81; Carpenter v. Farnsworth,
106
Mass. 561;
Walrad v. Petrie, 4
Blanckenhogen
575;
Wend.
V.
Blundell, 2
See Watson
Colt. 663;

B. & Ald. 417.
But
V. Evans, 1 Hurl. &
Spaulding V. Evans,

139, Fed.
2 McLean,
Cas.
No.
13216; Record v. Chisum, 25 Tex.
348.

question
has not been
upon by the courts.
6–Thus,
payable to
a
note
White, Davis and McLane, trus
Co., or
tees Apalachicola
Land
their successors in office, or or
der,
negotiable.
is
Davis
V.
Garr, 6 N. Y. 124.
See
also
Storm v. Sterling, 3 El. & Bl.
832;
Holmes V. Jacques, 1 Q. B.
376.
The Bills of Exchange Act,
changed the prior
Sec. 7 (2)

The

passed

English law as laid down in Cow
ie v. Sterling, 6 El. & Bl. 333.

7-It

payee

is not essential that
be named;
be indicated

the

it is

sufficient
if he
With reason
able certainty.
The maxim id
certum est quod certum reddi po
Thus, a note pay
test applies.
able to “the administrators
of
Abner Chase deceased” was held
sufficiently
certain
as
to the
payee.
Adams v. King, 16 Ill.
169. See United States v. White,
Moody v. Threlkeld,
2 Hill 59;
13 Ga. 55; Blackman v. Lehman,
Knight v. Jones, 21
63 Ala. 547;
Mich. 161.
A check drawn without the
name of a payee and with a line
drawn through the space reserved
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for the name of the payee is in
Valid for the reason that it is
without
a payee.
Where
the
drawer of a check not only fails
to insert the name of a payee or
leave a blank where the name of
the payee may be inserted, but
draws a line through the blank

LAW.

Space, making
it impossible for
anyone else to do so, he indicates
very clearly not only that he de
clined to name a payee but
tended to make it impossible for
anyone else to do so. Gordon V.
Lansing State Bank, 133 Mich. 143.

in

Sec. 11. When payable to bearer.—The instrument
payable to bearer:

First, When it is expressed to be
Second, When
or bearer;” or

it is

so payable;

is

or

payable to a person named therein

Third, When it is payable to the order of a fictitious

or non-existing person, and such fact was known to
the person making it so payable;” or
Fourth, When the name of the payee does not pur
port to be the name of any person; or
Fifth, When the only or last indorsement is an in
dorsement in blank."
1—Illustration: Pay to the bear
er hereof, as in bonds and coupons.
2—A note payable to the Order
of A or bearer is the same as
payable to bearer.
Bitzer v. Wa
gar, 83 Mich. 223. It is not nec
essary to use the word bearer. A
note payable to A or holder is
payable to bearer.
Putnam V.
Crymes, 1 McMullen (S. C.) 9, 36
Am. Dec. 250; Eddy v. Bond, 19
Me. 461;

see Sec. 32.

3–Compare Bills of Exchange
act, sec. 7 (3). The difference be
tween the two statutes is impor
tant.
The element of knowledge
is the distinguishing feature. Un
der the English statute the paper

is payable

to bearer

if

the payee

be a fictitious or non-existing per
Son.
Under the American statute

paper payable to a fictitious or
non-existing person is not payable
to bearer unless the maker or
drawer knew that the payee was
a fictitious or non-existing person.
Under the English statute the
fact governs;
under the Ameri
can statute the fact coupled with
knowledge governs.
Thus there

has been carried into the two stat
utes the differences heretofore ex
isting in the authorities, as will
appear from the following: The
authorities agree that if the mak
er Or drawer of an instrument

NEGOTIABLE
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knew at the time of making or
drawing it that the payee was a
fictitious or non-existing person,
the instrument is payable to bear
er. The authorities disagree upon
the effect of absence of knowl
Some courts hold that pa
per payable to a fictitious or non
existing person is not payable to
bearer unless the paper was put
in circulation by the maker with
knowledge that the name of the
payee does not represent a real
person.
A statute in New York

edge.

prior to the enactment of the Ne
gotiable Instrument Law provided
that paper made payable to the
order of a fictitious person and
negotiated by the maker should
have the same Validity as against
the maker and all persons hav
ing knowledge of the facts as if
payable to bearer.
Shipman V.
Bank, 126 N. Y. 318, was a case
in which a clerk of the plaintiff
made out checks to fictitious per
sons and indorsed
payees
the
and
checks to be cashed

the names of
procured
the
at the drawee

bank.
It was held that such pa
per could not be treated as pay
able to bearer. The court said:
“We are of the opinion upon ex
amination

of the authorities

that

this rule applies only to paper
put in circulation by the maker
with the knowledge that the name
of the payee does not represent
a real person.
The maker's in
tention is the controlling consid
eration which determines the char
acter of such paper.
It cannot
be treated as payable to bearer
unless the maker knows the payee
to be fictitious and actually in

51

tends to make the paper payable
to a fictitious person.”
To the
same effect: Armstrong v. Bank,
46 Ohio St. 512;
Chism v. Bank,
641;
96 Tenn.
First Nat. Bank V.
Farmer's Bank, 56 Neb. 149; Tat
lock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174. The
contrary view is upheld by Mr.
Daniel, Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed.,

139, wherein the author
that it will be no defense
for the maker to set up the fact
that he did not know the payee
to be fictitious.
The weight of
authority would appear to be
against the learned author, but
he is supported by:
Kohn V.
Watkins, 26 Kan. 691; Lane V.
Kreekle, 22 Iowa 404;
Meridian
Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Ind.
App. 322, 33 N. E. 247, on rehear
ing 34 N. E. 608.
The state of
the law in England prior to the
enactment of the Bills of Ex
change act is summed up by
Bowen, L. J., in Vagliano V. Bank
of England, 23 Q. B. Div. 243, as
follows:
“Down to the date of
the passing of the recent statute
(Bills of Exchange Act) the ex
ception that bills drawn to the
Sec.

Says,

Order of a fictitious or non-exist
ing payee might be treated as
payable to bearer was based uni
formly upon the law of estoppel
and applied only against the par
ties who at the time they became
liable Were cognizant of the fic

titious character or of the non
existence of the supposed payee.”
And it was held in that case that
the Bills of Exchange Act affirmed
the then existing
law on this
point.

On appeal the judgment
overruled,
was
Bank of England
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V. Vagliano
H. L. [1891]
107, wherein
it was held

A. C.

that
changed

the section in question
Lord Her
the existing
law.
Schell, referring
to the words
Of the SubSection
said:
“I con
they
appear
fess
to me to be free
from ambiguity. “Where the payee
is a fictitious or non-existing per
son, means surely according to
ordinary canons of construction,
in every case where this can, as a
matter of fact, be predicated of
the payee. I can find no warrant
in the statute itself for inserting
any limitation or condition. * * *
I find it impossible, without doing
violence to the language of the
statute, to give any other answer
than this,—in all cases in which
the payee is a fictitious or non
existent person. The majority of
the Court of Appeal read the sec

tion thus:
Where the payee is a
fictitious or non-existent person,
the bill may, as against any party
who had knowledge of the fact,
be treated as a bill payable to
bearer. It seems to me that this
is to add to the words of the
statute and to insert a limitation
which is not to be found in it Or
indicated by it. It is said that
when the acceptor is the person
against whom the bill is to be
treated as payable to bearer ‘fic
titious’ must mean fictitious as
regards the acceptor, and to his
knowledge.
I am unable to See
why it must mean this.” This
case is followed by Clutton v. At
tenborough [1897] A. C. 90.
In
this case the plaintiff drew cer
tain checks in favor of a perSOn

INSTRUMENTS
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named Brett, believing him to be
a real person. There was in fact
no such person, but the name was
provided by a clerk who intended
to commit a fraud and appropri
ate the money of his employers.
The clerk negotiated the checks
by endorsing the name of Brett
upon the same.
It was held that
these checks were within the lan
guage of the act; that they were
payable to a fictitious and non-ex
isting person and therefore pay
able to bearer.
See

Brown,

C.

L. Mich.

128 Mich.

4870;

Shaw

v.

573.

4—Illustrations: Checks drawn
payable to the order of “bills
payable,”
or “cash,” or “sun
dries,” etc. Such instruments are
payable to bearer for the reason
that the use of the Words “or or
der” indicates an intention that
the paper shall be negotiated. Mc
Intosh v. Lytle, 26 Minn. 336, 3
N. W. 983, 37 Am. Rep. 410; Wil
lets v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer 121.
5-Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich.
29;
Curtis V. Sprague, 51 Cal.
Unaka Nat. Bank V. Butler
(Tenn. 1904), 83 S. W. 65 (a case
under the statute);
Mass. Nat.
Bank v. Snow (Mass. 1905), 72 N.
E. 959 (a case under the statute).
Where a note indorsed in blank
by a payee is afterwards trans
ferred by special indorsement it
is still transferable by delivery
and the party to whom it is so
may make title by
transferred
filling up the blank indorsement
239;

to himself and striking out subse
quent ones.
Watervliet Bank v.
White, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 608.
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Terms when sufficient.—The instrument need
not follow the language of this act, but any terms are
sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform
Sec. 12.

to the requirements hereof."
1-Illustration: An ex p r e SS
promise is requisite to a promis
sory note, but the use of the word
neceSSary.
not
is
“promise”
“Agree,” “undertake,” “engage,” or
probably be
“stipulate,”
would
equivalent,
or any word
held
which would amount to a decla
ration of the maker's will to pay.
The imperative form need not be
used in a bill of exchange. Lan
guage indicating an expression of
the drawer's will that the money
should be paid is sufficient. The
instrument may be written in pen
cil as well as in ink. Geary V.
Physic, 5 B. & C. 234; Brown v.
It
Butchers Bank, 6 Hill 443.
may be written in a foreign lan
guage. Debebian V. Galá, 64 Md.
An order written under a
262.
note, “please pay the above note
and hold it against me in our
settlement,” signed by the draw

er and accepted by the drawee,
was held a good bill. Leonard v.
Mason, 1 Wend. 522. An instru

ment in the following form: “Na
thaniel O. Winslow cr. by labor
16-3/4 days at $4 per day, $67,
good to bearer, signed, William
Vanick,” was held a negotiable
promissory
note payable on de
mand.

Hussey v. Winslow, 59 Me.

170.

certificates of deposit there
is sometimes an express prom
ise to pay, but the promise
is most frequently implied from
the word “payable,” used in con
nection with the acknowledgment
of the deposit, or receipt of a
named sum of money, by or for
the benefit of the person to whom
or to whose Order the payment is

In

First Nat. Bank V.
to be made.
Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex. 40.

as to.—Where the instru
ment or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is
dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true
date of the making, drawing, acceptance, or indorse
ment, as the case may be."
Sec. 13.

1—Anderson

Date, presumption

v. Weston,

8 Scott

583.

The presumption is that the
note was executed and delivered
on the day of its date, but such
presumption is removable. May
bury v. Berkery, 102 Mich. 126;

If
v. Dunham, 7 Gray 543.
the date be a dies mon, the law
adopts the nearest day. Thus, a
note dated September 31, will be
Hill

considered to have been made Sep
tember 30. Wagner v. Kenner, 2
Rob. (La.) 120. See note 1, Sec. 8.

54

THE NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

LAW.

Ante-dated and post-dated.—The instrument
is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated
or post-dated, provided this is not done for an illegal
or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instru
ment so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as
of the date of delivery."
Sec. 14.

1—The indorsee of a bill post
dated and indorsed by the payee
who died before the day of its
date derives title through the in
dorsement and can recover from
the drawer. Pasmore V. North, 13
East. 517.
This case was fol
lowed by Brewster v. McCardel, 8
Wend. 478.
Where
a false date is put
in to evade some law, the in

strument is void as to all par
ties having notice. Bayley V. Ta
ber, 5 Mass. 286; Serle v. Norton,
So, too, if its
9 M. & W. 309.
purpose is to effect a fraudulent
design.
Lansing
Gaine, 2
V.
300; Vail v. Van
Doren, 45 Neb. 450, 63 N. W. 787.

Johns. (N. Y.)

The fact that a note is negotiated
prior to the day of its date is not
a Suspicious

circumstance
which parties must guard.
ster V. McCardel, supra.
general proposition of the
see Gatty v. Fry, 2 Ex.

against

Brew

On the
section
D. 265,
36 L. T. (n. S.) 182, and cases
cited. A post dated draft purport
ing to be payable at sight is for
all the legal purposes of present
ment, demand, protest, and pay
ment, a draft payable a certain
time after date, for example, ac
tual date 10th, post date 20th, ma
turity thirteen days after actual
date.
New York Iron Mine V.
Citizens Bank, 44 Mich. 344.

in

when may be inserted.—Where an
strument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after
date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an
Sec. 15.

Date;

instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is
undated, any holder may insert therein the true date
of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be
payable accordingly.
The insertion of a wrong date
does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subse
quent holder in due course; but as to him, the date
so inserted is to be regarded as the true date.”
1—When a note is made for another's
accommodation
without

and delivered to him, he is
authorized to fill in the date as
date

NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS
fit. Androscoggin V. Kim
ball, 10 Cush. 373; see next sec
tion.
2-First State Savings Bank V.

date So as to read June 1st, 1859,
it Was held he could recover
against a prior accommodation in
dorser on the ground that he had
implied authority from both mak
er and prior indorsers to fill the
blank With any day in the month.
Page v. Morrel, 3 Abb. Dec. (N.
Y.) 433; Inglish v. Breneman, 5
Ark. 377, holding to the contrary
is not supported by authority.

the sees

Webster,
Where

June

121

a

10th,
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Mich. 149.
note was made on
payable thirty days

–,

1859,
after date, dated June
subsequent
to
indorser
and a
negotiated
June
it
was
whom
15th, filled in the blank in the

Blanks; when may be filled.—Where the
instrument is wanting in any material particular, the
person in possession thereof has a prima facie author
ity to complete it by filling up the blanks therein."
And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the
person making the signature, in order that the paper
Sec. 16.

may be converted into a negotiable instrument, operates
any
as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for
amount.” In order, however, that any such instrument,
when completed, may be enforced against any person

it all

who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it
must be filled up strictly in accordance with the author
ity given, and within a reasonable time; but if any
such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a

if

as

it

a

in

in

he

holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for
may enforce
purposes
his hands, and
accordance with the au
had been filled up strictly
thority given, and within
reasonable time.”

bona

fide

without notice of the

Weidman
teration.
Mich. 657.

v.

holder

al

Symes, 120

to

a

note who care
leaves room for an altera
be made without defacing
tion
exciting the suspicion
the note,

The maker of

lessly

or

a

liable

to

is

edge,

is

of

in

a

promis
1–One who executes
sory note by filling
all the
blanks on the printed form ex
cept the one designed for the rate
interest, which blank
there
his knowl
after filled without
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56

of a careful
upon it to

man will

be

liable

fide holder
without notice, when the oppor
tunity he has offered has been
embraced.
First Savings Bank V.
Webster,
To
121
Mich.
149.
the Same
effect
are the fol
lowing cases:
Holmes V. Trum
per, 22 Mich. 427; Bank of Pitts
burgh V. Neal, 22 How. (U. S.)
96;
Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cow.
336;
Kitchen v. Place, 41 Barb.
465; Page v. Morrel, 3 Abb. Dec.

(N. Y.)

433;

a

bona

Van Etta

v.

Even

Johnston Har
Wester Co. V. McLean,
57
Wis.
258; Yocum v. Smith, 63 Ill. 321;
Garrard V. Lewis, 10 Q. B. D. 30;
Cruchley v. Clarance, 2 M. & S.
90; Harvey v. Cane, 34 L. T. (n.
s.) 64; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md.
son,

28

Wis.

33;

118.

2—This

is the Settled

rule

of

in

the law merchant. A person
dorsing such paper to another is
liable on it when it is filled up
according to the prima facie au
thority which
it gives, though
contrary to actual instructions. In
Russel V. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514,
a person indorsed his name upon
the back of certain checks, blank
as to sum, date and time of pay
ment. The checks were filled in
by the person to whom the in
them, with
sums,
dorser gave
dates, and time of payment, dif
ferent from those authorized. The
court held the indorser liable, say
ing:
“The indorsement upon a
blank note is a letter of credit
for an indefinite sum.”
In Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal,
How. (U. S.) 107, the court
said:
“Where a party to a ne

22
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gotiable instrument intrusts it to
the custody
of another, with
blanks not filled up, whether it
be for the purpose to accommo
date the person to whom it is
trusted, or to be used for his own
negotiable instru
benefit,
such
ment carries on its face an im
plied authority
to fill up the
blanks and perfect the instrument,
and as between such party and
nocent third parties, the person to
whom it was so intrusted must
be deemed the agent of the party
who committed such instrument
to his custody, or in other words
it is the act of the principal, and
he is bound by it.”
See also Market Nat. Bank V.
Sargent, 85 Me. 349; Ives v. Farm
ers' Bank, 2 Allen (Mass.) 236;
Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch 142;

in

in

Angle

v. Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330;
DePauw v. Bank, 126 Ind. 553, 25
N. E. 705, 26 N. E. 151; Brad
ford Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 75 Hun,
297, 27 N. Y. Supp. 96; Frank v.

Lilienfeld,

33 Gratt. 384; London
Southwestern
Bank V. Went
worth, 5 Ex. D. 96.
3–Boston Steel and Iron Co. v.
Steuer, 183 Mass. 140 (a case un
der the Statute).
In this case a
check was brought to the plain
tiff by the defendant's husband,
signed in blank by the wife and
all filled up except the amount.
With the husband's consent the
&

plaintiff filled in the amount for

$400.
It was held that this was
an incomplete instrument under
sections 16 and 17 and that evi
authority
dence to show the
real
of the husband was admissible.
In Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Wa.

NEGOTIABLE
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659 (1902) (a case un
der the statute) it was held that
One taking a negotiable instru
Iment before the blank in it was
filled, is put upon notice
and

Law. Reg.

must ascertain the real authority
of the person intrusted with the
incomplete instrument,
and that
the statute reverses the previous
Tule as established in Frank V.

Iilienfeld,

33

Gratt. 384.

Under the corresponding pro
Vision of the Bills of Exchange
act, sec. 20 (2), it has been held
that the word “negotiated” does
Inot include “issue.”
Herdman V.
Wheeler, 86 L. T. (N.S.) 48. The
facts in this case were that W
gave A a note, signed in blank
and stamped with a 9d Stamp,

sufficient
for a note of 75 l,
coupled with authority to fill it
up for 15 l, and make it payable
and get a loan on it
applied to H for a
l,
saying it was for
25

to himself

for W.
loan of

Sec.

A.

17.
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W, who was willing to pay 5 l
for the accommodation.
A filled
the amount blank with 30 l, de

livered it to H, who had no
knowledge that W had not him
Self made the note complete for
the sum of 30 l. A did not turn
the money over to W.
It was
held that A's delivery of the note
to H did not “negotiate” it with
in the meaning of the act, and
H could therefore not recover.
The court Said that if the Sec
tion had been intended to include
Such
a case, appropriate
words
should have been used. The lan
guage Should have been “issued
or negotiated,” instead of simply
“negotiated”;
that negotiation
simply
by one
meant transfer
holder to another, and that the
was not a holder in due
course.
See further as to payee
being a holder in due course,
note 3, sec. 54.
payee

Incomplete

instrument not delivered.—
Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered
it will not, if completed and negotiated, without author
ity, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder,
as against any person whose signature was placed
thereon before delivery."
1—The well established rule of
the law merchant
is here af
firmed; and so a party will incur

wich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307;
Davis Sewing
Machine
Co. v.
Best, 105 N. Y. 67; Baxendale v.
Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 525
(1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 624. The

thereon when the instrument Was
incomplete, if such incomplete in
strument was completed and ne

case

no liability
on an instrument
which bears his signature put

gotiated

without authority.

Led

last above cited is the lead

ing English
tion.
The
Holmes

on the proposi
facts
were:
One
had asked the defendant
case

*A*-*
t.A
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for his acceptance of an accom
modation bill and the defendant
had Written his name
paper, which had an
bill Stamp On it, and
it to Holmes to fill in

across the
impressed
had given
his name

and then to use it for the pur
pose
of raising money on it.
Afterwards Holmes, not requiring
accommodation, returned the pa
per to the defendant in the Same
State in which he had received it
from him.
The defendant then
put it into a drawer, which was
not locked, of his writing table,

Sec. 18.

Delivery;

LAW.

at his chambers,

to which
his
laundress, and other per
sons going there, had access.
He
had never authorized any person
paper with the
to fill up
the
Held, there could
drawer's name.
be no recovery on the acceptance,
inasmuch as there was no deliv
ery;
that the disposition which
the defendant made of the bill
after it was returned to him did
not amount to negligence
on
which delivery could be predicat
ed.
Boston Steel and Iron Co. V.
Steuer, supra, note 3.
clerk,

when effectual;

when presumed.

—Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incom
plete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for
the purpose of giving effect thereto." As between im
and as regards a remote party other
than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to
be effectual, must be made either by or under the
mediate parties,

authority of the party making, drawing, accepting,” or
indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the
delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or

for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of
But
transferring the property in the instrument.”
is in the hands of a holder in due
course, a valid delivery thereof by all the parties prior
to him, so as to make them liable to him, is conclusively
presumed." And where the instrument is no longer in
the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is
presumed until the contrary is proved.”
where the instrument

1–Instruments of the law mer
like other written
con

chant,

tracts, are without legal inception
or valid existence until they have

NEGOTIABLE
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delivered according to the
purpose and intent of the par
21
Burson V. Huntington,
ties.
Mich. 416; Baxendale v. Bennett,
Cox v.
3 Q. B. D. 525 (1878);
been

Troy, 5 B. & Ald. 474; Mass.
Nat. Bank V. Snow (Mass. 1905),
72 N. E. 959 (a case under the
statute).
Delivery may be made (a) by
intention, (b) by agency, (c) by
negligence, (d) by conclusive pre
sumption. Actual transfer of the
from the maker to
instrument
the payee is not indispensable,
but it must appear that the mak
er in some way evidenced an in
tention to make the instrument
an enforceable obligation against
himself, according to its terms,
by surrendering
control over it
and intentionally placing it in the
power of the payee or some third
person, for his use.
Purviance V.

Jones, 120 Ind. 162, 21 N. E. 1099.
Intent to deliver is not sufficient;
act and intent must concur. Drum
v. Benton, 13 App. Cas. (D. C.)
245.

“accepting”
is
2—The
word
omitted from the North Carolina
act.
3–As to conditional delivery
see Hyde v. Tenwinkel, 26 Mich.
93; McCormick Harvesting Co. v.
McKee, 51 Mich. 426;
Brown v.
St. Charles, 66 Mich. 71; Central
Savings
Bank v. O'Connor, 132
578;
Burke v. Dulaney, 153
Mich.
U. S. 228; Bell v. Lord Ingestre,
12 Q.

B.

317, 19

Burns and Smith

L.

J.

Q.

Lumber

B. 71;
Co. v.

Doyle, 71 Conn. 742, 43 Alt.
Merchants' Bank v. Luckow, 37
Juilliard v. Chaffee,
Minn. 542;
483;

IN GENERAL.
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92 N. Y. 529;
Stewart v. Ander
son, 59 Ind. 375; Jones V. Shaw,

Mo. 667;
Garner v. Fite, 93
405;
Ala.
Carter v. Moulton, 51
Kan. 9. The last four cases are
to the effect that there can be no
delivery in escrow to the payee
himself.
New London Credit Syndicate
[1898], 2 Q. B. 487,
V. Neale
(a case under the correspond
ing provision
of the Bills of
Exchange act).
The action in
this case was upon a bill by
which the defendant undertook to
pay 110 l at the end of three
months. The bill was signed and
handed over as a bill of ex
change, but there was an oral
agreement that at maturity it
Should be renewed if the defend
ant required it. “In other words,
although
the written document
67

States that the bill is to be met
upon a day certain, the parol evi
dence is that it is not to be then
Nothing
met.
is more clearly
Settled than that evidence of such
an agreement is not admissible
* * *
I do not think that it
was intended by the act to alter
of evidence
the general
law
which renders parol evidence in
admissible for the purpose of con

tradicting the terms of

a

written

document.”

4—This changes the rule in
Michigan
as established in Bur
son V. Huntington, supra, but af
firms what is probably the nu
In
merical weight of authority.
accord with Burson v. Hunting
ton:
Palmer V. Poor, 121 Ind.
135; Branch v. Sinking Fund, 80
Va. 427, 56 Am. Rep. 596; Dodd

THE NEGOTIABLE

60

v. Dunne, 71 Wis. 578; Hillsdale
College V. Thomas, 40 Wis. 661.
Kinyon V.
To the contrary:

Wohlford,

17

Minn.

239;

Faulk

ner v. White, 33 Neb. 199, 49 N.
W. 1122; Martina v. Muhlke, 186
Ill. 327, 57 N. E. 954; Gould v.
Segee, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 260; Wor
cester Bank v. Dorchester Bank,
10 Cush. 488.
It is presumed conclusively that

one of two joint makers of a note
had authority from the other to
deliver it, if he does so. Beman
V. Wessels, 53 Mich. 549.
“Deliv
ery * * * is conclusively pre
Sumed
in case a note has been
stolen and transferred by the thief
to a bona fide holder.”
Mass.
Nat. Bank v. Snow (Mass. ’05),

INSTRUMENTS
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N. E. 959; Greeser V. Sugar
man, 37 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 799,
76 N. Y. Supp. 922;
Poess v.
Twelfth Ward Bank, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 857 (cases under the Sta
72

tute).
5–Possession of the instrument
and its production at the trial is
prima facie evidence of the plain
tiff's title, and right to Sue upon
it. Hogan v. Dreifus, 121 Mich.
453.

See

24 Mich.

also Hovey V. Sebring,
Hall V. Wortman,

232;

123 Mich. 304; Worth V. Case, 42 N.
Y. 362; Newcombe V. Fox, 1 App.
N. Y. Div. 389, 37 N. Y. Supp
294;
Moak V. Stevens, 45 Misc.
Rep. 147, 91 N. Y. Supp. 903 (a
case under the statute).

Construction where instrument is ambigu
ous.—Where the language of the instrument is ambigu
ous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules
of construction apply:
Sec. 19.

First, Where the sum payable is expressed in words
and also in figures, and there is a discrepancy between

the two, the sum denoted by the words is the sum pay
able; but if the words are ambiguous or uncertain,
reference may be had to the figures to fix the amount;”
Second, Where the instrument provides for the pay
ment of interest, without specifying the date from

which interest is to run, the interest runs from the date
of the instrument, and
from the issue thereof;”

if

the instrument

is undated,

Third, Where the instrument is not dated, it will be
considered to be dated as of the time it was issued;"
Fourth, Where there is conflict between the written

NEGOTIABILE INSTRUMENTS
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and printed provisions of the instrument,
provisions prevail;”

Fifth, Where the instrument is
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the written

ambiguous that
there is doubt whether it is a bill or note, the holder
may treat it as either, at his election;"
Sixth, Where a signature is so placed upon the
so

in

not clear in what capacity the per
son making the same intended to sign, he is to be
deemed an indorser;"
strument that

it is

Seventh, Where an instrument containing the words
promise to pay,” is signed by two or more persons,
they are deemed to be pointly and severally liable there

“I

On.”
1—Thus,
where the bill
ex
pressed the sum payable in fig
ures, as 245 l, and in words two
hundred pounds, although a Stamp
was affixed applicable to the high
er amount, it was held that evi
dence to show that the words
“and forty-five” had been omit
ted by mistake was not admiss
ible.
The rule is absolute that
in case of a discrepancy between
the sum expressed in words and
the sum expressed in figures, the
sum expressed in words governs.
Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N.
Graham,
C. 425;
Mears
v.
8

Blackf. (Ind.)

2–Witty

144.

Mich. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 123 Ind. 411. In this case
there was no sum expressed in
figures
words.
The marginal
expressed

v.

the sum
Smith,

$147.70.

In

R.
I.
398, 53 Am. Dec. 652, the sum
expressed in words was three hun
dred seventy-five 94/100 dollars,
Smith

v.

1

in figures $175.94. The clerk of
the bank discounting the bill had
altered the figures to conform to
the written words, and the de
fendant therefore objected to its
admission in evidence as avoided
by the alteration. The court said:
“We do not think the marginal
notation constitutes any part of
the bill.
It is simply a memo
randum or abridgment of the con
tents of the bill for the conven
ience of reference. The contract
is perfect without it.” This hold
ing naturally
suggests the in
quiry, how that which is not a
part of the bill can be appealed
to to determine what the bill is.
It would seem that inasmuch as
the marginal figures are so gen
erally and extensively employed,
it cannot be said that they form
no part of the instrument.
The
Very language
of the statute,
which is an affirmation of the
general rule, indicates that the
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marginal

figures may be appealed
to in case of ambiguity and un
certainty.
Burnham V. Allen, 1
Gray 496; Williamson v. Smith,
1 Cold

(Tenn.)

1.

3-See
See
Sec. 9.

“Issue,” sec. 2.
Bills of Exchange

Act,

payable
An instrument
made
with interest, but without speci
fying the rate of interest or the
time from Which it was to be
computed, carries interest at the
legal rate and from the date of
complete
Campbell
execution.
Printing Co. v. Jones, 79 Ala. 475;
Belford V. Beatty, 145 Ill. 414. An
payable on demand
instrument
and providing for the payment of
interest carries interest from its
date Without a demand. Proctor
v. Whitcomb, 137 Mass. 303; Pate
v. Gray, Fed. Cas. No. 10794 a ;
Paine v. Caswell, 68 Me. 80; Colby
v. Bunker, id. 424. For the purpose
of suit paper payable on demand
reaches maturity from the day of

In re Estate of King,
Palmer, 36
Palmer
v.
Mich. 487, and the statute of lim
itation runs against it from that
time.
For the purpose of trans
fer, paper payable on demand is
considered overdue after the lapse
of a reasonable time
after its
issue; but before the lapse of a
reasonable time knowledge of ac
its issue.

supra;
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stitution of suit, which is treated
as a sufficient demand. In re Es
tate of King, supra.
4-Maybury
Berkery,
v.
102
Mich. 126; Richardson v. Ellett,
10 Tex. 190; Knisely v. Sampson,
100 Ill. 573.
Express
5-American
Co. v.
Pinckney,

29

6-Heise

Ill.

392.

Bumpass, 40 Ark.
547;
Funk v. Babbitt, 156 Ill.
408;
Brazelton v. McMurray, 44
Ala. 323; Planters' Bank V. Ev
ans, 36 Tex. 592; Lloyd v. Oliver,
v.

Q. B. 471;
Edis v. Burry, 6
B. & C. 433.
In the case last
cited the instrument was in the
following form: “Three months
after date I promise to pay Mr.
John Bury, or order, 44 l, 11 s,
5 d, value received, John Bury.”
It Was addressed to “J. B. Gruth
erot, 35 Montague Place,” whose
Iname appeared in the lower left
hand corner, and whose accept
ance Was Written across the face.
Bury's name was written across
the back as an indorsement.
Held that the instrument might
be treated either as a bill or note,
at the option of the holder.
7—Herring v. Woodhull, 29 Ill.
18

not be pre
reasonable time

v. Williams, 44 Ala.
The statute in this provi
Sion and in Section 66 has Settled
the Vexed question of What lia
bility is incurred by an irregular
indorser.
The comment of Mr.
Crawford
on this section
is:

depends upon circumstances. Ran
dolph’s Com. Pap., 2d ed., secs.
1041-3.
An instrument payable on
demand with interest after ma

“Throughout the act it has been
the policy to make all irregular
parties indorsers.”
8—See Bills of Exchange Act,

tual

dishonor

Sumed.

What is

will
a

turity carries interest from the
date of actual demand or the in

92;

Walton

347.

Sec. 85

(2).

Dederick

V.

Barber,

44

Mich.
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19;

Dow Law Bank v. Godfrey,
Scraper Co. V.
Mich. 521;
Locklin, 100 Mich. 339; Dart V.
Sherwood, 7 Wis. 523;
Dill v.
126

White, 52 Wis. 169; Salomon v.
Hopkins, 61 Conn. 47, 23 Atl. 716;
Arbuckle v. Templeton, 65 Vt. 205,
25 Atl. 1095.
Where a person signs a note in
place of the maker and adds

thereto the word “surety,” he does
not thereby change the nature of
his liability to the payee or hold
er.
Inkster V. First Nat. Bank,
30 Mich. 143; Dart v. Sherwood,
supra. The liability of one who
signs a note as surety is not co
extensive with that of the maker.
If the fact of surety ship is dis
closed by the note itself (as in
above cases) the holder must re
spect the suretyship relation.
He
cannot make agreements to ex
tend the time of payment to the
surety’s detriment. The same rule
prevails if the holder of the pa
per has knowledge of the surety
ship relation, independent of facts
disclosed by the paper. Barron V.
Cady, 40 Mich. 259.
If the fact
of suretyship was a private mat
ter between principal and Surety,
undisclosed, in any manner, to
the holder, it has no bearing upon

Sec. 20.
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the rights of the holder.
As to
him there might as well have
been no special understanding and
no suretyship relation in fact. As
between the parties signing
a
note as makers, it is competent
to show that part of them were
mere sureties.
Stevens V. Oaks,
58 Mich. 343;
Eastman V. Cleav
er, 72 Mich. 167. Where the payee
in a note sold it before maturity,
for a valuable consideration, and
at the request of the purchaser
signed his name below that of the
payer, it was held that his lia
bility would be measured accord
ing to that of a maker, although
he claimed to have signed as in
dorser, and supposed his legal lia

bility would be measured accord
ing to the standard of the in
dorser;

One

that

of law and

action.

such

mistake

was

no defense to the

Cook v. Brown,

62 Mich.

473.

The Wisconsin act adds the fol
lowing subdivision:
“8. Where
several writings are executed at
Or about the same time, as parts
same transaction, intended
to accomplish
the same object,
they may be construed as one and
the same instrument as to all par
ties having notice thereof.”

of the

Liability of person signing in trade or as

sumed name.—No person is liable on the instrument
whose signature does not appear thereon, except as
But one who
herein otherwise expressly provided."
signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the
same extent as if he had signed in his own name.”
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Bills of Exchange
(1).

1—See
Sec. 23

Act,

Thus, an agent cannot by Sign
to a negotiable
instrument, and adding the word
“agent,” thereby bind his princi
pal.
To bind his principal, he
must either sign his principal's
name, or it must appear on the
face of the paper in Some Way

ing his own name

was drawn for the prin
Shoup,
Anderton
V.
17
Ohio St. 126; Sparks v. Transfer
Co., 104 Mo. 531; Bradlee v. Bos
ton Glass Mfg. Co., 16 Pick. 347;
Manufacturers Bank v. Love, 13
App. Div. (N. Y.) 561, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 812.
An oral guaranty of payment
is not within this provision of
the statute.
Swanson V. Stoltz,
36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999 (a case
under the Statute).
2–Trade name:
Notes Were
made payable to the order of Na
that
cipal.

it

tional Publishing Co. and indorsed
in that name to the plaintiff. The
claim was made that the notes
were made payable to a company
that had no existence, and that
therefore the paper was fictitious,
and that as the indorsement Was
fictitious
and spurious no title

INSTRUMENTS
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Held, that
the notes.
estopped
the defendant was
from
alleging that the notes were made
payable
payee.
to
a
fictitious
Jones v. Home Furnishing Co., 9
App. Div. N. Y. 103;
41 N. Y.
Supp. 71. The court said:
“The
notes were as much payable to
Jones when they were made pay
able to the name under which he
Carried on his business as though
he had been named therein.
It
is not in legal contemplation a
fiction, but it was the plaintiff,
passed

to

under this business name, and rep
resented him.”
Assumed name:
One may be
bound by any mark or designation
he thinks it proper to adopt, pro
Vided it be used as a substitute
for his name and he intend to
bind himself.
Brown V. Butchers'
Bank, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 443; Fiore
V. Ladd, 22 Ore. 202, 29 Pac. 435;
Anderson v. Bank, 66 Hun, 613,
21 N. Y. Supp. 925.
But see Bart
lett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336;
Brown v. Parker, 7 Allen 337.
The fact whether the party
could Write is immaterial.
Baker
v. Dening, 8 Ad. & El. 94, 35 E.
C. L. 498.

Signature by agent; authority; how shown.
—The signature of any party may be made by a duly
authorized agent. No particular form of appointment
is necessary for this purpose; and the authority of the
Sec. 21.

agent may be established as in other cases of agency."
may be by pa
1—Authorization
rol.
Odd Fellows
v. Bank,
42
Mich. 461; Coy v. Stiner, 53 Mich.

The signing by One person
of another's name in his presence
and by his direction is sufficient.
42.
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Sager v. Tupper, 42 Mich. 605. It
is not necessary that a person
unable to Write his own name
should, in the execution of a
note, touch the pen while another
is signing for him. It is only nec
essary that such person be au
thorized to sign. Kennedy v. Gra
ham, Admr., 9 Ind. App. 624, 35

N. E.

925, 37 N. E. 25.

Sec. 22.
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party

or a partnership is sought
to be charged on a signature
made by an agent or by a partner,
if authority so to sign is dis
puted, the burden is upon the

plaintiff to Show due authoriza
New York Iron Mine V. Cit
izens Bank, 44 Mich. 344; Good
ing v. Underwood, 89 Mich. 187.
tion.

Where a

Liability of person signing as agent, etc.—

Where the instrument contains, or a person adds to his
signature, words indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity,
he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly au
thorized; but the mere addition of words describing

him as an agent, or as filling a representative character,
without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him
from personal liability.”
Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 26. The original draft submitted
to the Conference of Commission
ers on Uniformity of Laws by Mr.
Crawford, adopted in terms and
substantially in language the pro
vision of the Bills of Exchange
Act, above referred to, thus adopt
ing the English rule, and the rule
prevailing in New York prior to
that time. The Section as it now
stands was substituted for that
Submitted in the original draft.
1—See

Crawford's

Annotated

Neg.

Inst.

Law, 28. The result is a change
in the rule as recognized by the
weight of authority in the United
person
States.
Heretofore
the
signing, for or on behalf of an
other, would not, though he were
unauthorized, be liable on the in
5

strument, but would be liable only
on his implied warranty that he
had such authority.
Bartlett v.
Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; White v.
Madison, 26 N. Y. 117; Taylor v.
Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 108; Miller v.
Reynolds, 92 Hun, 400; Taylor v.
Shelton, 30 Conn. 122; Kroeger
v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; Shef
field v. Ladue,
16
Minn. 388;
Simpson v. Garland, 76 Me. 203;
Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 572. To
Byars v. Doores'
the contrary:
Admr., 20 Mo. 284; Dale v. Don
aldson, 48 Ark. 188;
Weare v.
Gove, 44 N. H. 196. The statute
makes the agent liable on the in
strument, if he were unauthor

ized to sign on behalf of his prin
cipal.
In Tuttle v. Bank (Mass.
1905), 73 N. E. 560 (a case under
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Ala.

80,

etc.
24

Moragne,

So. 824;

Stinson

119

V.

Richmond,

v.

v.
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tioned the name of his principal
at the time the contract Was ex
ecuted.” To the same effect: An
Pearce,
derson
Ark. 293;

8

V.

v.

1;

I.

v.

V.

is

v.

V.

a

it

a

to

a

V.

is

It

Were construed.
was
held that the representative char
acter need not be disclosed upon
the face
the paper so far as
immediate parties were concerned,
but the case might be different so
far as innocent purchasers for
Value Were concerned. The court
adds:
“We do not understand
that the statute to which we have
change
alluded was designed
the common law rule in this re
gard, Which
to the effect that
as between original parties and
those having notice of the facts
relied upon as constituting
de
fense, the consideration and the

to

a

if

to

a

has entered into
Written Con
tract in which he appears as prin
cipal, even though he should pro
show,
allowed, that he
pose
disclosed his agency and men

principal,”

is

v.

5

is

in

...

of

(Wash. 1905) 80 Pac. 811 (a case
under the statute).
The general rule
the law
*pierchant
expressed
Nash
Towne,
Wallace 689, as follows:
“Parol evidence can never be ad
mitted to exonerate an agent, who

transaction.
The rule thus ex
pressed
affirmed by the statute.
Peterson, 173 N.
In Megowan
Y.
(a case under the Statute),
the words “without disclosing his

of

Til

den V. Barnard 43 Mich. 376. The
mere impression of the Seal of a
corporation upon paper, signed by
individuals with added words de
scribing them as chairman, preS
ident, or secretary, does not show
the representative character of the
signers nor relieve
them from
personal liability. Dutton v. Marsh,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 361; 4 Eng. Rul.
Buttner,
278;
Cas.
Daniel
V.

1

one is
not relieved
from personal liability by adding
to his name the descriptive term
trustee, administrator,
guardian,
agent, president, Secretary, treas
urer, etc.
One signing as “ves
tryman Grace church” is not re
lieved from personal liability.

So. 710;
Penn Mutual
Life
Conoughy, 54 Neb. 124,
Ins. Co.
74 N. W. 422.
But in Michigan,
contrary rule
recognized in
Winegar, 95 Mich. 430,
Keidan
Wherein
was held that in
payee against the mak
Suit by
promissory
er of
note who
added the word “agent”
his sig
nature, the defendant may show
by parol testimony that the paper
really that of his principal,
Who,
to the knowledge of the
payee, Was the real party to the
10

a

2–Thus,

Lee, 68 Miss. 113,
So. 272; Mc
Robe, 93 Ind. 298; Rog
Clellan
er Williams Bank
Groton Mfg.
Co., 16 R.
504, 17 Atl. 170; Ins.
Burkett, 72 MO. App.
Co.
Pugh
Moore, 44 La. Ann. 209,

is

the statute),
it was held that
Where a trustee executed a note
without authority he was person
ally liable on it without regard
to the form in which the note
Was executed, even though the note
was given as evidence of a loan
for the benefit of the estate.

LAW.

conditions under which the note
was delivered may be shown.”
Buttner, supra, ac
In Daniel
v.
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was upon paper in the fol
“German-American
Inc.,
Co.,
Investment
No. 409,
$600.00. Seattle, Washington, Feb
ruary 8th, 1902. Received from
tion

lowing form:

Herman Daniel $600.00 (six hun
dred dollars), which we promise
to pay six (6) months after date,
With interest at the rate of eight
(8) per cent per annum. William
H. Buttner, President; H. M. Glid
den, secy.”
The note bore the
corporate seal, but there was no
reference by which it was made
a part of the instrument.
It was
upon a
lithographed
executed
form, bearing the name of the
corporation, as indicated.
Held,

that the instrument did not pur
port to be executed by the cor
poration,

and that

it

came Within
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this section of the statute;

that
were personally
In the two last
the facts out of
which the transaction grew were
known to the respective parties.
The case last cited seems to con
Strue the words “without disclos
ing his principal” as meaning
that Such disclosure must be made
upon the face of the instrument.
For further illustrations of in
Struments executed by agents, see:
Finan v. Babcock, 58 Mich. 305;
Cadillac State Bank V. Cadillac
Stave and Heading Co., 129 Mich.
the defendants
liable thereon.
preceding cases

v. Union Co., (Mich.)
N. W. 758;
Nunnemacher v.
Poss, 116 Wis. 444;
Wis. Trust
Co. v. Chapman, 121 Wis. 479;
Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189.

15; McGraw
99

Signature by procuration; operation of.—
A signature by “procuration” operates as notice that
the agent has but limited authority to sign, and the
principal is bound only in case the agent in so signing
acted within the actual limits of his authority."
Sec. 23.

1–Procuration signifies a con
sensual contract in writing by
party
which
one
confides the
carrying on or execution of one
or more matters of business to
another,
who takes it in his
charge.
William v. Conger, 125
U. S. 422. As a term applied to
negotiable instruments it is tech
nical.
In form it is usually ex
pressed per proc., or p.p.
The
use of the term is uncommon in
the United States, but common in
England.
Attwood v. Munnings,

Eng. Rul. Cas.
The phrase is an express
intimation of a special and lim

7 B. & C. 278, 4
364.

ited authority and the person who
takes a bill or note so drawn, ac
cepted
or indorsed, is bound to
inquire into the extent of the au
thority.
Daniel’s Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 299.
But where an agent
has such authority his abuse of it
not affect a bona fide holder
V. La Banque
du Peuple (1893) A. C. 170. But
see Reid v. Rigby (1894) 2 Q. B.

does

for Value. Bryant
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under the Bills of Ex
change act, Sec. 25, where the
signature to a check was Rigby
and Company, per procuration of
J. Alport, manager, it was held
that such signature conveyed to
the bank the intimation that
port had only limited authority
to sign, and the bank could not
40, a case

Al
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recover inasmuch as Alport had
Alport
his authority.
had authority
to draw
on his
principal's bank account for the
purpose of the business but had
no authority
to overdraw their
account, or borrow
money on
their behalf, both of which he
did in this case.

exceeded

by infant or corporation; effect
of.—The indorsement or assignment of the instrument
by a corporation or by an infant passes the property
therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity
the corporation" or the infant* may incur no liability
Sec. 24.

Indorsement

thereon.
1–Thus an indorsement of an
instrument by a corporation will
transfer title to the instrument,
although for want of capacity to
bind itself, the corporation would
incur no liability as indorser.
2—This changes the law. Here
tofore
an infant’s
indorsement
could be avoided by him. Roach
v. Woodall, 91 Tenn. 206.
See

In re Soltykoff [1891], 1 Q. B.
(a case under the Bills of
Exchange act, Sec. 22 (2),) in
which it was held that an infant
413

cannot
even

bind

himself

by

the

ac

bill of exchange
though the bill is given for

ceptance

of

a

the price of necessaries Supplied
to him during infancy.

Forged signature; effect of.—Where a sig
nature is forged or made without the authority of the
person whose signature it purports to be, if it is wholly
inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument or to
give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof
against any party thereto, can be acquired through or
under such signature,
unless the party against whom
it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority.”
Sec. 25.

1—One can never be bound on
an instrument to which his name

has been forged or affixed
out authority.
Robarts V.

with
Tuck
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er,

16

Q.

B.

560;
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Lancaster

Baltzell, 17 G. & J. (Md.)
Whiteford V. Munroe, 17 Md.
Pettyjohn

V.

468;
135;

Nat. Bank, 101 Va.
E. 203 (a case under
statute); Buckley V. Bank,
v.

111, 43 S.

the
35

N.

J.

Law

400.

Tolman

V.

R. I.
462, 48 Atl. 480 (a case under
the statute).
In this case the
facts were: C gave A a check,
upon the fraudulent
representa
tions of A that he was B.
A
indorsed B's name on the check
which was payable to the Order
American

Nat.

Bank,

22

of B, and transferred it to
who collected it at the bank.

D,

It

was held that C could recover
from the bank under this provi
sion of the statute, as the Sig
clearly
nature
here
was
One
“made without the authority of
the person whose signature
it
purports to be,” and was there
fore “wholly inoperative.”
The
contrary view was maintained in
Hoffman v. American Nat. Bank
(Neb.) 96 N. W. 112. The sta
tute was not in force in Nebras
ka when this decision was ren
dered (but is now, see Introduc

tion), but the court referred

to

it

and cited the case of Tolman
v. Bank, supra.
In the Nebras
ka case B No. 1, an impostor,
bore the same name as another
B No. 2, represented himself to
be B No. 2, and induced
believe that he was B No.
believing him to be B No.

A
2.
2

to

A
pro

cured a draft to his own order,
indorsed it to the order of Peter
W. Brubaker, a name common
to the two Bs, and delivered
it to B No. 1. B No. 1 indorsed
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the draft,
defendant

was identified at the
bank on which
the
draft Was drawn, as Peter W.
Brubaker,
and
received
the
amount of the draft.
A brought
Suit against the drawee bank. It
WaS held he could not recover.
however,
This case,
has two
points which distinguish it from
Here
Tolman v. Bank, supra.
parties
name,
the
bore the same
and here also the
bank
re
quired identification and obtained
it, through a notary.
See also

Land Title & Trust Co. V. N. W.
Nat. Bank
(Pa. 1905) 60 Atl.
723, wherein
it was held that
the drawer of a check, draft, or
bill of exchange, who delivers it
supposing
to an impostor,
him
person
to be the
whose name he
has assumed, must as against
the drawee, or bona fide holder,
bear the loss where the impostor
Obtains payment of or negotiates
the same.
Beattie V. Nat. Bank,
174

III.

571,

51

N. E.

602.

In

a draft designed for
Geo.
P. Bent was, by mistake,
made payable to Geo. A. Bent, to
whom it was mailed and by Whom
it was received.
Geo. A. Bent
indorsed the draft and sold it to
the plaintiff.
It was held that the
indorsement was a forgery and

this

case

plaintiff acquired no title to the
instrument.

Sec.
24 of the Bills
of Ex
change act is identical with this
section except this prefix: “sub
ject to the provisions
of this
act.”
This prefix requires sec.
60 to be read in connection with
Sec. 24. The English statute was
passed upon in Lacave & Co. v.

70
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[1897], 1 Q. B. the manner the note was signed,
English and the want of authority
on
act is restricted in the manner the part of the actor to sign his
above stated the case does not name, but who understandingly
aid in the construction
of the and unequivocally adopts the sig
American
Statute.
nature and assumes the note as
Forgery embraces a case where his own.
It is difficult to per
one unwittingly signs an instru ceive why such adoption should
ment in the form of a negotiable not bind the party, whose name
relying upon is placed on the note as promisor
promissory
note,
false representations made to him as effectually as if he had adopt
by
at the time, that the instrument
ed the note when" executed
he is signing is a contract of an one professing to be authorized,
entirely different nature.
Gibbs and to act as an agent as indi
V. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479; Ander cated by the form of the signa
ture, but who in fact had no au
son v. Walter, 34 Mich. 113.
2-AS to the ratification of a thority.
It is, however, urged
forgery there is a conflict of au that public policy forbids sanc
thority.
Some courts hold that tioning the ratification of a forg
a person can adopt and affirm ed note as it may have a ten
his signature made by another dency to stifle prosecutions for
without authority,
and thereby criminal offenses.
It would seem,
subject himself to liability on the however, that this must stand
ap
Ashpitel
instrument.
V. Bryan, upon the general principles
plicable to other contracts, and
3 B. & S. 492; Seaver V. Weston,
is only to be defeated where the
163 Mass. 202; Bowlin
V. Creel,
63
Mo. App. 229;
Casco Bank agreement was upon the under
that if the signature
v. Keen, 53 Me. 103; Forsythe v. standing
Bonta, 5 Bush 547; Greenfield was adopted the guilty party was
Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447. In not to be prosecuted for the crim
the case last cited the court said: inal offense.” To the contrary: Mc
“It was clearly competent, if duly Hugh v. County of Schuylkill, 67
Credit

Lyonnais

148, but as sec. 24 of the

authorized
(i. e., the signing),
sign
thus to
the note.
It is, as
it seems to us, equally competent
for the party, he knowing all the

circumstances
as to the signa
ture and intending to adopt the
note, to ratify the same and thus
confirm what was originally an
unauthorized and illegal act. We
are supposing the case of a party
acting with full knowledge of

Pa. St. 391; Building and Loan
Assn. v. Walton, 181 Pa. St. 201;
Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St.
405, 31 Am. Rep. 547; Smith v.
Tramel, 68 Iowa 488; Henry v.
Heeb, 114 Ind. 280; Brooke v.
Hook, 24 L. T. (n. S.) 34.
One
whose name has been forged may
be estopped
from setting up the
forgery as a defense.
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Article II.
Sec.

26.

Consideration;

28.

Consideration,
tutes.

7I
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Consideration.
Sec.

presumption

29.

Of.
27.

IN
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what

consti

30.

When
lien
on instrument
constitutes holder for Value.
Want of consideration, effect
Of.

Holder for value, what
Stitutes.

con

31.

Accommodation
ity of.

party,

liabil

Consideration; presumption of.—Every ne
gotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been
issued for valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a
party thereto for value."
Sec. 26.

one controlling
contracts of
the law merchant and contracts of
the common law. It is presumed
that negotiable instruments were
given for a valid consideration
and the burden is upon the party
alleging no consideration to prove
his allegation.
Rood v. Jones, 1
Doug. (Mich.) 188; Matteson v.
1—Herein

lies

distinction between

Morris, 40
Nat. Bank

Mich. 52;
Manistee
V. Seymour, 64 Mich.
59; Conrad Seipp Brewing Co. v.
McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191; Beath
Chapoton,
508;
v.
124
Mich.
Young v. Shepard's Est. Id. 552;

Fraser (Mich.),
Taylor v. Taylor's
Est. (Mich.) 101 N. W. 832; Un
ion Trust Co. v. Morgans (Mich.)
103 N. W. 568.
When the con
sideration
of a promissory note
is named therein it is part of
the contract itself and the COn
tract cannot be so varied by parol
Farnsworth

V.

100 N. W. 400;

as to show another

consideration.

Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich.
579.
The plaintiff does not lose
the benefit of the presumption by
Offering evidence to show consid
eration,

Durland v. Durland, 153
Consideration
is pre
although
Sumed
the words “value
received” be omitted and no con
sideration be expressed. Taylor V.
Taylor's Est. supra;
Bristol v.
Warner, 19 Conn. 7. See note 2,

N. Y.

67.

Sec. 8.

Under the law merchant a bill
of exchange non-negotiable by rea
Son of lacking the words “to or
der,” or “bearer” nevertheless im
ports a consideration.
But a bill
non-negotiable by reason of be
ing payable out of a particular
fund does not import a consider
ation under either the law mer
chant or the statute. Daniel's Neg.
Inst.
(5th ed.) sec. 161;
Nat
Sav. Bank v. Cable, 73 Conn.
568,

48

R. R.

Atl.
Co.

428;
v.

Louisville

Caldwell,

98

etc.

Ind.
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251;
576.

v. Hallack,
9 Col.
cases under the Statute

Cowan

For

V. Von Glahn, 71
Div. 537, 75 N. Y.
Supp. 845; Towles v. Tanner, 21
App. (D. C.) 530; Black v. Bank,
96 Md. 399; Hickok v. Bunting,
92 App. Div. 167, 86 N. Y. Supp.
1059;
Moak v. Stevens, 91 N.
See:

Bringman

N. Y. App.
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Y. Supp. 903, 45 Misc. Rep. 147;
Karsch V. Pottier etc. Co., 82
App. Div. 230, 81 N. Y. Supp.
782;
Bank V. Dooley, 113 Wis.
590.
Under the statute a non
negotiable note does not import
Deyo V. Thompson,
consideration.
53 N. Y. App. Div. 9, 65 N. Y.
Supp. 459.

Consideration,

what constitutes.—Value is
any consideration sufficient to support a simple con
tract."
An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes
value, and is deemed such whether the instrument is
payable on demand or at a future time.”
Sec. 27.

1-A valuable consideration is
necessary to support a negotiable
instrument as well as any other
contract. This is the settled rule.
A note given by a father to his
son as the son's share in the fa
ther's estate being but a promise

to make a gift in the future is
without consideration and unen
forceable against the estate by the
payee or by the indorsee with
knowledge of the facts. Conrad V.
Manning's
Est., 125 Mich. 77;
Phelps v. Phelps, 28 Barb. 121;
Richardson V. Richardson, 148 Ill.

E. 608. But see Eaton
v. Libbey, 165 Mass, 218, 42 N.
E. 1127, where the privilege of
naming a child was held a valid
consideration for a promise.
Sufficient consideration:
Rood
v. Jones, 1 Doug. 188; Miller v.
Finley, 26 Mich. 249; Wright v.
Irwin, 35 Mich. 347; Taylor v.
Dansby, 42 Mich.
82;
Parsons
v. Frost, 55 Mich. 230; Hanold v.
Kays, 64 Mich. 439; McCabe V.
563, 36 N.

Caner, 68 Mich.
Holmes, 79 Mich.
etc. V. Gorham,
Walton v. Mason,
Hilbert v. Barry,

Banking
Union
Est., 113 Mich.
McLachlan,
120
bridge v. Tuller,

182;

Steers

430;
87

V.

Aultman

Mich.

233;

109 Mich.

486;

Mich.

698;

111

Co.
V. Martin’s
521;
Stevens v.

Mich. 285; Wal
125 Mich. 218.
Lack of Consideration: Kulen
kamp v. Groff, 71 Mich.
675;
Thornton v. Damm, 120 Mich.
510;
Graham V. Alexander,
123
Mich. 168; Taylor v. Weeks, 121
233;
Mich.
Brown
v. Smedley,

(Mich.)

W. 856; Nowack
(Mich.) 102 N. W.

98 N.

v. Lehmann,
992.

Illegal consideration:

Where a
note is given upon an illegal con
sideration or one contrary to pub
lic policy, it is as if it were
given for no consideration at all
and is unenforceable.
Comstock
v. Draper, 1 Mich. 481; Paton V.
Coit,
People v.
505;
5
Mich.
Twp., 11 Mich. 222; O'Hara v.
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Carpenter,

23 Mich. 410; Buck v.
Nat. Bank, 27 Mich. 293;
Hannah
v. Fife, 27 Mich. 180;
Hill v. Callaghan, 31 Mich. 424;
Snyder v. Willey, 33 Mich. 483;
Williams v. Guarde, 34 Mich. 82;
Lyon v. Waldo, 36 Mich. 345;
Wisner v. Bardwell,
38
Mich.
278; Mut. Assn. v. Hoyt, 46 Mich.

First

473;
384;
159;
621;

Shaw v. Clark, 49 Mich.
Tinker v. Hurst, 70 Mich.
Turnbull v. Twp., 74 Mich.
Fosdick v. Van Arsdale, 74

Mich. 302; Ward v. Doane, 77
Mich. 328; Goodrich V. McDonald,
77 Mich. 486; Chapman v. Rem
ington, 80 Mich. 552;
Wolf v.
Troxell Est., 94 Mich. 573; French
v. Talbot Pav. Co., 100 Mich.
443; Case v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416;
Heffron v. Daly, 133 Mich. 613;
Hubbard v. Freiberger, 133 Mich.
-

139.

2—This

affirms the rule
in
and many other states.
Bostwick v. Dodge, 1 Doug. 413;
Outhwite V. Porter, 13 Mich. 533;
Hanold v. Kays, 64 Mich. 439;
Crump v. Berdan, 97 Mich. 293;
Burroughs v. Ploof, 73 Mich. 607.
In the case last cited it was held
that the debt must have been ex
tinguished to render the holder,
a holder for value. See also Hen
riques
v. Ypsilanti
Sav. Bank,
Michigan

84 Mich.
id. 549;

City Bank v. Dill,
Currie v. Misa, L. R.

168;

Ex. 153.
Whether
this section extends
the rule that an antecedent or
preéxisting debt constitutes value
given
to
include
instruments
10

as collateral security for
preéxisting
such a
debt seems to
be still in doubt.
In Michigan

merely
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the giving or transfer of an in
security
Strument
as collateral
for a preéxisting debt does not
constitute

a

valuable

considera

tion. The rule is thus expressed:
One who takes a note as addi
tional security for a preéxisting
releasing any se
debt,
without
curity already held or agreeing
to extend the time of payment

is not a bona fide holder for
value.
Boxheimer
v. Gunn,
24
Mich. 372; Hanold v. Kays, 64
Mich. 439; Burroughs
v. Ploof,
73 Mich. 607; Maynard v. Davis,
127 Mich. 571. The former New
York rule as established in Cod
dington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 636,
was that when a note is given
aS payment or as collateral
Se
curity for

the

payment of a pre

debt it is not based on
Sufficient consideration.
This rule
has been followed by a minority
Thompson
of the other states.
V. Maddux, 117 Ala. 468, 23 So.
157; Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo.
éxisting

106; Penn. Bank v. Frankish, 91
Pa. St. 339; First Nat. Bank V.
Strauss, 66 Miss. 479, 6 So. 233;
Jenkins v. Schaub, 14 Wis. 1;
Roach v. Woodall, 91 Tenn. 206;

Bank

v.

Wright,

63

Ark.

604;

Bone V. Tharp, 63 Iowa 223.
The United States courts and
a majority
of the state courts
have
taken
a
different
view.
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1.
In Railroad Co. v. National Bank,
102 U. S. 25 the court said, “Our
conclusion, therefore, is that the
transfer before maturity of nego
tiable paper, as security for an
antecedent debt, merely, without
other circumstances, if the paper

**

74

THE NEGOTIABLE

indorsed that the holder
a party
to the instru
although the transfer
7ment
is
without express agreement by the
creditor
for indulgence, is not
improper
an
use of such paper,
be so

becomes

and is as much in the usual
course of commercial business as
its transfer in payment of Such
debt.
In either case the bona
fide holder is unaffected by equi

prior
ties or defenses between
parties of which he had no no
tice. This conclusion is abundant
ly sustained by authority.
A
by this
different
determination
court would, we apprehend, great
ly surprise both the legal pro
fession
and
the
commercial
World.”
Maitland
V.
Citizens’
Nat. Bank, 40 Md. 540; Alexan
der v. Bank, 19 Tex. Civ. App.
Rockville Nat.
Gas Light Co.,
72 Conn. 581, 45 Atl. 361;
Nat.
Revere Bank V. Morse, 163 Mass.
383;
Dunham v. Peterson, 5 N.
620, 47 S.

Bank

V.

W.

840;

Citizen's

Dak. 414, 67 N. W. 293, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 556; Spencer v. Sloan, 108
Ind. 183; Bonaud v. Genesi, 42
Ga. 639; McPherson V. Boundreau,
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was held that a preëxisting debt
constitutes value for the transfer
of negotiable paper and a person
to whom a negotiable instrument
has been pledged as collateral is
a holder
to the extent of the
amount due him.
In Brooks v.
Sullivan, 129 N. C. 190 it was
held that when a negotiable in
Strument
is transferred
before
maturity as collateral security for
a preéxisting debt, the assignee is
Such a holder for value to the
extent of the debt secured, that
he takes the paper free from all
equities of which he had no no

tice;

changing

North Carolina.

the prior

law

of

In

Mohlman Co. v. McKane, 60
Div. 546, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 1046, it was held that un
der the statute, receiving a note
as security
for a debt or for
bearance to sue upon a present

N. Y. App.

claim or debt, constitutes a con
sideration for the note or an in
dorsement of the note made for
the purpose of procuring its ac
ceptance.

" ler,

57

See

App.

also Petrie
Div.

17,

173

V.

Mil

N. Y.

596.

Ann.
Barker V. Lich : Brewster v. Shrader, 26 Misc.
tenberger, 41 Neb. 751, 60 N. Rep. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606, was
W. 79.
* the first New York case in which
Thus the authorities were in ! this provision of the statute was
irreconcilable
conflict.
The court
It was . specially construed.
the evident purpose of the statute Said: “Prior to the enactment of
to settle the question, but it the said law it was the settled
would appear that the purpose rule in this state that one who
has failed of accomplishment. This receives a promissory note as col
provision of the statute has been lateral security
merely, for an
upon by the courts of antecedent debt, cannot enforce
passed
Virginia,
North Carolina
and Such note against a maker or in
New York.
dorser thereof when the same has
In Payne v. Zell, 98 Va. 294, it been obtained by fraud, or has
48 La.

431;
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been fraudulently
diverted from
the purpose for . which it was
made.” (Citing Coddington v. Bay,
20 Johns, 637).
The court says of this provi
sion, “The language of this sec
tion. When given its usual and
ordinary signification,
ought to
leave no room for doubt upon
the subject.
There is, however,
disposition
Such
a
universal
among lawyers to look for SOme
hidden or subtle meaning in the
most simple language, that it has
quite the fashion to re
become

quire the courts to construe sta

tutes, which, to the average lay
mind, Seem to require no construc
tion.” The court holds that this
section changes the prior law as
announced in Coddington v. Bay
and subsequent cases and affirms
the rule laid down in Railroad Co.
V. Nat. Bank, Supra; Swift V.
TySOn, Supra.
This case WaS
thought to settle the matter once

and for all, but in 1903 the ques
tion was again raised in Suther
land v. Mead, 80 App. Div. 103,
80 N. Y. Supp. 504, 1149.
In this
case the court seems partially if
not wholly to reaffirm the old
rule of Coddington v. Bay. The
provision
court said that this
standing alone had not changed
the existing law as laid down in
Coddington
v. Bay, and added:

“All
54,

of these sections (27,
57,

58,

59,

61)

can

28,

be

31,

har

monized in their entirety, With
out any subtle refinement of rea
soning,

by construing section 27
to mean that, to constitute an
antecedent or preéxisting debt a
valuable consideration in Support

of
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promissory

note that had
diverted,
as
valid in the hands of a bona fide
holder, the latter must have been
cancelled, and, in legal effect,
paid and discharged the antece
By still
dent or preéxisting debt.
holding the debt, he in fact parts
With no value.
It was not in
tended thereby that, where a debt
a

been

fraudulently

continued to remain in existence
and enforceable as such, and the
note is taken as collateral secur
ity for its payment, such debt, un
discharged, constitutes a valuable
consideration,
or the holder of
the note one in due course, as
against the accommodation maker
or indorser
who has been de
frauded by the negotiation of the
instrument.
We are not to im
pute to the Legislature an intent
to change a rule of law which
has existed in uniform course of
enforcement for over three-quar
ters of a century, without a clear
and unequivocal expression so to
do. We may take judicial notice
that the commission appointed to
revise and codify
the statutes
was created, in the main, to codi
fy existing laws and not make
new rules; and certainly it was
never intended that settled usages
in respect of commercial paper,
founded upon decisions covering
a period of 80 years, and uni
form in application,
should be
overthrown in the construction of
ambiguous
and obscure expres
sions used by such body.
The
harmony of these provisions
of
the statute is in no measure dis
turbed by a construction which
causes them to read

that an

an
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preëxisting
tecedent and
debt
paid
must be
and discharged, in
Order to constitute the holder of
commercial paper, which has been
fraudulently diverted, a bona fide
holder and, as such, capable of
enforcing the same as against the
accommodation maker Or indorser.
Merely taking such paper as col
lateral Security for the payment
of a prečxisting
or antecedent
debt does not constitute
such
Value,
meaning
debt
within the
of this statute.”
The court in
Speaking of the construction
of
the statute in Brewster v Shrader,
supra, said, “We are not dis
posed to adopt this construction
of the law.” Roseman v. Mahony,
86 N. Y. App. Div. 377, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 749, followed Sutherland V.
Mead.
The court held that to
make an antecedent or prečxist
ing debt constitute value the

LAW.

holder of the note must give up
the debt, either wholly or quali
fiedly. He must part with some
thing, if not with the debt, at
least with the right to sue upon
it for some determinate period.
Waydell,
Bank of America
v.
Supp.
666,
92 N. Y.
was decided
in March, 1905, and the rule laid
down in Sutherland V. Mead and
Mahoney
Roseman
v.
was af
firmed. See also Milius V. Kauff
man, 93 N. Y. Supp. 669.
The Wisconsin Legislature re
moved the question from the field
of controversy by adding to the

section the following: “But the
indorsement or delivery of nego
tiable paper as collateral Security
for a prečxisting debt, Without
Other consideration, and not in
purSuance of an agreement at
the time of delivery, by the mak
er, does not constitute Value.”

Holder for value, what constitutes.—Where
value has at any time been given for the instrument,
the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to
all parties who became such prior to that time.”
Sec. 28.

v. Miller,
Hunter v. Wilson,

1–Elliott
131;
19
12
22

8 Mich.
4 Ex. 489,

L. J. Ex. 8; Hoffman
Wall. 181; DeWitt v.
Wis. 451; Griffiths V.
Wis. 290; Simon v.

39
33 Iowa

v. Bank,

Perkins,
Kellogg,

Merritt,

537.

The section is referred to in:
Black v. Bank, 96 Md. 399; Petrie
v. Miller, 173 N. Y. 596.
An indorsee of negotiable paper
must

have

relinquished

some

right, incurred
ity, or parted

some responsibil
with some value
upon the Credit of the paper at
the time of the transfer,
else
he will not be a holder for value
So as to shut out the equities of

antecedent parties.
Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Church, 56 How. Pr. 29,
81 N. Y. 218.
If a party becomes
a bona fide holder for value of a
bill before its acceptance,
it is
not essential to his right to en
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force it against
a subsequent
acceptor, that an additional consideration
should proceed
from
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him to the drawee. Heuertomatte
V. Morris, 101 N. Y. 63.

When lien on instrument constitutes holder
for value.—Where the holder has a lien on the instru
ment, arising either from contract or by implication of
law, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of
his lien."
Sec. 29.

1—Compare Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 27 (3).
A lien generally is a mere right
to hold a thing till a debt is paid.
It differs from a pledge in that
the pledgee has a special property
in the thing pledged.
The per
son who has a lien On a nego
tiable instrument is the holder
thereof, with the corresponding

rights and duties.

He has more
an ordinary lien on an or
dinary chattel.
The lien of a
banker will protect a bank hav.
ing possession of the bills or
notes of a customer to the extent
of the balance due such bank
from such customer.
Nat. Bank
v. Ins Co., 104 U. S. 54; Reynes
v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354; Straus
V. Tradesman Nat. Bank, 122 N.
Y. 379; Clark v. Bank, 160 Mass.
26.
Transfer of Such an instru
ment to any other holder as col
lateral Security for the payment
3f a debt due such holder from
the person who transferred the in
strument, gives the holder a lien
to the extent of the debt. Attenbor
ough v. Clarke, 27 L. J. Ex. 138;
Anderson v. Bank, 98 Mich. 543;
than

Sec. 30.

or failure

Stoddard v. Kimball,

Collins
648.

Cush. 469;

6

Martin, 1 Bos. & Pul.
The following are cases
v.

under the
Alderman,
109.

In

Statute:

Mersick

(Conn. 1905)

this

case

V.

Atl.
plaintiff
60

was

the
indorsee
and holder
of a note and the owner of the
claim it was indorsed to secure.
The defendants Were the makers.
Held, that the plaintiff's assignor
was a lien holder, and a holder
for value to the extent of his
lien, and to that extent a holder

course.
The plaintiff suc
ceeds to the rights of the assign

in due
or

and
whether

in

holder
he be

a

due

holder

course,

in

due

course or not; see Sec. 60. Payne
v. Zell, 98 Va. 294;
Brooks v.
Sullivan, 129 N. C. 190; Redfern
Rosenthal, 85 L. T. 313, 86
V.
L. T. 855 (under the correspond
ing section of the Bills of Ex

change Act). If the securities are
sold to pay the debt, the pur
chaser, if he be a holder in due
course, under sec. 54, would be
entitled to recover the full face
value under sec. 59, although he
paid a less amount for them.

Want of consideration, effect of.—Absence
of consideration is matter of defense as
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against any person not a holder in due course; and
partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto”
whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated
amount or otherwise.”
1–It is the invariable rule Of
the law merchant that as be
tween immediate parties want of
consideration is always available
as a defense.
The defendant may
show by parol that there was
insufficient consideration, that the
consideration
was the perform
agreement
ance
of a certain
performed,
which has not been
or
that the consideration has failed
in some other way. Reeves V.
Kelly,

132;
30 Mich.
Dansby, 42 Mich. 82;
Fletcher, 52 Mich. 484;
Nat. Bank V. Seymour,
59; Farwell v. Ensign,
600; Shaw v. Stein, 79

Taylor

v.

Maltz V.
Manistee
64 Mich.
66 Mich.
Mich. 77;
Macomb v. Wilkinson, 83 Mich.
486; Funk v. Chambers, 95 Mich.
508; Keidan v. Winegar, 95 Mich.
430;
Van Tuyle v. Pratt,
101
Mich. 38; Perkins v. Brown, 115
Mich. 41; Kelley
v. Guy,
116
Mich. 43; English v. Yore, 123
Mich. 702; Keystone Mfg. Co. v.
Forsyth, 126 Mich'98, Brown v.
Smedley, (Mich. 1904) 98' N. W.
.856.

When the Want of consider
the Va
ation is total it
affect:
lidity of the Pnstrument, in its
entirety, when it is partial it af

fects the validity of the instru
ment pro tanto. Allaire V. Hart
shorne, 21 N. J. L. 665. If a per

who sues on a note is bound
by the equities existing between
the maker and the indorser the
son

Qf

for the indorsement
material question. Kelly V.
Freedman, 56 Mich. 321. Lack or
failure of consideration is a good
defense against any holder bound
by the equities existing between
Sutton
V.
maker
and payee.
Beckwith, 68 Mich. 303.
But if
the maker says to the proposed
purchaser of his note that it is
all right and that he will pay it
at maturity, he is estopped after
its purchase in reliance upon
Such a statement, from asserting
consideration

is

a

failure of consideration or plead
ing any other invalidity, against

it. Id.

paper
ported
eration.

exchange their
or checks although
accommodation, the
sup
exchanged is

parties

Where

bills, notes
for mutual
so

by

a ,

Farber

valuable
v.

'Nat.

consid
Forge

and Iron Co., 140 Ind. 54, 39 N.
E. 249; Union Trust Co. v. Rig
don, 93 Ill. 459.
This is so, al
though one of such notes is un
paid at maturity and such dis
honor is no defense of failure of
consideration on the other. New
man v. Frost, 52 N. Y. 422; Rice
v. Grange, 131 N. Y. 149, 30 N.

E.

46.

2—Sebring v. Hazard, 128 Mich.
Stacy v. Kemp, 97 Mass.
330;
166.

The

rule
is that whenever
party is entitled to go into
the question of consideration at
a
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all, he may set up a partial as
Well as a total failure.
This
rule does not, however, extend to
a case of a note given for an
article purchased for much more
than it is Worth.
If the article
for which the note was given be
of any value at all, the defense
of partial failure of considera
tion is not available.
Harness
v. Horne, 20 Ind. App. 134, 50 N.
E. 395. Courts Will not as a rule
inquire into the adequacy of the
consideration.
Mich. 559.

Shattuck

V.

Hart,

98

-

3-Partial failure

of considera
not be available as a
defense unless the facts are such
that the amount to be deducted
because of the partial failure can
be definitely computed, or unless

tion will
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the amount is liquidated or in
the nature of a certain debt. This
is the rule of the law merchant
in England and in many of the

Trickey v. Larne, 6 M.
States.
& W. 278; Sully v. Frean, 10
Exc. 535; Greenleaf v. Cook, 2
Wheat. 13; Packwood V. Clark,
Fed. Cas. No. 10656. The Statute
has changed this rule.
Partial failure of consideration
is available as a defense in some
States, although the amount be
unliquidated.
V.
Wentworth
Dows, 117 Mass. 14;
Davis
v.
Wait,

Wyckoff v.
Law 107. The
Statute affirms this rule.
See secs. 54-8 as to What is
Ore.

12

Runyon,

33 N.

necessary
holder

in

to
due

425;

J.

constitute
course.

one

a

party, liability of.—An ac
commodation party is one who has signed the instru
ment as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without
receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lend
ing his name to some other person.
Such a person
Sec. 31.

Accommodation

is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, not

withstanding such holder at the time of taking the
only an accommodation
instrument knew him to be
.
party."
*
1—An accommodation party is
liable to a holder for value ac.

merce v.

Qoumbe, 47 Mich. 358.
between the ac

An underständing

cording to the position he has commodition maker of a note and
assumed on the paper, and ac-‘the payee that the latter will
it, of which un
cording to the terms of the con- take
care of
derstanding the indorsee had full
tract. If he assumes thé position
of maker or acceptor he is pri- notice when he took the note,
marily liable. The accommodation is no defence to an action on the
contract stands upon its legal note by the indorsee against the
form.
Canadian Bank of Com- accommodation maker.
Thatcher
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Bank,
V.
West River Nat.
19
Mich. 196.
Parol proof that a
maker of a note Was induced to
sign it by agreement of the payee
that he should not be held liable
thereon is inadmissible
to Vary
or contradict the legal effect of
Kulenkamp
the instrument.
V.
Groff, 71 Mich. 675; Warder & Co.
v. Gibbs, 92 Mich. 29; Cristy v.
Campau, 107 Mich. 172; Grocers'
Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502.
The fact that an accommodation
maker of a note has written his
name across the back instead of
signing on the face of the note,
tends, though not conclusively, to
indicate that he did not intend to
sign as joint maker but only as
surety and is enough to put the

original

Moynahan

creditor
on
v. Hanaford,

inquiry.

42

Mich.

3.29.

paper has no
validity until it is negotiated and
does not become binding upon the
accommodation party until such
negotiation, that is, Value must
have been given by some one be
fore the accommodator can be
held. Any accommodation party
may withdraw
his signature as
maker, drawer, acceptor or in
dorser before the paper has been
negotiated.
Second Nat. Bank V.
Howe, 40 Minn. 390; Patterson v.
Bank, 26 Ore. 509, 38 Pac. 818.
Where one signs a note for the
accommodation of another with
Out the Solicitation
of the payee
or for his benefit, the fact that
there was no consideration as to
signing
the one
so
does
not
make
him
an
accommodation
Capital Bank
maker.
v.
Des
Accommodation
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Moines etc., 84 Iowa 561, 51 N.
W. 33. Accommodation paper can
not exist Without a loan of credit
to the accommodated party. Dunn
Exchange
V. Weston, 71 Me. 270.
paper
of
for the mutual benefit
and convenience of the parties
constitutes consideration for the
paper so exchanged. So a prom
issory note given by the maker
in exchange for a note given to
him by the payee is not an accom
modation note. Whittier V. Eager,

Allen

(Mass.)
tions as a general
out the power to
parties.
modation
Dacey, 45 Mich.
1

499.

Corpora

rule are with
accom
Beecher
V.

become

92;
Steiner V.
Land & Lumber Co., 120
Ala. 128, 26 So. 494; Bacon v.
Farmers' Bank, 79 Mo. App. 406;
Worthington V. Schuylkill Electric

Steiner

Pa. St. 211, 45 Atl. 927.
section does not apply to
corporations
nor enlarge
their
power to become accommodation
parties. Oppenheim v. Simon Rei
gel Cigar Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 355
Co.,

195

This

(a case under the statute).
A
partner has no implied authority
to bind the firm as an accommo
dation party and when he does
so, any holder
with notice of
such fact cannot recover against
the firm.
Heffron W. Hanaford,

Burke v. Wilbur,
National Bank v.
Law, 127 Mass. 72; Bank of Fort
Madison V. Alden, 129 U. S. 372.
The following cases have been
decided under the statute: Willard
v. Cook, 21 App. D. C. 237;
Black v. Bank of Westminister,
96 Md. 399; Rowe v. Bowman, 183
Mass. 488; Packard v. Windholz,
40 Mich.

305;

Mich.

329;

42
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Y. Supp.
66 N.
Y. App. Div. 23, 73 N. Y. Supp.
12.
The facts in this case were
that a note was made by defend
ant for the accommodation
of
the payee who transferred it be
fore maturity to a third person
at a discount of 40%.
This in
666.

365, 84 N.

Strickland

v.

Henry,

effect made the interest reserved
40 per cent per annum.
Held:
The note did not represent a le
gal transaction.
It had no legal

existence when sold to the plain
tiff and, having no legal exist
ence, could not be the subject of
sale and purchase.
In point of
law the sale of accommodation
paper is merely a loan of money,
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the purchaser being the lender,
the seller the borrower;
and if
the sale be at a usurious dis
count it is invalid.
The statute
has not changed this rule.
In
Nat. Citizen's
Bank v. Toplitz,
81 App. Div. 593, 81 N. Y. Supp.
422 an accommodation note Was

discounted by a bank for the in
dorser with full knowledge that
it was accommodation paper. It
was not paid at maturity and at
the request of the indorser, for
whose benefit it was discounted,
the time of payment was extend
ed without the knowledge of the
Held,
maker.
the maker
was

primarily liable and not released.
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34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Megotiation.
Sec.

Sec.

32.

INSTRUMENTS

Negotiation,
what
consti
tutes.
Indorsement, how made.
Indorsement must be of en
tire instrument.
Indorsement, kinds of.
indorsement;
Special
in
dorsement in blank.
indorsement;
how
Blank
changed to Special indorse
ment.
When indorsement is restrict
ive.
indorsement;
Restrictive
ef
fect of; right of indorsee.
Qualified indorsement.
Conditional
indorsement.
Indorsement
of instrument
payable to bearer.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.

Indorsement
where payable
to two or more persons.
Effect of instrument
drawn
or indorsed to a person as
cashier.
Indorsement where name of
payee is misspelled, etc.
Indorsement in representative
capacity.
pre
Time of indorsement,
Sumption.
pre
Place of indorsement,
Sumption.
Continuation
of negotiable
character.

Striking out indorsement.
Transfer
Without
indorse
ment; effect of.
When prior party may nego
tiate instrument.

Qo
Sec. o4.

Negotiation, what constitutes.—An instru
ment is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such manner as to constitute the
transferee the holder thereof. If payable to the bearer"
it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order” it is
negotiated by the indorsement of the holder” completed
by delivery."
1—As to what instruments are
payable to bearer see section 11.
2—AS to what instruments are
payable to order see section 10.
3—Indorsement:
See next SeC
tion.
4—Indorsement is not consum
mated without delivery in fact,
or by what, in legal construction
and effect, amounts to delivery.

Kinzie

V.

ics' Bank,
Spencer V.
445;
Sec.

Farmers'
2

Doug.

and Mechan
(Mich.) 104;

Carstarphen, 15 Col.
Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
In Swenson V. Stoltz,

Daniel's
665.

318, 78 Pac. 999
(a
under the statute) it was
held that sections 32-3 state mere
ly how negotiation may be com
pleted, and do not affect section
36 Wash.

case

NEGOTIABLE

provides that “where
51, which
the holder of an instrument pay
able to his order transfers it for
it, the
value without indorsing
transfer vests in the transferee
such title as the transferer had
therein.”
In Day V. Longhurst
(1893) 41 W. R. 283 (a case
provi
under
the corresponding
Exchange
Sion of the Bills of
Act) it was held that where bills
not payable to bearer were trans
ferred, but not indorsed, to a
party as security for a debt and
by
were subsequently
indorsed
the transferer, such indorsement
constituted
the first negotiation
under this section.
Bank
v.
Pick (N. D.
In this
N. W. 63.
provision
case
this
of the sta
tute was referred to but Was
not construed further than that
the Word “assigns” as used in
Section 3255 of the Revised Code
of 1899 does not include the in
dorsee of negotiable paper who
takes the same before maturity
for value, and without notice of
defense thereto.
The Word “aS
signs”
was used in connection
with a statute which provided
that every contract made by a
corporation which had not com
plied with certain statutory pro
visions, would be Void on behalf
of such corporation and its as
signs.
An executory contract to as
sign a promissory note on per
formance
of certain conditions
does not operate of itself to trans
Nat.
1904),

99

fer title.
Nat. City
Torrent, 130 Mich. 259.
agreement,

although
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Bank

A

v.
parol

entered into

at the time of making negotiable

83

paper, that the, payee will not
negotiate it, and will renew it,
etc., is inadmissible
to vary the
effect of the paper.
Parol evi
dence is inadmissible to vary the
written contract evidenced by the
Hyde V. Tenwinkel,
instrument.
26 Mich. 93; Cook v. Brown, 62
Mich. 473; Kulenkamp
v. Groff,
675;
Mich.
Hutchinson
v.
Hutchinson,
635;
102
Mich.
Frackelton,
Hitchcock
v.
116
Mich. 487. Thus, evidence is in
admissible to show that the mak
er was not to be held liable;
Gumz v. Giegling, 108 Mich. 295;
that the maker was to be liable
only as an indorser,
Aultman
Taylor Co. v. Gorham, 87 Mich.
233; that the paper was not to
be negotiated at all,
Heist
V.
71

Hart,

Pa.

73

St.

286;

Knox

V.

that it was
to be negotiated only at a cer
tain bank, Stubbs v. Goodall, 4
Clifford,

38 Wis. 651;

Ga. 106;
that it would be re
newed, United States Nat. Bank
V. Geer, 55 Neb. 462, 75 N. W. 1088.
But as between original par
ties and others taking with no
tice, a conditional delivery may
be shown, Ricketts V. Pendleton,
14 Md. 320; Higgins v. Ridgway,
153 N. Y. 130.
An insane person cannot make
a valid assignment
of a nego
tiable instrument during insanity.

Evidence that the payee of a ne
gotiable instrument,
payable to
during all
order,
was insane
the
time
from
the
issuance
of the paper until the death

of the
prove
fer.
Mich.

payee is admissible to dis
the validity of the trans
Sheldon,
Hannahs
V.
20

278.
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Indorsement;

how made.—The indorsement
must be written on the instrument itself or upon a
paper attached thereto." The signature of the indorser
without additional words, is a sufficient indorsement.”
Sec. 33.

1–“Indorsement
is
an
act
whereby a person not being ac
ceptor, or quasi acceptor, surety,
or guarantor, writes
his name
upon the back or face of a duly
negotiable bill of ex
executed
change,
promissory
note,
or
cheque,

terms of
liability, according

with or without

contract,

or

to the law merchant, or writes an
equivalent contract On a Separate
paper annexed to the bill or
cheque.”
Bigelow's Bills, Notes
and Cheques 83.
Indorsement
erally signifies a writing on the
back. Hartwell V. Hemmenway, 7
Pick. 117; Com. v. Spilman, 124
Mass. 327.
The ordinary mode
of indorsing a note is by the
dorser's writing his name upon
the back thereof, but the indorse
ment may be made upon the face
of the note with the same effect
as if made upon the back. Shain

lit

in

v. Sullivan, 106 Cal. 208, 39 Pac.
606; Haines v. Dubois, 30 N.
L. 259; Partridge v. Davis, 20

J.

Vt. 499.
The “paper attached
thereto” is called “allonge.”
The
indorsement may be on the al
longe whenever the interest or
convenience of the parties require
it. It is, not necessary that there
should be physical impossibility
of

writing

the indorsement on
Crosby V.
the instrument itself.
Roub, 16 Wis. 645;
Folger v.
Chase, 18 Pick 63;
French v.

Turner,

15
Ind. 59.
Some of
the foreign codes provide that the
first indorsement on the allonge
must begin on the bill and end
on the allonge. This provision is
designed to secure identification
and to prevent an allonge from
being taken from one bill and
Stuck
to
another.
Chalmers'
Bills of Exchange, 5th ed. 107.
Full indorsement embraces two
contracts; first, transfer of
an executed contract; second, as
liability
Sumption
personal
of
upon performance of conditions
precedent-an executory contract.
Aniba V. Yeomans, 39 Mich. 171.
Departures from the regular form

title

e., the mere
indorsement—i.
of the indorser's name
upon the back of the paper—have
been
held Sufficient to transfer
the title, e. g., “I hereby assign
the within note to M. & S.”
Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184;
Stevens V. Hannan, 86 Mich. 307;
Phelps v. Church, 65 Mich. 232;
Green v. Burrows, 47 Mich. 70;
Of

writing

Russell

Hall
Trust

Klink,

Mich. 161;
Pa. St. 318;
Co. v. Nat. Bank, 101 U.
Elgin City Banking Co. v.

v.

v.

Toby,

53

110

S. 68;
Zelch, 57 Minn. 487; Dunham v.
Peterson, 5 N. Dak. 414.
But
supra;
See Aniba V. Yeomans,
Spencer V. Halpern, 62 Ark. 595,
36 L. R. A. 120.
See further as
to sufficiency of indorsement War

NEGOTIABLE

der v. Gibbs, 92 Mich. 29; Whit
worth v. Pelton, 81 Mich. 98;
Marskey v. Turner, 81 Mich. 62.
In Thorpe V. Mindeman (Wis.
'04) 101 N. W. 417 (a case under
the statute) it was held that an
reading “For value
indorsement
received I hereby sell, transfer
and assign, the within note and
attached;
the coupons
thereto
recourse,”
without
was a good
indorsement,
commercial
and not
a mere assignment.
The signature of the indorser is
not essential to a valid indorsement.
Any substitute for the name, if
intended as an indorsement, Will
meet the requirement of the rule.
Thus a payee writes upon the in
strument “1, 2, 8” as a substi
tute for his name, and transfers
the instrument;
The act is an
indorsement.
Brown V. Butchers
Bank, 6 Hill 443. The maker of
a note payable to his own order
must indorse it to pass title, but
by indorsing his name upon the
back of the note and delivering
it in that form to the holder, the

maker does not become an in
dorser in the commercial accep
tation of that term. He is, never

Sec. 34.
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maker of the note,
on its back being
an essential part of its execu
tion, and his liability continues
to be that of a maker only. Ewan
V. Brooks-Waterfield,
55 Ohio St.
the

his signature

596.

AS to indorsement
of
non
negotiable notes,
see Steere
V.
Trebilcock,
108 Mich. 464;
Mer
chants’ Nat. Bank v. Gregg, 107
Mich. 146.
2—The legal title to a bill or
note may be transferred by blank
indorsement and the holder has
absolute
control
of and may
by
recover on the instrument
proving the indorsement.
Whit
worth v. Pelton, 81 Mich. 98. An
indorsement
in blank by the
of the instrument is pre
to have been intended as
a transfer thereof, but the pre
sumption may be rebutted by pa
rol proof that it was intended to
show a receipt of the money
from the agent of the maker.
Davis V. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570;
U. S. Nat. Bank V. Geer, 55 Neb.
payee

Sumed

462,

75 N.

W. 1088, 70 Am.

St.

R. 390.

must be of entire instrument.—

The indorsement must be an indorsement of the entire
instrument. An indorsement which purports to transfer
to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or
which purports to transfer the instrument to two or
more indorsees severally, does not operate as a nego

tiation of the instrument; but where the instrument
has been paid in part it may be indorsed as to the resi
due.
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1—Indorsement of less than the
entire title to an instrument does
not operate as a negotiation there.
of; e. g., an order by the payee

of

a note to pay a sum out of it
less than the entire Sum is not
an indorsement
thereof. Lindsay
Price,
v.
33 Tex. 282. The holder
of a bill for 100 l indorses it
“pay to D, or order 30 l.” This
is invalid unless C also acknowl

Sec.
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edges the receipt

of 70 l. Hawkins
Ld. Raymond 360.
Where two indorsements for parts
of the amount of a note were
made,
both together purporting
to transfer
the whole, it was
held that two Vicious indorse
ments could never constitute a
Hughes V. Kiddell, 2
good one.
Bay (S. C.) 324.
v.

Cardy,

1

Indorsement,

kinds of.—An indorsement
may be either special or in blank; and it may also be
either restrictive or qualified or conditional."
t

35.

1—(Special

indorsement,

or

in

dorsement in full: )
Pay to Walter Brooks, or order.
Oscar Adams.

in blank.)
Walter BrookS.

(Conditional indorsement.)
Pay to Seth Eaton, or Order, on
the completion of the Atlas Build
ing.
Aaron DaViS.

(Indorsement

(Qualified indorsement.)
Without
recourse.
Charles Clark.
-- -- --- --

(Restrictive indorsement.)
Pay Henry Fox, or order, for
collection for my account.
Seth

Eaton.

- - -- -- - - -- - - - --- -- - -- --

Sec. 36. Special indorsement; indorsement in blank.
—A special indorsement specifies the person to whom
or to whose order the instrument is to be payable; and
the indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to the
further negotiation of the instrument.
An indorsement
in blank specifies no indorsee, and an instrument so
indorsed is payable to bearer and may be negotiated by
delivery."
1-See:
Sections 11 and 35.
Bills of Exchange Act, section 34.
Where an instrument
is once

indorsed in blank, though after
wards indorsed specially, it will
still be payable to bearer, though

NEGOTIABLE
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as against the special indorser
himself,
title must be made
through his indorsement. Haber
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sham V. Lehman, 63 Ga. 383;
Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex. 212.

Blank indorsement; how changed to special
indorsement.—The holder may convert a blank indorse
ment into a special indorsement by writing over the sig
nature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent
with the character of the indorsement."
Sec. 37.

1—The reaSOn Of the rule em
bodied in this provision is stated
by Mathews, J. in Martin v. Cole,
104 U. S. 37.
“The contract
created by the indorsement and
delivery
of a negotiable note,

even between the immediate par
ties to it, is a commercial con
tract and is not in any sense a
contract implied by the law, much
less an inchoate
or imperfect
contract.
It is an express con
tract, and is in writing, some of
the terms of which, according to
the custom of merchants and for
the convenience of commerce, are
usually omitted, but not the less
on that account perfectly under
stood. All its terms are certain,
fixed, and definite, and, when nec
essary, Supplied by that common
knowledge, based on universal cus
tom, which has made it both Safe
and convenient to rest the rights
and obligations of parties to such
upon an abbrevia
instruments
tion.
So that the mere name of
signed
upon the
an indorser,
back of a negotiable instrument,
conveys and expresses his mean

ing and
Sec.

intention

38.

as

completely as if he had writen
the customary obligation of

out

his contract in full.”

Vincent

Horlock,

State Nat.

Bank

v.

1 Camp. 442;

Haylen,

14

Neb.

W.

482;

Beckwith V. Angell, 6 Conn. 317.
A qualified blank indorsement
may be changed to a special in
Lyon V. Ewings, 17
dorsement.
Wis. 63.
In Scott V. Calkin, 139 Mass.

529, it was held that an indorsee
might write over a blank indorse
ment, “I guarantee payment of
the Within note.” But in Belden
V. Hann, 61 Iowa 42, the con
trary was held upon the ground
that the effect Would be to de
prive the indorser of his right
to notice in case of non-payment.
In the latter case the writing put
in above the blank indorsement
was, “Guarantee payment at ma

turity

to bearer.”
holder under a blank indorse
ment cannot fill it up so as to
make the note payable in part to
One person and in part to anoth
er. Erwin v. Lynn, 16 Ohio St.

A

547.

fully and

When indorsement

dorsement is restrictive,"

is restrictive.—An

which either:

in
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of the

in

the indorsee the agent of the

in

the further

negotiation

or

Second, Constitutes
dorser;” or

Third, Wests the title in the indorsee in trust for or
the use of some other person." But the mere absence of
words implying power to negotiate does not make an
indorsement

1-A

restrictive.”

restrictive
indorsement
the first element of the
contract,
indorser's
transfer of

limits
title.

-

note 1, Sec. 33.
“Pay the contents
2—Thus:
to J. P. only.” Power v. Finnie,
4 Call. (Va.) 411.
3–Thus: “For deposit my ac
See

count”, “Pay H. A. Bedfield, cash
ier, or order, for collection.” Locke
V. Leonard Silk Co., 37 Mich. 479.
“The indorsement for collection
does not transfer the title to the
note, nor its proceeds to the in
dorsee, but makes him merely the
agent of the indorser to take the
pay
necessary steps to Secure
ment of the instrument for the
Owner.
Locke V. Leonard Silk
Co., supra;
Reading v. Beards
ley, 41 Mich. 123; Sutherland V.
First Nat. Bank, 31 Mich. 230;
Fuller v. Bennett, 55 Mich. 357;
Commercial Nat. Bank V. Arm
strong, 39 Fed. 684;
Nat. B. &
D. Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y.
Northwestern Nat. Bank v.
Kansas City Bank, 107 Mo. 402;
Freeman’s Nat. Bank V. National
Tube Works, 151 Mass. 413.
384;

Liability of banks as indorsees
for collection:

On this subject the holdings are
at variance, but for the purpose

they
may
of illustration
be
grouped as follows:
First, the bank with whom pa
per has been deposited for collec
tion is absolutely liable for any
negligence or default of the no
tary, agent, or correspondent, as

well as of its own immediate ser
Simpson
Waldby, 63
vants.
v.
Mich. 439;
Finch v. Karste, 97
Mich. 26. This is the rule of the
Supreme Court of the United

and of New York, as es
tablished in the leading case of
Bank,
Allen v. Merchants
22
States;

Wend. 215, and of other states.
Second, the bank is liable only
for the exercise of due care in
Selecting its correspondent bank
and is exonerated from all liabil
ity beyond making such selection.
Third, the bank is absolutely
liable for collections
in cases
primary
party
where the
is resi
dent at the place of the bank or
where the bank undertakes the
collection of the paper by its own
officers, but where the instrument
is to be collected at a point dis
tant, the bank is liable according
to the second rule above given.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
341, and

It

cases cited.
is negligence for a bank to
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collection,

to
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has been sent for
send it directly to
Or maker, and Such

the drawer
negligence makes the Sender lia
ble for any loss resulting.
Car
son, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. Fincher,

First Nat. Bank v.
Citizens Bank, 123 Mich. 336.
4—Thus: “Pay C. J. or order,
on account of B. G. & S.” Blaine
129 Mich. 687;

v.

Bourne, 11 R. I. 119;

Pratt, 78 N. Y.
V. Lloyd, 8 B. &

371;

Hook V.
Sigourney

C. 622. Such in
dorsement passes title, but gives
notice that the indorsee can col
lect only, not pass the in Stru
ment for his Own benefit.
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5–Thus: “Pay the within to
A. Thatcher,” omitting the words,
“Or Order,” is not a restrictive in
dorsement. Leavitt v. Putnam, 3
N. Y. 494. An indorsement is not
rendered restrictive by the men
tion of the consideration for which
Thus, “pay contents
it is made.
to A. B., being part of payment
of goods sold him by me.” The
nature of such an indorsement is
not to restrict the payment to a
particular person. It is not equiv
alent to “pay contents to A. B.
only.”
Potts V. Reed, 6 Esp. 57.

Restrictive indorsement; effect of; rights of
indorsee.—A restrictive indorsement confers upon the
indorsee the right:
Sec. 39.

First, To receive payment of the instrument;
Second,

To bring any action thereon that the indorser

could bring;"

Third, To transfer his rights as such indorsee, where
the form of the indorsement

him to do so.
acquire
only
But all subsequent indorsees
the title of
the first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement.
1—This affirms the rule in
Michigan.
An agent to whom ne
gotiable paper is indorsed for col
lection may sue thereon in his
own name. Wintermute V. Tor
rent, 83 Mich. 555; Brigham v.
Gurney, 1 Mich. 349; Boyd v. Cor

bitt,

37 Mich. 52;
Moore v. Hall,
Coy v. Stiner, 53
143;
Mich. 42; Watkins v. Plummer,
48

Mich.

93 Mich.

215;

Benjamin v. Early,

authorizes

To same effect:
Kohn, 12 Mo. App.
585;
Wilson v. Tolson, 79 Ga.
Regina Flour Mill Co. v.
137;
Holmes, 156 Mass. 11; Ward v.
Tyler, 52 Pa. St. 393; Roberts V.
Parrish, 17 Ore. 583; Smith v.
Bayer, (Ore. 1905) 79 Pac. 497 (a
case unde, the statute).
In this
case it was held that the indorsee
Mich.
Cummings

123

93.

V.

had the right to sue in his own
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name but the paper Was Open to
all defenses
which
could have
been made if it had remained in
the hands of the indorser, and
action had been brought by him.
Where a check is indorsed in
blank, and deposited with a bank
for credit and the bank forwards
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it for collection to another bank,
such latter bank, as against the
depositor, can regard the paper
as that of the first bank and re
fuse to surrender it to the de
positor.
Cody v. City Nat. Bank,
55 Mich. 379.

Qualified indorsement.—A qualified indorse
ment constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the
title to the instrument.
It may be made by adding to
the indorser’s signature the words “without recourse,”
or any words of similar import.” Such an instrument
[indorsement] does not impair the negotiable character
of the instrument.”
Sec. 40.

1—A qualified indorsement lim
its the second element of the in
dorser's contract, — personal lia
bility. See note 1, sec. 33.
2—“Pay to M. R. at his own
risk,” or “indorser not holden,”
are words of similar import. Rice
v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225; Ticonic
Bank v. Smiley, 27 Me. 225; Han
kerson v. Emery, 37 Me. 16.
The words used in qualifying
an indorsement must be such as
clearly express an intention on
the part of the indorser to dis

Horton
Without recourse
Gage,

parol evidence is admissible to
show to which indorser the limi
tation applies.
Corbett v. Fett
zer, 47 Neb. 269, and this al
though
Subsequent
a
indorsee
took the paper, believing
that
the limitation applied to the one
when it in fact applied to the
other.
Wood,

Fitchburg Bank
Allen 434.

V.

Green

2

the
“I
following:
signature
the
hereby assign the within note to
M & S”, he is not relieved from
liability as an indorser. Markey
v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184.
Where the Words “Without re
course” follow the name of one

When one has indorsed unquali
fiedly, in full, or blank, evidence
is inadmissible to show an agree
ment that the indorsement should
have been without recourse. Mar
tin V. Cole, 104 U. S. 30.
“Where the law furnishes Such
apt, brief, and well known ex
pressions, for making the indorse
ment accomplish exactly what the
parties may desire, wise policy

and precede the name of another
of two indorsers, thus:

demands that each
dorsement
should

claim
bard,

liability.

Fassin

v.

Hub

Where
55
N. Y. 470.
payee
writes
above
his

form of in
conclusively

.
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carry with it the liability which

it

implies.”

Dolittle v. Ferry, 20
Kan. 230, 27 Am. Rep. 166.
3—An instrument retains its ne
gotiable character after qualified
indorsement. Stevenson v. O'Neal,
71 Ill. 314; Kelley v. Whitney, 45
Wis. 110.
A qualified indorsement is not

Sec. 41.

Conditional

IN GENERAL.

91

out of due course of trade, and
is not notice to the transferee to
put him on inquiry as to any de
fects in the instrument.
Borden
V. Clark, 26 Mich. 410; Bisbing
v. Graham, 14 Pa. St. 4; Thorpe

v. Mindeman (Wis.), 101 N. W.
417 (a case under the statute).

indorsement.—Where

an

in

dorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the
instrument may disregard the condition, and make pay
ment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether the con

dition has been fulfilled or not. But any person to whom
an instrument so indorsed is negotiated will hold the
same, or the proceeds thereof, subject to the rights of the
person indorsing conditionally."
1—See Bills

of

Exchange

Act,

Sec. 33.

A conditional Indorsement in
volves
Some
fact
or
event
upon the occurrence of which the
validity of the indorsement is ulti
mately to depend and which is
either to give effect to it or avoid
it. The condition may be prece
Story on
dent or subsequent.
Prom. Notes, sec. 149. Such in
dorsement does not affect the ne
gotiability of the instrument, its
only effect is to give notice of
the consideration to Subsequent
holders. Tappan V. Ely, 15 Wend.
362.

The distinction between a con
dition in the instrument and a
condition in the indorsement must
be observed.
The former makes

the instrument bad as negotiable
paper, the latter does not alter
the negotiable character of the in
Strument.
In his note on the correspond
ing provision of the Bills of Ex
change Act, sec. 33, p. 110, Judge
Chalmers says: “It alters the law.
It was formerly held that if a
bill was indorsed conditionally,
the acceptor paid it at his peril if
the condition was not fulfilled.”
If the condition upon which the
indorsement is made be not ful
filled, the title of the indorsee and
every subsequent holder becomes
void and the right to the instru
ment reverts to the original in
dorser. Robertson v. Kensington,
4 Taunt. 30.

Sec. 42. Indorsement of instrument payable to bearer.
—Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed
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specially it may nevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery;' but the person indorsing specially is liable
as endorser to only such holders as make title through
his indorsement.”
1—A note on its face payable
to bearer or one indorsed in blank
by the payee and afterwards
transferred by special indorsement
by delivery.
is still transferrable
A party to whom it is so transferred may make title by filling

up the blank indorsement to him
self and striking out the subse
quent ones.
Watervliet Bank v.
Hoyt, 1 Den. 608;
Mitchell v.

Fuller, 15 Pa. St. 268.
2-Bates v. Butler, 46 Me,

387.

where payable to two or more
persons.—Where an instrument is payable to the order
of two or more payees or indorsees who are not part
Sec. 43.

Indorsement

all must indorse, unless the one indorsing his
authority to indorse for the others."
ners,

1—When the joint payees are
partners the indorsement of one
will transfer the instrument; when
they are not partners the indorse-

Sec. 44.

ment of all is required to trans
Ryhiner v.
fer the instrument.

Feickert, 92
Wood, 16 N.

Ill.

J.

L.

305;

Wood.

V.

428.

Effect of instrument drawn or indorsed to a

person as cashier.—Where an instrument is drawn or
indorsed to a person as “cashier” or other fiscal officer

of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be
payable to the bank or corporation of which he is such
officer, and may be negotiated by either the indorse
ment of the bank or corporation or the indorsement of
the officer."
1—The rule of the law merchant is that an instrument payable to or indorsed to a cashier
of a bank is payable to the bank
of which he is cashier, not to
him in his individual capacity.

The bank may maintain suit upon
such instrument without the cash.
ier's indorsement.
Bank V. Troy
City Bank, 1 Doug. 457; Garton
v. Union City Nat. Bank, 34 Mich.
278;

First

Nat.

Bank

v.

John
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Bank V.
son, 133 Mich. 700;
Bank, 29 N. Y. 619; Fleckner V.
Bank U. S., 8 Wheat. 338; Fol
ger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63.

This

section

settles

whatever

conflict has heretofore existed as
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to whether paper payable to or in
dorsed to the fiscal officer of cor
porations other than banks was
payable to the corporation or to
such fiscal officer individually.

Sec. 45. Indorsement where name of payee is mis
Spelled, etc.—Where the name of the payee or indorsee
is wrongfully designed or misspelled, he may indorse
instrument
as therein described,
proper
fit,
signature."
his
thinks

the

adding,

if

he

1—This is an affirmation of ex Sory note payable to the Order of
isting law.
the corporation, may, by indorsing
The uSual and proper Way the note in his own name, make
is for the holder to indorse a valid transfer thereof. Bryant
in the wrongly designated or mis V. Eastman, 7 Cush. 111.
spelled name and then to add his
One will be bound by paper made
proper signature.
Chalmers Bills by him in the name he adopts in his
of Exchange, 108. A bill was in business. Salomon v. Hopkins, 61
dorsed to J. Smythe, whose true Conn. 47. An indorsement of a
name was T. Smith. Indorsing the note payable to John P. Reed by
bill as J. Smythe was a valid ne and in the name of Joseph P.

gotiation.
Willis v. Barrett, 2
Stark. 29.
One who, while carrying on bus
iness on his own account, in the
name of a company, incorporated
but not organized, receives, in pay
ment of a debt contracted with
him in such business, a promis

being the person to
the note was intended to
be made payable, was held insuffi
cient to pass title, there being in
the town a person whose name
Was
John P. Reed. Bolles V.
Stearns, 11 Cush. 320.
Reed,
whom

he

Indorsement in representative capacity.—
Where any person is under obligation to indorse in a
representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms
as to negative personal liability."
Sec. 46.

1-To negative personal liability
the indorser in a representative
capacity should indorse in the
same manner as the maker or ac
ceptor would sign to effect the

Schmettler v. Si
mon, 101 N. Y. 554;
Towne V.
Rice, 122 Mass. 67; Grafton Nat.
Bank v. Wing, 172 Mass. 513.

like purpose.
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presumption.—Except
where an indorsement bears date after the maturity
of the instrument, every negotiation is deemed prima
facie to have been effected before the instrument was
Time of indorsement,

Sec. 47.

overdue."
instrument is presumed
negotiated before
maturity unless the contrary ap
pear on
the instrument
itself.
Higgins v. Watson, 1 Mich. 428.
Manistee Nat. Bank V. Seymour,
to

64

1—The
have

Mich.

been

City Bank

59;

v.

Dill,

Lewis v. Parker, 4
A. & E. 838; Mason v. Noonan,
7 Wis. 609;
Smith v. Nevlin, 89
Ill. 193. But contra: Ruddell V.
Landers, 25 Ark. 238; Clendennin
V. Southerland, 31 Ark. 20.
84 Mich.

549;

“It seems that circumstances of
strong suspicion short of direct
evidence, may rebut the prima
facie presumption and make it a

question for the jury whether the
bill was negotiated before or after
maturity.”
Chalmers' Bills of Ex

change, 5th ed., 119.
Where defendant alleges that an
indorsement was made after ma

turity, the burden is on him to
ShOW the fact.

Ranger

V. Carey,

Met. (Mass.) 369. Indorsement
can take effect only from the time
it is made and must be governed
by the laws then in force.
It
cannot be made to relate back to
the date of the instrument.
Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 728;
1

Brown

v. Hull,

33

Gratt.

23.

Place of indorsement, presumption.—Except
where the contrary appears, every indorsement is pre
sumed prima facie to have been made at the place
where the instrument is dated."
Sec. 48.

contract of indorsement
is effected,
signature
not where the
is at
Chapman v. Cottrell, 34
tached.
1—The

is

made where delivery

L. J.

Ex.

sant, 46

186;

Ill.

58.

Maxwell

v.

Wan

The law of the place where the
indorsement is made governs as
to notice to indorsers.
Snow V.

Perkins, 2 Mich. 238; Glidden V.
Chamberlin, 167 Mass. 486; Freese
v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. 285.

Continuation of negotiable character.—An
instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be ne
gotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or dis
charged by payment or otherwise."
Sec. 49.

NEGOTIABLE

1-Paper negotiable before ma
turity continues to be negotiable
after maturity.
“A bill of ex
change is negotiable ad infinitum
until it has been paid by, or dis
behalf
of the ac
Callow v. Lawrence, 3
M. & S. 95; Charles V. Marsden,
224; Nat. Bank V. Tex
1 Taunt.
as, 20 Wall. 72; Leavitt v. Put
nam, 3 N. Y. 494;
Britton v.
Bishop, 11 Vt. 70; Powers v. Nel
son, 19 Mo. 190;
McSherry
V.
Brooks, 46 Md. 103.
Accommodation paper is within
this rule.
It is negotiable after
maturity.
Seyfert v. Edison, 45
N. J. L. 393. There is, however,
in respect to time of payment, a
difference
between
indorsements
made before maturity and indorse
ments made after maturity.
In
indorsements before maturity, time
charged,
ceptor.”
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of payment is fixed at a future
day by the express agreement of
the parties; in indorsements after
maturity, time of payment is de
termined by law to be within a
reasonable time, on demand. Leav
itt v. Putnam, supra. The dis
tinction between the rights of the
indorsee before maturity and of
the indorsee after maturity,
is
sharp.
See Sec. 54.
“Where an overdue bill is ne
gotiated it can only be negotiated
subject to any defect of title af
fecting it at its maturity,
and
thenceforward no person who takes
it can acquire or give a better
title than that Which the perSon
from whom he took it had.”
In
these words the Bills of Exchange
Act affirms the general rule of the
law merchant.
Bills of Exchange
Act

Sec.

36

(2).

Sec. 50. Striking out indorsement.—The holder may
at any time strike out any indorsement which is not
necessary to his title. The indorser whose indorsement

is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent to him, are
thereby relieved from liability on the instrument."
1—A party suing as indorsee
may strike out all intervening in
dorsements and aver that the first
indorser
in blank indorsed im
mediately
to himself.
Rand v.
Dovey, 83 Pa. St. 280; Mayer v.
Jadis, 1 Moody & R. 247; Merz v.
Kaiser,

20 La. Ann. 377; Morris
v. Cude, 57 Tex. 337; Middleton
V. Griffith, 57 N. J. L. 442, 31 Atl.
405. The intervening indorsements
need

not

be

stricken

the trial, but may

be

out before
after

the

plaintiff has finished his case. May
er V. Jadis, 1 Moody & R. 247.
Where the plaintiff's own indorse
ment

appears

on

still has the right
son v.

Weidner,

the paper,
to sue.
79

Mich.

he

Atkin
575;

v. Stevens, 58 Mich. 297;
v. Panhandle Nat. Bank,
Tex. 255; Middleton v. Grif

Kerrick
Collins
75

fith, 57 N. J. L. 442;
Royce v.
Nye, 52 Vt. 375. Where the plain
tiff has indorsed the note to an
other for collection, he may sue
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on the instrument, and it is im
material Whether he strikes Out
his indorsement or not. Reading
V. Beardsley, 41 Mich. 123; Locke
v. Leonard Silk Co., 37 Mich. 479;
Best v. Nakomis Nat. Bank, 76
Ill. 608.
See also New Haven
Manuf'g Co. v. N. H. Pulp & Board
Co., 76 Conn. 126 (a case under
the statute).
appears
upon
When
there
the instrument
an
indorsement
plaintiff and indorse
by the
ments subsequent to his, there has
been conflict of authority
as to
whether
he can maintain
suit

LAW.

without showing a re-transfer to
himself.
The better View seems
Dugan v. U.
to be that he can.
172;
Bank of Kansas
Mills, 24 Kan. 604; Wick
ersham V. Jarvis, 2 Mo. App. 279.
The holder has no right to strike
out the name of a person men
tioned in a special indorsement
and insert his own name in place
S., Wheat.

City

v.

thereof.

Porter

Ill.

Nor can

572.

W.

Cushman,

he, by

19

striking

out the name, convert such Spe
cial indorsement into a blank in
dorsement.
Bank of U. S. V.
Moore, Fed. Cas. No. 930.

Transfer without indorsement, effect of.—
Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order
transfers it for value without indorsing
the transfer
vests in the transferee such title as the transferer had
addition, the
therein, and the transferee acquires,
But
right
have the indorsement
the transferer."
51.

determining

whether the transferee
course,
negotiation
due
the
takes effect

as

holder

in

a

the time when the indorsement

is

of is

for the purpose

of

to

of

in

it,

Sec.

actually made.”
In

was not sufficient
ties.

the hands of his transferrer. Rob
Wilkinson, 38 Mich. 299;
inson
Spinning
Sullivan, 48 Mich.
Bewick, 55 Mich. 491;
Minor
Morris, 40 Mich. 52;
Mattison
Hall, 47 Conn. 417;
Simpson
Artt, 17 Fed. 575;
Osgood
Bingham,
Goshen Nat. Bank

Meuer
Phoenix Nat. Bank,
Div. (N. Y.) 331, 88 N.
Y. Supp. 83 (a case under the
Statute),
was held that where
bank at the request of the holder
certified
check not indorsed by
the payee, the bank not knowing
whom
was being certified for,

Y.

118 N.

the

last

349, 23 N. E.
case

180.
to

the failure

in

cut off equi

v.

In

to

it

dorse was by mistake but
was
held that an intention to indorse

a

a

it

94 App.

it

v.

v.

v. V.

v.

v.

5;

v.

it

to

in

1—Where
the
instrument
is
transferred
without indorsement,
the transferee cannot Sue and re
cover
his own name, and he
takes the paper subject
all equi
ties to which
was subject in

NEGOTIABLE
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the bank was liable on such cer
tification as the holder had ob
tained title to the check by its de

livery

to him without indorsement
though such delivery destroyed its
negotiability and rendered the
transferee's title subject to any
equities existing between drawer
and payee. See also Lawless v.
State, 114 Wis. 189 (a case under
the statute).
2-Defenses which have come to
the notice of the transferee be
fore he Secures the indorsement
of the transferrer, are not cut off
by securing such indorsement. Os
good V. Artt, supra; Whistler V.

Forster,

32

L.

J.

C. P. 161;

Gosh

en Nat. Bank v. Bingham, supra.
But in Beard v. Dedolph, 29 Wis.
136, it was held that though in
dorsement, as well as delivery be
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fore maturity, was necessary to
cut off equities existing between
maker and payee before delivery,
a bona fide holder of such note
by delivery
only
is protected
against everything Subsequent to
such delivery, especially if the
by
note be afterwards indorsed
him; such indorsement being held
to relate back to the time of de
livery, as to an equity outside of
the note itself.
But compare with
this case: Sackett v. Montgomery,
57 Neb. 424, 77

N. W.

1083;

State

V. Stebbins, 132 Mo. 332, 33 S. W.
Kampmann
522;
V. McCormick,

Civ. App. 462, 59 S. W.
832.
See also Day V. Longhurst
(1893), 41 W. R. 283 (a case un
provision
der the corresponding
of the Bills of Exchange Act).
24 Tex.

When prior party may negotiate instru
ment.—Where an instrument is negotiated back to a prior
party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this
act, reissue and further negotiate the same. But he is
not entitled to enforce payment thereof against any
intervening party to whom he was personally liable."
Sec. 52.

1—See Bills
Sec.

of

Exchange

Act,

37.

This Section should be construed
in connection with section 49. At
tenborough v. Mackenzie, 25 L. J.
Ex. 244; Curtis v. Sprague, 51
Cal. 239;

N.

J. L.

Oliphant

v. Vannest,

58

162.

One of several joint makers of
a promissory note to whom it is

assigned by the payee, cannot by
its indorsement before maturity to
a third party convey any right, ex
cept to bring suit for contribu
tion, the appearance of his name
as one of the makers being suffi
cient notice to his indorsee. Ste
vens v. Hannan, 86 Mich. 305, 88
Mich. 13.

f
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I

of

Article
Sec.

53.

Right of holder

W.

to sue;

Rights
pay

ment.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Holder in due course; what
Constitutes.
When person not deemed hold
er in due course.
Notice
before full amount
paid.
When title defective.

LAW.

the Holder.

Sec.

58.

Notice of defect; what consti
tuteS.

60.

Holder in due course; rights
of.
When subject to original de

61.

Holder

59.

fenses.

in due course;

who

deemed.

Sec. 53. Right of holder to sue; payment.—The holder
of a negotiable instrument may sue thereon in his own
name" and payment to him in due course discharges the
instrument.”
1-The holder of negotiable pa
per may sue thereon in his own
name, even though the paper be
restrictively indorsed to him. See
Sec. 39 and note. The possession
of a negotiable instrument payable
to bearer, or indorsed in blank, is
prima facie evidence of owner
ship.
Wilson Sewing Machine
534;
Co. v. Spears, 50 Mich.
Barnes v. Peet, 77 Mich. 391; Bat
tersbee v. Calkins, 128 Mich. 569.
A bank holding a note as col
lateral security may sue on it in
its own name.
Lobdell v. Me
chanics and Mnfrs. Bank, 33 Mich.
408;
Hilton v. Waring, 7 Wis.
418; Curtis v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 645.
Where the plaintiff has acquired
the equitable title to the prom
issory note he sues upon prior to
bringing suit, the indorsement of
the same over to him by his
vendor is a mere matter of form

and may be made at the time of
the trial. Brown v. McHugh, 35
Mich. 50.
The note sued on in

this action was secured by mort
gage, and the plaintiff had taken
an assignment of the debt and
Securities.
The note was not
formally indorsed over by the
payee until the trial came on.
Non-ownership
of the note at
the time suit is brought on it is

complete defense.
Hannahs V.
Sheldon, 20 Mich. 278; Hovey v.
Sebring, 24 Mich. 232; Reynolds
V. Kent, 38 Mich. 246; Coon V.
Dennis, 111 Mich. 450; Hogan V.
Dreifus, 121 Mich. 453.
In this
case the court Said: “It is Settled
in this state that the possession
by the plaintiff of a promissory
note sued on and its production
by him upon the trial is pre
sumptive evidence of his title or
right to Sue upon it, and the
a
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plaintiff need not be the real or
beneficial OWner to entitle him to
recover, but the maker of the
note has a right to rebut Such
presumption
and show that the
plaintiff has no title, or that he
did not acquire title until after
the commencement Of Suit and
thus defeat recovery thereon in
such action.”

It

that such exceptions
general
to the
rule as exist, exist
by reason
of the provision
of
requiring
the code
suit to be
brought
in the name of the
By statute
real party in interest.
in Some of the States action will
lie upon a negotiable instrument
by the equitable owner in his
own name and the possession of
the note is itself evidence of such
ownership.
Hudson etc. v. Wier,
29 Ala. 294; Garner v. Cook, 30

Ind.

seems

331;

Harriman

v.

Hill,

14

Guest V. Rhine, 16 Tex.
549. An indorsee Suing On a note
must prove his title thereto. Spi
cer V. Smith, 23 Mich. 96. The
authority by which the indorse
ment was made must be proved
Me. 127;

as well as the fact of indorse
ment. Neither the statute allow
ing the note to be given in evi
dence under the money counts,
nor the rule, (circuit court rule
8, former
dispensing
rule 79)
proof
with
of execution when not
denied

under

oath

relieves

the

plaintiff from proving the indorse
ment.

Mich.

Redmond
445;

V.

Hinkley

Stansbury,
v.

24

Weather

wax, 35 Mich. 510; Hamilton V.
Powers, 80 Mich. 313; St. Johns
Table Co. v. Brown, 126 Mich.
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Principaal,

it

99
82

Mich.

was held that
Where an indorsee claims title
through an indorsement made by
an agent in the firm name, the
burden is upon, him to prove the
authority of the agent.
271.

case

Proof of indorsement is not nec
essary in a case where it ap
pears that plaintiffs were succes
sors to the firm to which the
note was made payable. Gray v.
Willcox, 56 Mich. 58. The plain
tiffs were Francis Gray, William
C. Gray, and Homer C. Nellis, a
firm doing business under the
firm name of F. Gray & Co., and
successors to F. Gray, O'Farrell &
Co., the payees named in the note.
The note did not bear the in
dorsement of F. Gray, O’Farrell
& Co.
See also:
Bellis V. Lyons,
97 Mich. 398; Hall v. Wortman,
Mich. 304.
Where a note is payable to or
der, and the payee without having
indorsed it, loses it, he can recoV
er in a suit against the maker,
and at common law the Suit could
not be defeated by the fact that
the note was in possession of a
third person. Hoil v. Rathbone,
123

98 Mich.

323;

McKinney

v.

Ham

ilton, 53 Mich. 497. In New Hav
en Mfg. Co. v. N. H. Pulp and
Board Co., 76 Conn. 126 (a case
under this section of the statute)
it was held that mere possession

of

a note indorsed in blank was
sufficient evidence of ownership to
support suit.
2-A payee in a note who has

discounted it and so received pay
ment on it is estopped from af
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Payment of a certified check by
in due course to a bond
fide holder entitled to payment,
discharges
the check, and the
payee who has received payment
but has repaid the money to the
bank when threatened with Suit
cannot maintain an action against
the bank
on
its certification.
Poess v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 86
N. Y. Supp. 857 (a case under the

terwards disputing such payment,
Whatever the case might be With
an indorser who had come into
possession of it.
Haughton
V.
Maurer, 55 Mich. 323.
In order to constitute payment
by the maker before maturity a
valid defense against a subsequent
indorsee, the maker must show
that the indorsee had notice of
Yenney V. Central
the payment.
City Bank, 44 Neb. 402.

a bank

statute).

Holder in due course; what constitutes.—A
holder in due course" is a holder who has taken the in
strument under the following conditions:
First, That it is complete and regular upon its face;”
Sec. 54.

Second,

That he became the holder of it before it was
overdue, and without notice that it had been previously

if

such was the fact;"
Third, That he took it in good faith 4 and for value;"
Fourth, That at the time it was negotiated to him he

dishonored,

had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating it."
1-Holder in

due course is a
term employed in the Bills of
Act, section 29 (1),
Exchange
and adopted here as a substitute
for the more involved term “bond

to part with it had been
fully formed, and that the maker
Still designed to add some provi
sion or formality to give the pa
Thus, it
per validity and effect.
appeared on the face of the paper

tion

fide holder for value without no
tice before due.”
In substance
this section is declaratory of the
common law.
2—Paper is not complete
regular upon its face when

-

and

it

it

that it
has been taken from the posses
Sion of its maker before inten
Self

furnishes

evidence

Of a corporation that it was de
signed that the president of the
corporation should sign the same.
A blank space was left for his
signature and it was indicated by
the word “president” being 'print
ed thereon.
Davis Sewing Ma
Best,
chine Co. v.
105 N. Y. 59.

NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS
to the right to fill up blanks
incomplete
instruments,
in
see
section 59 and note.
The effect of an irregularity ap
pearing on the face of the paper
cannot be avoided by subsequent
correction.
Losee v. Bissel, 76
Pa. St. 459.
The transfer of a post dated

As

note on the day of its date does
not furnish cause for suspicion or
put the indorsee on inquiry or
subject him to equities existing
between the parties. Brewster V.
McCardel, 8 Wend. 478.
As to post dated checks see
Mayer v. Mode, 14 Hun 155.
3—Although
a note does not
lose its negotiable character after

maturity,

if it

transferred
after maturity it is subject to all
equities
in the hands of any
holder because the face of the
instrument itself gives the holder
notice that the instrument
has
been
dishonored.
McKenna
V.
Kirkwood, 50 Mich. 544.
The
motives of a purchaser, good or
bad, of a past due note are un
important.
He gets no better title
than his vendor had. Church V.
Clapp, 47 Mich. 257; Simons v.
Morris, 53 Mich. 155; City Bank
v. Dill, 84 Mich. 549.
A person who acquires paper af
ter maturity from one who had
become a holder in due course
before maturity is protected be
cause of the good title of his
transferrer.
Barker . V. Lichten
berger, 41 Neb. 751, 60 N. W. 79.
A note transferred on the day
it matures is transferred before
maturity.
Cont'l Nat. Bank V.
be
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Townsend,

87 N. Y. 8.
A note
transferred
on the last day of
grace is transferred before matur
ity.
Crosby V. Grant, 36 N. H.
273.
Contra:
Pine V. Smith, 11
Gray 38. Conversely, suit brought
on a note on the last day of
grace, is prematurely brought, as
the party has all that day in
which to make payment. Wiesin
ger v. First Nat. Bank, 106 Mich.
291.

A note payable in instalments
is overdue in its entirety when

the first instalment is overdue. It
subject to equities as
becomes
Soon as any instalment is overdue
and unpaid. Hart v. Stickney, 41

Vinton v. King, 4 Allen
The transferee of a note on
which interest is overdue does
not take the note subject to equit
ies. A note matures only, when
by its terms the principal
be
comes due.
Patterson v. Wright,
64 Wis. 289; Kelley v. Whitney,
45 Wis. 110.
4-Lack of good faith alone
will prevent one from being a
holder
in due course.
Thus,
where one purchased a promis
Sory note for $300, the maker
Whereof was in fair credit and
able at the time to respond, pay
ing therefor $5, it was held that
Wis.

630;

562.

the element of good faith neces
Sary to a holder in due course
was entirely lacking.
DeWitt v.

Perkins,

22 Wis.

451.
The words
refer only to the
case of the indorsee.
Helmer v.
Krolick, 36 Mich. 373. In this case
it was held that the motives and
interests of the seller of the paper

“good

faith”

THE NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

under the statute).
to what constitutes no
tice of defect, see section 58.
The following cases illustrate
the Various circumstances requir
ed to constitute
holder in due
Miller, 29 Mich.
course: Gibson
Swarthout, 29 Mich.
355; Hull
Barnard,
249;
Tilden
43
Phenix,
376;
Mich.
Barnum
Seeley,
60 Mich. 388;
Davis
Ottaway,
71 Mich. 209;
Miller
Keyes,
81 Mich. 196; Williams
case

v.

a

6-As

v.

V.

v. V.

v.

v.

V.

V.

v.

v.

V.

Windholz,

88 App.

Div.

v.

Co.
Schnei
862, 34 Misc.

German American Bank
Cunningham, 89 N. Y. Supp. 836,
97 App. Div. 244; Black
Bank of
Westminster, 96 Md. 399; White
Dodge (Mass. 1905) 73 N.

V.

Bank

Pick

(N.

v. D. E.

v.

Nat.

v.

v.

549;

N. W. 63; Drinkall
10,
Movius State Bank,
Bowman,
W. 724; Rowe
183 Mass. 488; Mehlinger
Har
riman, 185 Mass. 245; Mass. Nat.
Bank
Snow (Mass. 1905)
Jose,
959; McNamara
D.

28 72

v.

v.

v.

N.

99

v. 11

1904)

N.

V.

a

It

case under the
this case the facts

Pottier etc.
782, 82 App.

195;

E.

statute).
In
were similar
to those in Drover's Nat. Bank V.
Blue, supra.
was held that the
bank was not
holder in due
Course.
To Same effect: Citizens
Cowles, 180 N. Y.
State Bank
(a

Misc. 799; Karsch
Co., 81 N. Y. Supp.
Div. 230; Packard
84 N. Y. Supp. 666,
365; M. Groh's Sons
der, 68 N. Y. Supp.

88

Y.

v.

v.

v.

447; Fredonia Nat. Bank
Tom
mei, 131 Mich. 674; Garrison
Union Trust Co. (Mich.) 102 N.
W. 978; Albany Co. Bank
Peo
ple's Ice Co., 92 N. Y. App. Div.
Supp. 773, 1128
47, 615; 86 N.

290; First Nat. Bank
Shue, 119 Mich. 560; Stevens
McLachlan,
120 Mich. 285; Tex
Stillwell,
arkana Nat. Bank
154;
121 Mich.
Glines
State
Savings Bank, 132 Mich. 638. See
the following cases under the sta
Govin, 71 N.
tute:
Ketcham
Y. Supp. 991, 35 Misc. 375; Bene
Kress, 89 N. Y. Supp. 607,
dict
Sug
97 App. Div. 65; Greeser
arman, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922, 37
90 Mich.

N.

in

W.

v. of

it

a

is

a

a

v.

V.

a

it,

is

5—One who purchases, at less
than its face value, a note of a
person employed by the original
parties to negotiate
not on
that account any the less
holder
Peck, 14
for Value. Vinton
Savings
Mich. 287; Henriques
Bank, 84 Mich. 168.
A bank which discounts
note
customer, crediting the pro
for
ceeds thereof to his account,
not
bona
fide purchaser for
value, unless such credit
was
drawn upon before the maturity
of the note and before notice of
facts invalidating
the hands
the payee. Drovers' Nat. Bank
Blue, 110 Mich. 31; First Nat.
Bank
Wills Creek Coal Co. id.

v.

v.

faith.”

(a

346

v.

are unimportant
in determining
the rights of the buyer. Haugan
v. Sunwall, 60 Minn. 367, 62 N.
W. 398; Barnum v. Phenix, 60
Mich. 388.
In this case it was
said: “It has always been the
law of this state that a person
obtaining negotiable paper for a
valuable consideration and before
maturity, is protected in its ac
quisition, unless obtained in bad

LAW.

v.
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Keegan v. Rock (Iowa

N. W.

805.

Payee as holder in due course.
Boston
Steel and Iron Co. V.
Steuer, 183 Mass. 140 (a case un

der the statute).
The facts in
volved were these: A check made
payable to the plaintiff was hand
ed by the drawer to her husband
to be delivered by him to the
payee in payment of a debt to
become due from the drawer to
payee.
The husband frau
dulently turned the check over
to the payee in payment of a debt
due from him.
The check was
by the payee in good
accepted
faith in payment of the hus

the

Held, that the payee
band's debt.
was a holder in due course. The
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fact that the plaintiff is the payee
of a negotiable security does not
prevent him from becoming a
bona fide purchaser of it at com
mon law with all the rights in
cident to a purchaser thereof for
value, without notice. He is like
Wise a holder in due course With
in this Section of the statute. See
Herdman v. Wheeler [1902] 1 K.
B. 361 (a case under the Bills of
Exchange Act). The payees of a
note given to a certain person as
their agent, and by him trans
mitted to them, cannot claim to
hold it as merely bona fide pur
chasers. Rickle v. Dow, 39 Mich.

Johnston Harvester
Miller, 72 Mich. 265.

91;

Co.

v.

Sec. 55.

Holder in due course; when person not
deemed.—Where
an instrument payable on demand is
negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue,
the holder is not deemed a holder in due course."
1-AS to paper payable On de
Paper pay
mand See Section 9.
able on demand reaches its ma

turity within a reasonable time
after its issue. After the lapse
of Such time it is deemed Over
due.
Losee v. Duncan, 7 Johns.
70; LaDue v. First Nat. Bank, 31
Minn. 33, 16 N. W. 426; see sec
tion 73 and notes.
There is no
certain rule by which it can be
determined
what
constitutes
a
reasonable time as the term is
here used.
See section 2.
The
cases furnish illustrations rather
than rules and are severally de

termined on the special facts and
circumstances involved.
Carll V.
Brown, 2 Mich. 401.
It will be
found that time ranging
from
One Week
to several months is
considered as a reasonable time
according to circumstances.
Transfer made within a rea
Sonable time after date: Mitchell
v. Catchings, 23 Fed. 710; Thurs

M'Kown,

428;
6 Mass.
Andrews, 3 Hill 582;
Pindar v. Barlow, 31 Vt. 529.
Transfer not made within a rea
Sonable time after date: Paine V.

ton v.
Wethey

v.

Central Vermont

R. Co.,

14 Fed.
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Townsend,
Nevins
v.
6
Conn. 5; Hemmenway v. Stone, 7
Mass. 58; Herrick V. Woolverton,
269;

41
N. Y. 581; LaDue v. First
Nat. Bank, supra.
In this case
it was said: “In View of the well
known fact that Bills of Exchange
are not always transmitted
im
mediately for payment, but first
pass through the hands of several
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intermediate holders in the or
dinary course of business, and in
purchased
by
Other cases are
by
travelers to be carried
them
instead of currency or coin, to
negotiated as occasion may
be
require, we are not disposed to
lay down any narrow rule on
this subject.”

Notice before full amount paid.—Where the
transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instru
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating the
same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid
therefor, he will be deemed a holder in due course only
to the extent of the amount theretofore paid by him."
Sec. 56.

1–Dresser v. Mo. etc. Co., 93
U. S. 92. Action on three prom
issory notes for the aggregate
amount of ten thousand dollars.
William Irwin was the payee. Be
maturity
fore
the notes were
transferred to plaintiff for a val
part of
uable consideration,
a
which, $500, the plaintiff paid.
Before making further payment

which discounts a note, placing
the proceeds to the credit of the
assignor and, before it honors
against this ac
checks drawn
count, obtains knowledge of facts

invalidating the note in the hands
of such assignor. After receiving
Such notice it pays at its peril.

he

Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Blue, 110
Mich. 31; Fredonia Nat. Bank v.
Tommei,
131
Mich.
674.
The

fraud

reason

was notified that there was
in the inception
of the
notes and was directed to pay no
further part of the consideration.

It was held that he was entitled
to recover only the amount paid
before receipt of notice of infirm
ity. The case is governed by the
rule that the portion of an un
performed contract, which is com
pleted after notice of the fraud,
is not within the principle which
protects a bona fide holder.
The
principle applies
to
a
bank

of the rule is that the
by the bank of the pro
ceeds of a note to the account
of a customer is not of itself
payment.
It is simply the prom
ise by the bank to pay such pro
ceeds to the customer by honoring
his checks or drafts in the or
dinary way pursued by banking
credit

institutions.
People's Ice

Albany Co. Bank v.
92 N. Y. App.
N. Y. Supp. 1128 (a
Co.,

Div. 47, 86
case under the statute).
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Sec. 57. When title defective.—The title of a person
who negotiates an instrument is defective within the
meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or

any signature thereto, by fraud,

duress,” or force and

fear,” or other unlawful means, or for an illegal considera
tion," or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under
such circumstances as amount to a fraud.”
1—See sec. 29 (2) Bills of Ex
change Act.
One whose title is defective
from One
must be distinguished
who has no title at all and who
can give none, as, for instance, a
person making title through a
Chalmers'
forged
indorsement.
Bills of Exchange, 5th edition,

Fraud as used in this Section
fraud,
1st,
of two kinds;
amounting to a want
of con
tract,
or fraud
in esse con
2nd,
(Bigelow);
and
tractus

92.

is

They
fraud in the inducement.
should be sharply distinguished.
There are two kinds of fraud
practised in the execution of an
instrument, the first is where the
instrument is misread to the par
ty signing it, or where there is a

Surreptitious

substitution of one
instrument for another, or where
by some other trickery or device
a party is made to sign an in
strument which he did not in
tend to execute.
The second con
sists in inducing a party to sign
an instrument or execute it by
misrepresentations
or fraudulent
representations as to
collateral
matters, or as to the nature or
value of the consideration. Papke
v. G. H. Hammond Co., 192 Ill.
631, 61 N. E. 910. Fraud amount

ing to a want of contract, or
fraud in esse contractus, is well
illustrated in Brown v. Reed, 79
Pa. St. 370, where the instru
ment involved was in the fol
lowing form:

North East, April 3d, 1872.

Six

order TWO HUNDRED

for

J. B. Smith or
AND FIFTY DOLLARS

months after date 1 promise to pay to

value

received,
-

with

legal

T. H.

$50.00 when

I

sell

by

worth of Hay& Harvest Grinders,

withoutiappeal,
i

interest,

defalcation or stay of execution.

The instrument upon which the
plaintiff sought to recover was

bearer

Brown. Agent

and

for

also

Hay

and

without
Harvest

the left hand part of the above,
the right hand part having been
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cut off at the place indicated by
the vertical line. Porter v. Hardy,
10 N. D. 551, 88 N. W. 458,
lustrates fraud practised in sub
stantially the same manner. There
can be no recovery on such in
struments at the suit of any one,
but the party whose name and

il

signature appears upon such paper
must have been free from negli
gence

ity.

liabil

in order to escape
22 Mich.
Gibbs v. Linabury,

Anderson v. Walter, 34 Mich.
113; Soper v. Peck, 51 Mich. 563;
First Nat. Bank v. Deal, 55 Mich.
592; Beard v. Hill, 131 Mich. 246.
In Soper v. Peck it is said “The
party will not be liable unless his

479;

own negligence was so gross as
defending against
to preclude his
See Holmes
purchaser.
a bona fide
v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427; Walker
v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194; Keller V.
Ruppold, 115 Wis. 636; Baldwin
v. Bricker, 86 Ind. 222; But See
Bedell v. Herring, 77 Cal. 572.
The following additional provision
Act:
appears in the Wisconsin
“And the title of such person is
absolutely void when such instru
ment or signature Was SO procured
from a person who did not knoW
the nature of the instrument and
such
could not have obtained
knowledge

by the use of ordinary

care.”

Fraud in the inducement. This
kind does not amount to a want
of contract, nor create a defense
as against a holder in due course.
70;
Lenheim
v. Fay,
27 Mich.
32;
Mich.
Campbell v. Skinner, 30
Stein,
77;
Shaw v.
79 Mich.
Hunt
v. Rumsey, 83 Mich. 136; Beath V.

LAW.

Chapoton, 115 Mich. 506; First
Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 133 Mich.
Slacom v. Wishart, 3 Mc
Lean 517, Fed. Cas. No. 12933;
Smith V. Livingston,
111 Mass.
342; Clothier v. Adriance,
51 N.
700;

Y.

322;

Bank,

Drinkall v. Movius State
11 N. D. 10, 88 N. W. 724

(a case under the statute).
A
cashier’s check was endorsed over
by the plaintiff, when the plain
tiff was partially intoxicated, to
one Maxwell
as the result of a
gambling
It was
transaction.
indorsee,
held that the
under this
section, had a defective title and
that the bank was liable under
sec. 90 because
when the bank
paid the amount to the indorsee
it had knowledge of the facts and
had been told by the plaintiff to
cancel the check.
See also Kee
gan v. Rock (Ia. 1905) 102 N.
W.

805,

(a

case

under

the sta

tute).

2—Whether a negotiable instru
ment executed
under duress is
void in the hands of a holder
in due course is a question upon
which decisions are in conflict. In
Michigan, it has been held that
duress is not a defense against a
holder in due course. Farmers &
Mechanics
Bank v. Butler,
48
Mich. 192.
In accord with this View are:
Beals v. Neddo, 1 McCrary 206;
Clark v. Pease, 41 N. H. 414.
Opposed, are: Palmer v. Poor,
121 Ind. 135; Barry v. Equitable
Life Society, 59 N. Y. 587; Berry
v. Berry, 57 Kan. 691. Daniel's
Neg. Inst. 5th ed. sec. 858.
As to what constitutes du
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ress see Beath V. Chapoton, 115
Mich. 506; Barger v. Farnham,
130 Mich. 487; Jones Co. v. Board
of Education, 51 N. Y. Supp. 950.
3–These Words were inserted
in the Bills of Exchange Act aS
equivalent to the technical term
“duress” which is a term un
known to the Scotch law. Chal
mers’
Bills
of
Exch a ng e,
supra. The introduction of these
Words into the American
Act
shows with what fidelity it fol
lows the English Statute.
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4-AS to illegality of consider
ation See note 1, Sec. 27.
5-Where a note has been di
verted or negotiated in violation
of an agreement under which it
was given such negotiation con
a breach of faith and
amounts to a fraud upon the
maker.
German American Bank
V. Cunningham, 97 App. Div. 244,
89 N. Y. Supp. 836 (a case under

Stitutes

the statute).
See also M. Groh's
Sons Co. v. Schneider, 34 N. Y.
Miss. 195, 68 N. Y. Supp. 862 (a
case under the statute).

Notice of defect; what constitutes.—To con
stitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument, or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person
to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge
of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith."
Sec. 58.

1–This

Section

Was

construed

in McNamara V. Jose, 28 Wash.
461.
The court said: “The hold
er's title to the paper is not to be
slight circum
by
overthrown
stances. He does not owe to the
party who puts the paper afloat
the duty of active inquiry in or
der to avert the imputation
of
bad faith; his rights are to be
determined by the simple test of
honesty and good faith, not by a
speculative inquiry into diligence
or negligence. Although he may
have been negligent in taking the
paper and omitted precautions
which a prudent man would have
taken, nevertheless, unless he act

ed mala
Vail.”

In

fide his

Valley

Mercer, 97 Md.
Construing this
mere suspicion
or knowledge

title will

Savings

pre

Bank

478, the court

section

v.

in

held that

of defect of title

of circumstances
which would excite such suspi
cions in the mind of a prudent
man or gross negligence on the
part of the taker of the note at
the time of transfer Will not de
feat his title.
This section was
also construed
in Unaka Nat.
Bank v. Butler, (Tenn., 1904) 83
S. W. 655. Other cases under this
section are: Ketcham v. Govin,
35 N. Y. Misc., 375, 71 N. Y. Supp.
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991;

Mass. Nat. Bank v. Snow
(Mass. 1905) 72 N. E. 959; Black
v. First Nat. Bank (Md.) 54 Atl.
88. Negligence, however gross, is
not equivalent to notice, but mere

ly evidence of bad faith. New
York Iron Mine v. Citizens' Bank,

44 Mich. 344; Mace v. Kennedy, 68
Mich. 389; Davis v. Seeley, 71
Mich. 209; Stevens v. McLachlan,

Mich. 285; Glines v. State
Savings
Bank, 132 Mich. 638;
Hotchkiss v. Nat. Bank, 21 Wall.
354;
Goodman v. Simonds, 20
How.
(U. S.) 343; Phelan v.
Moss, 67 Pa. St. 59; Seybel V.
Nat. Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288.
The following Michigan
cases
illustrate circumstances amounting
to notice of defect: Miller V. Fin
ley, 26 Mich. 249;
Borden v.
120

LAW.

Miller, 72 Mich. 2
Co.
v.
Thompson v. Union Trust Co.,
Knowledge
Mich.
508.
of
president of a corporation,
payee in a note, of a defect
the note cannot be imputed
the bank through him as its ca.
ier. State Savings Bank V. Mo
gomery, 126 Mich. 327; Peopl
Savings Bank v. Hine, 131 Mi
181.
See also World Mfg. Co.
Cycle Co., 123 Mich. 623.
Where a note is given in t
firm name by a member of t
firm the presumption is that it
given for partnership
purpos
Carrier v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 37
Nichols V. Sober, 38 Mich. 67

u

a

43

ti

n

is

it

a

of

a

a

52

a

in

of

v.

2:

v.

v.

v.

it

is

is

p fil

sup:
Stevens V. McLachlan,
Where one partner gives a
note for his private debt the
Clark, 26 Mich. 410; Lenheim V. Son taking such note with know
Fay, 27 Mich. 70; McNamara v. edge of the fact
charged wi
Gargett, 68 Mich. 454; Abele v. notice that
given for an
McGuigan,
415;
78 Mich.
Car authorized purpose and cann
penter v. Greenop, 84 Mich. 49; hold the other partners.
Heffri
Stevens v. Hannan, 86 Mich., 305,
Hanaford, 40 Mich. 305; RG
88 Mich. 13; Lockwood v. Noble, erts
People,
55 Mich. 36
113 Mich. 418; Conrad V. Mann Towle
Dunham, 76 Mich.
ing's Est., 125 Mich. 77.
84 Mich. 268; Carpenter
Gree
The following cases illustrate
op, supra,
Mechanics
Bank
circumstances falling Short of not Barnes, 86 Mich. 632.
ice of defect: Vinton V. Peck, 14
corpor
Where the paper
Mich. 287; Howry v. Eppinger, 34 tion appears
on its
face
Mich. 29; Bottomley v. Goldsmith,
have been duly issued
co
36 Mich. 27; Chicago & N. E. R. R. formity
with the charter,
bon
Co. v. Edson, 41 Mich 673; Shaw
fide holder can enforce the sam
v. Clark, 49 Mich. 384; Cristy v. Genesee
Savings
Co.
Bank
Campau, 107 Mich. 172; Drovers’ Mich. Barge Co.,
Mich.
Nat. Bank v. Potvin, 116 Mich. But
person taking
note fro
447.
corporation for
an officer
The agents' knowledge of a officer's individual
obligation
defect is knowledge of the prin with knowledge that
cipal.
given for corporation
Tilden v. Barnard,
purpos.
43
Mich. 376;
Johnston
Harvester
does so at his peril.
Prima fac
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the act is unauthorized, and un
less the holder can show special
authority
he cannot enforce the
paper against
the corporation.
New York Iron Mine V. First Nat.

Bank, 39 Mich. 644; McClellan v.
Detroit File Works, 56 Mich. 579;
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Merchants Nat. Bank V. Detroit
Knitting & Corset Works, 68 Mich.
620; Wilson v. Metropolitan
El.
R’y, 120 N. Y. 145. But see Doe
V. N. W. Coal etc. Co., 78 Fed.
Pittsburg etc.
62;
Cheever
v.
Co.,
R.
150 N. Y. 59.

Holder in due course; rights of.—A holder in
due course ("holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties and'free from defenses available
to prior parties among themselves," and may enforce pay
ment of the instrument for the full amount thereof *
against all parties liable thereon."
Sec. 59.

1-A payee may be a holder in
due course. See note 3, sec. 54.
2—Although
the instrument
is
invalid as between the immediate
parties the holder in due course
takes it discharged of equities.

132;
v. Miller, 8 Mich.
Hunter v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 96;
Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249;
Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich. 32;
Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29;
Helmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich. 371;
Spinning v. Sullivan, 48 Mich. 8;
Barnum v. Phenix, 60 Mich. 388;
Davis v. Seeley, 71 Mich. 209;
Evans V. Struhrburg,
78
Mich.

Elliott

145;

Mich.
Mich.

Chapman
552;
423;

v.

Remington,

80

Little v. Mills, 98
First Nat. Bank v.

Housknecht,
121 Mich. 313.
This section of the statute has

been referred to in the following
cases: White V. Dodge, 73 N. E.
549; Greeser v. Sugarman, 37 N.
Y. Misc. 799, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922;
Albany Co. Bank v. Peoples' Ice
Co., 92 App. Div. 47, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 1128; Nat. Bank of Com

merce v. Pick (N. D. 1904) 99 N.
W. 63; German American
Bank
V. Cunningham, 97 App. Div. 244,
89 N. Y. Supp. 836; Unaka Nat.

Bank V. Butler (Tenn.
S. W. 655; McNamara

1904)

83

Jose,
28 Wash. 461; Ketcham V. Govin,
35 N. Y. Misc. 375, 71 N. Y. Supp.
v.

991.

effects a change
the
law
Of
those
States
where it has been held that a
negotiable instrument
given on
account of a gambling transaction

in

This provision

is void

even in the hands of an
innocent holder for Value.
Wirt
V. Stubblefield, 17 App. Cas. D. C.

(a
In this

283

case under the statute).
case the court said: “The

leading object of the act has been
to establish a uniform system of
law to govern negotiable instru
ments wherever they might cir
culate or be negotiated.
It was
not only uniformity of rules and
principles that was designed, but
to embody in a codified form as
fully as possible all the law upon
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the subject, to avoid conflict of
decisions and the effect of mere
local laws and usages that have
heretofore prevailed.
The great
object sought to be accomplished
by the enactment of the statute
was to free the negotiable instru
ment as far as possible from all
latent or local infirmities that
would otherwise inhere in it to
the prejudice and disappointment
of innocent holders as against all
of the parties to the instrument
professedly bound thereby.
This
clearly could not be effected so
long as the instrument was ren
dered absolutely null and void by
local statute as against the orig
inal maker or acceptor.”
3—This provision settles a point
Over
which the decisions have
been
in conflict.
In Vinton V.
Peck, 14 Mich. 287, Judge Camp
bell said,—“The maker of a note
has no concern With the amount
paid for it by a bona fide pur
chaser.”
In Cromwell V. County
Sac, 96 U. S. 51, (6 Otto) the
court declares the rule to be:
“A purchaser of a negotiable se
curity before maturity in cases
where he is not chargeable per
sonally with fraud is entitled to
recover its full amount against its
maker though he may have paid
less than its par value, whatever
may have been its original in

firmity

* * * *. This
rule in no respect impinges upon
*

*

*
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the doctrine that One Who makes
a loan upon such paper or
takes it as collateral security for
a precedent debt may be limited
in his recovery to the amount ad
Vanced or Secured.”
This rule,
however, has not met with unani
Opposed
mous approval.
to it
are: Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 35 N. J.

only

Bank V. McNair, 116 N. C.
E. 389; Harger v. Wil
son, 63 Barb. 237; Oppenheim v.
Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 97
Tenn. 19.
In McNamara V. Jose,

L.

13

550, 21 S.

461, it was ruled that
the holder could recover the full
amount under this provision of
the statute. In Mersick v. Alder
Iman,
(Conn.
1905)
60
Atl.
109, (a case under the statute)
the right
of a holder in due
course to recover the full amount
Was recognized, but it was held
One who takes the paper as col
lateral security for a debt will
be limited in his recovery to the
amount of the debt.
For cases
where notice of defect or fraud is
received before full payment see
Sec. 56 and note.
4-The Wisconsin Act has the
following additional
provision:
“Except as provided in sections
1944 and 1945 of these statutes,
and also in cases where the title
of the person negotiating such
28 Wash.

instrument is void under the pro
visions of sections 1676-25 (sec.
57) of this Act.”

Sec. 60. When subject to original defenses.–In the
hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a
negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as
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were non-negotiable.

But a holder who derives his
through
title
a holder in due course, and who is not him
self a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru
ment, has all the rights of such former holder in respect
of all parties prior to the latter.”
1—Of this Section
Mr. Craw
ford makes the following explana
ation: “It Was not deemed ex
pedient to make provision as to
what equities the transferee will
be subject to; for the matter may
be affected by the statutes of the
various States relating to set-off
and counterclaim.
In an act de
signed to be uniform in the var
ious States, no more can be done
than fix the rights of holders in
due course.”
The law merchant is not more

The following analysis of de
fenses (see Ames’ Cases on Bills
and Notes) exhibits comprehen
sively, but perhaps not complete
ly, the classification
which the
law merchant recognizes:

I

(b) Coverture in some
jurisdictions.
(c) Insanity.
(d) Intoxication.
(e) Corporate incapa

explicit than the statute in de
fining the defenses which may be
urged against negotiable instru
ments, wisely leaving it, within

certain broad, general rules, to be
determined from the Status of
each case, what kind of defense
is available and to what extent it
may be carried.
There are two general classes
of defenses,
absolute or real,
equities or personal. The former
is so named because it applies
to an instrument unenforceable in
whose hands soever it may be. It
is also called a real defense be
cause it lies against the res—the
thing itself.
The latter is so
named because
it is available
against certain persons only, and
because
Of this
fact the name
personal has been applied to it
instead of equities.

Absolute or Real.
(1) Incapacity to contract.
(a) Infancy.

city.

(amounting
(2) Fraud
to
want Of contract, in
eSSe contractuS, See Sec
tion 57).
(3) Illegality when contract
is declared void by sta
tute.
(4) Discharge of Instrument
by

(a) Alteration

(see.

Sec. 126).

(b) Cancellation

(see
125).
renun
(c) Payment,
ciation or release
at Or after ma
sec.

turity

II

(see sec.
124).
Equities or Personal
(1) Fraud
(in the induce
ment). See Sec. 57.
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(2) Duress
(Some
courts
hold otherwise. See Sec.
57).
(3) Want or failure of con
sideration
either total
partial
or
(see Sec. 59).

(4) Illegality unless

instru

ment is declared void
by statute (see sec. 59).
renunciation,
(5) Payment,
or release before ma

turity.
(6) Discharge of party sec
ondarily liable by dis
charge of prior party
(see sec. 122).
provision of the

This
Seems

to allow

all

defenses,

statute

whe

Whether those arising out of col
lateral matters may also be as
Serted is a question upon which
the courts have disagreed.
The weight of authority is that
Such collateral
matters may not
be asserted against a transferee of
over due paper. Daniel Neg. Inst.,
5th ed., Sec. 725.
In the leading case of Bur
rough v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558,
the facts were that a promissory
note was made by the defendant,
payable to one Fearn and by him

to the plaintiff after it
The defendant
sisted upon his right to set off,
against the plaintiff's
claim, a
debt due the defendant from
Fearn at the time of the transfer.
It was held that the indorsee of
an over due bill or note is liable
indorsed

due.

to such

LAW.

equities

only

as attach

bill itself, and not
to claims arising out of collater
al matters.
This case has been
generally followed in the United
States and was reaffirmed in Eng
land in Whitehead v. Walker, 10
On the note or

M. & W. 695, where the indorsee
received the bill With notice of
the set off; and in Oulds V. Har
rison, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 524, where
the bill was indorsed for the ex
press purpose of defeating the
Set Off. See Nat. Bank V. Texas,

(U. S.) 72; Weader v.
Nat. Bank, 126 Ind. 111,
25 N. E. 887; Davis v. Miller, 14
Gratt. 8; Simpson v. Hall, 47
Conn. 417; Tinsley v. Beall, 2 Ga.
134; Long v. Rhawn, 75 Pa. St.
20

Wall

First

ther collateral or inherent.
Whether only such equities pre
Vail against an indorsee as are
attached to the note itself or

became
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128.

Other

states have held that
are available as a
defense.
McKenn
V. Kirkwood,
544;
50 Mich.
McDonald v. Mac
Kenzie, 24 Ore. 573, 14 Pac. 866;
Foot v. Ketchum, 15 Vt. 258, 40
Armstrong
678;
Am.
Dec.
V.
Chadwick, 12 Mass. 156.
Such

set-offs

Any Set-Off between antecedent
parties, which arises after the
transfer,
cannot
be
asserted
against the indorsee.
Davis V.
Miller, 14 Gratt. 8; Henderson V.
Johnson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 381;
55 S. W. 35.
2—This is an exception to the
general rule Stated in the first
half of the Section. Whenever
any person has acquired the pa
per as a holder in due course, he
can transfer his title to others
who will also take free from
equities though they may have

NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS
knowledge

of infirmities in the
instrument Wood v. Starling, 48
Mich. 592; Shaw v. Clark, 49
Mich. 384. The principle is that
the promise being good to the
prior indorsee or holder, free
from objection on the ground of
fraudulent or illegal considera
tion, such indorsee or holder has
the power of transferring it to

others with the same immunity,
as an incident to the legal right
which he had acquired in the in
Kinney V. Kruse, 28
strument.

Wis. 183; Simon v. Merritt, 33
Iowa 537. Jennings v. Carlucci, 87
N. Y. Supp. 475 (case under the
statute), in which plaintiff's as
signor, in due course, transferred
a note to the plaintiff after ma
turity. It was held that the same
title passed to the plaintiff as his

had and defenses avail
able between the original parties
against the
were not available
plaintiff. See also the following
cases decided under the Statute:
V.
Alderman
(Conn.
Mersick
assignor

1905)

60

First

Nat.

Atl.
Bank,

109;

Black

v.

Md. 399;
Bryan v. Harr, 21 App. Cas. (D.
C.) 190.
96
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Where a payee becomes a pur
chaser from a bona fide holder
he takes it subject to all equities
and defenses originally existing
against it; as against him there is
Kost V. Ben
a personal defense.
der, 25 Mich. 515; Andrews v.
Robertson, (Wis.) 87 N. W. 190
(a case under the statute).
The full import of this provi
A
Sion may be illustrated thus:
note is invalid in the hands of
A., the payee, by reason of fraud
in the inducement; A. transfers
it to B. under circumstances that
make B. a holder in due course;

B. transfers it for a valuable con
sideration
to C., who has full
knowledge of the fraudulent
in
ducement; C. may enforce the
note against the maker relying on
the fact that B. Was a holder in
due course. If A. should thereaf
ter become the holder for a Val
uable consideration, he could not
recover on the note.
The Wisconsin Act inserts the
the Word
word “duress” after
“fraud.” in the Second sentence
and substitutes the words “such
holder” for the words “the latter.”

Holder in due course; who deemed.—Every
holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course,'
but when it is shown that the title of any person who has
Sec. 61.

the instrument was defective, the burden is
on the holder to prove that he or some person under
whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due
course.” But the last mentioned rule does not apply in

negotiated
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favor of a party who became bound on the instrument
prior to the acquisition of such defective title.”
1-Bryan v. Harr, 21 App.
(D. C.) 190; German Am.
Bank V. Cunningham,
97
Div. 244; 89 N. Y. Supp.
Karsch V. Pottier & Stymus

Cas.
Nat.
App.
836;

Mfg.

Co. 82 App. Div. 230, 81 N.
782; Benedict v. Kress,
97 App. Div. 65, 89 N. Y. Supp.
607;
Packard
v. Windholtz,
88
App. Div. 365, 84 N. Y. Supp. 666
etc.

Y. Supp.

(cases arising under the statute).
nego
2—The
holder
of
a
tiable instrument is presumed to
be a holder in due course until
evidence on the part of the de
fendant Shows that the instru
ment had a fraudulent or illegal
inception;
thereupon the burden
is on the holder to show that he
acquired the instrument in good
faith and for value and without
notice or that some person under
whom he claims so acquired it.
Paton v. Coit, 5 Mich. 505; Pol
hemus V. Ann Arbor Savings
Bank,
44;
27 Mich.
Tilden v.
Barnard, 43 Mich. 376; Bottomley
v. Goldsmith, 36 Mich. 27; Conley

285; Tatam v. Haslar, 23 Q. B.
D. 345 (a case under the cor
responding provision of the Bills
Exchange
Act).
In Brown V.
Feldwert, (Ore. 1905) 80 Pac. 414

the court said that section 61
would seem to require “where
fraud has been shown in the in
ception, the purchaser of a note
among
must show affirmatively,
things,
Other
that he had
no
notice of such or any other in
firmities at the time he acquired
it.” To the same effect: Consoli
dation Nat. Bank v. Kirkland, 99
App. Div. 121, 91 N. Y. Supp. 353;
Mitchell v. Baldwin, 88 App. Div.
265, 84 N. Y. Supp. 1043; Keegan

(Iowa 1905) 102 N. W.
Lucker v. Iba, 54 N. Y. App.
Div. 566, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1019; M.

v.

Rock

805;

Hor

Groh's Sons Co. v. Schneider, 34
Misc. 195, 68 N. Y. Supp. 862
(cases under the statute).
3-The fact that one who held
possession of a note for the payee
put it into circulation in fraud of
the payee's rights is no defense
in a suit by the holder against
the maker; nor does it change
the burden of proof so as to re
quire the plaintiff to show in the

Mich. 121;
Mills,
423;
Little v.
98 Mich.
French v. Talbot Paving Co., 100
Mich. 443; Rice V. Rankans, 101
Mich. 378; Drovers' Nat. Bank v.
Blue, 110 Mich. 31; Drovers' Nat.
Bank v. Potvin, 116 Mich. 474.
Stevens v. McLachlan, 120 Mich.

first instance that he is a bona
fide holder for value. The fraud
in putting a note into circulation
which will operate as a defense
or change the burden of proof, in
such an action, must be fraud
Kinney v.
against the maker.
Kruse, 28 Wis. 183.

v. Winsor, 41 Mich. 253; Mace v.
Kennedy, 68 Mich. 389; Goodrich
v. McDonald, 77 Mich. 486; City

Bank

v.

rigan

v.

Dill,

84 Mich.

Wyman,

90

549;
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Liability of maker.
Liability of drawer.
Liability of acceptor.

62.
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Liability of general indorsers.
Liability of indorser where
paper negotiable by deliv
ery.

70.
71.

Order in which indorsers are
liable.
Liability of agent or broker.

etc.

Liability of maker.—The maker of a nego
tiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay
Sec. 62.

it according

to its tenor,

and admits the existence of the

payee and his then capacity to indorse.”
1—The contract of the maker
Speaks from the instrument
Self. Evidence is inadmissible to
show any understanding or agree
ment other than that imported by
Thus, one who indorsed a
it.
promissory
note before it was

it

uttered and before the payee had
indorsed it—being liable thereon
as a joint maker (see section 66)
—cannot in an action against him
on the note give evidence that he
was induced to sign the note by
the promise of the payee that he
should not be liable thereon. Gumz
v. Giegling, 108 Mich. 295.
Evidence of a parol agreement
to reduce the amount agreed to
Phelps
be paid is incompetent.
Abbott,
v.
114 Mich. 88.
Evidence of an oral agreement
to renew a note is inadmissible.
Wood's Sons Co. v. Schaeffer, 173
Mass. 443;
Hall v. First Nat.

Bank,

Mass. 16;
Heist v.
Pa. St. 289.
Where the signature is in the
usual place, the lower right hand
corner, the intention
is thereby
fixed, the signing in that way is
an execution of the note as a
matter of law.
If the Signature
place, a
be not in the proper
question of fact arises as to whe
ther the due execution of the in
Strument was intended. The bur
den of proof to show due execu

Hart,

173

73

under such circumstances is
Bills,
Bigelow,
on the holder.
Notes and Cheques, 41.
tion

Where one of two or more per
sons who execute a note adds to
his signature the word “surety,”

he is not the less liable as maker.
Inkster V. First Nat. Bank. 30
Mich. 143; Dart v. Sherwood, 7
Wis. 446; Hoyt v. Mead, 13 Hun
327.
See
Ballard V. Burton, 64
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Vt. 387; Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N.
Y. 457; see note 8, sec. 19.

The liability of the maker is
controlled by the law of the place
of execution of the note unless
it is made payable elsewhere when
the law of that place will con
Strawberry
trol.
Point Bank v.
Lee, 117 Mich. 122; Central Trust
Co. v. Burton, 74 Wis. 329.
2—The maker is estopped
to
deny the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse,
So if he is Sued by an indorsee

of the

payee he cannot defend on
ground
the
that the payee being
an infant, married woman, etc.,
had no capacity to indorse. Wolke
v. Kuhne, 109 Ind. 313; Castor
v. Peterson, 2 Wash. 204, 26 Pac.
223.
It has been held that the
maker may show the insanity of
the payee at the time the paper
was executed.
Peaslee V. Rob
bins, 3 Metc. (Mass.)
164, but
this holding has been criticised
and disapproved.

Where a note, made payable to
foreign corporation which has
not, at the time of execution and
delivery, complied with the laws
relative to the conditions which
doing business
would authorize
a

Sec. 63.

LAW.

within the state, was transferred
to a purchaser, before maturity,
for value and without notice, it
was held, under this provision,
that the defendant by giving the
note, which was not the subject
of statutory prohibition, thereby
conclusively admitted as to third
parties, purchasing before matur
ity and in good faith, the legal

of the payee and its
to take such note and
transfer it by indorsement.
Mc
Mann v. Walker, 31 Col. 261, 72
Pac. 1055.
existence
authority

When the payee is a fictitious
non-existing
person, the in
strument is payable to bearer. See
Section 11.

or

When the note is payable
firm the maker is estopped
denying
the existence of
firm, Griener v. Ulerey, 20

to a
from
such
Iowa
of the

266, or that the name
firm was indorsed by an infant
partner, Dulty v. Brownfield, 1
Pa. St. 497.

The maker of

a note
to show
payee was not the real
interest at the time the
executed.
Johnson
V.
119 Ind. 109.

be

permitted

will not
that the
party in
note was
Conklin,

Liability of drawer.—The drawer by drawing

the instrument admits the existence of the payee and
his then capacity to indorse; and engages that on due
presentment the instrument will be accepted or paid, or
both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored,
and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken,
he

will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any
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in

or

stipulation negativing

to pay
express

it.

subsequent indorser who may be compelled
But the drawer may insert
the instrument

limiting his own liability

to

INSTRUMENTS

an

NEGOTIABLE

the

holder."

Liability

is

a

is

a

a

is

if

a

If

he draws on himself.
partnership of
he draws on

is

is

is

a

a

if

2nd,

member, this
which he
equivalent to drawing
on him
self,
3rd,
he draws on
fictitious
per
or non-existing person or
Son not having capacity to con
tract.
See Section 116.
From the Colorado Act the
word “subsequent”
omitted.

if

ordinarily lia
drawer
secondary
party but
ble as
primary
party if,
liable as
fraudulent,
1st, his drawing
that is,
he had no reasonable
expectation that his draft would
be honored,

1-The

of

the payee and his then capac

indorse."
to

to

a

of

self

and

the payee,

not

a

N. Y. 63.
collater

not

a

101

is

is

of

Morris,

acceptance

is

An

V.

matte

a

His

to

ble.

it

&

L.

a

v.

primarily lia
note
engagement runs not
only
each
the indorsers but
to the drawer himself.
Heuerte
maker of

the holder
the bill; and the
engagements of all the other par
ties are merely collateral.
Prima
facie every acceptance affords
presumption of funds of the draw
er
the hands of the acceptor,
and is, of itself, an express ap
propriation of those funds for the
use of the holder. The case may
indeed be otherwise, and then the
acceptor,
fact, pays the debt of
the drawer, but as between him
in

a

it

bona fide holder who could sue
and hold the drawer. Attensbor
ough
McKenzie, 36 Eng.
Eq., 562.
The acceptor of
bill like the

engagement
pay the debt of
another.
It is an absolute en
gagement
pay the money to

in

to

a

is

is

1—Before acceptance the drawee
not liable on the instrument
He
stranger
and
it.
could himself
discount the in
strument
and transfer
to

al

ity

to

the instrument,” and
Second, The existence

of

*

to

of

to

of

it

of

acceptor.—The acceptor by ac
cepting the instrument engages that he will pay accord
ing
the tenor
his acceptance, and admits:
First, The existence
the drawer,” the genuineness
his signature,” and his capacity and authority
draw
Sec. 64.
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collateral, but an original and di
rect undertaking.
The payee ac
cepts the acceptor as his debtor
and he cannot resort to the draw
er, but upon a failure of due
payment of the bill.
Raborg V.
Peyton, 2 Wheat. 385.
2—The acceptor is required to

know that there is such a per
as the one who purports to
Cooper V. Meyer,
draw the bill.
10 B. & C. 468, 21 E. C. L. 202.
If the drawer be dead at the
time of acceptance,
the acceptor
is precluded from setting up the
Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. &
fact.
son

S. 474, 113 E. C. L. 474.
acceptor is estopped
3—The
from denying the genuineness of
the drawer's signature.
He is
bound to know, when he accepts
the instrument, that such signa
ture is genuine.
He is presumed
to know the handwriting
of his
correspondent and if he accepts
or pays a bill to which the draw
er's name has been forged, he is
bound by the act and can neither
repudiate the acceptance nor re
cover the money from a bona fide
holder to whom he has paid it.
National Park Bank V. Ninth Na
tional Bank, 46 N. Y. 77; Gar
land V. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Ex. 216.
If a bill be drawn by an agent,
the drawee, by his acceptance, ad
mits
the genuineness
of
the
agent's signature and his author
ity to draw, Robinson v. Yarrow,
Moore 150; but
he does not admit the authority
of the agent to indorse the same
bill, although it is made payable
to the order of his principal and

7 Taunt.

455,

1

LAW.

is indorsed by the same agent in
Story
the name of the principal.
Bills,
on
sec. 262.
The acceptor does not admit the
genuineness of the signature of
the indorser even though the bill
be drawn to the Order
of the
First Nat. Bank V.
drawer.
Northwestern Nat. Bank, 152 Ill.
296,

38

Drexel,

E.

739;

14 Md.

566.

N.

Williams

v.

The acceptor does not admit the
genuineness of the body of the
bill. He is not presumed to know
the handwriting
in the body of
the instrument.
So if he payS a
bill or check that has been raised
and he is not himself negligent
he can recover from the perSon
to whom he paid it, the excessive
amount.
White V. Continental
Nat. Bank, 64 N. Y. 317.
4—As he admits the legal capa
city of the drawer to draw the
bill, he cannot Set up as a de
fense that the drawer Was an
infant, Taylor V. Croker, 4 Esp.
187; or a married woman, Cow
ton v. Wickersham,
54 Pa. St.
302; or a corporation having no
legal authority to draw the bill,
Halifax v. Lyle, 2 Welsby, Hurl.
& G. (Exch.) 446.
5—He admits that he has funds
of the drawer in his hands to
pay the bill, so after acceptance
he is estopped
from asserting
against a bona fide holder that
the acceptance was given without
consideration.
Heuertematte
v.

Morris, 101 N. Y. 63. As between
himself and the drawer it is only
prima facie evidence that he has
such funds in his hands and he

NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS
may

show that the acceptance
merely for accommodation
and after paying the bill may re
COVer from the drawer in an ac
tion for money had and received.
Christian V. Keen, 80 Va. 369.
WaS

6–So,

from set
ting up that at the time of ac
ceptance the payee was an infant,
he

is

estopped

IN

119

GENERAL.

v. Darch, 4 Price 300; a lu
natic or a married woman, Smith
V. Marsack, 6 C. B. 486; or a cor
poration
legal capacity
without
or existence, Brickley v. Edwards,

Jones

Ind. 3, 30 N. E. 708.
Note that the acceptor “ad
mits,” the indorser
“Warrants.”
131

(See sec. 67, 68.)

When person deemed indorser.—A person
placing his signature upon an instrument, otherwise than
as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser,
unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his in
tention to be bound in some other capacity."
Sec. 65.

1—Under this section a party
may assume some other liability
such as guarantor or surety but
he must indicate his intention

that effect by some appropriate
expression.
See sec. 19, subd. 6
and note; Sec. 66.

to

Sec. 66. Liability of irregular indorser.—Where a per
son, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places there

on his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as
indorser" in accordance with the following rules:
First, If the instrument is payable to the order of a
third person, he is liable to the payee and to all subse
quent parties;”
Second,

If

the instrument is payable to the order of
the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable
to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer;”

Third,

he

If he

signs

for the accommodation of the payee

is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee."

1-This changes the law in
Michigan and in some other states
and

Settles

the

conflict

in

the

decisions as to the liability of the
irregular or anomalous indorser.

In

Michigan

a

person

placing

his name on the back of a note
before delivery
and before in
dorsement by the payee has been
held liable as a joint maker.
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Wetherwax v. Paine, 2 Mich. 555;
Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150;
Herbage V. McEntee, 40 Mich. 337;
Stewart V. First Nat. Bank, 40
Mich. 348; Sibley V. Muskegon
Nat. Bank, 41 Mich. 196; Moyna
han V. Hanaford, 42 Mich. 329;
Robbins V. Brooks, 42 Mich. 62;
Greusel V. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 95;
Fay & Co. v. Jenks & Co., 78
Mich. 312; Tredway v. Antisdel,
86

Mich.

Judge,

104

Giegling,

Bank

82;

Allison

Mich.

108 Mich.

V. Godfrey,

141;

V.

Circuit

Gumz

295; Dow
126 Mich.

V.

Law
521;

v.
Union Trust Co.,
(Mich.) 99 N. W. 758; Citizens'
Bank V. Platt (Mich.), 97 N. W.
694. The same rule applies where

McGraw

one indorses a note payable to
the maker at the time of execu
tion and before delivery,
even
though his indorsement follows
that of the payee.
Peninsular
Savings Bank V. Hosie, 112 Mich.
351.
Or where a party indorses
after the payee
has indorsed
but
Writes
his
name
above
that of the payee. Sweet v. Wood
in, 72 Mich. 393; Logan v. Og
den, 101 Tenn. 392.
Some of the
Other State courts follow the Same
rule as the Michigan court. Union

Bank
504;
441.

v. Willis, 8 Metc. (Mass.)
Childs v. Wyman, 44 Me.
In the case last cited the

irregular indorser

added to his
the words, “without re
course.” The court rejected these
words as mere surplusage, being
words applicable to an indorser,
not to an original promisor.
signature,

Other courts have held him
liable as indorser: as first indor

LAW.

ser, Blakeslee V. Hewett, 76 Wis.
341; as second indorser, Phelps v.
Vischer, 50 N. Y. 69; Eilbert v.
Finkbeiner, 68 Pa. St. 243. Other
Courts have held him liable as
guarantor.
Ranson V. Sherwood,
26 Conn. 437; Webster v. Cobb,
17 Ill. 459; Knight V. Dunsmore,
12 Iowa 35; Chandler
30 Tex. 477.

v.

Westfall,

Mr. Crawford says that the rule
adopted in the statute was taken
from the Civil Code of California,
Section 3117 of which is as fol
lows: “One who indorses a nego
tiable instrument before it is de
livered to the payee, is liable to
the payee thereon as an indorser.”
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law
64.
The
rule
of the Statute
accords With the intent of the
parties
in nearly every case.
When One “backs” a note to
enable the maker to procure the
Same to be discounted, he does
so for the purpose of lending se

curity to the maker just

as

he

would if the note were made pay
able to his Order and he in
dorsed it for the accommodation
of the maker. In the transaction
of lending his credit to the mak
er he takes no thought of whe
ther he or some other person is
named as payee.
In neither case
does he intend to pay the note
except in the event of the mak
er's failure SO to do.

It

matters little, however, wheth
er the irregular indorser be re
garded as maker, guarantor
or
technical indorser provided the rule
as

to

his

The statute

relation be uniform.
has settled a vexa
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tious conflict Without conceivable
injury to any interest.
In some jurisdictions the rela
tion of the irregular indorser to
the paper has been determined
from the face of the paper itself
(no parol evidence being admit
ted to explain his status); in oth
ers, from oral evidence showing
his true relation thereto. Thus
the Supreme Court of the United

States holds the irregular indors
er an original promisor, a guar
antor or an indorser according to
the nature of the transaction and
the understanding of the parties.
Oral evidence is admissible to
show the intent and undertaking.
If the indorsement was made to
give the maker credit with the
payee or if the indorser partici
pated in the consideration of the
note, he is to be considered a
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The statute seems to fix abso
lutely the status of the irregu
lar indorser and thus excludes
parol testimony to vary his liabil
ity.
The only question of fact
would seem to be, -did the per
son, “not otherwise a party to
the instrument,” place his signa
delivery.”
ture thereon “before

But
Co.,

A

see

Kohn

infra.
statute

V. Consolidated

of Connecticut

etc.

simi

lar but Somewhat more compre
con
was
in terms
hensive
strued in Spencer v. Allerton, 60
Conn. 410, wherein it was held
that parol evidence was inadmis
sible, the status of the anoma
absolutely
being
indorser
lous
fixed by the statute.
This section was considered by
the Supreme Court of New York
in Kohn V. Consolidated Butter

& Egg Co., 30 Misc. 725, 63 N. Y.
Supp. 265, but the case was out
side the statute in that it was al
leged that the maker made and
delivered the note to the payee
the other
and that “thereafter
the note.”
indorsed
defendants
McAdam, J., said: “The true in
as between
tention of indorsers
themselves can always be shown
by oral evidence. To go further
and decide that the statute in
tended to create an incontestable
liability against irregular indors
ers would be to impute to the leg
islative wisdom a design repug
tin, 95 U. S. 90. In New York, nant to every notion of judicial
testimony was admissible to show procedure, especially in a provi
that the indorsement was made sion enacted in the interests of
to give the maker credit with the law reform.”
payee and thus make the indors
2-Thus if it is drawn by A
payee.
payable
the
to
to B, or order and is in
er liable

maker,
If the indorsement
was after the note Was delivered
to the payee at the request of
the maker to procure further in
dulgence or forbearance for the
maker, he can be held only as
guarantor, and there must be le
gal proof of a consideration to
uphold the promise unless it be
was connected
he
that
shown
with the inception of the note.
the note was intended for dis
count and the indorsement Was
to be inoperative until after the
payee indorsed, he is liable only
Good V. Mar
as second indorser.

joint

If
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dorsed by C before delivery to
B, C is liable as indorser to B
and all subsequent parties. Leon
ard V. Draper, (Mass. 1905) 73
N. E. 644 (a case under the Sta
tute).
3—Thus if it is drawn by A
payable to A or order and in
dorsed by B, and subsequently de
livered to C, B is liable to C and
all subsequent parties.
4—Thus if it is drawn by A
payable to B, or order, and in
dorsed by C before the payee in
dorses but for his accommodation,
and the payee then gets it dis
counted, C is liable to all parties
Subsequent to B, the payee, but
not

liable

to

the

payee.

Mr.
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Crawford says that this Subdivi
sion was added to provide for a
case where, the payee being un
able to enforce payment, there
might be a question whether the
indorser
would be liable to a
person claiming under the payee.
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law,
Supra.

The following cases involve this
Section and hold the anomalous
signer liable as indorser: Corn v.
Levy, 97 App. Div. 48, 89 N. Y.
Supp. 658; McLean v. Bryer, 24
R. I. 599; Downey v. O'Keefe, (R.

I.

1905)

59

Atl.

929;

Jenkins &

Sons v. Coomber, [1898]
168 (a case under the
Exchange Act.)

2 Q.

B.

Bills of

Warranty; where negotiation by delivery, etc.
—Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or
by a qualified indorsement warrants:"
Sec. 67.

First, That the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be;”

Second, That he has a good title to it;"
Third, That all prior parties had capacity to contract;"
Fourth, That he has no knowledge of any fact which

would impair the validity of the instrument or render it
valueless.”

But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the war

ranty extends in favor of no holder other than the imme
diate transferee." The provisions of subdivision three of
this section do not apply to persons negotiating public
or corporate securities, other than bills and notes."
1—See Bills
sec. 58

of Exchange

Act,

(3).

Compare

secs.

62,

63

and

64.

The maker, the
ceptor admits.
These warranties

drawer,

the ac

are implied by

as

it,

is

a

in

of

to

in to

to

condition of the principal
Contract, as to the essence
and
Substance of the thing agreed
be sold, and
this country be
ing generally termed an implied
warranty of identity of the thing
sold.”
void
So where an instrument
for usury between the original
parties, though the vendor have
no knowledge of such fact, he
for the
liable
to the Vendee
Crum,
amount paid.
Challiss
West, 33
22 Kan. 157; Giffert
Wis. 617. In New York the con
trary has been held in Littauer
Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506, but
this case was criticized and disap
Richards, su
proved
Meyer
Sheldon, 42
pra, and
Wood
N.
L. 421.
conflict as
There seems to be
an implied
whether there
warranty on the part of the ven
dor, of the solvency of the maker.
The correct rule would seem to be
that where commercial paper
quali
transferred by delivery
v.

v.

is

is

in

to

as

v.

v.

in

a

or

is

is

and the vendee recovers only the
original amount he may recover
the difference from his vendor.
Jones v. Ryde, 1 Marsh. 157, 5
Taunt. 488. The transferrer may,
however, at the time of sale ex
pressly refuse to warrant the gen
uineness of the instrument and
such refusal will prevail over the
implied warranty.
Bell v. Dagg,
There is an im
60 N. Y. 528.
plied warranty in the sale of com
mercial paper that it is what it
purports to be, the same as in the
sale of ordinary chattels. Han
nun v. Richardson, 48 Vt., 508.
In Meyer v. Richards, 163 U. S.
385, bonds were sold by one per
son to another, buyer and seller
regarding them as lawful obliga
tions, when in fact they were
The court in holding that
void.
the seller must refund to the buy
“Both
er the amount paid, said:
in England and in the United
States the doctrine is universally
recognized that where commercial

in

consideration has failed. Aldrich
v. Jackson, 5 R. I. 218; Allen V.
Clark, 49 Vt. 390.
Where a bill has been raised

is

were forged, the vendee may re
cover what he has paid to his
vendor, as he has not received
what he bargained for and his

paper is sold without indorsement
or without express assumption of
liability on the paper itself, the
contract of sale and the obliga
be
tions which arise from
tween Vendor and vendee, are gov
erned by the common law, relat
ing
goods and chat
the sale
tels. So, also, the undoubted rule
that
such
sale the obliga
not restrict
tion of the vendor
ed
the mere question of forg
upon
ery vel mon, but depends
whether he has delivered that
sell, this
which he contracted
England,
rule being designated,
a

impliedly

123

J.

transferrer

warrants that all prior signatures
are genuine and that the instru
ment has not been altered and
that it is based on a good and
If it turn
valid consideration.
out that any signatures thereto

GENERAL.

v.

law from the mere fact of de
livery or sale of the instrument.
2—The

IN
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indorsement and the maker
is insolvent at the time, which
fact is not known to the vendor,
the loss should fall on the Ven
dee.
Roads V. Webb, 91 Ma. 406,
40 Atl. 128;
Hecht v. Batcheller,
147 Mass. 335.
In Bicknall V.
Waterman, 5 R. I. 43, this rule
was followed, the court saying:
“The
well
known
common-law
principle, applicable alike to sales
and exchanges of personal things,
is, that fraud or warranty is nec
essary to render the vendor or
exchanger liable, in any form, for
a defect in the quality
of the
Apply
thing sold or exchanged.
ing this principle to the sale or
exchange of the note of a third
person, transferred
by indorse
ment without recourse or by de
livery merely, the vendee or per
son taking it in exchange takes
the risk of the past or future in
solvency of the maker, or other
party to it; unless indeed, in case
of past insolvency, the vendor or
exchanger is guilty of the fraud
of passing it off with knowledge
of that fact.”
There is no implied warranty
fied

in the case of a Vendor or quali
fied indorser of a bill of exchange
that it was drawn against funds
or that it was not drawn for ac
commodation.
In re Hammond,
DeGex,
6
M. & G. 699; People's
Bank v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101.
3—Meriden Nat. Bank W. Gal
laudet, 120 N. Y. 298; Gompertz
v. Bartlett, 23 L. J. Q. B. 65.
4—Thus, where a corporation
had no authority to issue certain
bonds, the bonds being therefore

LAW.

valueless, the transferrer was com
pelled to refund the considera
Rogers v. Walsh, 12 Neb.
tion.
Likewise,
28.
where a prior

in

dorsement was that of an infant.
Lobdell V. Baker. 3 Metc. (Mass.)
469.

The indorsement by a corpora
tion of a promissory note, paSSes
the property
therein
and the
power
want
of
of the cor
poration to indorse is no defense
to a subsequent indorser who by

his indorsement warrants the gen
uineness of the paper, his own
property therein and the capacity

of all preceding parties
tract. Willard v. Crook,
(D. C.)

237

(construing

to
21

con

App.

this sec

tion).
5—Thus where a person trans
fers notes knowing that the mak
er is insolvent and does not com
municate Such fact to his trans
feree, the latter may hold him re
sponsible.
People's Bank V. Bo
gart, 81 N. Y. 106.
The vendor impliedly warrants
that the note, if it is overdue,
has not been paid.
Howell V.
Wilson, 2 Blackf. (2d) 418; Das
kam V. Ullman, 74 Wis. 474.

6—The warranties of the qual
ified indorser extend to all sub
sequent holders;
those of the
transferrer by delivery to his im
mediate transferee only.
7–In affirmation of the general
rule the statute exempts such se
curities from the implied
war
ranties of the transferrer.
Otis V.
Cullom, 92 U. S. 448. In this case
municipal bonds payable to bear
er Were under consideration.
The
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action was against the vendor of
these bonds, which had been held
void, because the legislature had
no power to pass the acts in pur
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suance of which the bonds were
issued. The court held that there
could be no recovery in the ab
sence of an express warranty.

in

Liability of general indorsers.—Every
Sec. 68.
dorser who indorses without qualification warrants to
all subsequent holders in due course:

First, The matters and things mentioned in subdivis

ions one, two and three of the next preceding section;"
and
Second, That the instrument is at the time of his
dorsement valid and subsisting.”

in

And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment,
it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be,
according to its tenor,” and that if it be dishonored and
the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any sub
sequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."
1—The

indorser

warrants

that

instrument
is genuine and
that it has not been altered. Fish
v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Mich. 203;
Packard v. Windholtz,
84 N. Y.
Supp. 666, (a case under the stat
ute); Leonard v. Draper (Mass.
1905), 73 N. E. 644, (a case un
the

der the statute).
But this rule
has not been applied to an in
dorser for collection.
In United
Exchange Nat.
States
v.
Am.
Bank, 70 Fed. Rep. 232, a draft
was indorsed for collection and
the collection agent paid over the
money to his principal before it
was discovered that the payee's
indorsement had been forged.
It
was held that in such a case the

by the
collecting
indorsement
agent, who has no proprietary in
terest, does not import any guar
anty of the genuineness of all
prior indorsements, but only of
the agent's relation to the prin
cipal, as stated upon the face of

the draft; and as this relation is
evident upon the face of the draft
itself, the payer cannot claim to
have been misled by the indorse
ment of the agent, or any right
to rely upon that indorsement as
a guaranty of the genuineness of
the payee's indorsement. The same
was held where a check was raised
and the collecting agent paid over
the money before discovery of
that fact. National Park Bank V.
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Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28. See
First Nat. Bank V. First Nat.
Bank, 58 Ohio St. 207, 50 N. E.
723.

As the statute applies to every
indorser
who
indorses Without
qualification it includes indorsers
for collection and thus makes a
change in the law.
Under
the
statute a bank indorsing paper
forwarded for collection would be
liable as a general indorser though

the prior indorsement was for col
lection or for deposit.
2—An indorser of a promissory
note always warrants the exist
ence and legality of the contract
therefore, he
which he assigns;
cannot urge in defense of a suit
by the indorsee against him that
the note was made on the Lord's
Day, Prescott Nat. Bank v. But
ler, 157 Mass. 548, or that the
note was given for a gaming debt,
Unger v. Boas, 1 Harr. 601.
3—An indorser of a promissory
note which contains a stipulation
for a reasonable attorney’s fee
in case of suit is as much liable
for the attorney's fee as for the

principal of the

Kutzschan,

Sec. 69.

24

note.

Ore.

28, 32

Benn v.
Pac. 763.

LAW.

As a rule, parol evidence is

in

admissible to change the legal im
port of the indorsement and con
Vert it into an undertaking rest

ing on Outside conditions.
Ort
mann V. Canadian Bank of Com
merce,

Ferry,

39 Mich.

518;

Doolittle

v.

Kan.

230;

Johnson

V.

20

Glover, 121 Ill. 286;
Charles v.
Denis, 42 Wis. 56; Martin v. Cole,
104 U. S. 37.
4—The conditional obligation of
the indorser
becomes
absolute
when the note has become dis
honored and the necessary pro
ceedings have been taken.
His
contract, whether in blank or in
full, is determined by law. Charles
V. Denis, 42 Wis., 56.
He has no
right to require the holder to sue
the maker or drawer;
it is his
duty to take up the instrument.
Day v. Ridgway, 17 Pa. St. 303.
The holder of indorsed paper

has a right to rely on the con
tract of the indorser that the pa
per will be paid by the maker at
maturity and he is not bound to
anticipate and make provision for
a breach of the contract.
Bart
lett V. Isbell, 31 Conn. 296.

Liability of indorser where paper negotiable

by delivery.—Where a person places his indorsement on
an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the
liabilities of an indorser."
1—Indorsement

is not necessary

to pass an instrument
bearer or indorsed in
if the holder choose
name on the back he

payable to
blank, but
to put his
becomes

as

much bound as an indorser as if
the instrument
had been made
payable to him or order.
Brush
etc., 3 Johns.
v. Administrators,
439;
Tam v. Shaw, 10 Ind. 469;

NEGOTIABLE
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Atl.

V.

850;

Myers,

75

Smith

v.

Md. 406, 23
Rawson, 61

Ga. 208.

By

indorsing

a

JN
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note a payee does not become lia
ble as an indorser.
Haber v.
Brown, 101 Cal. 445, 35 Pac. 1035.

Order in which indorsers are liable.—As re
spects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in
the order in which they indorse, but evidence is admis
Sec. 70.

sible to show that as between or among themselves they
have agreed otherwise.” Joint payees or joint indorsees
who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally.”
1-Successive indorsers are prifacie liable in the order in
which they indorse and not as coSureties, and this applies to ac
*ma

COmmodation indorsers as Well as
to indorsers for Value. For ex
ample, where a second indorser
of a promissory note pays and
takes up the note, he becomes a
holder for Value and may main
tain an action to recover the
amount thereof of the first indor
Ser although both are accommoda

Kelly v. Bur
indorsers.
roughs, 102 N. Y. 93; Harrah v.
Doherty, 111 Mich. 175; Greusel
v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 95; McGurk
v. Huggett, 56 Mich. 187; Farwell
v. Ensign, 66 Mich. 600; Brewer
v. Boynton, 71 Mich. 254;
Mc
Carty v. Roots, 21 How. (U. S.)
432; Wolf v. Hostetter, 182 Pa. St.
292, 37 Atl. 988;
Russ v. Sadler,
tion

Easterly v.
Pa. St. 51;
ber, 66 N. Y. 433.
197

Bar

2—Parol evidence is admissible
to show that by agreement among
themselves they were to be co

sureties,
Mich.
Mich.

Farwell v.
Shufelt

600;

Ensign,
V. Moore,

66
93

564;
or that their under
taking was joint, Harrah V. Do
herty, 111 Mich. 175. But parol

evidence is inadmissible to show
that what stands as a clear and
unambiguous contract of indorse
ment was not intended to be such.
An agreement made at the time
of indorsement that the indorser
was not to be liable is inadmis
Sible, as the indorsement must
upon
stand
its legal import.
Frackelton,
Hitchcock
V.
116
Mich. 487; Phelps v. Abbott, 114
Mich. 88; Kulenkamp v. Groff, 71
Mich. 675. If one indorser as the
result of a mistake sign before
another,
this may be shown.
Rhinehart v. Schall, 69 Md. 352.
changes the common
which was that where
joint payees indorsed they were
only jointly liable. Lane v. Stacy,
8 Allen 41;
Russ v. Sadler, 197

3—This

law

rule

Pa. St. 51, 46 Atl. 903.

128

THE NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW.

Sec. 71. Liability of agent or broker.—Where a broker
or other agent negotiates an instrument without indorse
ment, he incurs all the liabilities prescribed by section
sixty-seven

of this act, unless he discloses the name of
his principal, and the fact that he is acting only as agent."
1-Worthington v. Cowles, 112
30. Action to recover back
money paid by plaintiff to de
fendants for a promissory
note
MaSS.

signed by one Hanson, the in
dorsement upon which was forged.
The defendants were note brok
ers who sold the note for Hanson
and paid him the purchase money,
less commissions, before the forg
ery was discovered.
Held: that
to relieve an agent from liability

upon an implied warranty of the
genuineness of a promissory note
sold by him, which afterwards
proves to be forged, the transac
tion must have been such that
the purchaser understood, or ought
as a reasonable man to have un
derstood, that
he
was dealing
With the principal.

Lyons
439.

v.

Miller,

6 Gratt.

(Va.)

NEGOTIABLE

Article VI.
Sec.

Want of demand on principal

73.

effect of.
Presentment.
Where

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

debtor;

Instrument
must be exhibited.
Presentment,
where
instrument payable at bank.
Presentment,
where person

primarily liable is

dead.

Presentment to persons liable
aS partnerS.

Presentment to joint debtors.
presentment not reWhen
quired to charge the drawer.

12.9

Sec.

re

82.

presentment not
When
quired to charge the
dorser.

83.

When delay in making
Sentment is excused.

84.

When presentment
dispensed with.

85.

When instrument dishonored
by non-payment.

instru-

ment is not payable on de
mand.
Sufficient presentment; what
constitutes.
Place of presentment.

GENERAL.

for Payment.

Presentment

72.

74.

IN

INSTRUMENTS

liable,

when
dishonored.

88.

pre

may

be

Liability of party secondarily

86.

87.

in

instrument

Time of maturity.
Time; how computed.
payable at

89.

Where instrument
bank.

90.

Payment in due course; what
constitutes.

Want of demand on principal debtor; effect
of.—Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to
Sec. 72.

a

at

as

of

to

it

is

to

at
a

is,

charge the person primarily liable on the instrument,"
by its terms, payable
special
but if the instrument
willing
pay
place, and he
able and
there
ma
turity, such ability and willingness are equivalent

9

to commencement of suit.

Harris

292;

head,

35

Howard

Hills

Shufeldt,
Co.
78
Greeley
White

Fla.

17

v.

Trust

v.

burg
Fed.

523,
So. 643;
Boorman, 17 Wis. 459;
Place, 48 N. Y. 520. The

v.

is

of

1—This is an affirmation of the
general rule. The primary party
liable, by the terms
his con
tract, without any demand prior

v.

in

to

is

payment upon his part.” But except
tender
herein
provided,
presentment
payment
necessary
otherwise
for
charge
order
the drawer and indorsers.”
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rule applies to one who has guar
anteed the payment of the instru
ment by the maker or acceptor.
Presentment for payment, either
to the principal debtor or to the
guarantor, is not a condition prece
dent to the liability of the guar
antor
of payment. Roberts v.
Hawkins, 70 Mich. 566; Walton
V. Mascall, 13 M. & W. 452; Gage
V. Lewis, 68 Ill. 605.
The rule
applies
to
the accommodation
maker;
although he is a Surety
in fact, he is liable Without pre
sentment for payment. Torrey V.
Foss,

40 Me. 74; American Nat.
V. Junk Bros. 94 Tenn. 624,
30 S. W. 753, 28 L. R. A. 492.

Bank

This provision should not be
considered as an absolute rule.
It is to be construed in connec
tion with sections relating
to
qualification
of acceptance.
Ob
Viously it Was not designed to
change the general rule that the
acceptor may, by the terms of a
qualified
acceptance, make pre
Sentment for payment a condition
precedent to his liability.
The Wisconsin Act omits the re
mainder of this sentence.
2-AS against the maker of a
note payable at a bank or other
particular place it is not neces
sary to allege or prove present
ment or demand for payment at
such a place.
Reeve v. Pack, 6
McIntyre v.
Co.,
State Ins.
52 Mich. 188;

Mich.

240;

Mich.

How

ard V. Boorman, 17 Wis. 459. The
only consequence of neglect to
make presentment for payment at
the place named is to relieve the
primary party from damages and

INSTRUMENTS
costs

LAW.

incident

on

Suit

brought

without such presentment.

Such
bar interest and costs,
not the cause of action.
But if
actual loss or damage has at
tended failure to make present
ment at the place named, such
loss or damage may be offset
against the instrument.
Cox V.
Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 713; Armis
tead V. Armisteads, 10 Leigh. 525;
Bank V. Zorn, 14 S. C. 444. The
bringing of a suit upon a certifi
cate of deposit, which is held to
be a promissory
note payable on
demand, is a sufficient demand of
payment.
Beardsley v. Webber,
104 Mich. 88; Tripp v. Curtenius,

will

neglect

Curran v. Witter,
Lynch V. Goldsmith,
64 Ga. 42;
Hunt v. Divine, 37
Ill. 137. Some courts have made

36 Mich.
68

Wis.

494;

16;

between a promis
Sory note payable on demand and
a certificate of deposit:
in the
case of a note the maker might
be sued without a demand, but in
the case of a certificate of de
posit, a demand for payment must

this distinction

made.
Riddle V. First Nat.
Bank, 27 Fed. 503; Pardee v. Fish,
60 N. Y. 265;
Shute v. Pacific
Nat. Bank, 136 Mass. 487;
Mc
Gough v. Jamison, 107 Pa. St. 336.
be

In the New York Act this addi
tional

clause appears between the

“maturity” and “such”:
words
“and has funds there available for
Concerning these
that purpose.”
words Mr. Crawford says: “They
were added by the laws of 1898,
chap. 336. They seem to be su
perfluous.
It is difficult to see
how a man can be able to pay,

NEGOTIABLE
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he has the funds
with
which to make such payment. Be
sides, if taken literally, they im
pose a condition not deemed nec
If, for ex
essary by the courts.
ample, the special place' where
the paper is payable is the office
of the maker or acceptor, this pro
Vision requires that he have the
funds there, and it would not be
enough that he have
them in
bank.
The interpolation
is not
unless

only at variance with the decisions
on the subject, but is contrary to
good sense, and to the practice of
the

business

World.”

Crawford's

Ann. Neg. Inst. Law, 72.
3–Demand upon the real maker
is necessary to charge the irreg
ular indorser. Peck v. Easton, 74
Conn. 456 (a case under the Stat

Sec. 73.

IN
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The statute changes the
rule in Michigan in this regard.
Demand is necessary although
the indorser has become the per
Sonal representative of the maker.
Magruder V. Union Bank, 3 Pet.
90; SO too, to charge the accom
modation indorser, although
the
indorsement was made for the sole
purpose of giving the note credit
and currency.
Buck V. Cotton, 2
ute).

Conn. 126;
so too, where the
maker has become insolvent, Law
rence v. Langley, 14 N. H. 70;
So too, where the indorser has re
ceived security.
Moses v. Ela, 43
N. H. 557; Whittier v. Collins, 15

R. I. 44.
This provision

of the statute
was referred to in In re Swift, 106
Fed. 65.

Presentment where instrument

is not payable

on demand.—Where the instrument is not payable on
demand, presentment" must be made on the day it falls
due.” Where it is payable on demand, presentment must
be made within a reasonable time after its issue,” except
that in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for
payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable
time after the last negotiation thereof.
1-Presentment and demand are
usually spoken of as a single act;
they

are, however,

separate

and

distinct acts, and both acts must
be performed in order to fix the
liability of secondary parties. The
demand must be made according
to the tenor of the instrument.
Thus, a holder demands payment
in gold coin on presentment of an

instrument payable in silver. Due
presentment is not made.
Lan
genberger v. Kroeger, 48 Cal. 147.
2—As to date of maturity see
Section 87.
In Ryerson V. Tourcotte, 121
Mich. 78, it was held that where
orders were payable only on the
tenth day of each month, it was
unnecessary to make presentment
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to the drawee on that day, if pay
ment had been refused on earlier
presentment on the ground that
the drawee did not owe the draw
er.
In case of paper payable in in
stalments, demand for each in
stalment is necessary to charge

the indorser.
Eastman V. Tur
man, 24 Cal. 380.
3—See Sec. 2.
No delay is reasonable beyond

that which would fairly be re
quired in the ordinary course of
business Without Special inconveni
ence to the holder or by special

particular

circumstances
of the
Phoenix Ins. Co., V. Gray,
13 Mich. 191;
Carll v. Brown, 2
Mich. 401;
Home Savings, Bank
V. Hosie, 119 Mich. 116.
In England a note payable on
demand has been regarded as a
continuing security whether it be
with or without interest, imme
diate payment not being contem
plated by the parties;
so if pay
ment be not demanded Within any
definite time, the holder is not
chargeable with neglect and the
case.

instrument
due.

is not considered Over

Brooks

v. Mitchell,

9 M. &

W. 15. In this case two years
Was not considered unreasonable
time. Chartered Bank V. Dickson,
L. R. 3 P. C. 574. The same rule
prevailed in New York prior to
the statute. Wheeler v. Warner,
47 N. Y. 519;
Parker v. Stroud,
98 N. Y. 379;
Shutts v.
100 N. Y. 541.
In the

Fingar,

United
States as a general rule, the courts
have followed the rule embodied
in the Statute.
Martin V. WinS
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low, Fed. Cas. No. 9172; Perry v.
Green, 19 N. J. L. 61; Bassen
horst v. Wilby, 45 Ohio St. 333,
13 N. E. 75; Field v. Nickerson,
13
Mass. 131.
In the case last
cited seven months’ delay in mak
ing presentment was held to dis
charge the accommodation indor
ser, who had been told by one of
the makers that payment was not
to be demanded immediately.

As Overdue instruments
are
made payable on demand by sec
tion 9, the requirements of this
Section apply to such paper.

statute of Massachusetts pro
Vided that a note payable on de
mand Should be considered over
due if presentment and demand
of payment were not made within
sixty days from the date thereof.
This was the statutory definition
of reasonable time as applied to
notes payable on demand. In Mer

A

v. Jackson, 181 Mass. 69 (a
under the statute), it was
held that in the absence of any
evidence of usage of trade or facts
of the particular case to bring it
within the provisions of the Ne
gotiable Instruments
LaW, defin

ritt

case

ing reasonable time

(Sec. 2) a de
mand on a promissory note pay
able on demand must be made
within sixty days of the date in
order to hold an indorser, and
this, too, although the statute first
above referred to was repealed by
the Negotiable Instruments
Law.
The presentment for payment of
a note payable on demand is pre
sumptively within a reasonable
time;
an indorser, to raise the
issue that its presentment was de

IN GENERAL.
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for an unreasonable time
plead and prove such mat
ter as a defense.
German-Ameri
can Bank V. Mills, 99 App. Div.
312, 91 N. Y. Supp. 142 (a case
under the statute). The ordinary
certificate of deposit, when it is
negotiable, has been considered as
a continuing security and imme
diate demand of payment is not
contemplated;
so the indorser re
mains liable on the certificate
though demand be not made with
in the time required in the case
of other negotiable instruments.
Birch v. Fisher, 51 Mich. 36; Nat.
must

al

Bank

Bank,

133

v. Washington
5 Hun,

County Nat.

In this

605.

case

the certificate was not presented
until seven years after its issue.
When the material facts are ad
mitted or not in dispute, the ques
tion as to what constitutes a rea
Sonable time is one of law for the
court, Turner V. Iron Chief Min

ing

Co.,

Reddick,

74

Wis.

65 Miss.

355;

Parker

v.

242;

when the
facts are complicated and conflict
ing the question is one for the
jury, under instructions from the
court. Muilman v. D'Equino, 2 H.
Black. 565.

Sufficient presentment; what constitutes.—
Presentment for payment, to be sufficient, must be made:
Sec. 74.

First, By the holder, or by some person authorized to

receive payment on his behalf;"
Second,

At

a reasonable hour on a business day;”

Third, At a proper place, as herein defined;”
Fourth, To the person primarily liable on the instru
ment, or, if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person
found at the place where the presentment is made.”
1—Mere possession of a negotia
ble instrument payable to bearer
or indorsed in blank, is sufficient
to entitle one to make presentment
and demand. Jackson V. Love, 82
N. C. 405. Payment to such per
son is always good
unless the
payer knows that the holder is
not rightfully possessed of the in
strument, Sussex Bank v. Bald
win, 17 N. J. L. 487. But posses
sion of a note payable to the or
der of a third person and not in

dorsed by him, is not sufficient to
entitle the holder to demand pay
ment.
Barnett V. Ringgold,
80
Ky. 289; Doubleday V. Kress, 50
N. Y. 413. Any duly authorized
agent of the holder may make
presentment and the authorization
not be in writing. Hartford
Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489;
Hartford Bank V. Barry, 17 Mass.
93. Upon the holder's death pre

need

Sentment

should

be

made

his personal representative,

by
even
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though the note has been specific

ally bequeathed. Crist
Carter (Ind.) 570.

v.

Crist,

1

One to whom negotiable paper
has been transferred as collateral
security or as a pledge, must make
presentment for payment, give no
tice, etc., otherwise he will make
the paper his own and will be
liable for any loss sustained by
reason of his neglect. Jennison V.

Parker, 7 Mich. 355; Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Whit
ten V. Wright, 34 Mich. 92; Pea

cock V. Pursell,

14 C.

B. (n. S.)

COnSideration the habits of the
community or district in which
he lives, the maker may reason
ably be expected to be in condi

tion to attend to ordinary busi
ness.
Farnsworth v. Allen, 4
Gray,

453;
Estes V. Tower, 102
65;
Mass.
Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B.
& Ad. 188.
Presentment should

made within hours not given
over to rest. What might be a
reasonable hour in one community
might be an unreasonable hour in
another.
The difference between
country residence and urban resi
be

in the hours of retiring and
will affect the reasonable
ness of the hour of making pre
sentment.
The question whether
a presentment is within reason
able time cannot be made to de
pend on the private and peculiar
habits of the maker of a note, not
known to the holder; but it must
dence,

728.

the case of foreign
bills
there may be two presentments,
one by the holder or his agent in
the usual way, the other by a no
tary or other proper person for
purpose
protest.
the
of
This
might also occur in the case of
inland bills or promissory notes,
but as to these protest is permis
sible, not compulsory.
Mr. Bigelow says that for the
purpose of fixing the liability of
secondary
parties,
presentment
by
must be made
one who can
compel, not merely receive, pay
Bigelow, Bills, Notes and
ment.
Cheques, 124.
No authority
is
cited to support the statement and
the distinction assumed seems un
warranted in View of the statute
which declares presentment suffi
cient if made by some person “au
thorized to receive payment” on

In

behalf of the holder.

of paper not pay
able at bank, presentment is made
within a reasonable time if made
at an hour at which, taking into
2—In the

LAW.

case

rising,

determined

be

by

a consideration

of the circumstances which, in

or

would render it sea
Sonable Or otherwise. Farnsworth
v. Allen, supra.
If presentment
place
be made at the
of business
of the payer it must be during
the hours when such places are
usually open.
Dana v. Sawyer, 22
Me. 244; Triggs v. Newnham, 1
Car. & P. 631; Waring v. Betts,
dinary

cases,

Va. 46.
As to time of pre
sentment of paper payable at a
bank See Sec. 77.
3—See next section.
90

4-Presentment

to the clerk of
acceptor or promisor at his
office or place of business is suf
ficient without showing any spe
cial authority given to the clerk.

an
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Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
121; Draper V. Clemens, 4 Mo. 52;
Stainback V. Bank, 11 Gratt. 260.
To render an indorser liable on
a note signed by one who affixes
the word “agent” to his name
without disclosing his principal,

GENERAL.
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payment must be demanded
of
and refused by the agent.
De
mand on the principal is not suffi
cient.
Stinson v. Lee, 68 Miss.
113, 9 L. R. A. 830, 24 Am. St. R.
257;
Hall v. Bradbury, 40 Conn.
32.

Sec. 75. Place of presentment.—Presentment
for pay
proper
place:
ment is made at the
First, Where a place of payment is specified in the
strument and it is there presented;"

in

Second, Where no place of payment is specified, but
the address of the person to make payment is given in

the instrument and it is there presented;
Third, Where no place of payment is specified and no
address is given and the instrument is presented at the
usual place of business or residence of the person to make
payment;”

Fourth, In any other case

if presented

to the person to
make payment wherever he can be found,” or if presented
at his last known place of business or residence.
1—Secondary
parties
will be
discharged unless presentment be
made at the place specified in the
instrument,
but primary parties

will

not be affected by failure of
presentment at the specified place
unless the place be especially re
stricted by the words “only and
not elsewhere,” or words of sim
ilar import.
Cases arise where
the drawer of a bill of exchange
designates in the instrument the
place of payment, and the de
cisions are that in Such case both
the drawer and the indorser will

be

discharged unless the bill
presented for payment

be

at
maturity; but the same decisions

there

hold otherwise as to the maker of
a note and the acceptor of a bill.
Cox v. Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 704;
Struthers V. Kendall, 41 Pa. St.
214, 80 Am.

Dec.

Higby, 11 Hun,
Van Santvoord,

610;

Brooks

v.

Wolcott v.
17 Johns. 248. In
Sorenson (N. D. 1904),
235;

Regan v.
100 N. W. 1093 (a case under the
statute), it was held that where
the notary presented a
note—
made payable to one Grondahl “at
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his store in Fargo, North

-at

Dakota.”

the store to some person Con
nected therewith, it was a suffi
cient presentment to charge the
payee indorser,
although
there
was no personal demand made On
the maker.
2—If presentment be made with
in office hours at the place of
business of the payer, though
there be no one there to answer,
it is sufficient to charge the

in

Crilley, 46
Wallace
v.
Wis. 577; West V. Brown, 6 Ohio
St. 542.
If the party presenting the pa
per for payment find the place of
business closed but the payer has
a residence in the place where his
business is conducted, which can
be found
With reasonable dili
gence, presentment must be made
at Such residence.
Farnsworth V.
Mullen, 164 Mass. 112, 41 N. E.
131;
Reinke v. Wright, 93 Wis.
368, 67 N. W. 737. See also Sulz
bacher Bros. V. Bank Of Charles
ton, 86 Tenn. 201.
Presentment
at the place of
business Within business hours is
sufficient unless the place has
been permanently closed.
Baum
gardner V. Reeves, 35 Pa. St. 250.
The presumption that a note
which specifies no place of pay
ment is to be paid where the note
dorser.

is

dated, at the residence of the
person liable upon it, is one that
McIntyre v.
applies to indorsers.
Mich. State. Ins. CO., 52 Mich. 188.
But see Blodgett v. Durgin, 32

Vt.

361.

The making and dating of a
promissory note at a particular

LAW.

place is not equivalent to making
it payable there nor does it super
sede the necessity for presentment
and demand at the residence or
place of business of the maker, if
place of busineSS Or resi
Such
be known or can be ascer
tained by due diligence in make
ing inquiry.
Anderson V. Drake,
14 Johns. 114; Oxnard V. Varnum,
111 Pa. St. 193.
If the primary party has
changed his residence to another
place within the state the holder
is bound to use due diligence in
endeavoring to ascertain the new
place of residence and make pre
sentment there, but if the change
of residence is to a place with
out the state, the holder is not
bound to inquire further or take
further steps.
Nailor V. Bowie, 3
Taylor
251;
Md.
V. Snyder,
3

dence

Den.

N. Y.

145;

Foster

v. Julien,

24

28.

It has been held that diligence
must be exercised to obtain pay
ment even where the primary
party has absconded.
Pierce v.
contra, Leh
Cate, 12 Cush. 190;
man V. Jones, 1 Watts & Sarg.
126;
Duncan v. McCullough,
4
Serg. & R. 480.
The place of presentment and
demand is immaterial if the mak
er or acceptor, on demand made,
expressly or impliedly refuses to
pay. Parker V. Kellogg, 158 Mass.
90, 32 N.

E. 1038.
V. Cromwell,

3—In King

244,

made on
was held sufficient to
indorser.
The court
would seem that such
demand

61 Me.

the street
charge the
Said:
“It
a demand
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would be more satisfactory than
a mere formal ceremony of a de
mand gone through at his place

Sec. 76.
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of residence during the maker's
King
absence.”
But see
v.
Holmes, 11 Pa. St. 456.

Instrument must be exhibited.—The instru

ment must be exhibited to the person from whom payment
is demanded, and when it is paid must be delivered up

to the party paying it."
1-The instrument must be ex
hibited in Order that the maker
or acceptor may be able to judge
(1st) of the genuineness of the
instrument; (2d) of the right of
the holder to receive payment;
and (3d) that he may immediate
ly reclaim possession of the in
strument upon paying the amount.
Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; Mus
son v. Lake, 4 How. (U. S.) 262;
Hansard V. Robinson. 7 B. & C.
90; Freeman V. Boynton, 7 Mass.
483.
In the case last cited de
mand was held insufficient
be
cause it appeared that the party
demanding payment did not have

the bill with him. If, on demand
of payment, the exhibition of the
instrument is not asked for, and
the party to whom demand is

formal

presentment by actual

ex

hibition of the paper is consid
Waring V. Betts,
ered
waived.
supra; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18
Conn. 361; King V. Cromwell, 61
Me. 244; Fall River Union Bank
v. Willard, 5 Met. (Mass.) 216.
In case the instrument has been
lost, presentment of a copy with
offer of indemnity will be suffi
Hinsdale v. Miles, 5 Conn.
When the maker pays the
instrument he has a right to its
possession and also a right to re
ceive any collaterals which have
been deposited with the holder as
security for its payment. He may
refuse to pay unless such collat
cient.
331.

erals are tendered With the note.
Ocean Nat. Bank V. Fant, 50 N. Y.
474.

made declines On other groundS, a

Sec. 77.

where instrument payable at
bank.—Where the instrument is payable at a bank, pre
sentment for payment must be made during banking
hours, unless the person to make payment has no funds
Presentment

there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case
presentment at any hour before the bank is closed on that

day is sufficient."
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1-In the case of paper payable
at a bank actual presentment and
exhibition of the paper is not re
quired and obviously is not pos
sible. Presentment of such paper
Stands upon a footing of its own
and differs from presentment and
demand as understood in other
cases.
Presentment of paper pay
able at bank is complete on the
1st,
concurrence of two facts:
presence of the paper at maturity
in the bank; 2d, knowledge of
the bank of such fact. See Mar
tin v. Smith, 108 Mich. 278; Chic
Bank,
opee Bank v. Philadelphia
8 Wall. 641. This case affords an
interesting illustration of the rule
above stated. The facts were: a
letter in which a bill had been
transmitted,
was, when brought
from the post office to the bank,
lain down with other papers on
the cashier's desk and before be
ing taken up or seen by the cash
ier had slipped through a crack
in the desk and so disappeared.
The fact of the bill being thus
physically present in the bank did
not of itself amount to present
ment, because it was there With
out knowledge of the bank of

such fact. This rule of present
ment applies 1st, to paper payable
(generally);
2nd,
at bank
to
paper payable at a specified bank;
3d, to paper payable at a speci
fied bank but lodged with the
holder's bank for collection.
Pa
per payable at bank is payable
at any bank in the place of pay
ment and may be lodged for pay
accordingly.
Hazard
V.
ment
Spencer, 17 R. I. 561.
But to
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lodge paper with a trust company
would not be a sufficient demand.
Nash v. Brown, 165 Mass. 384.
Paper on its face payable at a
designated bank may be lodged
by the holder thereof with his
own bank for collection.
In such
a case the practice is for the
bank with which the paper is
lodged
notify
maker,
to
the
drawee or acceptor, as the case
may be, that it holds such paper
for collection and requests ac
ceptance or payment. Paper thus
lodged with the holder's bank and
left until maturity will satisfy the
rule for presentment.
Mechanics
Bank v. Merchants Bank, 6 Metc.
13;
(Mass.)
West V. Brown, 6
Ohio St. 542. If the bank desig
nated has branches, presentment
should be made at that branch
where the maker keeps his ac
count.
Prince v. Oriental Bank,
3 L. R. App. Cas. 325;
Woodland
V. Fear, 7 El. & B. 519.

Presentment as used in this sec
tion was clearly designed to in
clude demand. Presentment made
after banking hours is good if
there have been no funds of the
maker at the bank during the
day, and there is a proper offi
cer at the bank to whom present
ment can be made.
Salt Springs
Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 432. If
the maker has funds at the bank
any time during business hours
and then withdraws them, no pre
sentment having been made, the
indorsers are discharged, because
no valid presentment
could be
subsequently made though an offi
cer were in the bank after

busi
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Authorities are
to when suit may

be brought on a dishonored note
payable at a bank.
It has been
held that the maker has until ex
piration of banking hours to pro
vide funds for payment and Suit
cannot be commenced
until then,
payment
but if
is demanded and
refused, right of action accrues at
the close of such banking hours.

v. Clark, 21 Pick. 310. It
has been held, on the other hand,
that suit cannot be brought until
the day following the dishonor of
the paper. Blackman v. Nearing,
43 Com. 56.
It has been held
also that suit may be brought as
soon as payment is refused. Hum
phrey v. Sutcliffe, 192 Pa. St. 336.
German-American
Nat. Bank V.

Church

Milliman,

31 N. Y. Misc. 87, 65 N.
Supp. 242 (a case under the
statute).
It was sought, in this
case, to charge the maker with
protest fees, the protest having
been made before four o’clock on
the day of maturity.
The note

Y.
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presented

at the bank at
which it was made payable at 10
O'clock A. M. and also at 3:30
P. M. There were no funds pro
vided for payment at the time of
presentment.
either
After the
was

presentment the note was
protested, but before the close of
banking hours the maker deposit
Second

sufficient funds to make his
account Cover the note.
It was
held that although demand for
payment
previously
had
been
made, and the note protested for
non-payment, the protest became
Of no avail
on deposit of the
amount of the said note and in
terest, and the maker cannot be
compelled to pay the protest fees
thus incurred. Sutherland, J., said:
“In my opinion it was not the in
tention of the legislature by sec.
135 (77) to change the law as it
stood up to that time, giving the
maker of the note all of the bank
ed

ing hours to meet his note pay
able at the bank.”

Presentment where person primarily liable
is dead.—Where the person primarily liable on the in
strument is dead, and no place of payment is specified,
Sec. 78.

of

if,

presentment for payment must be made to his personal
representative, if such there be, and
with the exercise
diligence,
reasonable
he can be found."

7

v.

and does not recognize the
exception made by certain courts
in cases where the representa
exempt
tive of the deceased

is

493;

from

Hale

suit for
certain period.
Burr, 12 Mass. 86; Orien
a

V.

to

statute makes definite
the proper course
be pursued
in the case of the death of the
maker or acceptor and affirms the
general rule, Gower
Moore, 25
Maurian,
Me. 16; Toby
La.

v.

1-The
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tal Bank v. Blake, 22 Pick. 206;
Landry V. Stansbury, 10 La. Ann.
484.
Hale W. Burr is criticized in
Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16, where
in it is held that knowledge of
the indorser that the note Would
not be paid on presentment, that
the maker had died and that his
estate was insolvent, would not

relieve the holder from his obli
gation to make presentment. Pre
sentment to the personal repre

LAW.

sentative of the deceased is re
quired even though the indorser
and personal representative
are
one and the Same person.
Ma
gruder v. Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87.

It has been held that if there be
pre
no personal representative
Sentment should be made at the
former residence or place of busi

ness of the deceased.
Bank of
Washington v. Reynolds, Fed. Cas.
No. 954.

Presentment to persons liable as partners.–
Where the persons primarily liable on the instrument
are liable as partners, and no place of payment is speci
Sec. 79.

fied, presentment

for payment may be made to any

one

of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the
firm."
1-Presentment to and demand
of the partners primarily
liable on an instrument is suffi
On one

cient, inasmuch as each partner
represents the partnership.
Be
fore dissolution it would not be
necessary to make demand on the
several partners, nor could it be
necessary after dissolution, for the
partnership as to all antecedent
transactions continues until they
Crowley V. Barry, 4
are closed.

Sec. 80.

Presentment

to

Gill.

(Md.) 194; Mt. Pleasant
Branch Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa
306; Fourth Nat. Bank V. Heusch
en, 52 Mo. 207; Coster v. Thom
ason, 19 Ala. 717; Gates v. Beech
er, 60 N. Y. 518. When one part
ner is dead presentment should
not be made to his personal rep
resentative but to the Survivor.
Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2

Hill

635.

joint debtors.—Where there

are several persons, not partners, primarily liable on the
instrument, and no place of payment is specified, present
ment must be made to them all."
1—There is some authority to
the effect that presentment to and
demand upon one of the joint
makers is sufficient to charge the

indorser.
Harris V. Clark, 10 Ohio
Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio
6;
St. 416;
but the statute is de
claratory of the general rule of
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Arnold V.
law
merchant.
Dresser, 8 Allen 435; Shutts V.
Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539; Blake V.
McMillen, 33 Iowa 150.
“Where the joint debtors are at
different places at the maturity
of the note, and it could only be
presented to one, due diligence
would only require its present

the
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ment to the others
in such
time as they could be reached;
and the impossibility
of present
ing to all on the day of maturity
would excuse non-presentment to
Daniel,
those at other places.”
Neg. Inst., 5th ed., Sec. 595. See
Sec. 84.

When presentment not required to charge the
drawer.—Presentment for payment is not required in
order to charge the drawer where he has no right to
expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the
Sec. 81.

instrument."
Bills of Exchange Act,
(2) (C).
Failure to make presentment

1—See
Sec.

46

and to give notice of dishonor
cannot be successfully interposed
as a defense in an action against
the drawer (of a check) when he
had no funds in the bank and had
no expectation that the check
would be paid. Carson, Pirie,

Scott & Co. V. Fincher (Mich.),
101 N. W. 844; Compton v. Blair,
46 Mich. 1.
But see note 3, Sec.
187, distinction between drawer
Of check and drawer of bill.
The mere fact that the drawer
of a bill has no funds in the
hands Of the drawee Will not ex
cuse presentment if the drawer
had a right to expect or require
the bill to be accepted or paid.
Knickerbocker Life InS. Co. V.
Pendleton, 112 U. S. 696; Welch
v. B. C. Taylor Mfg. Co., 82 Ill.
579.

See Sec. 63.

Drawing without funds of the
drawer
in the hands of the
drawee is presumptively
fraudu

lent, but the presumption may be
by showing reasonable
Overcome
grounds for belief on the part of
the drawer that his draft would
be honored notwithstanding
the
want of funds. Reasonable ground
for drawing is the test.
Har
Savings
ness
V.
Davies
Co.
Assn.,
357, and
46 Mo.
cases
supra.
ground
Reasonable
for
drawing
may
relate
to
the
time of drawing or to the time
of presentment. If at the time of
drawing the drawer has funds in
the hands of the drawee but with
draws them, presentment is not
necessary to charge him with lia

bility, but if the drawer has funds
in the hands of the drawee when
the bill is presented, but did not
when the bill was drawn, he is
entitled to notice. Gage Hotel Co.
v. Union Bank, 171 Ill. 531. Where
a bill is accepted
for the accom
modation of the drawer, present
ment to the acceptor is not neces
sary to charge the drawer.
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When presentment not required to chal
indorser.–Presentment for payment is not requi
order to charge an indorser where the instrumel
made or accepted for his accommodation and he
reason to expect that the instrument will be paid
Sec. 82.

sented."

1-This

section deals with cases
where the indorser is the primary
debtor.
In Such cases he is not
entitled to presentment, demand
or notice any more than he would
have been had he appeared on the
paper in his true character. The
reason is obvious, no one is bound

to

indemnify

him.

We

Mitchell, 22 Fed. 871; A
Bank v. Junk Bros., 94 Te
30 S. W. 753, 28 L. R.
Holman v. Whiting, 19 A
Witherow v. Slayback, 1:
McVeigh v. Bank,
660;
785.

Sec. 83. When delay in making presentment is el
—The delay in making presentment for payment
cused when the delay is caused by circumstances l
the control of the holder, and not imputable to
fault, misconduct or negligence. When the cause o
ceases to operate, presentment must be made

with

1

able diligence."

1–For example,

delay in the mail,
Heinrichshoffen,
67 Mo.
163; Windham
Bank v. Norton,
22 Conn. 213; see sec. 107; delay
caused by war, House v. Adams,
48 Pa. St. 261; delay caused by
illness, Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis.
411. But, as was said in the case
last cited, the illness must not
only be shown to have been Sud
den, but likewise so severe as to

Pier

v.

have prevented
the ow
agent from
employing
person to make the pre:
or to give the notice,
preclude
to
aS
have
possibility of his doing

self;

and then it must b
that the proper steps we
as soon as the disability
moved.

When presentment may be dispensed
Presentment for payment is dispensed with:
First, Where, after the exercise of reasonable
required
presentment
this act cannot
mad
be

by

as

dil

Sec. 84.
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Second, Where the drawee is a fictitious person;”
Third, By waiver of presentment, express or implied.”
1-Reasonable diligence is all
that is required. The holder is
not expected to do the impossi
ble, but the burden is upon him
to show that he has exercised
such

tin

reasonable
v. Grabinski,

diligence.

Mar

38 Mo. App. 359.

It is impossible to define what
constitutes
reasonable diligence,
depends
upon the cir
because it
particular
cumstances
of each
case. It is clear that the holder
must take all steps which are like
ly to give him information as to
the whereabouts of the party to
whom presentment is to be made.
He must make all reasonable ef
forts to discover the residence of
the maker or acceptor. Merely
consulting the directory is not
sufficient when other sources of
accurate information may be with

in convenient reach. If the in
strument be put into the hands of
a notary to be presented by him,
the holder should give him all the
facts within his knowledge as to
the whereabouts or place of busi
ness or residence of the maker or
acceptor.
Reasonable diligence is
not exercised if the holder omits
to inquire of the indorsers or
other parties to the instrument as
to the whereabouts of the princi
pal debtor.
Smith v. Fisher, 24

If, after due dili
Pa. St. 222.
gence has been
exercised, the
maker, his place Of business or
residence cannot be found, pre
Sentment will be excused.
solvency of the maker will not ex

In

presentment.

Reinke
V.
It has been
held that in case the maker is in
Solvent when the note falls due
and is without property sufficient
to pay it the holder has an im
mediate right of action against
the indorser without presentment
and demand. Forbes V. Rowe, 48
Conn. 413;
Hawkinson V. Olson,
CuSe

Wright,

93 Wis.

368.

Ill. 277; Couch v. First Nat.
Bank, 64 Ind. 92. But under this
holding the insolvency must be
absolute and so notorious as to
leave no doubt of the fact. Oliver
V. Munday, 3 N. J. L. 982.
What is due diligence is a ques
tion of law when the facts are ad
mitted or clearly established; it
is a mixed question of law and
fact when the facts are in dis
pute.
Fourth
Nat.
Bank V.
Heuschen, 52 Mo. 207; Bank of
Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Pet. 578.
2-Smith V. Bellamy, 2 Starkie
48

223.

3—Waiver of presentment need
not be in any particular form;
any language or conduct from
which it appears that a waiver is
intended, is sufficient. Quaintance
v. Goodrow, 16 Mont. 376, 41 Pac.
76.

Where
an indorser
makes a
parol promise to pay the note at
the time of his indorsement, he
has been held to have waived pre
Sentment.
Annville Nat. Bank V.
Kettering, 106 Pa. St. 531.
See
contra:
Davis V. Gowan, 19 Me.
447.
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If

the

waiver

be

embodied

itself, it be
instrument
comes a part of the contract and
Subsequent indorsers become par
ties to it and are bound by it.
Lowry v. Steele, 27 Ind. 170. If
the waiver be written in connec
tion with the signature of an in
dorser it affects only him. Wood

in the

man v. Thurston, 8 Cush. 157. But
See Parshley V. Heath, 69 Me. 90.

In re Swift,

106 Fed. 65 (a case
the statute).
The facts
Were, a firm had given a note in
Shortly
dorsed by one partner.
maturity
before
the indorser held
a conference with the holder and
declared that neither the firm nor
he could pay at maturity.
Sub
sequently, and before the matur

under
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ity of the note, the partnership
assigned for the benefit of cred
itors.
It was held that the in
dorser had impliedly waived pre
Sentment.
Congress Brewing Co. v. Habe
nicht, 83 App. Div. 141, 82 N. Y.
Supp. 481 (a case under the sta
tute). The defendant was indors
er of a demand note.
Some time
made,
before demand was
the
payee
informed the indorser of
the amount of the maker's then
indebtedness
and
the indorser
Said he would see the maker and
if the latter did not make his ac
count good “he would go and
shut him up.” Held, not a waiv
er of demand.

Sec. 85. When instrument dishonored by non-payment.
—The instrument is dishonored by non-payment when:
First, It is duly presented for payment and payment is
refused or cannot be obtained; or
Second, Presentment is excused and the instrument is
overdue and unpaid."
1—This section is entirely con
sistent with the proposition that
a note payable at a bank is not
dishonored provided funds to meet
it are deposited before the close

of banking hours. German-Amer
ican Nat. Bank V. Milliman, 31 N.
Y. Misc. 87, 65 N. Y. Supp. 242
(a case under the statute).
See
Sec. 77.

Liability of party secondarily liable, when in
dishonored.—Subject
strument
to the provisions of this
act, when the instrument is dishonored by non-payment
an immediate right to recourse to all parties secondarily
liable thereon accrues to the holder."
Sec. 86.

1-If

the instrument has been
dishonored and proper notice giv-

to the indorser,
his condi
tional liability is changed into an
en

NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS
absolute liability, his status is
changed from that of mere Surety
to that of principal debtor.
Though the holder have in his
hands collateral Security for the
payment of the paper, the indors
er cannot compel him to Sue the
maker or to enforce his security.
the indorser desires the benefit
of any security held by the cred
itor, he must pay the debt, fulfill
the contract and enforce his right
of subrogation to such securities.
First Nat. Bank v. Wood, 71 N.

If

IN
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(86) is to be construed
as applying to notes payable at
a bank, it might be argued, with
much force, that the legislature
intended to permit an indorser to
Sec. 144

be sued on the day the note falls
due, and even before the close of
banking hours provided an early
demand be made. I hardly think
any such startling innovation was
intended.”

This section does not apply to
of Collection and Oth
er conditional guaranties. In such
Y. 405; German-American Bank V. cases, further steps must be taken
Milliman, 31 N. Y. Misc. 87, 65 to fix the liability of the guaran
N. Y. Supp. 242 (a case under the tor. There is no right of action
statute). The note involved in against the guarantor until the
this case was payable at a bank. holder
has
first
made
due
Defendant contended that the note
was not dishonored if funds were
deposited in the bank at any time
before the close of banking hours
although demand was made ear
lier in the day and payment re
Sutherland, J., Speaking
fused.

for the court said,—“This section
not inconsistent with the de

is

position,
fendant's
because
the
note is not dishonored absolute
ly if the deposit is made before
the close of banking hours.
If

a guaranty

effort to collect from the princi
pal debtor.
Cowles v. Peck, 55
Conn. 251; Summers v. Barrett,
65 Ia. 292.
A distinction must be
made between a right of recourse
and a right of action. The hold
er's right of action against the
drawer or indorser dates from
the time when notice of dishonor
is or ought to be received by such
Castrique v.
drawer or indorser.
Barnabo

[1884]

6 Q.

B. 498.

Sec. 87. Time of maturity.—Every negotiable instru
ment is payable at the time fixed therein without grace.
When the day of maturity falls upon Sunday or a holi

day, the instrument is payable on the next succeeding
business day. Instruments falling due on Saturday are
to be presented for payment on the next succeeding busi
ness day, except that instruments payable on demand
may,
the option of the holder. be presented for pay

#
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ment before twelve o’clock noon on Saturday when
entire day is not a holiday."
changes the law in
and repeals 4871-2 C. L.
1897, in virtue of which, as well
as of the law merchant, grace has
prevailed in Michigan.
This sec
tion differs from the correspond

1—This

Michigan

ing section of the Bills of Ex
change Act Sec. 14 (1) by which
days of grace are preserved.
In
addition
to those states which
have adopted the negotiable in

struments law (See introduction),
California, Illinois, Maine, Min
nesota and Vermont have abol
ished days of grace. The Massa
chusetts Act has, in addition to
the first sentence, the following:
—“except that three days of grace
shall be allowed upon a draft or
bill of exchange made payable
Within
this
commonwealth
at
sight, unless there is an express
stipulation to the contrary.” The
New York Act as amended 1898
(see introduction)
contains the
additional
words “or becoming
payable” after the words “instru
ment falling due.” The Colorado
Act Substitutes the following for
the third sentence,—“Instruments
falling due on any day, in any

that

place where any part of such day
is a holiday are to be presented
for payment on the next succeed
ing business day, except that
struments payable
on
demand
may, at the option of the holder,
be presented for payment during

in

reasonable hours of the part of
such day which is not a holiday.”
In the North Carolina Act an
Other proVision is added, as
lows,—“The laws now in force in
this state with regard to days of
grace Shall remain in full force

fol

and shall not be construed to be
repealed by this act.”
The Wisconsin Act omits the
last Sentence.

By virtue

of

Sec.

4880

C.

L.

1897, as amended by laws of 1903,
420, promissory notes falling due

on Saturday are presentable for
payment and payable on the next
secular day or business day suc
ceeding such Saturday,
unless
Such Succeeding day is a legal
holiday, in which case they are
payable
on
the next succeed
ing day. Notes maturing on Sun
day, are payable on Monday.
Hitchcock v. Hogan, 99 Mich. 124.

Sec. 88. Time; how computed.—Where the instrument
is payable at a fixed period after date, after sight, or
after the happening of a specified event, the time of pay
ment is determined by excluding the day from which the
time is to begin to run and by including the date of pay
ment."

NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

1—This is declaratory

of the
Campbell v.
rule.
French, 6 T. R. 200; Roehner v.
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 63 N.
common

Y.

law

163.

According to the law merchant
a month means a calendar month.
A note dated January 1, payable
one month after date, matures
(grace excluded) February 1. One
dated January 31, payable one
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month after date matures (grace
February 28, 29th if
excluded)
leap year.
Roehner V. Knicker
bocker, supra.
When the last day of grace falls
upon a non-business day, the pa
per reaches maturity on the next
Capital
preceding business day.
Nat. Bank V. Am. Exc. Nat. Bank,
51 Neb. 707.

Where instrument payable at bank.—Where
the instrument is made payable at a bank it is equiva
lent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the
account of the principal debtor thereon."
Sec. 89.

1—This section settles a matter
which has been the subject of

526;

disagreement among the courts.
Some courts have held that there
is no implied authority for a
bank to pay a third party a note
made payable at its place of busi
ness simply because of the fact

560.

that the maker has funds Suffi
cient for that purpose. Grissom
V.

Commercial

Nat.

Bank,

87

Tenn. 350, 3 L. R. A. 273; Ridge
ly Nat. Bank v. Patton, 109 Ill.
479; Nat. Exchange Bank V. Nat.
Bank, 132 Mass. 151. Other courts
have maintained the rule aptly
stated by Rapallo, Judge, in Indig
v. Nat. City Bank, 80 N. Y. 106,
in these words: “A note payable
at a bank
where the maker
keeps his account is equivalent to
a check drawn by him upon that
bank.”
State Bank v. McCabe,

(Mich.)
Horan,

Bank

98
55

v.

N. W. 20; Lazier v.
Iowa 75; First Nat.

Hall,

119

Ala.

64, 24 So.

Bedford Bank V. Acoam, 125
Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713, 9 L. R. A.

The statute follows, in effect,
the words above quoted.
In case the bank is holder of
paper there payable it is its right
to apply to the payment of the
note any funds standing to the
credit of the maker, unless such
funds are specially applicable to
particular purpose.
Some
Daw
son v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Pike
284; Alpena Nat. Bank V. Green
baum, 74 Mich. 157. It has been
held that it is its duty as well
as its right to make such applica
tion, because the note is, in effect,
a draft on the bank in favor of
the holder and in discharge of
the indorser.

German Nat. Bank

v. Foreman, 138 Pa. St. 474; Com
mercial Bank v. Henninger, 105
Pa. St. 496.
But see Mechanics
& Traders
Bank v. Seitz Bros.,
150

Pa.

St.

632,

wherein

it

is
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held that while a bank which
has discounted a promissory note
may appropriate
funds
in its
hands belonging to any party to
the note, to the payment of the
note when payment is not made
at the time and place named, yet
it is not bound to do so as to

Sec. 90.
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any party except the maker. But
inasmuch as the maker is liable
to the indorser, he cannot require
the bank to appropriate the in
dorser's funds to the payment of
his own note nor complain if the
bank refuses so to do.

Payment in due course; what constitutes.—

Payment is made in due course when it is made at or
after the maturity of the instrument" to the holder there
of in good faith and without notice that his title is de
fective.”
1-See Bills of
Sec.

Exchange

Act,

holder.
515;

59.

A

payment before maturity is
not in the usual course of busi
ness and if the paper should sub
sequently get into the hands of a
bona fide holder before maturity

pay

he could enforce a second
ment, Williams v. Keyes, 90 Mich.
290; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick.
545; Watson v. Wyman, 161 Mass.
96.

2-The party having actual pos
session of the instrument is the
One prima facie entitled
to re
ceive payment. The party paying
cannot assume that the paper has
not been transferred and make
payment to the Original holder
without demanding the return of
the instrument.
If he does so,
and the instrument
has been
transferred, though he take a re
ceipt from the party to whom he
pays the amount, he will be liable
to pay it again to a bona fide

Dutton

v.

Williams

Markey

Ives, 5 Mich.
Keyes, supra;

V.
v. Corey, 108 Mich.

184;

562;

Struthers,
110 Mich.
Wilson v. Campbell, 110

Mich.

580;

Brooke

v.

V.

Texarkana

Stillwell & Co.,

Nat.

121 Mich.,

Bank
154;

Bloomer V. Dau, 122 Mich. 522;
Wheeler v. Guild, supra; Davis
V. Miller, 14 Gratt. 1.
If an instrument has been lost
and the party primarily liable has
notice Of Such fact, he should re
quire the person presenting it to
establish his identity and his title
Page Woven Wire
to the note.
Fence Co. v. Pool, 133 Mich. 323.
Drinkall v. Movins State Bank,

(N. D.

1901)
88 N. W. 724 (a
under the Statute).
This
case involved the question of the
defendant's notice when it paid
the check that the holder's title
Was defective.
See Sec. 2, “holder.”
case
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of

Dishonor.

Sec.

96.

Notice of dishonor, to whom
must be given.
By whom given.
Notice given by agent.
Effect of notice given on
behalf of holder.
Effect where notice is given
by party entitled to give
notice.
When agent may give notice

113.

97.

When

114.

98.

Form of notice.
To whom notice

92.
93.
94.

99.

notice sufficient.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

115.

may

116.

Notice when party is dead.
Notice to partners.
Notice to joint parties.
Notice to bankrupt.
Time Within which notice
must be given.
parties
reside
in
Where
place.
same
Where parties reside in dif
ferent places.

When

sender

deemed

to

have given due notice.
Deposit in post-office, what
constitutes.
Notice to antecedent parties,
time of.
Where notice must be sent.
Waiver of notice.
Whom affected by waiver.
Waiver of protest.
When notice dispensed with.
Delay in giving notice, how
excused.

be

given.
100.

107.

117.
118.
119.
120.

When notice need not be
given to drawer.
When notice need not be
given to indorser.
Notice
of
non-payment
where acceptance refused.
Omission to give notice of
non-acceptance, effect of.
When protest need not be
made; when must be made.

Notice of dishonor; to whom must be given.
—Except as herein otherwise provided, when a negotiable
Sec. 91.

instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non
payment, notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer
and to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom
such notice is not given is discharged."
1—This Section follows the Bills
of Exchange Act, sec. 48, and is
declaratory of the common law.
Daniel,

Neg.

InSt.,

5th

ed.,

Sec.

970.

Knowledge

that

the paper has

dishonored is not enough to
charge the secondary party; no
tice is absolutely requisite. Union
Bank v. Magruder, 7 Pet. 287;
Bank v. McVeigh, 29 Gratt. 546;
Juniata Bank V. Hale, 16 S. &
been
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R.

157.

The

same

results follow

from the omission to give notice
as from the Omission to make de
mand of payment.
A party dis
charged from liability on the in
Strument by omission to give no
tice of dishonor
is discharged

liability

on the debt evi
by
the
instrument.
Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 131;
Jones v. Savage, 6 Wend. 659;
Woodcock v. Bennet, 1 Cow. 711.
The rule of the Section does not
apply to guarantors who are not
discharged by omission to give no
from

denced

Hawkins, 70
tice.
Roberts
v.
Hungerford
566;
Mich.
v. O'Brien,
37 Minn. 306.
But the same per
SOn may be guarantor
and in
dorser of a negotiable instrument;
in Such case failure to give him
notice of dishonor will discharge
him as indorser but not as guar
antor.
Daniel Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
Sec.

required

LAW.

to give notice to his immediate
indorser
who may then notify
antecedent indorsers and secure
himself; so the notary need not
make any inquiry as to the resi
dence of any of the indorsers ex
cept the last. Wood v. Callaghan,
61 Mich. 402; West River Bank
v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128; Linn v.
Horton, 1 Wis. 157. But such in
dorsee could look for indemnity
only to the party to whom he had
given notice unless notice to oth
er antecedent parties had been
given, which would inure to him.
This section has been referred

to in the following cases arising
under the statute: Ebling Brewing
Co. v. Reinheimer, 32 N. Y. Misc.
594, 66 N. Y. Supp. 458;
Fon
seca v. Hartman, 84 N. Y. Supp.
131;
Peck v. Easton, 74 Conn.
456. In the case last cited a party
indorsing before delivery to the
payee

1754.

The indorsee is only

INSTRUMENTS

was held entitled

of dishonor.

to notice

By whom given.—The notice may be given
by or on behalf of the holder or by or on behalf of any
party to the instrument who might be compelled to pay
to the holder, and who, upon taking it up, would have a
right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice
Sec. 92.

is given."
Bills of Exchange Act,
(1).
For about fifty years the ques
tion was in doubt whether a party
1—See

Sec. 49

other than the holder could give
valid notice. In Tindal V. Brown,

T. R. 167 (1786) it was held
that no party could give a valid
1

notice unless he were a holder
at the time. This rule was dis
approved in Chapman v. Keane, 3

A.

& E. 193, 30 E. C. L. 69 and
the rule embodied in the statute
was declared to be the true rule

and in accordance with the prac
tice in commercial circles.
AuS

IN GENERAL.
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ten v. Miller, Fed. Cas. No. 661;
Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns.
230; Cromer v. Platt, 37 Mich.
132. A mere stranger cannot give
valid notice. Chanoine V. Fow
ler, 3 Wend. 173; Lawrence V.
Miller, 16 N. Y. 235. A party
who cannot in any event bring
an action on the instrument is

151

a stranger.
Harrison Y.
Ruscoe, 15 M. & W. 231, 15 L. J.
Ex. 110; Traders' Nat. Bank v.
Jones, 93 N. Y. Supp. 768 (a case
under the statute).
Notice by
the drawee who has refused ac
deemed

ceptance

is not sufficient. Stanto
14 Mass. 116.

V. Blossom,

Notice given by agent.—Notice of dishonor
may be given by an agent either in his own name or in
the name of any party entitled to give notice, whether
Sec. 93.

that party be his principal or not."
1—Notwithstanding
party,
a
who cannot in any event bring an
action on the instrument, cannot
give valid notice on his own be
half (see preceding section), he
may nevertheless give notice as
agent of any party who is entitled
to give notice.
Traders'
Nat.
Bank v. Jones, 93 N. Y. Supp.
768 (a case under the statute);
Drexler V. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143,
33 Pac. 773; Renick v. Robbins,
28 Mo. 339.
Some cases are to
the effect that the acceptor “or
any party to the bill” may give
independent
Valid
notice
of
any question of agency, Rosher
v. Kieran, 4 Camp. 87; Douglas
V. Bank, 97 Tenn. 133.
But the
of these cases so far as
to be accepted can only be
explained on the ground that the
acceptor was the authorized agent
of the holder in the matter; oth
erwise the doctrine is unsound.
There must be an agency, if the
notice is not given by an indors
doctrine

it is

er, at the time of giving the
notice and in the act of doing it.
New York Co. V. Selma Sav.
Bank, 51 Ala. 305; Bigelow Bills,
Notes & Cheques, 144. In giving
notice, a notary public acts as the
agent of the party he serves, not
as a public officer.
Bank V. Ober,
31 Kan. 599, 3 Pac. 324.
But a
notice made out by a notary public
and signed, by mistake, with the
name Of the maker instead of
With his own name Without the
authority of the maker is insuffi
cient. Cabot Bank v. Warner, 10
Allen 522.
A bank which re
ceives paper for collection
is
deemed
the holder thereof for
the purpose of giving notice of
dishonor.
Burnham V. Webster,
19 Me. 232; Crocker v. Getchell,
23 Me. 392; Blackeslee v. Hewett,
76

Wis.

chester

H.
Vt.

302;
756.

341, 44 N.

W.

1105.

Man

Fellows, 28
Worden v. Nourse,

Bank

v.

N.
36

152
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Effect of notice given on behalf of holder.—
Where notice is given by or on behalf of the holder, it
enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and all
prior parties who have a right of recourse against the
party to whom it is given."
Sec. 94.

1—Lysaght v. Bryant,
Chapman v. Keane,

46;

C. B.
3 Ad. &
Yates, 18
9

El. 193; Stafford V.
Johns. 327.
The section deals with notice by

inurement.
Illustration:-A note
is dishonored while in the hands
of Gage, as holder; he gives notice
in due form to all secondary par
ties; he transfers the note to Hor
ton who in turn transfers to

Ir

win.
The notice given by Gage
inures “for the benefit” of Horton
and Irwin.
Again: Adams, Brooks, Clark
and DaViS are Successive indorsers
On a note dishonored in the hands
of Eaton. Eaton gives notice to
Davis and Adams.
The notice
given to Adams inures “for the
benefit” of Brooks, Clark and
Davis.

Effect where notice is given by party entitled
to give notice.—Where notice is given by or on behalf
of a party entitled to give notice, it enures for the benefit
of the holder and all parties subsequent to the party to
Sec. 95.

whom notice is given."
1–Illustration: Adams, Brooks,
Clark and Davis are successive in
dorsers of a note dishonored in
the hands of Eaton.
Eaton gives
Davis,
notice to
Davis to Clark,

Clark to Brooks, and Brooks to
Adams.
The notice given by
Brooks to Adams inures, “for the
benefit” of Eaton. See cases sec.
94.

Where agent may give notice.—Where the in
strument has been dishonored in the hands of an agent,
he may either himself give notice to the parties liable
thereon, or he may give notice to his principal. If he
gives notice to his principal, he must do so within the
same time as if he were the holder, and the principal,
Sec. 96.

upon the receipt of such notice, has himself the same time

NEGOTIABLE

for giving

holder."

notice as

if the agent

1-This

section follows the Bills
Act, sec. 49 (13),
Exchange
of
and is declaratory of the common
law.
An agent to whom a negotiable
is intrusted for col
instrument
lection, whether by indorsement
or mere delivery, may give notice
of dishonor direct to secondary
parties thereto, but he is under
His ob
no obligation so to do.
ligation is to his principal alone
and that obligation as a matter
of law does not in any case re
quire him to give notice to any
Such an
one except his principal.
agent is treated in the matter of
giving notice of non-payment as
an indorsee of the note and the
reason of this is, that the agent
may not know which of the prior
parties the principal may desire
to hold or where they may be
The agent is entitled to
found.

the usual time to notify his prin
cipal of non-payment and the
principal to the usual time there
after to notify antecedent indors
But if the agent fails to
ers.
give notice to his principal in
due time, the principal is cut off
notwithstanding he may thereafter
use due diligence in giving notice
Rosson V.
to antecedent parties.
Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90; Ohio Life

Sec. 97.
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had been an independent

Ins. Co. v. McCague, 18 Ohio 54;
Farmers' Bank v. Vail, 21 N. Y.
485; Firth v. Thrush, 8 B. & C.
387.

The rule applies to the several
For
branches of the same bank.
giving
purpose
notice
of
the
of
dishonor each of the branch banks
is considered as an independent
indorsee.
For example, a bill of
exchange was indorsed by plain
tiffs to the Portmadoc Branch of
Bank
the
National
Provincial
from whence it was sent to the
Pwllheli Branch of the same bank,
by Whom it was indorsed to the
head

establishment

of

the

bank

duly
in London.
presented and dishonored.
It was
then returned With notice of its
dishonor by that day's post from
the bank in London to the branch
The bill was

bank at Pwllheli; from thence to
the branch bank at Portmadoc
and from the Portmadoc bank to
the plaintiffs, who gave notice to
the defendant

indorser.

The no

tice was sufficient. Clode v. Bay
ley, 12 M. & W. 51; Bray v. Had
wen, 5 M. & S. 68; Fielding &
Co. v. Corry [1898] 1 Q. B. 268
(a case under corresponding pro
vision of the Bills of Exchange

Act).

When notice sufficient.—A written notice need

not be signed, and an insufficient written notice may be
supplemented and validated by verbal communication.
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misdescription

of the instrument does not vitiate the
party
notice unless the
to whom the notice is given is in
fact misled thereby."
1-In connection with the cor
responding provision of the Bills
of Exchange Act there is added:
“The return of

a dishonored bill
to the drawer or an indorser is,
in point of form, deemed a suffi
cient notice of dishonour.” (Sec.
Concerning this added
49 (6).
provision
says:
Mr. Chalmers
“This subsection approves a com
mon practice of collecting bank
ers
which
was previously
of
doubtful validity.”
The practice
is peculiar to England.

According to the law merchant
the written notice should be sign
ed or at least it should indicate
from whom it proceeds.
Bank v.
Dibrell, 91 Tenn. 301; Klocken
baum v. Pierson, 16 Cal. 375;
Walmsley V. Acton, 44 Barb. 312;
Walker v. State Bank, 8 Mo. 705.
In providing that the notice need
not be signed, the statute changes
the law. Inasmuch as the entire
notice may be oral, (see next sub
section) the provision that an im
perfect or invalid written notice
may be supplemented or made
valid by oral communication is
natural and consistent.
The law requires that the no

tice should describe the dishonor
paper with such particularity
as will apprise the person
to
whom the notice is given of the
instrument in question.
Dodson

ed

Taylor, 56 N. J. L. 19. A mis
description which does not mis
lead is immaterial.
Misdescription
as to amount:
A note of $200 described as note
of $175 with interest, not mis
leading.
Snow V. Perkins,
2
Mich. 238.
A note of $1,400 er
roneously described as a note of
$1,457, but correctly described in
respects, not misleading,
other
there was no other note signed by
the person named in the notice
and indorsed by the person to
whom the notice was sent. Bank
of Alexandria V. Swann, 9 Pet. 33.
Misdescription as to date: Note
dated July 20th, incorrectly
de
scribed as dated Sept. 20th, cor
rect in other respects, except as
to Omission of holder’s name, not
misleading,
Mills v. Bank, 11
V.

are only
illustrative.
is to be
determined on the special facts
involved.
The test is, was the
party misled?

Wheat.

431.

The

cases
Each case

Form of notice.—The notice may be in writing
or merely oral, and may be given in any terms which
sufficiently identify the instrument and indicate that it
has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment.”
Sec. 98.
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may in all cases be given by delivering

or through the mails.”

1—The rule as to sufficiency of
notice of dishonor has undergone
a number of changes before aS
suming the generally recognized
form now expressed in the statute.
The law merchant has always re
quired that the indorser be ap
prised of the paper dishonored.
The first rule on the Subject im
portant to refer to, required that
the notice should apprise the in
dorser in express terms or by
necessary implication of the dis
honor of the paper.
Solarte V.
Palmer, 7 Bing. 530, 1 Bing. N.

Any notice failing to
C. 194.
show that the paper had been
dishonored
was deemed
insuffi
cient.
Then it was held that the no
tice was sufficient if it showed by
reasonable intendment that the
bill had been presented to the
acceptor and not paid by him and
if that would be inferred by any

man of business. The doctrine of
reasonable intendment was duly
Armstrong v. Chris
established.
tiani, 5 C. B. 687; Everard v.
Watson, 1 El. & Bl. 801.
A notice containing a state
ment that the instrument had not
been paid was held sufficient and
whether preceding steps had been
taken was a matter of evidence
to be established at the trial.
Mills v. Bank, 11 Wheat., 431. A
notice declaring that a note is
unpaid and the holders look to
the indorser for payment is suffi
cient.
132.
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it personally

The Bills of Exchange Act pro
vides that notice shall be suffi
Cient in form if it intimate that
the bill has been dishonored; the
section above, if it indicate that
it has been dishonored.
Both
Statutes follow the rule of reason
able intendment.
NO particular form of notice is
required.
The object of the no
tice is to inform the party to
whom it is sent, that the instru
ment has been dishonored and
that the holder looks to him for
Any form in which
payment.
these facts are communicated is
sufficient.
Bank v. McVeigh, 29

558; Dodson v. Taylor, 56
L. 11.
A notice that a note has been
protested
for non-payment and
that the holders look to the in
dorser for payment was deemed
not sufficient in Platt v. Drake, 1
Doug. 296; followed in Newberry
v. Trowbridge,
4 Michi. 390; over
ruled in Burkam v. Trowbridge,
distinguished
209,
9
Mich.
in
Spies v. Newberry, 2 Doug. 424;
Snow v. Perkins, 2 Mich. 238.
It is not necessary to state in

Gratt.

N.

J.

terms that the holder looks for pay
ment to the party to whom no
tice is sent. Notice that the in
Strument is dishonored for non
payment is in itself sufficient no
tice that the indorser is looked to
for payment. Nelson V. First Nat.
Bank, 69 Fed. 798.
It is not necessary that a copy
of a foreign bill should accompany
the notice of its dishonor.
At
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water v. Streets,

1

Doug. (Mich.)

455.

The Section is referred to in
Second Nat. Bank V. Smith, 118
Wis. 18; Am. Exch. Nat. Bank V.
American
Hotel Co., 92 N. Y.
Supp. 1006.
2—This changes the prior rule
required
personal notice
which
where the parties resided in the
same place. Notice Sent through
the mail was insufficient in such
cases if it did not in due time
actually
reach the indorser
to
whom it was addressed. Newberry
v. Trowbridge, 4 Mich. 390; Nev
ius v. Bank, 10 Mich. 547; Cabot
Bank v. Warner, 10 Allen 522;
Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 29 W.
Va., 547.
If the parties live in different
places it has always been held
that notice deposited in the post
office in due time was sufficient
through it never reached the ad
Lindenberger v. Beall, 6
dressee.
Wheat. 104;

Shelburne

INSTRUMENTS
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v. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177.
Many exceptions have been en
grafted onto the rule that where
parties reside in the same place
notice by mail is insufficient un
less actually received by the ad
dressee in due time.
One of the
most important of these excep

Bank

tions is made in the case of per
Sons living or doing business in
a place where there is a daily de
livery of letters through mail car
riers.
In Such a case it is the
rule that if the notice be de
posited in the post office in time
to be delivered the same day it
will be sufficient.
Walters
V.
Brown, 15 Md. 292; Shoemaker v.
Mechanics Bank, 59 Pa. St. 83.
Again, an indorser who has re
ceived notice by mail from a holder
living in a different town may give
valid notice by mail to a prior
indorser living in the same town
Eagle Bank V. Hath
as himself.
away, 5 Met. (Mass.) 213.

Falls Nat.

Sec. 99. To whom notice may be given.—Notice of dis
honor may be given either to the party himself or to his
agent in that behalf."

1-This is similar in

language

in effect with Sec.
49 (8) of the Bills of Exchange
Act and is declaratory of the
and identical

common law.
Agent within the meaning of
this section is one who is author
ized to make and indorse paper
for his principal, or to transact
his banking business, or to act
as the general agent in the con

duct of his principal's business,
or to liquidate the affairs of his
principal,
or to have general
charge of his principal's acts and
dealings with his bank and man
agement of the principal's paper
handled by the bank.
Fassin V.
Hubbard, 55 N. Y. 465; Persons
v. Kruger, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1078.
But an attorney or Solicitor with
out being specially empowered in
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INSTRUMENTS

that behalf is not such an agent
as is authorized to receive no
tice. Louisiana State Bank V. El
lery, 4 Mart.

(n. S.) 87.

Authority to indorse negotiable
paper has been held to carry with
it authority to receive notice of
its dishonor.
Firth V. Thrush, 8
387;
B. & C.
but there is author
ity to the contrary.
Louisiana
State Bank V Ellery, supra; Valk
V. Gaillard, 4 Strob. 99; Story on
Prom. Notes, sec. 309; Crosse V.
Smith, 1 M. & S. 545.
Notice given to a secretary of
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COmpany
is not notice to
another company of which he is
also secretary unless it comes to
him under circumstances which
make it his duty to communicate
One

it.
Fenwick & Co. re, 86 L. T.
(n. S.) 193 (a case under the
corresponding provision. Bills of
Exchange Act).

The section is referred to in
Am. Exch. Nat. Bank V. American
Hotel Victoria Co., 92 N. Y. Supp.
1006; Mohlman Co. v. McKane, 69
N. Y. Supp. 1046.

Notice when party is dead.—When any
party is dead, and his death is known to the party giving
notice, the notice must be given to a personal representa
tive, if there be one, and
with reasonable diligence, he
Sec.

if,

100.

can be found."

a

V.

not
Strafford

is

appointed
administrator
Sufficient. Mathewson

as

to

J. L.

if

471.

2—Stewart

Eden,

2

N.

Caines

v.

(N. Y.), 121; Goodnow
War
ren, supra; Merchant's Bank
Birch, 17 Johns. 25; Massachu

v.

v.

v.

is

Notice to an executor named but
not qualified
sufficient. Shoen
berger's Ex'r
Lancaster Sav
ings Institution, 28 Pa. St. 459;
McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143.
Drexler
person afterwards
But notice to

v.

V.

is

5

Bennett,
Hill 236.
Notice to one of several execu
tors or administrators
notice to
Peck, 12 Barb. 245.
all. Beals

Notice
45 N. H. 104.
should be addressed
the per
Sonal representative by his name,
not by his office merely,
“Ex
ecutors
M. Quimby, deceased,”
although notice addressed as last
good
above
the personal rep
resentative actually and duly re
Wright, 40
ceives it. Smalley
v.

91

Bank,

J.

56

setts Bank

v.

122

is

Bank
Cayuga

Taylor,
Darling
CO. Bank

V.

236;

Warren,
v. V.

Dodson
11;

L.

J.

N.
Hun

83;

v.

1–Goodnow
Mass.

of

to

or

If

there be no personal representative,
may
notice
be sent
the last residence
last place
business of the deceased.”

Oliver, 10 Cush. 557.
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Notice to partners.—Where the parties to be
notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice
to the firm, even though there has been a dissolution."
Sec. 101.

1—Notice to any member of a
firm is sufficient either before or
after dissolution.
A partnership,
though dissolved, must be treated
as still in existence so far as the
question of demand, protest and
notice is concerned, and the acts
of one partner in such cases must
be considered as binding on all.
Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen, 52

Mo. 207;
Fourth Nat. Bank v.
Altheimer, 91 Mo. 190; Hubbard
v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 50; Brown

Turner, 15 Ala. 832. If one
partner die, notice to the surviv
ing partner or partners will bind
the estate of the deceased part
ner. Slocomb v. de Lizardi, 21 La.
v.

Ann.

355.

Notice to joint parties.—Notice to joint par
ties who are not partners must be given to each of them,
unless one of them has authority to receive such notice
for the others."
Sec. 102.

1—People's Bank v. Keech, 26
Md. 521; Boyd v. Orton, 16 Wis.
495;

Miser

v.

Ohio St. 281

Trovinger's Exr's, 7
The distinction be

tween joint parties who are part
ners and joint parties who are not
partners rests upon the fact that
partners are but one person in
legal contemplation; that each part
ner acting in such capacity is not
only capable of performing what
all can do but by such acts nec
essarily binds them all; that as
an incident to such joint relations
all the partners are affected by
the knowledge of one; hence no
tice to one is notice to all. But
these things do not pertain to the

Sec. 103.

adjudged

relation of joint parties who are
not partners.
The law does not
create the relation of agency be
tween them. While their act in
making the contract is joint each
cannot perform what all can do
nor by his individual act bind his
co-contractors;
all of Such joint
contractors are not affected by the
knowledge of one of them. Gates
v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 523. If there
be no agency of their own making
between joint indorsers, not part
ners, notice to a part of the num
them;
ber will not bind even
since they are liable only jointly

with the

rest.

Jarnagin

ton, 95 Tenn. 621.

V.

Strat

Notice to bankrupt.—Where a party has been
a bankrupt or an insolvent, or has made an
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for the benefit of creditors, notice may be

given either to the party himself or to his trustee or
assignee."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
concerning
sec. 49 (10),
which
Mr. Chalmers says: “All that had
been decided before the act was
that notice given to the bankrupt
in ignorance that a trustee had
been appointed
was sufficient.”
The act enlarged the rule in this
respect.
This section is some
what more comprehensive than
the corresponding provision of the

English Act.
The Kentucky

Court of Appeals
Supreme
and the
Court of Ten
nessee
have held that notice to
the assignee of an indorser who

had made an assignment would
bind the indorser and his estate.
Callahan V. Bank of Kentucky, 82

Ky.

231;

American Nat. Bank V.
Bros., 94 Tenn. 634.
The
Supreme
Court of Ohio disap
proved the holding and refused
to follow it, making a distinction
between an assignee under a Vol
untary general aSSignment and an
assignee in bankruptcy.
House V.
Vinton Nat. Bank, 43 Ohio St. 346.
In this case two judges dissent
from the majority opinion, and
approve the rule of Callahan V.
Bank of Kentucky.

Junk

Sec. 104. Time within which notice must be given.—
Notice may be given as soon as the instrument is dis
honored; and unless delay is excused as hereinafter pro

vided, must be given within the time fixed by this act."

1-It

is settled that the holder
may send notice of dishonor upon
its happening and need not wait
until the close of business hours.
Bank Of Alexandria V. Swann, 9
Roberts, 2
Pet. 33;
Lenox
v.

bill fell

Wheat. 373; Coleman v. Carpen
ter, 9 Pa. St. 178; Ex parte Mo
line, 19 Wes. Jr. 216. In Kennedy

due the holder might give
immediate notice of dishonor to
drawer and indorser but could not
commence Suit against them. Or
the acceptor until after the ex
piration of the last day of grace.
Paper payable at a bank is not
absolutely dishonored before the
close of banking hours.
If de

v. Thomas [1894] 2 Q. B. 759, (a
provi
case under corresponding
sion of the Bills of Exchange
Act) it was held that where an
acceptor refused payment at any
time within the day on which the

mand should be made before the
close of banking hours and there
were no funds provided for pay
ment of the paper, the holder
could not treat the paper as dis
honored and give notice accord
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ingly.

German-American Bank V.
31 N. Y. Misc. 87, 65 N.

Milliman,

Y. Supp. 242
Statute).

LAW.
(a case

under the

Sec. 105. Where parties reside in same place.—Where
the person giving and the person to receive notice reside
in the same place, notice must be given within the follow

ing times:"

First,

If given

at the place of business of the person to
receive notice it must be given before the close of busi
ness hours on the day following;”
Second,
given at his residence, it must be given

If

before the usual hours of rest on the day following;”
Third,
sent by mail, it must be deposited in the

If

post

in time to reach him in the usual course on the day
following."
office

1–In the giving of notice of dis
honor the law merchant only re
quired that reasonable diligence
should be used but it interpreted
reasonable diligence to be con
fined in point of time to the day
of dishonor and the first Secular
day following.
The occurrence of
non-secular days while reducing
the period of grace increased the
time for giving notice.
Farns
worth V. Mullen, 164 Mass. 112;
Bank of Utica v. Bender, 21 Wend.
643.
The Statute has confirmed
this rule except as to the matter
of grace.
The holder may send
notice on a non-secular day but
is not required to do so. The in
dorser is not bound to open the
letter containing the notice or to
act on it until the next day. Deb
lieux V. Bullard, 1 Rob. (La.) 66.
If there be several indorsers the
holder may notify any of them

he sees fit but he has no more
time in which to notify the first
than the last indorser.
For ex
ample there are four successive

indorsers of a dishonored promis
sory note. The maximum time the
holder has to give notice is two
days, but if notice were given to
the indorsers in succession, the
maximum time for giving the
first indorser notice would be five
days. Notice by holder to first in
dorser five days after dishonor
would

not be good.

See

sections

94, 109.

2—Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis.
Rowe v. Tipper, 13 C. B.
249;
Lockwood v. Crawford, 18
Conn. 361; Barker v. Webster, 10
Iowa, 593.
408;

3—Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn.
If service be properly made
at the place of business or resi
dence it is immaterial
that the
90.
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party

to be notified did not in
fact receive the notice. Adams v.
Wright, supra.
In the case of
personal notice the rules govern-
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ing presentment for payment ap
ply.

See sec. 74.
4—See note 2, Sec. 98.

See note

1, Sec. 106.

Where parties reside in different places.—
Where the person giving and the person to receive notice
reside in different places, the notice must be given within
the following times:
*
First, If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post
office in time to go by mail the day following the day of
dishonor, or, if there be no mail at a convenient hour on
that day, by the next mail thereafter;"
Second, If given otherwise than though [through] the
Sec. 106.

postoffice, then within the time that notice would have been
received in due course of mail if it had been deposited in
the postoffice, within the time specified in the last sub

division.”
1—The Status of the unwritten
law

on

the

subject

covered

by
by

this SubSection is thus Stated
Earl, J., in Smith v. Poillon, 87
N. Y. 590: “It is clear that the
law is not precisely settled. It
appears that at first it was Sup
posed to be necessary that notice
dishonor
would be given by
the next post after dishonor, on
the same day, if there was one.

of

That rule was found inconveni
ently stringent, and then it was
held that when the parties lived
in different places, between which
there was a mail, the notice could

be posted the next day after the
dishonor or notice of dishonor.
Some of the authorities hold that
the party required to give the no

tice may have the whole of the
11

next day.
Other authorities lay
rule,
down the
in general terms,
that the notice must be posted by
the first practical and convenient
mail of the next day; and that
rule seems to be supported by the
most authority in this state. What
is a practical and convenient mail
depends upon circumstances.
It
may be controlled by the usages
of business and the customs of
the people at the place of mail
ing, and the condition, situation
and business engagements of the
person required to give the no
tice. The rule should have a rea
Sonable application in every case,
and whether sufficient diligence
has been used to mail the notice,
the facts being undisputed, is a
question of law.”
To the same
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effect: Lawson v. Farmers' Bank,
1 Ohio St. 206; Western Wheeled
Scraper Co. v. Sadilek, 50 Neb.
105;

Corbin
V.
Planters’ Nat.
Bank, 87 Va.
666;
Brown
v.
Jones, 125 Ind. 375; Hawkes V.
Salter, 4 Bing. 715.
Stainback V. Bank, 11 Gratt.
260. This was an action against
the indorser of a bill drawn on a
drawee in London, and protested
for non-acceptance April 5th. No
tice was sent in a mail leaving
Liverpool, April 19, by a Cunard
steamship, that being the first
Steamship leaving
England
for

the United States after the dis
honor of the bill.
But between
the 5th and the 19th several Sail
ing packets left England for the
United States.
It was the usage

of the London post-office to for
ward all mail by the Cunard line
unless specially
directed to be
forwarded by other vessels. The
indorser defended on the ground
that the notice should have been
sent by one of the sailing pack
ets departing from England on an
earlier day than the steamship.
The sending of the notice by the
first steamship that left England

for the United

States after the
dishonor of the bill was held to
be within the stringent
rule re
quiring that notice be sent by the

first mail.
Notice

must

be

sent

by

the

first ship bound to any port of
the United States, and it is not
sufficient to send it by the first

LAW.

ship bound for the port where
the indorser resides. Fleming v.
McClure, 1 Brevard (S. C.) 428.
Indorser resided in Charleston, S.
C. Holder, in England, waited for
ship sailing for Charleston, S. C.,
by which he sent notice. In the
meantime there were Several Sail
ings of mail
ships
for other
ports of the United States. Held:
notice not seasonably sent.
Fielding & Co. v. Corry [1898]
1 Q. B. 268 (a case under corre
sponding provision of the Bills of
Exchange Act), Mohlman V. Mc
Kane, 60 App. Div. 546, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 1046 (a case under this sec

tion).
2—The holder need not send
the notice by mail.
He may send
it by special messenger, and if
he does So it is Sufficient if it be
Served Within the time it would
have been received in due course
by mail as provided in subsection
“first.”
It has been held that al
though the notice by messenger
reaches the party after the time

it would have been received in
due course it is nevertheless Suffi
cient if Served Within
business

Bancroft
v. Hall,
Holt.
E. C. L. 190;
Corbin V.
Planters' Bank, 87 Va. 666.
The Statute would seem to be
mandatory
in requiring notice
“given otherwise than through the
post office” to be served within
the time it would have been re
ceived in due course of mail.
hours.
476,

3

When sender deemed to have given due
notice.—Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and
Sec.

107.
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deposited in the postoffice, the sender is deemed to have
given due notice, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the
mails."
1—Shelburne

Falls

Nat.

Bank

v. Townsley, 107 Mass. 444; Farm
ers' Bank v. Gunnell, Adm'x, 26
Gratt. 137; Wooley v. Lyon, 117
Ill. 244; Phelps v. Stocking, 21
Neb. 443; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick.

Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W.
515, 10 L. J. Ex.
227;
State
Bank V. Soloman, 84 N. Y. Supp.
976 (a case under the statute).
All who deal in mercantile pa
per are presumed to assent, and
even to expect, that such infor
401;

Deposit

mation as they want will be com
municated through the medium of
the post office. And thus the post
office becomes
their agent; and
happen
if it
to fail from any un
expected

cause,

he who made

the

right use of it by placing his let

ter there, properly directed, has
done all his duty, and the con
Sequences must fall upon him who
has to receive.
Shred v. Brett,
Supra.

in postoffice;

what constitutes.—
Notice is deemed to have been deposited in the postoffice
when deposited in any branch postoffice or in any letter
box under the control of the postoffice department."
Sec. 108.

1—Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich.
402;
Brown,
Johnson
v.
154
Mass. 105; Casco Nat. Bank V.
Shaw, 79 Me. 376.
It has been held that delivery

of notice to an Official letter car
rier is the full equivalent of de
positing it in a receiving box or

the post office.
Pearce v.
Langfit, 101 Pa. St. 507. The rule
of the foregoing case is not with
in the terms of the Statute. Mr.
says that it was not
Crawford
deemed wise to adopt this rule.
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law,

in

97.

to antecedent parties; time of.—
Where a party receives notice of dishonor he has, after
the receipt of such notice, the same time for giving notice
Sec. 109.

Notice

to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dis
honor."

1-It

is

an established

princi his

ple of mercantile law that if the
holder of a bill or note chooses
to rely upon the responsibility of

immediate indorser, there is
necessity
no
for his giving notice
any
previous
party;
to
and if
such notice be properly given, in
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due time, by the other parties, it
will inure to the benefit of the
holder, and he may recover there
on against any of them. Thus, if
the holder notifies the sixth in
dorser, and he the fifth, and so
on to the first, the latter will be
liable to all the parties. And it
is no objection to such notice that
it is not in fact received SO SO.On
by the first or any prior indorser,
as if
rectly

had been transmitted di
by the holder or notary,

it

LAW.

provided it has been seasonably
sent by each indorser as he re
ceives it.
And the same degree
of diligence must be exercised on
the part of the indorser in for
warding notice as is required of
Ordinary diligence
the holder.
must be used in both cases.
Linn
v. Horton, 17 Wis. 151; Corbin v.
Planters' Nat. Bank, 87 Va. 666;
Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 433.
See note, sec. 94.

Where notice must be sent.—Where a party
has added an address to his signature, notice of dishonor
must be sent to that address; but if he has not given such
Sec. 110.

address, then the notice must be sent as follows:
First, Either to the postoffice nearest to his place of
residence, or to the postoffice where he is accustomed to
receive his letters;” or
Second,
he live in one place and have his place of
business in another, notice may be sent to either place;” or
Third,
he is sojourning in another place, notice may

If

If

be sent to the place where he is so sojourning." But where
the notice is actually received by the party within the time
specified in this act,

it will be sufficient, though not sent

in accordance with the requirements of this section.”
1—An indorser has the right to
designate, when he indorses, a
place to which notice shall be
Sent.
Notice must be addressed
to him at the place designated in
order to bind him. So held where
an indorser added to his signa
ture the words, “214 E. 18th St.,”
and the notice was addressed

“City of New York.”

Bartlett

v.

Robinson,

39 N. Y. 187, and it
was so held notwithstanding
a
statute which provided that no
tices of non-payment, etc., may be
served by depositing them * * *
in the post office
*
* * di
rected to the indorser at such city
or town. This statute, it was said,
was not intended to and did not
abridge the right of such indorser

NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS
to designate the place within such
town or city
to which
notice
should be sent.
Peters v. Hobbs, 25 Ark. 67;
Eastern Bank V. BrOWI), 17 Me.
356.

-

Nat. Bank V. Cade,
Mich. 449; Northwestern Coal
Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa 150.
The general rule is that notice
must be sent to the place where

2-Citizens

73

the indorser will be most likely
to receive it. American Bank V.
Junk Bros., 94 Tenn. 624; Bank
of America v. Shaw, 142 Mass.
290; Casco Bank v. Shaw, 79 Me.
376.
In View of this rule the true
interpretation
of this subsection
would seem to be this: that no

tice must be sent to the post office
nearest the indorser's place of res
idence, but if he is accustomed to
receive his letters at another post
office, and that fact is known to
the holder, notice should be sent
there, and not that the holder has
the option to send to the one or
the other. See the following cases
in which this subdivision was re
ferred to but not construed.
Eb
ling Brewing Co. v. Reinheimer, 66
N. Y. Supp. 458; Mohlman Co. v.
McKane, 60 App. Div. 546, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 1046; Fonseca v. Hartman,
84 N. Y. Supp. 131.
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3-Montgomery County Bank V.
7 N. Y. 481;
Simms v.
Larkin, 19 Wis. 412.
4–Sojourning signifies a tem
Marsh,

porary residence as that of a trav
eler in a foreign land;
to live,
and not at home; it applies to
temporary as contra distinguished
from permanent residence. Wit
tenbrock V. Mabius,
10 N. Y.
Supp. 733, 57 Hun, 146; Henry v.

Ball, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 1. Thus,
a Senator or member of the House
having

an abode in Washington
during the session of Congress is

“sojourning”

there and notice may
be sent to such temporary abode.
Webster,
Chouteau
v.
6
Met.
(Mass.) 1; Tunstall v. Walker, 2
Smedes & M. 638; Bank of Com
merce v. Chambers, 14 Mo. App.
152.
But see Bayly's Adm'r V.
Chubb, 16 Gratt. 284; Walker V.
Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 89.

5-Notice is good if actually re
ceived by the indorser.
A party
who receives notice in due time
cannot object to the means em
ployed.
Dicken v. Hall, 87 Pa.
St. 379; Terbell v. Jones, 15 Wis.
253.

Notice by telegraph is good if
Fielding
delivered in due season.
v. Corry, [1898] 1 Q. B. 268.

Sec. 111. Waiver of notice.—Notice of dishonor may
be waived, either before the time of giving notice has
arrived, or after the omission to give due notice,” and
the waiver may be express or implied.”
1—Any conduct on the part of
the indorser calculated to induce,

and inducing,

serving him

the holder

with regular

to omit
notice
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of non-payment, will have the ef
fect to waive it.
Hale V. Dan
forth, 46 Wis. 554; Boyd V. Bank,
32 Ohio St. 526;
Glaze v. Fer
guson, 48 Kan. 157;
Tailer v.
Murphy Furnishing Co., 24 Mo.
App. 420. A promise by the in
dorser before the maturity of the
note to pay the same is a waiver
Sigerson V. Math
of all steps.
ews, 20 How. (U. S.) 496; Gove v.

Vining,

7 Met. (Mass.) 212.
Waiver, at or before maturity,
of presentment and notice upon
an instrument indorsed by a part
nership may be by one of the
partners as agent of the others,
and this even though the part
nership is dissolved, since it does

not create a new liability. Seld
ner V. Mount Jackson Nat. Bank,
66 Md. 488;
Star Wagon Co. v.
Swezey, 52 Iowa 391. But it seems
that waiver after maturity, the
firm being discharged for want of
presentment or notice, would not
revive its obligation.
Daniel Neg.
Inst., 5th ed., sec. 1109a, and cases
cited.
An oral waiver of notice may
be revoked before the time of

giv

ing notice has expired.
Second
Nat. Bank V. McGuire, 33 Ohio St.
295, 31 Am. Rep. 539.
2—Notice is waived by a sub
sequent promise to pay the note,
with full knowledge of all the
facts. Burden of proof, however,
is

on

the plaintiff to show that
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the indorser had such knowledge.
State Bank
v.
McCabe
(Mich.
1904), 98 N. W. 20; Newberry v.
Trowbridge,
13 Mich. 263;
Par
Dickinson,
sons v.
23 Mich. 56;
Woods v. Dean, 32 L. J. Q. B. 1.
A promise to pay made by the
indorser after maturity and after
he is discharged for want of de
mand or notice is binding in anal
ogy with the promise to pay a
debt barred by the statute of lim
Rindge V. Kimball, 124
itations.
209;
Mass.
Ross v. Hurd, 71 N.
14;
Y.
Oxnard V. Varumn, 111
Pa. St. 193.
The indorser to be bound by
subsequent promise must
such
have knowledge of the laches and
all the material facts constituting
such laches. Parks v. Smith, 155
Mass. 26. But it is not necessary

he should understand the legal
effect of Such laches.
3-The waiver need not take
any particular
Any lan
form.

whether oral or written, or
any understanding
between
the
parties, is sufficient if it can be
guage,

Seen that a waiver

was intended.
Quaintance v. Goodrow, 16 Mont.
376, 41 Pac. 76; Schwartz & Sons
v. Widmer, 90 Md. 136 (a case
under the statute).
See In re
Swift, 106 Fed. 65, in which, sec
tion 84, subdivision 3, a provision
identical with this except that it
applies to presentment, was con
Strued.

Whom affected by waiver!—where the waiv
er is embodied in the instrument itself, it is binding upon
all parties; but where it is written above the signature
of the indorser, it binds him only.”
Sec. 112.
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1-A Waiver embodied in the in
strument is a part of the contract
and applies to every indorser of
the paper. Phillips V. Dippo, 93
35;

Iowa

Ewing,

78

Farmers'

Ky.

266;

Bank

Lowry

v.
v.

Steele, 27 Ind. 168; Jacobs v. Gib
son, 77 Mo. App. 244; Woodward

v. Lowry, 74 Ga. 148.
is
2—“Such
an
indorsement
spoken
facul
of
as
a
sometimes
indorsement.
It relates
tative

only to the indorser's liability,
and does not otherwise affect the
negotiation of the bill. Such stip
ulations are resorted to when the
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payment of the bill is doubtful,
and the drawer or indorser Wishes
to save expense in case of its re
Bills of Ex
turn.”
Chalmers'
change, 5th ed., 40. Some courts
have held, contrary to the gen
eral rule, that such an indorse
ment dispenses with the neces
sity of notice to all subsequent in
Daniel, Neg. Inst., 5th
dorsers.
ed., sec. 1092 a; Parshley v. Heath,
69 Me. 90; Johnson v. Parker, 86
MO. App. 660; Farmers' Exchange

Bank
263.

V. Altura & Co., 129 Cal.
The statute settles the rule.

Waiver of protest.—A waiver of protest,
whether in the case of a foreign bill of exchange or other
negotiable instrument, is deemed to be a waiver not only
of a formal protest, but also of presentment and notice of
Sec. 113.

dishonor."
1—Strictly, protest is a single
step in fixing the liability of sec
ondary parties and pertains only
to foreign bills of exchange. Prac
tically, however, it has long since
come to be used as a term in
cluding all the steps necessary to
charge the indorser.
The general rule of the law
merchant on the subject is em
in

bodied

Bank
son

First

this

section.

v. Hyde, 6 Wheat. 572;

Parsons,

Union

John

Mass. 173;
Nat. Bank V. Hartman, 110

V.

140

Coddington v. Da
Pa. St. 196;
vis, 1 N. Y. 186; First Nat. Bank
v. Falkenhan, 94 Cal. 141, 29 Pac.
866.

A Waiver of notice will not be
construed to extend beyond the
plain and clear import
of the
terms used and Will not include
Voorhies V.
Waiver of demand.
Atlee, 29 Iowa 49; Drinkwater v.
Tebbetts, 17 Me. 16;
Backus V.
Shipherd, 11 Wend. 629; Sprague
v. Fletcher, 8 Ore. 367.

Sec. 114. When notice dispensed with.—Notice of dis
honor is dispensed with when, after the exercise of
reasonable diligence, it cannot be given to, or does not
reach, the parties sought to be charged."
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is

in

is

to

is

L.

v.

is

9

V.

it.

Ghiselin,
Lambert
How. (U. S.) 552.
The meaning of reasonable dili
gence as used
this section
thus interpreted by the Supreme
Court of New York in Brewster V.
Schrader, 26 Misc. 480, 57 N. Y.
Supp. 606:
“The reasonable dili
gence required by the statute in
giving notice, depends upon the
ceived

would have suggested
itself as
necessary, under the existing cir
cumstances,
the man of ordi
nary prudence and intelligence.”
The Section
referred to in Fon
Hartman, 84 N. Y. Supp.
seca
Beesty, 60
131. See Studdy
T. (n. S.), 647 (a case under the
corresponding
provision of the
Bills of Exchange Act).
Merely consulting directories
not reasonable diligence in mak
ing inquiry. The information they
afford may be misleading.
Their
help may be invoked, but their
error, though
may excuse the
notary, will not charge the in
Hanna, 137 N.
dorser.
Bacon
V.

liability of the indorser as effect
ually as if he had actually re

circumstances of each particular
case.
The question of what
reasonable diligence must be de
termined With reference to what

it

1—The law does not require ac
tual notice.
It requires reason
efforts,
able
made in good faith,
to give it. And if sufficient in
quiries have been made, and in
formation received upon which the
holder has a right to rely, a mis
take as to the nearest post office
or usual post office does not de
prive him of his remedy.
He has
done all that the law requires,
and the notice thus sent fixes the

LAW.

v.
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Y.

379.

be

to

of

to

or

of

is

is

of

in

in

giving notice; how excused.—Delay
giving notice
dishonor
excused when the delay
caused by circumstances beyond the control
the holder
negli
and not imputable
his default, misconduct
delay ceases
operate, notice
gence. When the cause
given with reasonable diligence."
must
Delay

Sec. 115.

v.

a

in

is

See

note,

Sec.

83.

to

to

be

to

is

be

given
When notice need not
drawer.—
given
dishonor
not required
the
either
the following cases:

of

Notice
drawer

in of

Sec. 116.

This section deals with what
known as temporary excuse for
taking
given step
fixing the
liability
secondary
party.
the
487.

of

v.

1—Thus delay caused by war
whereby communication was cut
off so that notice could not be
sent, James
Wade, 21 La. Ann.
Despard, 38 Md.
548; Norris
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same

per

son;"
Second, Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a
person not having capacity to contract;”

Third, Where the drawer is the person to whom the
instrument is presented for payment;”
Fourth, Where the drawer has no right to expect or
require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the instru
ment; or

Fifth, Where the drawer has countermanded
1—Where the drawer and drawee
are the same person the bill is in
legal effect a promissory note and
no notice to the drawer is neces
sary.
Planters' Bank V. Evans,
36 Tex. 592. Where a bill of ex
change is drawn by one partner

ship on another and the two have

a common partner, notice of the
dishonor of the bill is not neces
sary to charge the drawers.
New
York, etc. Co. v. Selma Sav. Bank,
51 Ala. 305; Gowan V. Jackson,

Johns.

20

176.

2—Smith v. Bellamy, 2 Starkie,
223; Wyman v. Adams, 12 Cush.
210.

applies to
drawer who has

3—This subdivision
the

case

of

a

been appointed executor or trustee
of the drawee's estate.
Present
ment for payment having been
made to him in his representative
capacity he gets actual knowledge
of the dishonor of the paper.

Further notice would
OuS.

be

superflu

KnOWledge of the dishonor

paym:

in such a

case amounts to notice.
Thompson,
Caunt v.
7 C. B. 400,
62 E. C. L. 399;
Groth v. Gyger,
Magruder v.
31
Pa.
St. 271;
Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87.

4—Where

the

drawer

has

no

right to expect that the acceptor
will pay the bill, as where it is
an accommodation bill, So that he
could

not be damnified

by want

of notice, notice is not necessary.
Sharp v. Bailey, 9 B. &
Knickerbocker
Life Ins.
Pendleton, 112 U. S. 696;
V. Bank of Columbia, 4

C. 44;
CO.

V.

French
Cranch,

141.

The mere fact that the drawee
has no funds of the drawer in his
hands will not dispense with due
presentment
and
notice.
All
that is required is that the drawer
have reasonable grounds to expect
that his draft Will be honored.
Cathell V. Goodwin, Har. & Gill
(Md.) 468.
5–Sutcliffe
& McC. 251.

v. M'Dowell,

2 Nott.

170
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Where notice need not be given to indorser.
-Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to an
indorser in either of the following cases:
First, Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a per
son not having capacity to contract, and the indorser
was aware of the fact at the time he indorsed the instru
Sec. 117.

ment;"
Second, Where the indorser is the person to whom the
instrument is presented for payment;”

Third, Where the instrument was made or accepted for

his accommodation.”
1—The indorser, aware that the
drawee is a fictitious person, has
all the knowledge that the paper
cannot be accepted and will not be
paid that he could acquire from
notice;
hence notice is properly
dispensed
with.
In case the
drawee were a person lacking ca
pacity to contract and the in
dorser were aware of the fact at
the time he endorsed, his knowl
edge that acceptance or payment
could not be compelled is as
complete as notice could make it.
2–Hull v. Myers, 90 Ga. 674.

In re Swift, 106 Fed. 65 (a case
under this subdivision of the stat

v. Mitchell, 22 Fed.
American Nat. Bank V. Junk
Bros., 94 Tenn. 624;
Morris v.
Birmingham
Nat. Bank, 93 Ala
511, 9 So. 606.
Where one, as indorser, pro
Cures the note Of another to be
discounted by a bank
for his
credit, and at the time the dis

3–Webster

871;

count is effected makes a distinct
promise to the bank to pay the
note at maturity, his liability is
absolute, not conditional, and pro
test and notice of non-payment
are unecessary. Sieger V. Second
Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. St. 307.

ute).

Notice of non-payment where acceptance re
fused.—Where due notice of dishonor by non-acceptance
has been given, notice of a subsequent dishonor by non
payment is not necessary, unless in the meantime the in
Sec. 118.

strument has been accepted."
1–De La Torre

v.

Barclay,
6

1

T. R.

Stark,
200.

7;

Campbell

v.

French,
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Omission to give notice of non-acceptance;
effect of.—An omission to give notice of dishonor by non
acceptance does not prejudice the rights of a holder in
Sec. 119.

due course subsequent to the omission."
1—This section affirms the rule
declared in Dunn V. O'Keefe, 5
M. & S. 282, wherein Lord
lenborough
said:
“No
author
ity has pronounced that a bill
of exchange shall be a Void Se

El

in the hands of an in
indorsee,
nocent
who
has
no
knowledge that the bill has ever

curity,

Sec. 120.

been

dishonoured,

because

a

for

mer holder has omitted to give
notice to the drawer that the
drawee has refused acceptance.”

The Wisconsin
Act contains
this further provision: “But this
Shall not be construed to revive
any liability discharged by such
Omission.”

When protest need not be made; when must

be made.—Where any negotiable instrument has been
dishonored it may be protested for non-acceptance or non
payment, as the case may be; but protest is not required,
except in the case of foreign bills of exchange."
1-Foreign bills

defined, section
131.
See
sections 154-162 and
notes as to protest generally. The

statute affirms the law merchant
in requiring protest of foreign
bills only.
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Article

VIII.

Discharge

of

Sec.

121.
122.
123.
124.

LAW.

Negotiable Instrumen

Sec

How instrument discharged.
Discharge of person second
arily liable on.
Rights of party paying in
Strument.
Renunciation by holder.

125.
126.
127.

Cancellation
unintent.
burden of proof.
Alteration
of instru
effect of.
alteration,
Material
constitutes.

Sec. 121. How instrument discharged.—A negot
instrument is discharged:
First, By payment" in due course by or on beha
the principal debtor;”
Second,

By payment in due course by the party ac

modated, where the instrument
accommodation.”

is made or accepted

Third, By the intentional cancellation thereof by

ho
(

Appledorn

Morris,

5

Morris

V.

to

See
171;

b

r

is

r

a

v.

7.

v.

9;

v.

Streete
Mich.
Sherwood
M
Bank, 94 Mich. 78; State
Byrne, 97 Mich.
Whether
note given in
al of another note
to
garded as payment of the
note when the old note is
question in conflict
ed,
Pellet, 102 Mich.
Child
is

it a

Page Woven Wire Fence
Pool, 129 Mich. 57.
As
what constitutes pay

v. a

to

of

a

to

a

1-Payment and Surrender of
negotiable instrument at the right
time, -at or after maturity (sec.
90),
the right person—the
holder—by the right person,—the
principal debtor or his agent in
that behalf,-extinguishes the lia
bility of all parties to the in
Strument.
promissory
The possession of
note by the maker makes
prima facie case
payment,
upon the
throws
the burden
plaintiff
prove non-payment.

ri

in

or

at

of

of

Fourth, By any other act which will discharge a
money;”
contract for the payment
Fifth, When the principal debtor becomes the
the instrument
after maturity
his own

sil

holder;"
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was held that unless there was
evidence of a contrary intention,
renewals at banks ought always
to be regarded as payment, be
cause the banks themselves SO
regard them. To the same effect
is Citizens Commercial & Savings

Platt, (Mich.) 97 N. W.
694.
But see McMorran V. Mur
phy, 68 Mich. 246. To the con
trary see Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
Bank

ed.,

V.

sec.

1266 and cases

cited.

Where the old note is Sur
rendered the renewal note, accord
ing to the probable weight of
authority, does not constitute pay
ment of the old, but the giving
up of the old note is a mere con
ditional Surrender, and upon non
payment of the new, the obliga
tion of the old is revived, Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., Sec. 1266 a.
The intention of the parties
will, however, always be allowed
to control.
If the renewal note
be intended as payment of the
old, although the old be not sur
rendered, it will be considered as
payment.
Hotchin
v. Secor, 8
Sage
494;
Mich.
v. Walker, 12
Mich. 425; Dodge v. Stanton, id.
408; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich.
29;
Riverside
Iron Works v.

Hall,
lou,

165; Ellis v. Bal
Mich. 303;
See
also
Dudgeon v. Haggart,
17 Mich.
273; Burchard v. Frazer, 23 Mich.
228; Matter of the Utica Plowing
Co. 154 N. Y. 268.
When a debtor gives his note
for a preéxisting or contemporan
eous debt it amounts to condi
tional payment,. not to an ex
tinguishment
of the debt.
Breit
ung v. Lindhaur, 37 Mich. 217;
64 Mich.

129
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Marinette Iron Works Co. v. Cody,
108 Mich. 381; Smalley v. Gear
ing, 121 Mich. 190; Philadelphia

Neill, (Pa. 1905) 60 Atl. 1033.
The law does not raise a pre
Sumption of non-payment but of

V.

payment when due.
Bailey v.
Gould, Walk. Ch. 478; Bassett v.
Hathaway,
George
28;
9 Mich.
V. Ludlow, 66 Mich. 176.
When the holder of a bill of
exchange, acting for the accom
modation of the drawer, sends it
to a bank for collection and the
bank, when the bill comes to ma
turity, passes the amount to the
credit of the holder, this is not
payment as discharges
Such
a
the acceptor; but the bank suc
ceeds to the rights of the holder
and may maintain an action on
against
the bill
the acceptor.

Pacific Bank v. Mitchell, 9 Met.
(Mass.) 297.
2—When an agent makes pay
ment on behalf of the principal
debtor the instrument
is dis
charged.
But when an indorser
makes part payment to the holder
not as agent for the principal
debtor, such a payment is not a
defense to the principal debtor;
he is liable for the whole amount
notwithstanding
payment.
such
Square
Madison
Bank V. Pierce,
137 N. Y. 444.
See Sec. 123 as
to payment by party of secondary

liability.
Y.

3–See Lancey

v.

Clark,

64 N.

209.

4-See Sec. 125.
5-Thus a release of

one joint
the holder will dis
all the joint parties, for
such a release is a complete bar

maker
charge

by
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to any joint suit and no separ
ate suit can be maintained
in
such cases.
Daniel Neg. Inst.,
5th ed., Sec. 1294.
Crawford W.
Roberts, 8 Ore. 324; but accord
ing to Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick.
305, such a release, to operate as
a discharge, must be under Seal.
6—This Subdivision was con
strued in Schwartzman V. Post,
94 App. Div. 474, 84 N. Y. Supp.

In this case the
holder of a note for $5,000 sur
rendered it to the maker upon
payment by the latter of $3,250
and a promise to pay the balance.
922, 87 Id. 872.

pro

It was held that under this
Vision of the statute the holder
was precluded from later main
taining an action against the
maker On the note to recover the
balance due. The court said: “The
words “in his own right, merely
exclude Such a case as that of
acquiring
a maker
the instru
ment in purely a representative
capacity.”
corresponding
The
provision
of the Bills of Ex
change Act was construed
in
Nash V. De Freville

B.

72.

In this

case

[1900] 2 Q.
A. gave B.
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certain notes as security upon his
promise
negotiate
not to
the
Same,
and later gave renewal
notes but did not ask for the re
turn of the old notes.
B. again
agreed not to negotiate the notes
but later transferred all of them
to C.
A. paid the amount of
the notes to B. but did not get
the notes back at the time. Later
B. again obtained the notes from
C. by fraudulently giving C. his
check which was Worthless.
B.
returned the notes to A. and then
A., thinking the trans
absconded.
action closed, burned the notes.
It was held that inasmuch as B.
got title to the notes from C.
fraudulently, he could give A. no
better title than he had, and A’s
possession of the notes did not
discharge the same.
It was held
further that the words “in his
OWn right” must mean Something
more than ‘not in a representa
tive capacity,
as executor,
for

Collins, J., said:
“I
think “in his own right must
mean having a right not subject
to that of any one else-good
against all the world.”
instance.

Sec. 122. Discharge of person secondarily liable on.—
A person secondarily liable on the instrument is dis

charged:

First, By any act which discharges the instrument;"
Second, By the intentional cancellation of his signature
by the holder;”

Third, By the discharge of a prior party;”

Fourth, By a valid tender of payment made by a prior
party;”

NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

IN GENERAL.

175

Fifth, By a release of the principal debtor, unless the
holder’s right of recourse against the party secondarily
liable is expressly reserved;”
Sixth, By any agreement binding upon the holder to
extend the time of payment, or to postpone the holder’s
right to enforce the instrument," unless made with the
assent of the party secondarily liable," or unless the right
of recourse against such party is expressly reserved.”
1-Farmers
V. Kingsley,

& Mechanics
2 Doug.

(Mich.)

Bank
379.

See preceding Section.
2–Bank of Scotland V. Domin
ion Bank [1891] App. CaS. 592.
3–This is the rule of the law
merchant and is general in its
application;
whatever discharges
the maker of a note or the ac
ceptor of a bill discharges the
indorsers, and the discharge of an
indorser
releases all
indorsers
subsequent to him.
Brewer V.
Boynton, 71 Mich. 254; Gunnis etc.
v. Weigley, 114 Pa. St. 194;

Shutts

In

V.

Fingar,

100

N. Y.

539.

the case last cited it is said:
“Whatever discharges a prior in
dorser discharges all subsequent
indorsers, for the reason that he
stood between them and the hold
er, and on making payment each
one
could
have had
recourse
against him but from which his
discharge precludes them.
The
contracts of the parties to a note
are said to be like the links of a
pendant chain, if the holder dis
solves the first every link falls

with it.”
But this rule does not apply
where a prior party is discharged

by the holder's failure to give
him due notice, such discharge
not affecting the indorser Whose
liability has become fixed, West
River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y.
Nor, where the party pri
128.
marily liable is discharged be
cause of lack of capacity to con
tract, as an infant or a married
Wolman.

Where the holder has allowed
the statute of limitations to run
against the maker of a note, the
Bridges
indorser is discharged.
V. Blake, 106 Ind. 332.
But see
Villars v. Palmer, 67 Ill. 204.
4—The creditor, who declines
to accept a valid tender of pay
ment for which the surety is ob
ligated,
discharges
the surety.
Sears v. VanDusen, 25 Mich. 351;
Joslyn V. Eastman, 46 Vt. 258.

The Wisconsin Act has this ad
ditional provision:
“4 a. By giv

ing up or applying to other pur
poses collateral securities appli
cable to the debt, or, there being
in the holder's hands or within
his control the means of com
plete or partial satisfaction,
the
same are applied to other pur
poses.”
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Noble v. Murphy, 91 Mich. 653,
involves a case similar to the
foregoing provision.
5—Release
of the principal
debtor discharges the drawer and
indorsers; as it takes away their

right

of reimbursement.
Mont
gomery v. Sayre, 100 Cal. 182,
34 Pac. 646.
But if the holder
in making such release expressly

reserves his right of recourse
against the drawer and indorsers
they will not be discharged, as
their rights and remedies are
thus,
by
implication,
reserved
against the party primarily lia
ble.
Boatman's
Sav. Bank V.
Johnson, 24 Mo. App. 317; Glou
cester Bank v. Worcester, 10 Pick.
Tombeckbe Bank v. Strat
Wend. 429.
6—The surety’s promise cannot
be enlarged in the slightest par
ticular without his consent; so
528;

ton,

7

any

extension of time given to
principal,
no matter
how
short, will discharge him.
Bul

his

lock

Taylor,

39 Mich.
Cady, 40 Mich.
Stevens v. Oaks, 58 Mich.
Walter A. Wood etc. Co. v.
ver, 103 Mich. 326;
First
Bank v. Walker, 115 Mich.
Frackelton,
Hitchcock
v.
v.

Barron

Mich.

v.

137;
259;
343;

Oli
Nat.
434;
116

487.

In order to discharge the in
dorser by giving time to the
maker, there must be a contract
to that effect, express or implied,
that is, the holder must have put
it out of his power for the time
being
to proceed against
the
maker.
Peninsular SaV. Bank V.
Hosie, 112 Mich. 351; Continental
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Life Ins. Co. v. Barber,

50 Cor

567.

The agreement for extension
time must be supported by a co
sideration, otherwise it will
unenforceable and will not su
pend the creditor's right to st
Briggs v. Norris, 67 Mich. 32
McInerney V. Lindsay, 97 Mic
238;
Morse V. Blanchard,
1
Mich. 37; Shayler v. Gidding
122 Mich. 659.

Part payment of the debt a
tually due is not sufficient co
sideration
for an extension
Briggs v. Norris, supra.
time.
The taking by the creditor,
a new note, payable on deman
does not operate as an extensit
of time. Continental Life Ins. C
V. Barber, 50 Conn. 567; Merl
man v. Barker,
121
Ind. 7
Board of Education v. Fonda,
N. Y. 350.
But when the ne
note is payable at a future da

the right of action on the o
is suspended and a surety is di
charged.
Pomeroy v. Tanner, '
N. Y. 547; Okie v. Spencer,
Whar. 253; Bangs v. Moshe
23 Barb.
478.
But see Conti
Austin v. Curtis, 31 Vt. 64; Whi
ney v. Goin, 20 N. H. 354.
Where two parties appear :
joint makers on a note, althoug
One is in fact a mere Suret
a fact unknown to the holder, a
extension given to the princip
debtor will not discharge
th
Surety who appears Ostensibly :
a joint maker.
36 Mich. 440.

Gano V.

Heat

The individual promise of or
member of a banking firm to r
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lease an accommodation

from liability

on

a

indorser
note held by
pay the note

the firm, and to
from means in his hands belong
ing to the maker, cannot be con
strued as a promise of the firm
and will not exonerate the in
dorser from liability on the note.
Webber v. French, 102 Mich. 638.
7—Where a party secondarily
liable gives his consent to an ex
tension he is not discharged.
mental V. Marques, 109 Cal. 406,
Bishop V. Eaton,
42 Pac. 159;

Pi

161 Mass. 496, 37 N. E. 665. The
burden of proving that the in
dorser gave such consent is on
the party seeking to charge him.
Sibeneck V. Anchor Sav. Bank,

Pa. St. 187.
In the Wisconsin Act the fol
lowing provision stands as a sub
stitute for subdivision 6, supra:
“By an agreement binding on
the holder to extend the time of
payment or to postpone the hold
111

er’s right to enforce the instru
ment unless made with the as
sent, prior or subsequent, of the
party secondarily liable, unless
right of recourse against
the
such party is expressly reserved,

or

unless
fied.”

he

is

fully

indemni

8—Where the right of recourse
against
the secondary party is
reserved, he is not discharged,
because the objection that the
surety's rights are thereby post
poned, does not exist.
Indorsers
are discharged by an extension

of

time

without

right of
the
them, because
12

reservation

of

recourse against
their contract is
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impaired;
they cannot step in
and pay the instrument until af
ter the expiration of the period
of extension, so that their right
of recourse against the principal
debtor is postponed; but if the
agreement for extension express

ly reserves the right of the hold

er against the indorsers, the in
dorsers can step in immediately,
pay the instrument, take it from
the holder and sue their princi
pal for reimbursement.
They
have thus lost nothing and their

right of reimbursement has not
postponed. Big Rapids Nat.
Bank v. Peters, 120 Mich. 518;
Bank v. Simpson, 90 N. C. 467;
been

Sawyers v. Campbell, 107 Ia. 397,
78 N. W. 56; Hodges v. Elyton
Land Co., 109 Ala. 617, 20 So.
23;
Boaler v. Mayor, 19 C. B.
(n. s.) 76, 115
E. C. L. 76;
Hagey v. Hill, 75 Pa. St. 108.
In the case last cited the court
said: “The ground upon which
an agreement to give time to
the maker, made by the holder
Without the consent of the in
dorsers, upon a valid considera
tion, is held to be a discharge
of the indorsers, is solely this,
that the holder thereby implied
ly stipulates not to pursue the
indorsers, or to seek satisfaction
from them in the intermediate
period.
It can never apply to
any case where a contrary stipu
lation exists between the parties.
Hence, if the agreement for delay
expressly saves and reserves the

in

rights of the holder in the
termediate time against the in
dorsers, it will not discharge the
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latter.
ground
moved,

such case the very
the objection is refor their rights are not

In

of
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postponed against the maker
they should take up the note.”

if

Rights of party paying instrument.—Where
the instrument is paid by a party secondarily liable there
on it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is re
mitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties,
Sec. 123.

and he may strike out his own and all subsequent endorse
ments, and again negotiate the instrument,
except:
First, Where it is payable to the order of a third person
and has been paid by the drawer,” and
Second, Where it is made or accepted for accommoda
tion, and has been paid by the party accommodated.”
1—This section is obscured by
arrangement of the clauses
containing the exceptions, but its
true meaning will be apparent
by reading it thus,—Where
the
the

instrument
is paid by a party
secondarily
liable thereon it is
not discharged, but the party so
paying it is remitted to his for
mer rights as regards all prior
parties, except; where it is made

or

for his accommoda
and has been paid by the
party accommodated, and he may
strike out his own and all Sub
sequent indorsements and again
negotiate the instrument, except
where it is payable to the order
of a third person and has been
accepted

tion

paid by the drawer.
Where a party secondarily lia
ble pays or discharges the in
struments its character as a Va
lid, subsisting obligation is not
destroyed. The party making such
payment always

has the right of

recourse against all prior parties.
So when an indorser makes pay
ment to the holder, it is not such
payment as discharges
the in
strument, but is, in effect, a re
purchase of the paper.
All in
dorsers Subsequent to the party
making payment are discharged
and their names should be strick
en out if the paper is again ne
gotiated.
French V. Jarvis, 29
Conn. 343; Coleman v. Dunlap,
18 S. C. 591; Fenn v. Dugdale, 40
Mo. 63.
See Thurston V. Pren
tice, 1 Mich. 193; McDonough v.
Heyman, 38 Mich. 334;
Hanish
Kennedy,
V.
106
Mich. 455;
Twelfth Ward Bank V. Brooks,
App. Div. (N. Y.) 220, 71
63
N. Y. Supp. 388 (a case under
statute).
In this case the
indorser paid the amount
of the instrument to the holder.
It was held that such payment
was no defense to the first in
dorser, unless he could show that
the

Second
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such payment had been made for
him.
2—Where the drawer pays a bill
payable to the order of a third
person, the bill is not discharged
and he may sue the acceptor and
recover on the instrument, save
that the acceptance was for the
The
accommodation.
drawer's
drawer of a bill, who pays it,
may leave it in the hands of the
indorsee to whom he makes pay
ment and have the indorsee Sue
upon it for his benefit. Williams
v. James, 15 Ad. & El. (n. S.)
But although the drawer
499.
upon paying the instrument may
sue the acceptor on the bill, he
cannot reissue it, if it is payable
to the order of a third person.
Gardner V. Maynard, 7 Allen 456.
A bill cannot be indorsed or
negotiated after it has once been
paid, if such indorsement or ne
gotiation would make any of the
parties liable, who would other
Beck V.
wise be discharged.
Robley, 1 H. Bl. (n.) 89.
is
3—Where
the
instrument
paid by the party for whose ac
commodation it was made, it is
absolutely discharged the same as
if paid by the maker or acceptor.
The negotiability of a note ceases
after its payment by the party
rightfully pay it.
should
who

Lyford, 70 Me. 149;
Watkins, 89 Va. 801;
Cottrell
Merrill v. First Nat. Bank, 94
Cal. 59; Cook v. Lister, 32 L. J.
Bleen

v.

v.

C. P. 121; 13 C. B. (n. s.)
also
Canadian
Bank
See
Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358.

549.

V
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Where a joint maker, who is
really a surety, takes up the
note, he cannot sue the princi
pal debtor on the note but may
Sue him as for money paid to
his use. McClatchie v. Durham,
44 Mich.
435.
This is equally
true where an accommodation ac
ceptor pays the instrument. First
Nat. Bank v. Maxfield, 83 Me.
576.
A surety can waive the
statute of limitations and pay a
note that has been kept alive as

his joint maker and enforce
against
McClatchie
V.
him.
Durham, supra.
Where a person indorsing for
the accommodation of an accom
modation maker and a real mak
er, is compelled to pay the note,
he can sue the maker and the
accommodation maker jointly, the
rule as to contribution between
co-Sureties not applying in such a
case.
Hanish v. Kennedy, 106
Mich. 455.
See as to the rights of indors
ers and sureties: Myres v. Yaple,
60 Mich. 339; Nash v. Burchard,
to

it

Bliss V. Est. of
Mich. 181.
Where the acceptors of a bill
have paid the same, they cannot
Mich.
Plummer,
87

85;

103

from
the
the amount
on the ground that they
paid it under a mistake of fact
as to the value of their security
from the drawers; their remedy
is against the drawers.
First
Nat. Bank v. Burkham, 32 Mich.
recover
payee

328.
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Sec. 124. Renunciation by holder.—The holder may
expressly renounce his rights against any party to the
instrument before, at, or after its maturity. An abso

lute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against
the principal debtor, made at or after the maturity of
the instrument, discharges the instrument; but a renun
ciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course
without notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless
the instrument is delivered
liable thereon."
1—Where
an obligee delivers
up the obligation, which he holds
against another party, with the
intent and for the purpose of dis
charging the debt, where there
is no fraud or mistake alleged
or proved, such surrender oper
ates,
in law, as a release and
discharge of the liability thereon,
nor is any consideration required
to support such a transaction,
when it has been fully executed.
Larkin v. Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y.
333; Slade v. Mutrie,
156 Mass.
19, 30 N. E. 168. In the case last
cited the court Said that the de
livery of a promissory note by
the holder to the maker, with the

intention of transferring to him
the title to the note, is an as
signment of the note and a dis
charge of the obligation to pay it.
The corresponding provision of
the Bills of Exchange Act, Sec.

(1) was construed in Edwards
v. Walters, C. A. [1896] 2 Ch.
157.
The facts were that there
62

was an oral renunciation
of a
note, the note was delivered, not
to the maker, but to a devisee of

up to the person

primarily

the maker. The devisee had real
of the maker in her hands
and such real estate was liable
for the payment of the debt. The
devisee had for some time paid

estate

interest on the note.
Notwith
Standing these circumstances
it
was held that delivery to such
devisee Was not Sufficient under
sec. 62

of the Act (124) as

nunciation,

a

re

the acceptor
or maker did not include a lega
though the legal
tee or devisee,
personal representatives might be
because

so included.
The same section of
the Bills of Exchange Act was
also construed in In re George,
44 Ch. D. 627.
The facts were

these: the payee of a note about
to die wished to destroy the note
in suit, but it could not be found.
He

then

of the

note

declared

to the

maker

in the presence of two

other persons that he wished to
give the note to him. The nurse
of the payee was then sent for
and the payee told her he want
ed the note destroyed.
He made
the nurse promise that she would
see that the note was destroyed

NEGOTIABLE

that she would testify that
was his Wish that it should
He told her to
be destroyed.
write it down, which she did as
follows, “30th Aug., 1899.
It is
by Mr. George's dying Wish that
the checque (sic.) for £2,000 of
the money lent to Mrs. Francis
be destroyed as soon as found.
Mr. George is perfectly conscious
and in his sound mind.” (signed

and

it

nurse T.)
It was held that the
acts of the payee did not consti
tute a renunciation
as required
by the statute.
Chitty, J., said:
“Now it is plain that what must
be in Writing is an absolute and
unconditional
renunciation
of
rights.
It is not necessary to put
those words in; but that must be
the effect of the document. Then
the document is not to be a note
or memorandum of the renuncia
tion or of an intention to do it,
but it must be itself the record of
the renunciation.”
This case Was
followed in Leask v. Dew, 92 N. Y.
Supp. 891. The facts were these:
The note in Suit was found after
the death of the payee among his
papers enclosed in an envelope
together with a writing signed by
him

addressed

to

his

executors

“New York, Nov. 25,
1901.
To my executors. Gentle
men: The enclosed note I wish
to be cancelled in case of my
death, and if the law does not
allow it I wish you to notify my
heirs that it is my wish and or
Truly yours, Oliver Buck
ders.
ingham. Witness, Frank W. Wog
as follows:

The court referred to the
provisions
of the Bills of Ex
change Act and the provisions of
1am.”
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the Negotiable Instruments
Law
and said: “It is readily seen that
these two statutes in character
and import are alike, the only
difference is change in the form
of phraseology, but it affects
neither the sense nor the con
Struction.”
The court followed
the rule of construction adopted
in In re George and said:
“There is some obscurity in the
provisions of our statute.
In its
first sentence it provides for the
renunciation of the rights of the
holder against any party to the
instrument which may be made
before, at, or after its maturity;
in the second sentence, it pro
Vides for an absolute and uncon
ditional
renunciation
of
the
rights of the holder against the
principal debtor at, or after the
maturity of the instrument, and
discharges the instrument.
The
first relates to the party;
and

to the instrument.
It is
somewhat difficult
to
see how
there could be an absolute dis
charge of a party to an instru
ment without discharging the in
strument as an obligation, so far
as he is concerned. We do not
clearly perceive why this distinc

second,

tion

should have been

made.

It

however, to the
is immaterial,
rights of the parties to the pres
ent action.
The instrument of
renunciation
declaration

contains no express
of the testator
to

renounce his rights in the note
against the party, or of his right
to enforce it as a subsisting ob
ligation.
The expression is, “I
Wish

in

(the

case

note)

to

be

of my death.

cancelled
There is
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nothing

in

these words which
can be construed as expressing a
renunciation of any rights either
against the party or upon the
instrument.
Had it been deliv
ered to the defendant during the
lifetime of the testator, it would
not have precluded the latter at
any time upon maturity
from
enforcing
There is
the note.

INSTRUMENTS
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nothing indicating an intent upon
his part not to enforce it during
his lifetime.
There was no de
livery of it, to anybody, and while,
doubtless, it was sufficiently au
thenticated to accomplish a re
nunciation,
it had no operative
whatever,
effect
as it did not
fall within the statute or comply
with its terms.”

Cancellation unintentional; burden of proof.
—A cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mis
take, or without the authority of the holder, is inoper
ative; but where an instrument or any signature thereon
appears to have been cancelled the burden of proof lies
on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made
unintentionally, or under a mistake, or without authority."
Sec. 125.

1-Lyndonville
Fletcher,

Bank

v.

Vt.
Rossing,
68

Nat.

Bank
v.
Humboldt
95 Ia. 1; Wil81;

kinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C. 428;
Raper v. Birkbeck, 15 East 17;
Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B. & Ad. 757.

Sec. 126. Alteration of instrument; effect of.—Where
a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except
as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or
assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers."

But when an instrument has been materially altered and
is in the hands of a holder, in due course, not a party to

|

the alteration,

he may enforce payment thereof accord

ing to its original tenor.”

1-A

material

alteration

of an

instrument is one which changes
the legal effect of the instru
ment, is made with intent and
has become final, is made without
consent, is made by a party to

*

it or by one in lawful possession
or custody of it. Such an alter
ation releases all parties not as
senting.
Wait v. Pomeroy, 20
Mich. 425; Holmes v. Trumper,
22 Mich. 427; Aldrich v. Smith,
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Mich. 468; Bradley v. Mann,
1; Glover V. Green, 96 Ga.
126, 22 S. E. 664;
Hulburt v.
Hall, 39 Neb. 889, 58 N. W. 538;
Horn v. Newton City Bank, 32
Kan. 518; Hoffman V. Planters
Nat. Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E.
134 (a case under the statute).
appears
Where an instrument
to have been altered, the burden
is upon the party producing it to
show that it was in the shape in
37

id.

which he produced it at the
time he received it.
Willett V.
Shepard, 34 Mich. 106; Simpson
v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. St. 186. In
the latter case the court said:
“Without a presumption to sus
tain him, the maker would in
every case be defenseless.
It
may be said that the holder, with
such a presumption against him,
would also be defenseless.
But
it is his fault to take Such a
note. As bills and notes are in
tended for negotiation,
and as
payees do not receive them when
clogged
impediments
with
to
their circulation, there is a pre
sumption
that such an instru
ment starts fair and untarnished,
which stands until it is repelled;
and the holder ought, therefore,
to explain why he took it brand
suspicion,
ed
with marks
of
which would probably render it
unfit for his purposes. The very
fact that he receives it, is pre
sumptive evidence that it was un
altered at the time, and to say
the least, his folly or his knav
ery raised a suspicion which he
ought to remove.
The maker of
a note cannot be expected to ac
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count for what may have hap
pened after it left his hands,’
but a payee or indorsee who
takes it, condemned and discred
ited on the face of it, ought to be
prepared to show What it was
When he received it.”
See Baent
V. Kennicut, 57 Mich. 268.
An indorser's consent to an
alteration need not be in writing.
Parsons v. Dickinson,
23 Mich.
57; Stewart v. First Nat. Bank, 40
Mich. 348.
See also Johnson V.
Est., 66 Mich. 525.
Johnson's
Where an instrument has been
negligently executed by the mak
er, that is, where blanks are left
which may be filled in, without giv
ing the paper a suspicious appear
ance, the general rule is that the

maker will be liable on the instru
ment if any such alteration
is
made.
First State Bank V. Web
ster, 121 Mich. 149; Weidman v.
Symes, 120 Mich. 657; Noll v.
Smith, 64 Ind. 511.
But see Wait
V. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Green
field's Sav. Bank v. Stowell, 123
Mass. 203.
In England the rigid rules ap
plied to cases of alteration
by
SOme party
to the instrument
have also been applied to spolia
tion or alteration
made by a
stranger.
Master v. Miller, 4 T.

R.

320, 2 H. Bl. 140.

In

the United

States the more

liberal view that spoliation or al
teration by a stranger does not
Vitiate the instrument
has pre
vailed. White Sewing Machine Co.
v. Dakin, 86 Mich. 581; Walsh v.
Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 Pac. 115;
Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 45
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Wis. 373; United States
ing 2 Mason 478, Fed.

V.

Spald

Cas.

No.

16365.

This question was raised in
Jeffrey v. Rosenfield, 179 Mass.
506 (a case under the Statute).
The court left the question in
doubt,

saying:

“Quaere,

whether
of the Negotia
ble Instruments
Law relating to
alteration should be construed as
the English Bills of Exchange Act
probably would be that the effect
of a material alteration by whom
SOever made Would be to avoid
the paper as to all parties except
those consenting and Subsequent
indorsers
or Whether the rule
Sec. 124 (sec. 126)

laid down in Massachusetts (in
Drum v. Drum, 133 Mass. 566) and
generally followed in the United
States should be applied that a
material alteration of a note by
But
a stranger will not avoid it.
considering the state of the law
at the time
the

of the

passage
of
Law
Instruments
hesitate to say that

Negotiable

should
the effect of sec. 124 (Sec. 126)
is not only to avoid a note in
case of a material alteration but
to cancel the debt for Which it
was given and to deprive the
party to the benefit of any Se
curity he may have taken.”

We

2—This provision makes a ma
terial change in the law of Mich
igan and most of the states.
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in due
Heretofore
a holder
course could not recover on an in
strument which had been mater
ially altered, because the original
contract had been destroyed and
the altered contract was not the
Wait V.
contract of the maker.
Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Holmes
v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427; Brad
ley V. Mann 37 Mich. 1; Mers
man v. Werges 112 U. S. 141;
Greenfield SaV. Bank V. Stowell,
123

Mass. 196.

Scholfield v. Earl of Londens
borough [1896] A. C. 514 (a case
under the corresponding provision
of the Bills of Exchange Act).
In this case a bill for £500
by
Was, after acceptance, raised
the drawer to £3500, this being
made possible by the drawer's
leaving certain spaces which he
could later fill up and by the bill's
being stamped higher than for
It was held that the accep
42500.
tor was liable to the bona fide
holder only for the original amount
of the bill and he owed no duty
of precaution to the holder and was
chargeable with no negligence.

The following

cases have aris
Bryan v.
the
statute:
en
Harr, 21 App. D. C. 190; Mass.
Nat. Bank v. Snow (1905) 72,
N. E. 959; Muscovitz v. Duetsch,
Mut. Loan
92 N. Y. Supp. 721;
Div.
Ass’n V. Lasser, 81 App.
138, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1112.

under

Material alterations; what constitutes.—Any
alteration which changes:
First, The date;"
Sec. 127.
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Second, The sum payable, either for principal” or
terest;"
-

Third, The time

in

or place" of payment;
Fourth, The number or the relations of the parties;"
Fifth, The medium of currency in which payment is to
*

be made."

Or which adds a place of payment where no place of
is specified,” or any other change or addition,
which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect,”
is a material alteration.
payment

1-Johnson
66 Mich.
Wall. 80.

525;

Est.,
Johnson’s
Woods v. Steele, 6

V.

2—It is a material alteration
Whether the amount be increased
or lessened, whether it be benefi
cial to the maker or not. People
v. Brown, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 9;

Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52
Pac. 115; Aetna
Bank v. Win
chester, 43 Conn. 391; Hewins v.
Cargill, 67 Me. 554. In the case
last cited, the amount WaS re
duced from $500 to $400.

specified, an insertion of 7%, the
legal rate, is not a material al
teration.
First Nat. Bank V.
Carson, 60 Mich. 432. Nor is the
addition of the Word “annual” to
an interest clause of a note made
payable in less than two years
a material alteration, as it does
not change the liability but only
shows that interest is to be earn
ed at the stipulated rate by the
year and does not require the
interest to be paid at the end of
a year from the date of the note.

alteration
which will
affect the interest, making it pay
able at a greater or less rate,
making the instrument bear in
terest when it originally did not,
or changing the time when in
terest should begin to run, is a

Leonard's Adm'r
Mich. 182.

material

V.

239;

v.
V.
v.
v.

Va. 392.

3—Any

Trumper,

alteration.

Holmes

22 Mich. 427;
Swift
Barber, 28 Mich. 503; Bradley
Mann,
37
Mich. 1; Willett
Shephard, 34 Mich. 106; Baent

Kennicutt,

57 Mich. 268.
Where a note is made payable
with interest but the rate is not

V.

Phillips,

39

Boyce, 33 Mich.
Yeomans, 84 Ill.
403; Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 265;
Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St. 119.

4—Jourdan

302;

v.

Wyman

5—Ballard

Bank

v.

V.
v.

Ins. Co., 81 Ind.
Lockwood, 13 W.

6-It

is not a material altera
to add the name of another
maker. Gano v. Heath, 36 Mich.
tion

440; Union Banking Co. v. Mar
tin's Est., 113 Mich. 521; Merseman
V. Werges, 112 U. S. 139; Brown
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ell
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v. Winne,

cock

V.

To the
Rudisill,

29 N. Y. 400; Bab
Murray,
58 Minn.
385.
contrary:
Sullivan V.

63
Ia. 158.
The addition of a surety is not
a material alteration.
Miller V.
Finley, 26 Mich. 248. Obviously
the statute changes this rule. The
addition of either a maker or a
surety would be a material al
teration.
7–AS Where the Word “gold”
was added after the Word “dol
lars,”
Bogarth v. Breedlove, 39

Tex. 561; as where the words “in
specie” were added after the sum
payable, Darwin
V. Rippey,
63
Angle
318;
N. C.
V. N. W. etc.

Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330.
8–Burchfield v. Moore,

23

L.

J.

Q. B. 261; Pelton V. Lumber Co.,
Cal. 21, 45 Pac. 12; Carl
ton v. Reed, 61 Ia. 166; White
sides v. Northern Bank, 10 Bush.
501.
In the case last cited the
indorsee of a bill, which had
generally, caused
accepted
been
to be added to the word “accept
ed” the words “payable at the
First Nat. Bank of Franklin.” All

13

LAW.

not consenting to the al
teration were discharged.
9–The words “or bearer” were
added to a note payable to the
order of Henry Bromley.
It was
held not a material alteration.
Weaver v. Bromley, 65 Mich. 212.
parties

A

memorandum

fying the

on a note

quali

Held
a material alteration.
Wait v.
Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425.
In those states where a dis
tinction
is made
between at
tested
and
unattested
instru
ments, the addition of the name
Of a witness, after delivery,
is
a material
alteration.
Brackett
V. Mountford, 11 Me. 115; Homer

Wallis,

Same Was cut off.

Mass. 309. In Rowe
183 Mass. 488
(a
case under the statute) the put
ting on of a revenue stamp and
its cancellation, in the name of
the maker, was held not a ma
terial alteration.
For cases where a simple con
tract of the
common
law
is
fraudulently altered and made a
negotiable instrument, see note 1,
V.

V.

11

Bowman,

Sec. 57.

TITLE II.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
Form and Interpretation.

Article I.
Sec.

Sec.

Bill of exchange defined.
Bill not an assignment

128.

131.

130.

Sec. 128.

Bill of

Inland and foreign bills of
exchange.

of
funds in hands of drawer.
Bill addressed to more than
One drawee.

129.

132.
133.

When bill may be treated
as promissory note.
Referee in case of need.

exchange defined.—A

bill of exchange

on

to

a

is

bearer."

v.

to

J.
J.

1

V.

to

Jar

a

to

it

&

“No particular form of words
necessary
constitute
bill
Hasey.
of exchange.”
White
Pigeon Beet Sugar Co.,
Doug.
a

1

1

v.

I.

is

And so, “Please let the
bearer have, etc.” Biesenthall
Williams,
Duv. (Ky.) 329. “Mr.
please
pay
A. M. W.
$189
and charge the same
me.”
Wilson, 46 Conn. 90. But
vis
on the other hand, “Mr. Little,
please
let the bearer have £7,
129.

v.

in

193.

This Section
referred to in
Rogers,
Amsinck
93
N. Y.
Supp. 87.
The instrument
in
Suit was drawn in New York On

187

is

be

V.

can

Thus, “Mr.
ferred
sufficient.
oblige
Nelson
will much
Mr.
Ruff, or or
Webb by paying
der,
on
his account, twenty
guineas.”
Webb,
Esp.
Ruff

to

from which

my account, and
and place
you will much oblige your hum
good
ble servant,” was held not
Slackford, M.
bill. Little
M.
171, on the ground
that there
was no order to pay but that the
words simply
meant “You will
oblige me by doing it.”

V.

bill is not
manda

be

is

it

1—The form of the
provided
material
tory. Any expression
an order or direction

to

order

or

money

to

a

it

to

it,

is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one
requir
person to another, signed by the person giving
ing the person
pay
whom
addressed
demand
or at fixed or determinable future time sum certain in

188
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firm in Vienna and was in
form: “On demand of this orig
unpaid)
inal check (duplicate
pay to the order, etc.” The in
Strument was held a bill of ex
a

change and not a check.
The section clearly embraces

Sec. 129.

Bill

INSTRUMENTS

LAW.

Within its terms, a check.
Mc
Lean V. Clydesdale Banking Co.,
9 L. R. App. Cas. 95.
(A case
provi
under the corresponding
sion of the Bills of Exchange

Act.)

not an assignment of funds in hands of
of itself does not operate as an assign

drawee.—A bill
ment of the funds in the hands of the drawee available

for the payment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on
the bill unless and until he accepts the same."
1-A

draft is not an assign
in the hands of

ment of funds

the drawee. Grammel V. Carmer,
55 Mich. 201;
Edson v. Angell,
Upham v. Clute,
58 Mich. 336;
105 Mich. 350;
Stone v. Dowling,
119 Mich. 476.
But Where the
draft was drawn for the exact
Sum claimed to be due from the
drawee to the drawer on account
of a bill of merchandise, the
statement of the account being
attached to the draft with the
evident purpose of being sent
forward with it, it was held an
assignment.
Moore V. Davis, 57

distinguishing Gram
Mich. 251;
mel v. Carmer, supra.
The authorities are in conflict
On the general proposition wheth
er the draft operates as an as
signment.
As to the rule when
the drawing
is for the whole
amount due, see Mandeville
V.
Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Corser v.
Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. 424, Fed. Cas.
No. 3255; Wheatley v. Strobe, 12
Cal. 92; Bank v. Bogy, 44 Mo. 13;
First Nat. Bank V. Dubuque, S.

R. Co., 52 Iowa 378; Cutts V. Per
kins, 12 Mass. 207. As to rule when
the drawing is for part of the
amount due: Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N.
Y. 457; Throop, etc. Co. v. Smith,
110 N. Y. 90;
First Nat. Bank v.
Coates, 8 Fed. 540;
Harris v.
Clark, 3 N. Y. 93; Cowper
thwaite v. Sheffield, 1 Sandf. (N.
Y.) 416; Christmas V. Russell,
Lowery v. Steward,
14 Wall. 69;
241;
25 N. Y.
Gibson v. Cooke,

20 Pick.
15.
See also Hopkin
son V. Forster, L. R. 19 Eq. 74;
Schroeder V. Central Bank, 34 L.
T. (n. S.) 735.
When for a Valuable considera

tion from the payee, the order is
drawn upon a third party, and
made payable out of a particular
fund then due or to become due
from him to the drawer, the de
livery of the order to the payee
operates as an assignment
pro
tanto
of the fund,
and
the
drawee is bound after notice of
apply
such assignment
to
the
fund as
ment of

it

accrues
the Order

to

and

the pay
to no

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
other purpose, and the payee may
applica
by action compel Such
tion. Brill V. Tuttle, supra.
An intention to make an as
signment of the funds
in the
hands of the drawee may be in

ferred from the circumstanceS at
tending the delivery of the draft
and the conduct of the parties.
Throop Grain Cleaner Co. v. Smith,
supra. Crawford's Ann. Neg. Insts.
Law, 115-16; Fulton v. Gesterding

(Fla.

1904)

36 So. 56

Sec. 130.

Bill

(a
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the statute). In this case it was
held that a draft for an amount
equal to the precise amount of
deposit in the drawee's hands did
not operate as an assignment.

To

same

effect see:

Nelson

V.

Nelson Bennett Co., 31 Wash. 116,
71 Pac. 749;
Wadhams v. Port
land etc. Ry. Co. (Wash. 1905),
79 Pac. 597 (cases under this sec
tion). As to check operating as
an assignment see Section 191.

case under

addressed to more than one drawee.—A

or more drawees, jointly,
whether they are partners or not, but not to two or more
drawees in the alternative or in succession."

bill may

be addressed to two

1—The words, “or in succes
Sion,” are not included in the
Wisconsin Act.

A bill was directed to A, or in

It was held
his absence to B.
good. Anon. 12 Mod. 447. A bill

Was drawn upon partners and ac
cepted after notice of dissolution

Held, that only
had been given.
the accepting partner was bound.
Tombeckbee Bank V. Dumell, 5
Mason 56, Fed. CaS. No. 14081.

Inland and foreign bills of exchange.—An
inland bill of exchange is a bill which
on its face
or

as

it

for

it

in

it

6

v.

a

of

v.

30

Ward,
Yale
Tex. 18.
determining
The test

eign bill
appears on
whether
its face that
is drawn in One
state and payable
another.
Some claim has been made that
the residence of the drawer and
the drawee
the test.
Grim
Bender,
shaw
Mass. 157, sup
ports that view.
The bill in

is

v.

v.

S.

V.

1—The statute affirms the well
Settled rule of the law merchant.
Armstrong
American Exchange
433; Joseph
Nat. Bank, 133 U.
Salomon, 19 Fla. 623; Phoenix
Hussey, 12 Pick. 483;
Bank

is

pears on the face
an inland bill."

drawn and payable within this State.
foreign bill. Unless the contrary ap
the bill, the holder may treat

of

Any other bill

a

be, both

is

purports

to

is,

Sec. 131.
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volved in this case was drawn by
an English merchant living in
Manchester, upon an American
firm having
their
domicile
in
Boston, payable in London. The

bill

WaS accepted
in Manchester
by one of the drawees.
The
question was, whether the bill
was foreign or inland.
The court
Said:
“It appears that the bill

was

drawn

on

a

house,

Boston

of which was then at Man
chester, in England, but that his
domicile Was in Boston;
and
that the acceptance by him in the
One

name of the firm Was made at
Manchester by which
the firm
undertook to pay the bill in Lon
don.
From this statement it is
manifest that the remedy con
templated by the parties, in the
event of the bill being dishon
ored, must be sought in this state,
where the acceptors lived. From
this View of the case the instru
ment must be considered as a
foreign bill, having the same ef
fect as

if

the payee

had

LAW.

Boston and it had been
payable in London by t
house here, in which case t
money must be remitted to Lo
dOn to meet the bill returned
the drawer after acceptance.”
is questionable whether, und
the circumstances, this case ml
be regarded as a dissent frc
the general rule above stated.
A check may be a check thou
drawn in one country and pa
Heywood
able in another.
Pickering,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 42
Roberts V. Corbin, 26 Iowa 31
to

cepted,

See

Sec.

187.

States of the American Uni
are foreign to each other. Bal
of United States v. Daniel,
Peters 32;
Commercial Bank
Varnum, 49 N. Y. 269.
The only
difference
betwe
foreign and inland bills, is th
the former must be protests
While the latter
need not l
See sec. 154, Buller v. Crips,
Mod. 29.

sent it

When bill may be treated as a promissor
note.—Where, in a bill, drawer and drawee are the sam
person, or where the drawee is a fictitious person, or
person not having capacity to contract, the holder ma
Sec. 132.

treat the instrument, at his option, either as a bill of
change or a promissory note."
1—See Bills
sec.

5

(2);

of Exchange
see

sec.

Act,

19.

Hasey v. White Pigeon Beet
Sugar Co., 1 Doug. (Mich.) 193;
Funk v. Babbitt, 156 Ill. 408, 41
N. E. 166; Chicago etc. R. Co. v.

West, 37 Ind. 211;
terick, 100 Mass.
Bank V. Evans, 36
ler V. Thomson, 3
Willans v. Ayers,
CaS.

133.

e.

Com. v. B.
12; Plantel
Tex. 592; M
M. & G. 57
L. R. 3 Ap
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“If

both drawer and drawee
persons
fictitious
the bill
might perhaps be treated as a

are

Sec. 133.
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note made by the first indorser.”
Chalmers' Bills of Exchange Act,
5th ed., 18.

Referee in case of need.—The

drawer of a

bill and any endorser may insert thereon the name of a
person to whom the holder may resort in case of need;
that is to say, in case the bill is dishonored by non-accept
ance or non-payment.

Such person is called the referee
in case of need. It is in the option of the holder to resort
not, as he may see fit."
to the
referee in case of need or
1—This section is
identical
with Section 15 of the Bills of
Exchange Act, q. V.
The usual
form of Such a bill is: “In case
of need apply to Messrs. C and
Chitty on Bills, 165.
D, at E.”
The reference may relate to non
payment aS Well as to non-accept

The concluding sentence
of the section settled the mooted
ance.

point,

presentment
whether
to
the “referee in case of need” is
Chal
obligatory
optional.
or
mers' Bills of Exchange Act, 5th
ed., 38.
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Article II.
Sec.

Acceptancé.
Sec.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Acceptance;

how made, etc.
Holder
entitled
to accept
ance on face of bill.
Acceptance by separate in
Strument.
accept; when
Promise to
equivalent to acceptance.
Time allowed drawee to ac
cept.

LAW.

INSTRUMENTS

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Liability of drawee retain
ing or destroying bill.
Acceptance
of incomplete
bill.
Kinds of acceptance.
acceptance;
General
what
constitutes.
Qualified acceptance.
Rights of parties as to
ified acceptance.

qual

how made, etc.—The accept
signification
by the drawee of his
ance" of a bill is the
assent to the order of the drawer.” The acceptance must
be in writing and signed by the drawee.” It must not
express that the drawee will perform his promise by any
other means than the payment of money."
Sec. 134.

Acceptance;

1—See Section 2.
2—Acceptance is usually maní
fested by writing or stamping
the word “accepted” across the
face of the paper, and by the
signature
drawee’s adding
his
thereto.
But according to the

law merchant no particular form
is required. Thus, the drawee's
signature
alone has been held
Spear v. Pratt, 2 Hill
sufficient.
“Accepted”
upon
582.
written
the paper without the signature
of the drawee has been held Suf
Clearly this would not
ficient.
be an acceptance under the Stat
ute.
The words, “seen”, “hon
ored”, “presented”, and “acted”
have severally been held suffi
cient to constitute

an acceptance.

Peterson
197.

In

V.

this

Hubbard,

28

Mich.

it was held
writing of the

case

that the mere
drawee's name across the face
was sufficient to constitute
an
acceptance,
and the words “paid
on this order $40” written above
the signature did not qualify the
acceptance or limit it to that
amount.
But see Cook V. Bald
win, 120 Mass. 317.
The language of the bill and
the acceptance,
are but parts of
an entire contract in Writing, all
the terms of which are expressed

in writing with just as much
certainty as if the acceptor was
the maker of a note for the
Meyer v. Beardsley, 30
amount.
Acceptance is re
N. J. L. 236.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
garded

new contract.
Su
Ripley, 138 U. S.
drawee as Such is un

as a

perior City

v.

The
der no liability on the instru
ment to anyOne.
3—This affirms the rule in
Michigan.
C. L. '97, sec. 4873;
93.

Elliott

v.

Miller,

Upham

v.

Clute,

Mich. 131;
Mich. 350.
According to the law merchant
an acceptance could be oral or
written, and if written could be
on the bill itself or on a Sep
arate paper. Acceptance by tele
gram
has been held sufficient.
North Atchinson
Bank V. Gar
8

105

193

retson,

51 Fed. 168.
Cases under
the statute are:
Izzo V. Lud
ington, 79 App. Div. 272, 79 N.
Y. Supp. 744;
Baltimore
& O.

R. Co.

First

Nat. Bank (Va.
S. E. 837; Nelson v.
Nelson Bennett Co.,
31
Wash.
116, 71 Pac. 749;
Wadhams v.
Portland etc. Ry. Co. (Wash.)
79 Pac. 597.
1904),

v.

47

An instructive case on the gen
eral proposition of acceptance is
Steele V. M'Kinlay, 5 App. Cas.
754, 29 W. R. 17.
4–Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B.
891.

Holder entitled to acceptance on face of bill.
—The holder of a bill presenting the same for acceptance
may require that the acceptance be written on the bill,
and if such request is refused, may treat the bill as dis
Sec. 135.

honored."
1—The acceptance here spoken
of is what has been known as
“proper”
acceptance,
such
ac

ceptance
titled to

as the holder
demand.

is

en

Sec. 136. Acceptance by separate instrument.—Where
an acceptance is written on a paper other than the bill
itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in favor of a
person to whom it is shown and who, on the faith thereof,
receives the bill for value."
1—Thus, one draws a bill upon
another and informs him of the
fact of drawing.
The drawee
makes assurance by letter that
the bill will
meet
with due
honor from him. This is an ac
ceptance of the bill
by the
drawee, and binds such acceptor
13

to any

holder

who

took

on the

faith of such acceptance. Clarke
v. Cock, 4 East 57.
In this case
Lord Ellenborough said: “It may
be for the convenience of mer
cantile affairs that a bill may be
by a collateral writing
accepted
without the bill itself coming to

THE NEGOTIABLE
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the actual touch of the acceptOr,
which would
SOmetimes
Create
great delay.”
In Bank V. Garretson, 51 Fed.

INSTRUMENTS
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168, one had given assurance that
if a certain draft were drawn he

would accept the same. See Fair
child v. Feltman, 32 Hun, 398.

Sec. 137. Promise to accept; when equivalent to ac
ceptance.—An unconditional promise in writing to accept
a bill before it is drawn is deemed an actual acceptance

in favor of every person who, upon the faith thereof, re
ceives the bill for value."
1—An

absolute

unconditional

authority

to
make
drafts
is
equivalent to an acceptance of
the draft drawn in pursuance of
such authority.
Bissell V. Lewis,
4 Mich. 450;
Ruiz v. Renauld,

Y.

256; Merchants'
Nat.
Griswold, 72 N. Y. 472.
The promise to accept must be
Germania
Nat.
unconditional.
Bank V. Taaks, 101 N. Y. 442.
The unconditional
character of
the promise is not impaired by
restrictions
as to time, amount
purposes.
or
Bank of Michigan
Ely,
Thus, au
v.
17 Wend. 508.
100

N.

Bank

V.

thority to draw “from time to
time as may be necessary for the
purchase of lumber”
does
not
constitute a condition, but Only
an instruction to the agent. Mer
chants’ Bank V. Griswold, supra.
When the right to draw
is
upon the per
made conditional
formance of Some act Or the ex
istence of certain facts, such act
must have been performed
or
such facts must exist.
Bank of
Montreal V. Recknagel, 109 N. Y.
482;
Bank of Atchinson
Co. v.

Bohart Commission

Co., 84 Mo.
App. 421.
The promise may be made be
fore the bill is drawn.
Putnam
Bank V. Snow, 172 Mass. 569.
Or it may be made afterwards.
Central
Bank V. Richards,
109
Mass. 413.
An oral promise was sufficient
at common law.
Dull V. Brick
er, 76 Pa. St. 255;
Scudder v.
Union Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 406;
Jarvis v. Wilson, 46 Conn. 91.
The American, rule on the sub
ject is declared in the leading
Payson, 2
case of Coolidge
V.
Wheat. 66, to be:
“that a let
ter Written a reasonable time be
fore or after the date of the bill
of exchange, describing
it in
terms not to be mistaken, and
promising
to accept it is,
if
shown to the person who after
Wards takes the bill on the credit
of the letter, a virtual accept
ance binding
the person
who
promise.
makes the
The bill is
considered accepted only in case
the promise is shown to the per
Son Who afterwards takes the bill
On the credit of Such promise.

—

—

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

195

Time allowed drawee to accept.—The drawee
twenty-four
is allowed
hours after presentment in which
to decide whether or not he will accept the bill; but the
acceptance, if given, dates as of the day of presentation."
Sec. 138.

1-This is the rule of the law
merchant. Case V. Burt, 15 Mich.
Connelly v. McKean, 64 Pa.
82;

St.

113;

Overman V. Hoboken
31 N. J. L. 563; Dan
iel on Neg. Inst., Sec. 492.

City Bank,

Liability of drawee retaining or destroying
bill.—Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for
acceptance destroys the same, or refuses within twenty
Sec. 139.

four hours after such delivery, or within such other period
as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or
non-accepted to the holder, he
accepted the same."
1-Acceptance
cumstances Stated

under

the

cir

in this Section

has been termed acceptance by
conduct.
The mere retention of
the bill has been construed as
not amounting to an acceptance.
Mason V. Barth, 2 B. & Ald. 26;
Col. Nat. Bank V. Boetcher, 5
Col.

185;

Overman v. Hoboken
City Bank, 31 N. J. L. 563.
This Section of the Statute WaS
construed in Westburg
v. Chi
L. & C. Co., 117 Wis. 589,
wherein it was held that Where
conduct
in retaining
the
bill
which had been presented for ac
ceptance is substantially
tortious
and amounts to a conversion of
the bill, this is a phase of con
duct which this section of the
cago,

will be

deemed

to have

Statute has undertaken to define
and limit as refusal (not mere
neglect) to return the bill. The
court added:
“In such a case
a party must not only have re
ceived the bill but
ingly have received

must know
it from the

payee,
or his authorized agent,
and for acceptance.”
See State v. Weiss, 91 N. Y.
Supp. 276 (a case under the stat
ute). The consensus of authority
is that the duty rests on the hold

er to demand either acceptance or
return of the bill and that mere

part of the
inaction
on
the
drawee has no effect.
The Wisconsin statute adds the
Words “mere retention of the bill
is not acceptance.”

Sec. 140. Acceptance of incomplete bill.—A bill may
be accepted before it has been signed by the drawer, or
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is it,

while otherwise incomplete or when it is overdue,” or
after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to
accept,” or by non-payment."
But when a bill payable
after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance and the

2—Williams

14

V.

is

V.

496.

Whenever
ance

will

not

qualified.

possible

be construed

The

an

accept

as general,

qualification

is

a

A

of

the

a

or condition must be clear and
qualified
distinct to make Out
Clark, 45
acceptance.
Corbett
Wis. 403; Meyer
Co.
De
Croix (1891), App. Cas. 520 (a
v.

A

is

Nat.
100 U.
714.
An accept
gen
pay when due
Sylvester
Staples, 44 Me.
S.

Cox

quali

V.

is

to

to

bill.

to

ance
eral.

in

of

the order
the drawer.
express terms varies the effect

1—An acceptance
an engage
pay the bill according
ment
to the tenor of the acceptance.
general acceptance
an engage
pay according to the
ment
the

general acceptance assents

&

in

A

qualified.

without qualification
fied acceptance
bill as drawn."

A

of acceptance.—An acceptance
to

or

either general

to

v.

Kinds

is

V.
V.

5—The liability of the acceptor

Sec. 141.

C. to

v.

Rice, 98
Shaw, 16

under the corresponding pro
vision of the Bills of Exchange
Act).
In this case the facts
were: Across the face of the bill
were stamped in printed letters
the Words, “accepted, payable at
Alliance Bank, London, for H.
Meyer
Co., limited.”
Then fol
case

&

Spaulding
Pa. St. 411.
4—Exchange Bank
Mass. 288;
Grant
Mass. 344.
494;

of

the maker's signing an incom
plete note.
bill
deemed
prima facie
have been accept
ed before maturity and within
reasonable time after its issue
unless the terms of the bill make
appear.
the contrary
Roberts
Bethell, 12
B. 778.
to

3

v.

3

Leavitt

Bramble,
Ind.
Putnam,
N. Y.
Andrews, 48

v.

3—Stockwell

tenor
Bank,

primary and of the same na
ture as that of maker, therefore
the same reasons apply to his
accepting an incomplete bill as

is

N.

L. 339.

428;

to

of

v.

Winan,

v.

U. S.) 107;
Md. 513.

J.

Neal, 22 HOW. (63
Hopps
Savage, 69

V.

1–Bank

of

as

of

drawee subsequently accepts
the holder,
the absence
any different agreement,
entitled
have the bill
accepted
the date
the first presentment.”

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
lowed the signatures of two di
rectors
of defendant COmpany,
countersign
by the Secre
and a
tary.
Above the word “accepted”
defendants Wrote the Words “in
favor of Mr. L. Delobbel Flipo

only,” and

between
these words
and the word “accepted” they
Wrote “No. 28.”
The Word “or
der” in the bill had been Strick
en out, but when or by whom it
did not appear. It was held that
the words Written above the ac
ceptance did not form any part

197

of it and could not be construed
as qualifying the acceptance un
der the act. The court Said in

substance:
If a person Writes
across a bill that which unquali
fied would, in the ordinary course,
import a clear acceptance of the

bill, and intends to qualify its
operation, he must do so by plain
language,
and intelligible
and
make that qualification sufficient
ly a part of the acceptance itself
to be intelligible in the Ordi
nary course of business.

Sec. 142. General acceptance; what constitutes.—An
acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general ac
ceptance unless it expressly states that the bill is to be

paid there only and not elsewhere."
1—This rule was established in
England by Sergeant
Onslow's
Act, 1 & 2 Geo. IV.
Prior to
that time there had been conflict
as to whether a bill accepted pay
place was
able at a particular
qualifiedly
accepted,
which con
flict was settled in Rowe v. Young,
5 Ad. & El. 86, in which case it
was held that Such an accept
ance was qualified, thus making
it necessary in an action against
the acceptor to aver and prove
presentment at such place.
In
this case the acceptance Was in
the following language: “Accept
ed, payable at Sir John Perring
& Co., bankers, LOndon.”
This

decision led to the passage
of
the statute above mentioned which
provided that an acceptance pay
able at a particular place should
be deemed a general acceptance

unless expressed
to be payable
there “only, and not otherwise or
elsewhere.” This Statute did not
apply to promissory notes.
Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 519.
By weight of authority the rule
in the United States is in ac
cord with the provisions of this
section.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
Wallace V. McCon
136;
U. S. (13 Pet.)
Bank,
Cox v. Nat.
100 U. S. (10
Otto) 704.
When a bill is addressed to a
drawee in a city generally he
may designate a particular place
of payment in the same city
without making the acceptance
qualified.
But he cannot desig
nate a place of payment in an
other town or city without mak
ing the acceptance qualified. My
ers V. Standart, 11 Ohio St. 29;
ed.,

nell,

Sec. 520.
38
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Troy City Bank v. Lauman,
Niagara
N. Y. 477;
Bank

Sec.

143.
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Fairman

V.

403.

etc.

Qualified acceptance.—An

LAW.
Mfg.

Co.,

31

Barb.

acceptance

is

qualified, which is:

First, Conditional; that is to say, which makes pay
ment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfillment of a
condition therein stated;"
Second, Partial; that is to say, an acceptance to pay
part of the amount for which the bill is drawn;”
Third, Local; that is to say, an acceptance to pay only
at a particular place;”
Fourth, Qualified as to time;"

Fifth, The acceptance of

some

one or more

of the

drawees, but not of all."
1—Thus, to pay “when goods
consigned to me are sold.” Smith
V. Abbot, 2 Stra. 1152.
To pay
cargo
equal
“when a
of
value is
consigned
to
me.”
Mason
v.
Hunt, 1 Doug. 297.
“Payable
when house is ready for occu
pancy.”
Cook v. Wolfendale, 105
Mass. 401.
To pay “when lum
ber is run to market.”
Lamon
V. French, 25 Wis. 37.
A conditional acceptance be
per
upon the
comes absolute
formance or happening of the
condition.
Stevens
gin Water Power
498.
The acceptor
on his acceptance
formance

v.

Androscog

Co.,

62
Me.
is not bound
until the per
of the condition. New

V. Clark, 3 Cush. 376; Greene
Duncan,
V.
37 S. C. 239.
Where an order is drawn upon
a fund to be paid upon the hap
pening of a condition, which or

hall

der is accepted, the acceptor can
not either by his own act or by
acting
in collusion
with the
drawer of the order defeat the
condition and then Set up such
defeasance as a defense

to an

ac

tion upon the acceptance.
Her
ter v. The Goss & Edsall Co., 57
N. J. L. 42, 30 Atl. 252.
2—Thus “I do accept this bill
to be paid half in money and
half in bills.” Petit V. Benson,
2 Comb 452.

A bill for £127 ac

Wegerslofe
£100.
Keene, 1 Stra. 214.
3—See section 142.

cepted

for

V.

4—A bill drawn at sight was
presented to
the drawee who
wrote he would pay, but could
It was held
not say when.
party
upon whom a
that where a
bill is drawn at sight offers of
promises to pay at a future day,
that amounts to an acceptance if
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to by the holder. Hatch
Stalworth, 25 Miss. 376.
A bill drawn November 28th,
forty-two
1836, payable
months
after date was accepted thus, “ac
cepted on condition of its being
renewed until November 28, 1844.”
Russell V. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891,
68 E. C. L. 891.
A bill accepted according to a
Contract is regulated by the terms
of the contract referred to in the
acceptance, although the bill WaS
in its body made payable on a
Kellog v. Lawrence,
certain day.
Laylor's Supp. to Hill and Denio
acceded

er

V.

332.

5—Thus,

a bill was drawn

199

a firm and accepted by one mem
He
ber thereof after dissolution.
only was bound by the accept
ance.
Tombeckbee Bank V. Du
mell, 5 Mason 56, Fed. Cas. No.
14081.

drawn upon a com
an official body may
by the several per
be accepted
sons composing
the committee.
In Such a case although a bill
may be treated as dishonored if
not accepted by all the members
of the committee, if accepted by
a part, it will be a good accept

An order

mittee

as

ance as to them.
Smith
ton, 133 Mass. 369.

V.

Mil

on

Rights of parties as to qualified acceptance.
—The holder may refuse to take a qualified acceptance,
Sec. 144.

and
may

if

he does not obtain an unqualified acceptance, he
treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance."

Where a qualified acceptance is taken, the drawer and
endorsers are discharged from liability on the bill unless
they have expressly or impliedly authorized the holder
to take a qualified acceptance, or subsequently assent
thereto.” When the drawer or an endorser receives notice
of a qualified acceptance, he must within a reasonable
time express his dissent to the holder, or he will be
deemed to have assented thereto.
1–The

holder is not bound to
qualified
acceptance.
v. Garcias, 1 Camp. 425.
This was an action on a bill
“payable
in
drawn on Lisbon,
receive
Boehm

a

effective and not in ‘vals reals.’”
The drawees offered to accept it
payable in vals denaros, another

of currency, which was re
proposed
to
fused.
Defendant
show that vals demaros was Suffl
cient to answer what was meant
by effective.
Lord Ellenborough
considering
said:
“Without
whether a payment in demar08.
might not have satisfied the term
sort
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“effective,

in

demaros

an

acceptance to pay
not a sufficient

Was

acceptance of a bill drawn pay
able in effective.”
Wintermute
v. Post, 24 N. J.
L. 420; Shackelford V. Hooker,
54 Miss. 716;
Gibson v. Smith,
75 Ga. 33.
An agent for collection is not
authorized
to receive anything
Short of an explicit and general

Walker v. New
State Bank, 9 N. Y. 582.

acceptance.

York

INSTRUMENTS
Sebag
Gibson

V.

LAW.
Abitbol, 4 M. & S. 462;
supra.

v. Smith,

2-At common law according
to Some authorities
the drawer
and
indorsers
were
not
dis
charged on a bill accepted in part,
if the holder protested as to the
residue.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
sec. 516.
The statute makes
no such exception and to that
extent changes the existing law.

ed.,

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

Article

III.

Presentment

Sec.
145.
146.

drawer

and

149.

Acceptance.

Presentment; how made.
On what days presentment
may be made.
Presentment; where time is
insufficient.

Sec. 145.

150.

presentment
When
excused.

151.

When dishonored
acceptance.

152.

Duty

indor

Ser.
148.

for

Sec.

When presentment for ac
ceptance must be made.
When failure to present re
leases

147.

201

153.

is
by

ex
non

of holder where bill
not accepted.
Rights of holder where bill
not accepted.

When presentment for acceptance must be

for acceptance must be made:
First, Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any
other case where presentment for acceptance is necessary
in order to fix the maturity of the instrument; or
Second, Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall
be presented for acceptance; or
Third, Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than
at the residence or place of business of the drawee. In
no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in
order to render any party to the bill liable.
made.—Presentment

1—This is an affirmation of the
common-law
rule.
Mullick
V.
Radakissen,
9
Moore P. C. 46.
The words, “or in any other case
where,” are additional to the cor
responding provision of the Bills
of Exchange Act, Sec. 39 (1), and
seem superfluous, because in no
other case than in bills payable
after sight (grace being abol
lished) could the time when the

bill

was to be paid depend upon
acceptance.
Presentment for ac
ceptance of a bill payable a spec

ified time after date is not nec
essary to charge the drawers and
indorsers.
Allen V. Suydam, 20
321;
Wend.
Plato v. Reynolds,
27

N. Y.

586.

Although
presentment for ac
ceptance is optional the holder
may make presentment for two
purposes, 1st, to secure the

ability

of

li

the

drawee
as
a
party to the bill, in other words
to turn the drawee into an ac
ceptor;
2d,
in case of non
acceptance to obtain an imme

202
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diate right of recourse against
Thus, a bill
antecedent parties.
August
1st,
1905, pay
is dated
able three months after date;
August 2nd, 1905, the holder pre
sents the bill to the drawee for
acceptance; acceptance is refused;
the drawer is liable on the bill
at once, proper steps having been

taken to fix his liability.
The
holder need not wait until the
maturity of the bill as therein
Stated
before Suing.
Mason V.
Franklin, 3 Johns. 202; Weldon
144; See Sec
V. Buck, 4 Johns.
tion 153, and notes.
But if presentment be made
in cases not required and ac
ceptance refused notice must be

INSTRUMENTS
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given in the same manner as in
cases
where acceptance is re
quired. Sweet V. Swift, 65 Mich.
90;
United States v. Barker, 4
Wash.

ams,

this

C. C.

464,

Fed. Cas. No.
held that if
presentment
for acceptance be
made in a case not required the
Same is nugatory.
House V. Ad
14520.

It

has

been

48 Pa. 261. But the
case is peculiar.

rule of

It is the duty of banks and other
agents to whom paper is forwarded
for collection to present the same
for acceptance as soon as possible
to the end that the drawee may
become bound on the instrument.
Allen V. Suydam, supra.

When failure to present releases drawer and
indorser.—Except as herein otherwise provided, the hold
Sec. 146.

er of a bill which is required by the next preceding sec
tion to be presented for acceptance must either present
it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable time."
If he fail to do so, the drawer and all endorsers are dis
charged.”
1—Phoenix
Ins. Co. v. Allen,
Mich. 501.
In this case the
court said, “the court cannot say
as a matter of law that any de
lay is reasonable beyond
that
which may be fairly required in
the ordinary course of business
without special inconvenience to
the holder; or by the special cir
cumstances
of the particular
11

case.”
Co.
V.
InSurance
Phoenix
Gray, 13 Mich. 191; Bridgeport
Bank V. Dyer, 19 Conn. 136;

Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason 336,
Fed. Cas. No. 17096; Walsh V.
Dart, 23 Wis. 334.
In Nutting V. Burked, 48 Mich.

it was held that a bank
draft issued for negotiable pur
241,

was not required to be
forwarded at once for acceptance
and payment; and delay for a
longer time than might be held
reasonable in the case of mere
private
drafts
would
not dis
charge the indorsers.
Where a
person presenting a bill agreed
poses

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
to

present it again for accept
no protest could be made

ance,

Without
Burt.

15

a new

demand.

Case V.

Mich. 82.
so although

all par

2-This is

203

ties are solvent and no damage is
caused by the delay. Allan v.
dred, 50 Wis. 132; Thornburg v.
Emmons, 23 W. Va. 333.

El

Presentment;

how made.–Presentment for
acceptance must be made by or on behalf of the holder
at a reasonable hour, on a business day, and before the
Sec. 147.

bill is overdue, to the drawee or some person authorized
to accept or refuse acceptance on his behalf,

and

First, Where a bill is addressed to two or more drawees
who are not partners, presentment must be made to them
all, unless one has authority to accept or refuse accept
ance for all, in which case presentment may be made to
him only;”
Second, Where the drawee is dead, presentment may
be made to his personal representative;”

Third, Where the drawee has

been adjudged

a

bank

rupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, presentment may be made to him or
to his trustee or assignee.
1—“Comparing presentment for
acceptance with presentment for
payment, it is clear that the two
cases are governed by somewhat

Speak
different
considerations.
ing, generally,
presentment
for
aceptance
personal,
should
be
while presentment for payment
should be local. A bill should be
presented for payment where the
money is. Anyone can then hand

over the money. A bill should be
presented for acceptance to the
drawee himself, for he has to

the acceptance; but the
where it is presented to
him is comparatively immaterial,
for all he has to do is to take
Again
(except in the
the bill.
case of demand drafts), the day
for payment is a fixed day; but

write

place

the drawee cannot tell on what
day it may suit the holder to
present the bill for acceptance.
These considerations
are mater
ial as bearing on the question
whether the holder has used rea
sonable diligence to effect pre
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Sentation.”
Chalmers'
Exchange Act, 5th Ed.

Bills

of

137-8.

The holder of the bill mak
ing presentment for acceptance
should have it in his possession,
make an actual exhibit of it to
the drawee and request him to
accept it.
Fall River Union
Bank V. Willard, 5 Met. (Mass.)
216.
It is not neceSSary that the
notary
in making presentment
for acceptance should actually
produce the bill; it is sufficient
if he has it with him ready to
produce in case the drawee calls
for it.
First Nat. Bank V.
Hatch, 78 Mo. 13. In making de

for

acceptance,
the
possible,
if
to see
the drawee personally
or some
agent appointed by him to ac
cept; and diligent inquiry must
be made for him, if he shall not
be found at his house Or place
of business.
Wiseman
V. Chi
appella,
64 U.
S. (23 How.)
368; Sharpe v. Drew, 9 Ind. 281.
Presentment for acceptance of
a foreign bill should be made
by a notary.
First Nat. Bank V.
Hatch, Supra.

mand
party

an

ought,

Presentment to a clerk in the
drawee's counting room is suffi
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Bank, 11
cient.
Stainback
v.
Acceptance
may be
Gratt. 269.
made by the agent but the holder
may require the production
by

him of clear and explicit au
thority from his principal to ac
cept in his name and without
its production may treat the bill
as dishonored. Daniel’s Neg. Inst.

(5th ed.) Sec. 487.
Refusal
to
accept when presentment for ac
ceptance is made on day of ma
turity is equivalent to refusal
to pay. Plato v. Reynolds, 27 N.
Y. 586. As to reasonable time,
See

Sec.

Smith,

Bank

74;
18

Bank

Johns.

V. Hunt, 2

Hill

of Utica
230;

V.

Cayuga

635.

2-Drawers not partners; pre
Sentment must be made to each.
Willis v. Green, 5 Hill 232;

Bank v. Willis, 8 Met.
(Mass.) 504. Drawers, partners;
presentment to any one sufficient.
Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634.
Union

3-Presentment in such a case
by section 150.
excused
An
executor
Or
administrator
is
Without authority
to bind the
estate of decedent by an accept
ance.
Schmittler v. Simon, 101
554;
N. Y.
Roscoe v. McDonald,
91 Mich. 270, 101 Mich. 313.

is

Sec. 148. On what days presentment may be made.—A
bill may be presented for acceptance on any day on which
negotiable

may be presented for payment
under the provisions of sections seventy-four and eighty
seven of this act. When Saturday is not otherwise a holi
day, presentment for acceptance may be made before
twelve o’clock noon on that day."
instruments

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

1-See C. L. '97, Sec. 4880, as
amended, Laws 1903, p. 420.
The Colorado Act substitutes

the following for the last Sen
tence:
“When any day is in
part a holiday, presentment for

Sec. 149.

Presentment;
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acceptance may be made during
reasonable hours of the part of
Such day which is not a holi
day.”
The Wisconsin Act omits
the last Sentence.

where time is insufficient.—
drawn payable elsewhere than

When the holder of a bill
at the place of business or the residence of the drawee has
not time, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, to
present the bill for acceptance before presenting it for
payment on the day that it falls due, the delay caused
by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting

it for

payment is excused, and does not discharge
drawers and indorsers."
1—This follows the Bills Of
Exchange Act, Sec. 30 (4) con
cerning
which Judge Chalmers
says:
“It settles a moot point
and perhaps alters the law. Sup
pose a bill payable one month
after date, is drawn in New York
on a Liverpool firm, but payable
bank.
It only
at a London
reaches the English holder, or
his agent, on the day that it
He must, nevertheless,
matures.
present

it for

acceptance to the

drawers
provides

in Liverpool.

that
prejudiced by

the

The Act

shall not be
Before
so doing.
usual practice was
he

the Act the
to protest the bill in London
without any presentment to the
drawees-an obviously inconven
ient mode of proceeding, for the
holder's object is to get the bill
paid, and not to run up expenses
against the drawer and indors
er.” Chalmers'
5th ed., 133.

Bills of Exchange,

Sec. 150. When presentment is excused.—Presentment
for acceptance is excused, and a bill may be treated as
dishonored by non-acceptance, in either of the following
CaSeS:

First, Where the drawee is dead" or has absconded,
or is a fictitious person, or a person not having capacity
to contract by bill;
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Second, Where, after the exercise of reasonable
gence, presentment cannot be made;

dili

Third, Where although presentment has been irregular,
acceptance has been refused on some other ground.”
1-See

“The fact

that the holder has
reason to believe that the bill,
the death on presentment, will be dishon
of the drawer will not operate Ored, does not excuse present
ment.”
Chalmers' Bills of Ex
as an excuse for non-presentment
Neg. change, 5th ed. 137.
for acceptance.
Daniel’s
The mean
Inst., 5th ed., sec. 1178. Whatever
ing of the provision seems to be
notwithstanding
doubt there may have been on. unmistakable
the point is now settled by the there is not coupled with it
Statute.
Such a proVision
as is coupled
provision
corresponding
provision
2-This
is not a cod with the
Act,
ification of existing law but was of the Bills of Exchange
pre
borrowed from the Bills of Ex and that is that although
change Act, Sec. 41 (2) concern
sentment was made in such a
ing which Judge Chalmers says: manner that the drawer Was not
yet
“This is perhaps new law and bound to recognize
he
is important having regard to put his refusal to accept On oth
the next Sub-section.” The Sub er grounds, presentment will be
Section referred to is as follows: excused.
Sec.

147.

Mr. Daniel
doubts
generally stated that

the

rule

Sec. 151.

if

it,

(-)

When dishonored by non-acceptance.—The

prescribed by this act

is

is

refused

for acceptance

excused

is

Second, When presentment
and the bill
not accepted.

is

such an acceptance
or cannot be obtained;

or

as

it
is

is

bill
dishonored by non-acceptance:
First, When
duly presented for acceptance and

indorsers.

is

as

is

of

or

it

a

is

of

Duty
holder where bill
not accepted.—
duly
presented
acceptance
Where
bill
for
and
not
accepted within the prescribed time, the person present
ing
must treat the bill
dishonored by non-acceptance
he loses the right
recourse against the drawer and
Sec. 152.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
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Rights of holder where bill is not accepted.—
When a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, an imme
diate right of recourse against the drawers and indorsers
accrues to the holder, and no presentment for payment is
Sec. 153.

necessary."
1-Upon dishonor by non-ac
ceptance the holder may at once
bring suit against parties secon

darily liable. He need not wait
until the maturity Of the in

145;
strument.
See
sec.
Win
throp v. Pepoon, 1 Bay (S. C.)
468; Watson v. Loring, 3 Mass.,
557;
Lennox V. Cook, 8 Mass.
460,
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ProtéSt.
Sec.

In what

cases

protest

eSSary.
155.

Protest;

156.

Protest;

how made.
by whom made.

157.

Protest;

when to be made.

158.

Protest;

where

159.

Protest,

both

made.

for

In what

and

nOn-pay

before
Where acceptor
protest
When
With.

insolvent.
dispensed

Ceptance

neC
160.
161.
162.

ment.
Protest

Protest

where

maturity

bill

is lost,

etc.

non-ac

necessary.—Where a
foreign bill appearing on its face to be such, is dishonored
by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non
Sec. 154.

cases protest

acceptance, and where such a bill which has not pre
viously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored

by non-payment it must be duly protested for non-pay
ment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and indorsers
are discharged.
Where a bill does not appear on its face
to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor
is unnecessary.”
1–Protest
from
the
Words
“pro”
and “testare”
has been
given two meanings in this con
1st, the bearing of pub
nection.
lic witness. 2nd, bearing of wit
ness before the notary, of facts
going to make up the dishonor
of the paper.
The word “protest” is applied
to the formal instrument
made
by a notary public, alleging the
due presentment and dishonor of
a bill, and declaring that Said
notary does protest the same for
non-payment
non-acceptance
or
as the case may be.
Platt V.

Drake,
Doug.
1
(Mich.)
296.
Failure to protest discharges the
drawer and indorsers.
Smith V.
Long,
40
Walsh, 5

555;
Mich.
Gale
v.
R. 329;
Citizens'
Sav. Bank v. Hays, 96 Ky. 365,
29 S. W. 20; Smith v. Curlee, 59
Ill. 221; Ocean Nat. Bank v. Wil
liams, 102 Mass. 141; Halliday v.
McDougall, 20 Wend. 81; Amsinck
v. Rogers, 93 N. Y. Supp. 87 (a
case

under

T.

the statute).

The law conclusively presumes
injury to the indorser from fail
ure to protest and give the requi
site

notice

and

will

not

permit

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
the contrary to be shown. Smith
V. Long, supra.
Protest of a for
eign bill is So indispensable that
nothing can take its place and
none of the facts necessary to
the protest can be proved by ex
traneous testimony.
Union Bank
V. Hyde, 6 Wheat 572; Joseph V.
Salomon, 19 Fla. 623.
Mr. Dan
iel, in discussing the reason why
protest of foreign
bills is re
quired, says, “The requisition of
a protest in the case of foreign
bills was in Order to afford au
thentic and satisfactory evidence
of due dishonor to the drawer,
who, from his residence abroad,

209

would experience a difficulty in
making proper inquiries on the
Subject, and be compelled to rely
On
the representations
of the
holder.
It also furnishes an in
dorser With the best evidence
to charge an antecedent party
abroad; for foreign courts give
credit to the acts of a public
functionary in the same manner
as a protest under the Seal of a
foreign
notary
is evidence in
our courts of the dishonor of a
bill payable abroad.”
Daniel’s
Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 927.

2-See

sections

120

and 131.

Protest; how made.—The protest must be
annexed to the bill, or must contain a copy thereof, and
must be under the hand * and seal” of the notary making
and must specify:
First, The time and place"
presentment;
*

of

it,

Sec. 155.

Third, The cause

or

Second, The fact that presentment was made, and the
manner thereof;"
reason for protesting the

bill;

or

or

if

Fourth, The demand made and the answer given,
any,
acceptor could not
the fact that the drawee

V.

it

is

It

should

Fulton

be

authorized by
MacCracken,

3–Under the law merchant by
authorities the seal of the
was regarded as an abso
Wood,
lute essential. Donegan
49
Ala. 251; by others
was
not.
Huffaker V. Nat. Bank, 12
Some

V.

notary

it

is

is

is

3

14

that
him.
Supra.

v.

18

it

MacCracken,

Md. 528.
2—Although
the notary
re
quired to sign the protest, for
that
the obvious meaning of
“under his hand,” his name may
be signed by his clerk, for that
too
included in the phrase
“under his hand,” (see Phelps
Riley,
may
Conn. 266) or
printed.
only
necessary
be

Bush

it

1—Fulton

V.

be found."

287.

was said:

In

the case last cited
“The notary being
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an officer of the state, his offi
cial signature is all that is re
quired to the protest.”
The seal of the notary proves
the genuineness of his signature.
Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546.
A protest, required by the laws
of one State to be under seal,
Will not be received as evidence
in another State without
such
seal.
Bank v. Gray, 2 Hill 227.
The Bills of Exchange Act does
not require the protest to be
made under seal (Sec. 51 (1) ).
4—The date upon Which pre
sentment and demand were made
must be Stated. Union Nat. Bank

Williams

V.

Milling

Co.,

117

Mich. 535.
But the hour of the
day need not be stated, as the
certificate imports a presentment
during the proper hours of busi
Cayuga County Bank V.
ness.

Hunt,

Dustin,

2
92

Hill
Ill.

635;

Skelton

V.

49.

5—Burbank V. Beach, 15 Barb.
Duckert v. Von Lilenthal,

LAW.

55.
In this case the cer
tificate stated that the note was
presented “at Montello” and pay
ment demanded and refused, but
it did not state to whom or at
pre
what place in the town
sentment and demand were made.
Held insufficient.
When it is necessary to make
presentment at a bank, it is not
sufficient to allege presentment
to the cashier.
Seneca Co. Bank
V. Neass, 5 Denio 329.
6-It must appear in the cer
tificate of protest that present
ment and demand were made. A
Statement that the notary made
demand does not comply with the
requirement.
Musson v. Lake, 4
How. (U. S.) 262. But see Nott's
Ex’r. v. Beard, 16 La. 308.
7-This section requires sub
11 Wis.

stantially the same particulars to
be set out in the protest as have
ordinarily
required.
been
See
Brooks

Notary,

4th ed. 82.

326;

Sec. 156.

made by:

Protest; by whom made.—Protest may be

First, A notary public; or
Second, By any respectable resident of the place where
the bill is dishonored, in the presence of two or more

credible witnesses.”
1—A notary public is a Sort of
international
officer and the rule
has been general to intrust the
protest of bills to him.
The
general rule is that the protest
must be made by him in per
son. Sacrider v. Brown, 3 MacL.
481, Fed. Cas. No. 12205; Ocean

Nat. Bank v. Williams, 102 Mass.
141; Cribbs v. Adams, 13 Gray
597;
Commercial
Bank v. Var
num, 49 N. Y. 269; Carter v.
Union Bank, 7 Humph. (Tenn.)

Since interest in litigation
longer
disqualifies witnesses,
no
notary
public
a
who is cashier
548.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
of a bank may legally protest
its paper.
Nelson v. First Nat.
Bank, 69 Fed. 798; Moreland's
Assignee et al. v. Citizens' Sav
ings Bank, 97 Ky. 211, 30 S. W.
Though such cashier be the
19.
maker of a note, he can protest

211

it

himself, the note being held
by the bank. Dykman V. North
ridge, 36 N. Y. Supp. 962, affirm
ed 153 N. Y. 662.
2-See Todd V. Neals Adm'r,
49

Ala.

266.

Sec. 157. Protest; when to be made.—When a bill is
protested, such protest must be made on the day of its
dishonor, unless delay is excused as herein provided.

When a bill has been duly noted, the protest may be sub
sequently extended as of the date of the noting."
protest
1—The formal
need
not be made at the time or On
the day of presentment and de
mand, but may be made there
after if proper Steps Were taken at
the
time presentment and de

were made.
It is the duty
notary at the time of
making presentment and demand
mand

of the

to note on the bill or On the
paper attached thereto or in his
book the particulars which are
to make up the formal protest,
Viz: the time, the fact of refusal
of acceptance or payment as the
case may be, and the reaSon aS
signed therefor, and his charges
of protest, and verify such mem

by

adding

his name or
initials.
This is called noting.
The notes or memoranda may
afterwards be extended into the
Leftley V. Mills,
formal protest.
4 T. R. 170.
The noting must
oranda

on the very day of dis
else it cannot be made
the basis of the extended pro
test.
Dennistown V. Stewart, 58
Cayuga
606;
U. S., (17 How.)
Hunt,
Bank V.
2 Hill 635.
The
noting is not protest but may be
used in the place of protest if
the formal certificate be lost or
destroyed without
the holder's
consent or if the notary should
die before extending his notes.
be made

honor,

Sec. 158. Protest; where made.—A bill must be pro
tested at the place where it is dishonored, except that
when a bill drawn payable at the place of business or resi
dence of some person other than the drawee, has been
dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be protested for
non-payment at the place where it is expressed to be pay

able, and no further presentment for payment to, or
demand on. the drawee is necessary.”
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1—This is an affirmation Of
the general rule.
Daniel's Neg.
Inst., 5th ed. 935.
2—The Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 51

(6), from which this pro

vision

is

borrowed,

follows

terms

the

LAW.
declaratory

Williams IV Ch.
turned

Mitchell
35, 19 E.

the
v.
C.

rule laid
Baring, 4

L.

statute

3

over
down in
C. & P.

98, which

395.

in

Protest both for non-acceptance and non
payment.—A bill which has been protested for non-ac
ceptance may be subsequently protested for non-pay
Sec. 159.

ment."
1—When a bill has been pro
tested
for non-acceptance,
im
mediate recourse may be had
against
drawer
and
indorsers.
See Secs. 145 and 153 and notes.
protest
Therefore
for non-pay
ment would not be necessary ex
cept for the fact that some of
the Secondary parties are resi
dents of a foreign country by

the laws whereof no right Of
action accrueS on non-payment at
maturity.
See Introduction, pp. 9
and 10. See Bills of Exchange Act,
Concerning
sec.
51
(3).
this
provision Judge Chalmers says:
“Protest in such case might be
necessary
for the purpose of

Protest
solvent.—Where the
rupt or an insolvent,
benefit of creditors,
Sec. 160.

*

charging

a foreign

drawer

Or

in

in his own country.
An
English Act can only lay down
the law for the United Kingdom,
dorser

though by the comity of nations
the duties of the holder Would
regu
generally
be regarded as
by
place
lated
the law of the
where they are to be performed.
* * * Under Some of the Con

tinental codes no right of action
non-acceptance;
arises
on
the
holder can demand security from
antecedent parties,
but he is
bound to re-present the bill at
maturity.” Chalmers’ Bills of Ex
change, 5th ed. 172.

in

before maturity where acceptor
acceptor has been adjudged a bank

or has made an assignment for the
before the bill matures, the holder
may cause the bill to be protested for better security
against the drawer and endorsers."

1–In

the matter of protest for
says:
better security
Chalmers
acceptor
“When the
of a bill of
exchange becomes
bankrupt
be-

fore its maturity, it may be pro
tested
for better security,” and
adds that “the only effect of such
a protest is that there may be

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
acceptance
supra
protest.”
Bn
Bills,
Digest
Chalmers'
Notes and
Checks (Benjamin) 177; Exparte
Wackerbath, 5 Wes. Jr. 574; Dan
iel’s Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 530.

This Section is borrowed from
Bills of Exchange Act, sec.

the
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(5). Mr. Bigelow questions
whether this section is the ex
pression of any custom existing
in this country.
Protest for better security is
not necessary.
In re English
Bank, 2 Chy. (1893) 438.

51

Sec. 161. When protest dispensed with.—Protest is
dispensed with by any circumstances which would dis
Delay in noting or pro
pense with notice of dishonor.

testing is excused when delay is caused by circumstances
beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to
his default, misconduct or negligence. When the cause
of delay ceases to operate, the bill must be noted or pro
tested with reasonable diligence.
1—See sec. 113, 114 and notes. Whatever
excuse protest.

will excuse notice, Will

Protest where bill is lost, et cetera.—Where
a bill is lost or destroyed, or is wrongly detained from the
person entitled to hold
protest may be made on copy
or written particulars thereof."

Mo. App. 540,

Presentment

of

331.

5

v.

Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
Kavanaugh
Bank, 59
of
a

1464;

v.

Daniel’s

copy
sufficient
and protest
may be made on the basis
the
Miles,
copy.
Hinsdale
Conn.

is

1-Loss of the instrument will
not excuse demand and protest.

a

it,

Sec. 162.
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Article

V.

Acceptance

Sec.

163.
164.

for

be accepted

167.

168.

Honor.

Acceptance

for honor;

'' *

how
169.

when
deemed to be an as
ceptance
for honor
of
-

Agreement
honor.

*

*

of acceptor for

Maturity of bill payable
sight;
ter
honor.

honor.

drawer.

166.

for

LAW.

Sec.

bill may

When

made.

165

INSTRUMENTS

1,-

r:
Protest

accepted

af

for

of bill accepted for
etc.

resentment for payment to
acceptor for honor, how
Inacle.
d

171

when delay in making pre
Sentment is excused.

172.

Dishonor

of

bill

by aecept

or for honor.

When bill may be accepted for honor.
Where a bill of exchange has been protested for dishonor
by non-acceptance or protested for better security and
is not overdue, any person not being a party already
liable thereon may, with the consent of the holder, inter
vene and accept the bill supra protest for the honor of
any party liable thereon, or for the honor of the person
for whose account the bill is drawn. The acceptance for
honor may be for part only of the sum for which the bill
is drawn; and where there has been an acceptance for
honor for one party, there may be a further acceptance
by a different person for the honor of another party."
Sec.

163.

1—Acceptance
for honor
is
likewise called acceptance supra
protest.
This is an English cuspreserved
tom
in the Bills of
Exchange Act, sec. 65 (1) and
(2), from which the section is
borrowed. The object of the provision is to enable a party who
is liable on the bill to induce

another to intervene for the pro
tection of his credit and permit
a ready negotiation
of the bill.
The holder is not bound to take
an acceptance for honor.
Before
taking such an acceptance, he
should cause the bill to be pro
tested
and then to be accepted
in the manner provided in the

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
Act. Acceptance for honor may be
made by any person not already
liable as a party to the bill. The
drawee, though refusing to accept
the bill generally, may accept it

for the honor of the drawer Or
of any one indorser. The drawee
after refusing to accept may in
through

tervene

an

agent,
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he may request a stranger to
the bill to accept for his honor
Konig
and under his guaranty.
v. Bayard, 1 Pet. (26 U. S.), 250.
No One but the drawee can ac
cept a bill, but for the honor of
May v. Kel
one of the parties.
ly, 27 Ala. 497.

thus

Sec. 164. Acceptance for honor; how made.—An ac
ceptance for honor Supra protest must be in writing and
indicate that it is an acceptance for honor, and must be
signed by the acceptor

for honor."

1—Compare

Bills of Exchange
(3),
sec. 65
which requires
acceptance for honor to be writ
ten on the bill.
Section
164
Act,

permits

written

such an acceptance to be
on a separate paper. The

of acceptance for
“Accepted
supra pro
is:
“Accepts
test for honor of A.”
by the signa
S. P.,” followed
ture.

usual
honor

form

When deemed to be an acceptance for honor
of drawer.—Where an acceptance for honor does not ex
pressly state for whose honor it is made, it is deemed to
be an acceptance for the honor of the drawer."
Sec. 165.

1-The

purpose of this section
to fix under all circumstances
the person for Whose honor the
acceptance is made, and thus to
define the recourse of the ac
ceptor for honor.
The acceptor
for honor must State in his ac
ceptance for whose honor he ac
cepts, as his rights against ante
cedent parties may be materially
affected thereby, for if the ac
ceptor for honor should after
wards pay the bill, he will be en
titled to recourse for repayment
against
the person for whose

is

honor he made the acceptance
and to all other parties who are
liable to that person. Goodall v.
Polhill, 1 C. B. 233. Hence, if
he accepts for the honor of the
drawer only he will, in general,
have no right of recourse against
the indorsers;
and if for the
honor

of

an

indorser

he

will

have no right of recourse against
any subsequent indorser, unless,
indeed, such person for whose
honor he accepts the bill might

right of recourse
have
such
against either; as for example, if
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he were an accommodation draw
Story on Bills,
er or indorser.
Sec.

256.

The acceptor of

bill for the
honor of the drawer cannot main
a

tain an action thereon against
the drawer without proof of its
presentment to the drawee and
non-acceptance or non-payment by
him, and notice thereof to the

drawer.

LA.

W.

Baring

v.

Clark,

19

Pick.

220.

An acceptor for the honor of
the first indorser may require,
as a condition of payment, that
the holder shall indorse the bill
to him, or otherwise indemnify
him.
Freeman v. Perot, 2 Wash.
C.

485, Fed. Cas.

C.

No. 5087.

Sec. 166. Liability of acceptor for honor.—The ac
ceptor for honor is liable to the holder and to all parties
to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honor he has
accepted.
Sec. 167. Agreement of acceptor for honor.—The ac
ceptor for honor by such acceptance engages that he will
on due presentment pay the bill according to the terms

of his acceptance, provided it shall not have been paid
by the drawee, and provided also that it shall have been
duly presented for payment and protested for non-pay
ment and notice of dishonor given to him."
1—The acceptor for honor does
not assume an absolute liability
but a conditional One. To fix his
liability certain steps are essen
tial. At maturity the bill must
be presented to the drawee, not
withstanding
that he has previ
ously refused acceptance.
Upon

the original drawee's refusal to
pay, the bill must be again pro
tested for non-payment and due
notice given to the acceptor for

Phillips V. Im Thurn,
honor.
R. 1 C. P. 463, 14 L. T. (n.
406; Williams v. Germain, 7
& C. 468; Hoare v. Cazenove,

L.
s.)
B.
16

East

391;

Wend.

Schofield

v.

Bayard,

3

491.

Whether the acceptor for hon
or admits the genuineness of the
signature of the party for whose
honor he accepts has been a
question—that
controverted
he
does is maintained by the follow
ing: Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
sec. 528; Story on Bills, sec. 262;
Byles on Bills (Sharswood ed.)
258,

406;

Phillips

v.

Im Thurn,

s.) 694; that he
by Par
does not is maintained
Sons
on Bills and Notes, 323,
citing Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B.
& C. 428.
18 C.

B.

(n.
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Maturity of bill payable after sight; accepted
for honor.—Where a bill payable after sight is accepted
for honor, its maturity is calculated from the date of the
noting for non-acceptance, and not from the date of the
Sec. 168.

acceptance

for honor."

1-This
sec.

section is the same as
(5)
Bills of Exchange
Judge
concerning
which

65

Act,

SayS:
Chalmers
“This
brings
tion
the law into
ance
with
mercantile
standing, and gets rid of

sub-sec-

accordunderan in

convenient ruling to the effect that
maturity
was to be calculated
from the date of acceptance for
honor (William V. Germaine, 7
B

& C. 468).”

of Exchange, 5th

Chalmers'
ed.,

Bills

228.

Protest of bill accepted for honor, et cetera.
—Where a dishonored bill has been accepted for honor
supra protest or contains a reference in case of need it
must be protested for non-payment before it is presented
for payment to the acceptor for honor or referee in case
Sec. 169.

of

need."

1-See Bills of

Exchange

Act,

Sec.

67

(1).

for payment to acceptor for
honor; how made.—Presentment for payment to the ac
ceptor for honor must be made as follows:
First, If it is to be presented in the place where the
protest for non-payment was made, it must be presented
Sec. 170.

Presentment

not later than the day following its maturity;
'Second, If it is to be presented in some other place than
the place where it was protested, then it must be for
warded within the time specified in section one hundred
•

six."
1-Doubts having arisen as to
the day on which it was requisite to present for payment to

the acceptor supra protest for
honor, or to the referee in case
of need, bills which had been
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dishonored,

passed a
Parliament
statute in 1836, 6 & 7 William
IV, Ch. 58, declaring, “That it
shall not be necessary to present
such bills of exchange to Such
acceptors for honor or to such
referee until the day following
the day on which such bills of
exchange shall become due; and
that
if the place of address
On
Such
bill of exchange Of
acceptor
such
for
honor
or
of Such
referee
Shall
be
in
any city, town or place other

INSTRUMENTS

LAW.

than in the city, town Or place
where such bill Shall be therein
made payable, then it shall not
be necessary to forward such bill
of exchange for presentment for
payment to such acceptor for
honor or referee until the day
following the day on which such
bill of exchange shall become
due.” Sec. 67 (2) of the
of Exchange Act re-enacts
statute in substance.
Sec.
follows said Sub-Section.

Bills
this
170

When delay in making presentment is ex
cused.—The provisions of section eighty-three apply
where there is delay in making presentment to the ac
ceptor for honor or referee in case of need.
Sec. 172. Dishonor of bill by acceptor for honor.—
When a bill is dishonored by the acceptor for honor it
must be protested for non-payment by him."
Sec. 171.

1-The Bills of

Exchange

Act,

(4), from which this sec
tion is taken, settled the law in
England on the matter covered
sec. 67

by

the provision.
Before that
time it was probable but not
certain that when a bill of ex
change was dishonored by the

supra protest, it must
again
protested
have been
in
order to charge the other parties
liable thereon.
Chalmers’ Bills,
(Benjamin)
Notes and Checks
178.
The Section affirms the ex
acceptor

isting law in the United States.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., 527.
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for

Payment

Honor.

Sec.

Sec.

173.
174.

Who may make payment for
honor.
Payment
for honor;
how
made.

175.
176.

on

subsequent

bill

where

for honor.

is

par
paid

Where holder refuses to re
ceive payment supra pro

178.

Declaration before payment
for honor.
Preference of parties offering to pay for honor.

Sec. 173.

Effect
ties

177.

test.

Rights of payer for honor.

179.

Who may make payment for honor.—Where

for non-payment any person
may intervene and pay it supra protest for the honor of
any person liable thereon, or for the honor of the person
for whose account it was drawn."
a

bill has

been

protested

law
merchant
limits
the right to make payment for
honor to bills of exchange and
does not extend it even to ne1—The

gotiable promissory notes, Smith
V. Sawyer, 55 Me. 141.
A stranger to a bill which has
been
refused acceptance can at
the request and under the guaranty of the drawee who has refused acceptance or payment, pay
the bill supra protest for the
honor of the drawer or an inKonig v. Bayard, 1 Pet.
dorser.
(26 U. S.) 250.

Sec. 174.
ment

Payment

There can be no payment for
by
honor until after
dishonor
non-payment, and protest. Deacon
v. Stodhart, 2 Man. & Gr. 317;
Vandewall v. Tyrrell, 1 M. & M.
87; Wood v. Pugh, 7 Ohio, pt. 2,
156,

164.

The protest

for non-payment,
though necessary, need not be
completed at the time of the pay
ment for honor;
it may be ex
tended

opulo
20

L.

at
v.

J.

a

later

Wieler,

C.

time.
Geral
C. B. 690,

10

P. 105.

for honor; how made.—The pay

for honor supra protest in order to operate as such

and not as a mere voluntary payment must be attested
by a notarial act of honor which may be appended to the
protest or form an extension to it."
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Stranger

may take up a

bill for the honor of the parties
or any of them and thus acquire

the rights of an indorsee, pro
Vided he makes the payment af
ter protest, causes a notarial act
to be made showing why and for
whom he made the payment and
gives immediate
notice to all

LAW.

parties to whom he intends to re
Sort for indemnity.
Gazzam V.
Armstrong's Exr., 3 Dana (Ky.)
554.
If he fails to notify such
parties within a reasonable time,

he loses his right of recourse
against them. Wood v. Pugh, 7
Ohio, pt. 2, 156. See note, sec
tion 173.

Sec. 175. Declaration before payment for honor.—The
notarial act of honor must be founded on a declaration
made by the payer for honor, or by his agent in that
behalf, declaring his intention to pay the bill for honor,
and for whose honor he pays.

of parties offering to pay for
honor.—Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill
for the honor of different parties, the person whose pay
ment will discharge most parties to the bill is to be given
Sec. 176.

Preference

the preference.

Effect on subsequent parties where bill is
paid for honor.—Where a bill has been paid for honor, all
parties subsequent to the party for whose honor it is paid
are discharged, but the payer for honor is subrogated for,
and succeeds to, both the rights and duties of the holder
as regards the party for whose honor he pays and all
parties liable to the latter."
Sec. 177.

payer
supra
protest
1—The
stands in the shoes, so far as re
course is concerned, of the party
for whose honor he pays.
For
example, a dishonored bill is held
by the fourth indorsee.
If A
pays it supra protest for the
honor of the acceptor, he has re
course against the acceptor alone.
If he pays it for the honor of

the first indorser he has recourse
against
against
him
and
the
acceptor, but in
drawer
and
dorsers subsequent to the first
are discharged.
A payer supra
protest for the honor of the
drawer has no recourse against
the acceptor if he accepted
for
the accommodation of the draw
er, because
the drawer
would

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
not have the right of reimburse
ment against the accommodation
acceptor.
McDowell v. Cook, 14
420;
Miss.
Gazzam V. Armstrong's
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EXr. 3 Dana (Ky.) 554. But see
Ex parte Swan, L. R. 6 Eq. 344;
Daniel's

Neg. Inst.,

5th ed.,

sec.

1255.

Where holder refuses to receive payment
supra protest.—Where the holder of a bill refuses to re
ceive payment supra protest, he loses his right of recourse
against any party who would have been discharged by
Sec. 178.

such payment."
1–Before the enactment of the
Exchange Act the prop
osition
covered by this section
was undetermined by any adjud
ication in England.
It is one of

Bills of

those propositions which Chalmers
States With a “perhaps.”
Intro
Digest
p. 7, Chalmers’
duction

(Benjamin) 243. Subsection 7 of
Section 68 set at rest whatever
doubt had theretofore existed as

to the right of recourse of the
holder who refuses payment su
pra protest.
This section is a
copy of Said subsection.

Sec. 179. Rights of payer for honor.—The payer for
honor, on paying to the holder the amount of the bill and
the notarial expenses incidental to its dishonor, is entitled

to receive both the bill itself and the protest."
1—This Section follows Sec. 68
(6) of the Bills of Exchange Act,
which affirmed the practice in
England. There were no adjudi
cated cases On the Subject. Chal
mers' Digest (Benjamin) 243,

A person desiring to make
payment for honor must be ready
and offer to do so at the time
and place of payment.
Denston
v. Henderson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.)
322.
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Article VII.

Bills in a

Sec.

LAW.

Set,

Sec.

180.

Bills in
bill.

181.

Rights

Set

of

different

constitute

one

holder
where
parts are nego

Liability of holder who

in

dorses two or more parts

Sec. 180.

a
Sons.

183.

185.

set to different

Acceptance

in
184.

tiated.
182.

of

of

bills

per

drawn

SetS.

Payment
by
acceptor
of
bills drawn in sets.
Effect of discharging cne of
a Set.

Bills in set constitute

one bill.—Where

a

part of the set being num
bered and containing a reference to the other parts, the
whole of the parts constitutes one bill."

bill is drawn in a

set, each

1-Because the means of com
munication
were imperfect and
uncertain,
the custom arose at
an early day to make a foreign
bill generally in three but some
times in four separate parts, the
better to facilitate the transmis
sion and insure the delivery of
the bill to its destined place.
To
secure the end sought, these sep
arate parts were forwarded by
different messengers or by differ
transportation.
ent
modes
of
The practice was maintained af
ter the reason for it had for
purposes
all practical
ceased.
These several parts constitute but
one bill which is called a bill in
a set. Each part of the set is
numbered and contains a refer
ence to the other parts. Downes v.
Church, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 207. A
form of a bill in a set is as
lows:

fol

$500.00

New York, August 1, 1905.
sight of this first of ex
change, (second and third un
paid) pay to the order of Solon
Clark Five hundred dollars. Val
ue received and charge to the ac
count of
Daniel DaViS.
TO
Seth Eaton,
1009 Marquette Bldg.
Chicago, Ill.
The three parts would be trip
licates except the second would
state, “Pay this second
of ex
change,
(first and third un

At

paid)”;
the third, “Pay
this
third of exchange, (first and sec
ond unpaid).” Walsh v. Blatch
ley, 6 Wis. 413; Ralli v. Den
nistoun, 6 Ex. 483, 20 L. J. E.X.
278;
Holdsworth
v. Hunter,
10
B. & C. 449.
The condition in
corporated in bills in a set-Sec

BILLS OF EXCELANGE.
ond and third unpaid-gives no
tice that all the parts Constitute
Payment of any
but one bill.
part extinguishes the whole. Dur

kin

v.

Wells
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Cranston,
7 Johns. 442;
Whitehead,
15
Wend.

V.

527.

Rights of holders where different parts are
negotiated.—Where two or more parts of a set are
negotiated to different holders in due course, the holder
whose title first accrues is as between such holders the
true owner of the bill. But nothing in this section affects
the rights of a person who in due course accepts or pays
the part first presented to him.
Sec. 181.

1—The

first indorsement of

One

set vests in the indorsee the absolute right
to
the possession

of the whole Set.
Walsh
Blatchley, 6 Wis. 413.

V.

Liability of holder who indorses two or more

Sec. 182.

parts of a set to different persons.—Where the holder
of a set indorses two or more parts to different persons
he is liable on every such part, and every indorser sub
sequent to him is liable on the part he has himself in
dorsed, as

if

1—Holdsworth

such parts were separate bills."
v. Hunter,

10 B. & C. 449.

Sec. 183. Acceptance of bills drawn in sets.—The ac
ceptance may be written on any part, and it must be

written on one part only.

If

the drawee accepts more

than one part, and such accepted parts are negotiated to
different holders in due course, he is liable on every
such part as if it were a separate bill."
1—This section is substantially
identical with Subdivision 4, Sec.
71 of the Bills of Exchange Act.
It is declaratory of existing law.

Holdsworth
V. Hunter,
10 B. &
C. 449; Bank v. Neal, 22 How.
(U. S.) 96. Any one of the set
may be presented for acceptance
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not accepted, a right of
action arises upon due notice
against the indorser.
Walsh v.

and,

if

LAW.

Blatchley, 6 Wis. 413; Downes &
Co. v. Church, 13 Pet. 205.

Payment by acceptor of bills drawn in sets.—
When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it with
out requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be de
Sec. 184.

livered up to him, and that part at maturity is outstand
ing in the hands of a holder in due course, he is liable
to the holder thereon."
1—Holdsworth

v. Hunter,

10 B. & C.

449.

Effect of discharging one of a set.—Except
as herein otherwise provided, where any one part of a
bill drawn in a set is discharged by payment or other
Sec. 185.

wise the whole

bill is discharged."

1—Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B.
& C. 449.
See note to section
180.

The Wisconsin Act contains the
following additional provisions:
Sec. 1682.
Whenever any bill
of exchange drawn or indorsed
within this state and payable
Without the limits of the United
States shall be duly protested for
non-acceptance
or non-payment
the party liable for the contents
of such bill shall, on due notice
pay the
demand thereof,
at the current rate of ex
change at the time of the de
mand, and damages at the rate
of five per cent upon the con
tents thereof, together with in
terest On the Said contents, to be
computed from the date of the
and

Same

protest; and said amount of con
tents, damages and interest shall
be in full of all damages, charges
and expenSeS.
Sec.

1683.

change drawn
or corporation

If

any bill
upon any

of ex

person
out of this state,

but within some state or terri
tory of the United States, for
the payment of money shall be
duly presented for acceptance or
payment and protested for non
acceptance or non-payment the
drawer or indorser thereof, due
notice being given of such non
acceptance or non-payment, shall
pay said bill with legal interest
according to its tenor and five
per cent. damages, together with
costs and charges of protest.

TITLE III.
PROMISSORY

NOTES AND CHECKS.

Article I.
Sec.

Sec.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Promissory note defined.
Check defined.
Within what time a check
must be presented.
Certification
of check; ef
fect of.

190.

Effect where the holder of
check procures it to be
certified.

191.

When check operates as an
assignment.
Inconsistent
laws repealed.

192.

Promissory

note defined.—A negotiable
promissory note within the meaning of this act is an un
conditional promise in writing, made by one person to
Sec. 186.

another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay on
mand, or at a fixed or determined future time, a sum

de
cer
note is

tain in money, to order or to bearer." Where a
drawn to the maker’s own order, it is not complete until
indorsed by him.”
1—See

Bills of Exchange

Act,

Sec. 83.

The Bills of Exchange Act
its definition
of

cludes
in
promissory

in

a
note a note payable
“to or to the order of a specified
person or to bearer,” thus em
bracing instruments
which were
not negotiable according to the
law merchant.
In some states
a non-negotiable note was held to
import consideration by virtue of
statutory provision or by inter
pretation of common law rules.
15

Daniel’s Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
The statute changes the
rule in those states because the
statute deals only with negoti
able instruments, and so it was
held in Yarwood
V.
Trusts &
163.

App.
Guarantee Co. (ltd.),
94
Div. 47, 87 N. Y. Supp. 947 (a.
case under the Statute), that a.
note in the following terms:
“I
promise to pay Jennie Crawford
$5,000 when I die and George
Crawford $5,000,” imported con
sideration prior to the act, but

225

THE NEGOTIABLE

226

that this
prior law.

section

changed such

In Deyo V. Thompson,
Div. 9, 65 N. Y. Supp.

53

App.

459

(a

case under the statute), it was
held that a note payable to “a
specified
person”
imported
no
consideration.
See
Hickok V.
Bunting, 92 App. Div. 167, 86 N.
Y. Supp. 1059 (a case under the
Statute).
Certificates of deposit in the Or
dinary form payable to order or to
bearer are in legal effect negotia
ble promissory notes. Cate V. Pat
terson, 25 Mich. 191; Tripp v. Cur
tenius, 36 Mich. 494;
Birch V.
Fisher, 51 Mich. 36; Beardsley v.
Webber, 104 Mich. 88; Curran v.
Witter, 68 Wis, 16; Trustees etc.
V. Lewis, 34 Fla. 424; Kirkwood
v. First Nat. Bank, 40 Neb. 484.
A certificate of deposit made out
to Z or her assigns was held not a
negotiable instrument under this
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statute. Zander v. N. Y. Security
& Trust Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 1151.
Coupon Or interest notes are
Boyer
promissory
V.
notes.
Chandler, 160 Ill. 394.
2-A note payable to the mak

er's own order satisfies the re
quirement
of the rule that it
should be made payable “to an
Other,” but only when the note is
negotiated.
See note 2, sec. 10.
This part of the section was re
to, in connection
ferred
with
others, in Hoffman V. Planters’
Nat. Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E.
134.

A

note drawn payable to the
of the maker and not in
dorsed by him is valid against
although
the indorser,
he
did
not know that it was to be is
Sued
without the maker's in
Order

dorsement. C. L. '97, 4870. Penin
Sular Savings Bank V. Hosie, 112
Mich. 351.

Check defined.—A check is a bill of exchange
payable on demand.” Except as
on a bank,

Sec. 187.

drawn

herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act ap
plicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply
to a check.”
1—This section
is
identical
with Section 73 of the Bills of
Exchange Act, except that the
word “bank” is substituted for
“banker.”
The Variation is im
material, as the words are made
synonymous by the terms of the
statute.
See sec. 2.
Sec.
73
of the Bills of Ex
change Act was declaratory of

then existing law so far as it de
fined a check as a bill of ex
change.
Clydesdale
McLean
V.
Banking Co., 9 App. Cas. 95. See
note Sec. 128.
All checks are
bills of exchange but not all bills
of exchange are checks. A check
is distinguishable from a bill in
that it is always drawn on a
People v. Kemp, 76 Mich.
bank.

PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS.
410;
Merchants
Bank v. State
Bank, 10 Wal. 604; Bull v. Bank,
123 U. S. 105; Rogers V. Durant,
140 U. S. 298; Hopkinson v. For
ster, L. R. 19 Eq. 76; Ridgely
Bank v. Patton, 109 Ill. 479;
N. W. Coal Co. V. Bowman, 69 Ia.
152;
Harrison v. Nicollett Nat.
Bank, 41 Minn. 488; Amsinck V.
Rogers, 93 N. Y. Supp. 87, (a
case under the statute)
Wherein
the instrument
was held not a
check because not drawn. On a
bank.

2—A check is further distin
guishable from a bill in that it
is always payable on demand.
The courts have been at Variance
as to whether a draft On a bank
payable at a future day is a
check or bill of exchange.
That
such a draft is not a check:
Bowen V. Newell, 13 N. Y. 290;
Georgia Nat. Bank V. HenderSon,
Ivory v. Bank, 36
46 Ga. 496;
Mo. 475; Harrison v. Nicollett
Nat. Bank, supra;
Morrison
v.
Bailey, 5 Ohio St. 13; Minturn

v. Fisher, 4 Cal. 36. That such a
draft is a check:
In re Brown,
Story
502,
2
Fed. Cas. No. 1985;
Champion
Gordon,
V.
70
Pa.
St. 474;
Wheaton,

Westminster
R. I. 30.

Bank v.

4

A check is a bill of exchange
payable
on
demand
and
the
drawee will be deemed to have ac

if he does not return
twenty-four hours after
its delivery for acceptance, ac
cording to sec. 129. State Bank
v. Weiss, 91 N. Y. Supp. 276 (a
case under the statute), Unaka
cepted

it

it within
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Nat. Bank v. Butler, (Tenn.), 83
S. W. 655
(a case under the
Statute).

3-Presentment and notice of
dishonor are required to charge
the drawer of a check as well as
the drawer of a bill, with this
distinction,
if the drawer of a
check draws Without funds in
the hands of his bank he is
able as a primary party without
notice.
Carew v. Duckworth, L.

li

R.

4 Exch. 313; Andrew V. Black
ly, 11 Ohio St. 89; First Nat. Bank
v. Linn etc., 30 Ore. 296; Indus
trial Bank v. Bowes, 165 Ill. 70.
If the drawee of a bill draws
Without funds in the hands of
the drawee he is liable only pre
Sumptively as a primary party,
the drawing without funds being
only prima facie fraudulent.
The
arising
presumption
of fraud
from a lack of funds in the hands
of the drawee may be rebutted.
Dolph
Rice,
418;
V.
18
Wis.
Harker V. AnderSon, 21 Wend.
372.

There are other distinctions be
apart
tween bills and
checks
from
those mentioned
in the
statute which should be noted. A

check is ordinarily intended for
payment and, as its name im
plies, for stopping or closing a
transaction;
a bill is frequently,
perhaps ordinarily, intended as
an instrument of credit; a check
purports to be drawn against a
fund or deposit of the drawer in
the hands of his bank; a bill
necessarily
import
does
not
funds of the drawer in the hands
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of the drawee, but may

be drawn
grounds
reasonable
that
the drawee will honor the bill;
all
checks
are
intended
for
prompt presentment, not all bills.
Authority to draw checks does
not necessarily include authority
to draw bills.
Forster V. Mac
reth, L. R., 2 Exch. 163.

upon

Checks.—Earlier than
it was the practice of Eng

Crossed
1850

lish

merchants and bankers to
cross checks, that is, to write or
stamp across the face of the
check some direction as to its
payment.
See Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 76-81.
In Bellamy v.
Marjoribanks,
7
Ex. (W. H. &
G.) 389, decided in 1852, it was
held that the practice of cross
ing checks did not amount to a
fixed custom.
In 1856 a declara
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tory statute was enacted defining
the status of crossed checks and
providing that a crossed check
payable only
“shall
be
to or
through some banker,” 19 & 20
Vict. ch. 25. In 1858 this statute
was amended, 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 79.
See Smith V. Bank, 1 Q. B. D.
31, 4 Eng. Rul. CaS. 436.
The

Statutes above named were further
amended in 1876, 39 & 40 Vict.
ch. 80. This last statute is sub

stantially

re-enacted
in the
Of Exchange Act.
Bank V.
[1891] 1 Q. B. 435, 4 Eng.

Cas.

Bills
Silke
Rul.

The object of crossing
to the drawer or
and caution to the bank.

440.

is protection
holder

The English usage is not prac
ticed in the United States.
Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., Sec. 1585 a.

Within what time a check must be presented.
—A check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue, or the drawer will be dis
charged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss
Sec. 188.

caused by the delay."
1—See sec. 2, reasonable time.
This Section affirms the rule of
the common law.
To meet the
requirements of this rule a check
must, in the absence of special
circumstances,
be presented for
payment not later than the day
after it is received if the party re
ceiving the check and the drawee
bank are in the same place; if in
different places, the check must, in
the absence of special circum
stances, be forwarded not later
than the day after it is received.

Freiberg v. Cody, 55 Mich. 108;
Holmes v. Roe, 62 Mich. 199;
Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 95 Mich.
Haggerty
436;
v. Baldwin,
131

Mich. 187; Aebi v. Bank (Wis.),
102 N. W. 329 (a case under the
Statute). In this case the payee of
a check, drawn on a bank 17 miles
distant, deposited it in his bank
Sept. 21 and was credited with

the amount.
The bank forward
ed it to the drawee bank but

for ten days to make in
quiry from the drawee bank and
failed

PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS.
then

found that the check haW
lost had never reached
the drawee bank. Held, that this
delay was not excusable and that
the payee indorser was discharged

ing

from

As

been

liability.

reasonable time
sentment of a check for
see Gifford
V. Hardell,
Lloyd V. Osborne,
538;
93;
Grange v. Reigh,
552;

to

for pre
payment

Wis.
Wis.
93 Wis.
Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Drey
82 MO. App. 399;
Hamlin
88

92

fus,
v. Simpson, 105 Ia. 125; Cox. V.
Boone, 8 W. Va. 500;
Kershaw
V. Ladd, 34 Ore. 375; First Nat.

Bank v. Miller, 43 Neb. 791; Wil
lis v. Finley, 173 Pa. St. 28.
The insolvency of the drawee
bank is the
under which
check can be
of presentment

only circumstance
the drawer Of a
injured by failure

within

a

reason

able time. The drawer is injured
only to the extent of the loss
by him.
Heywood v.
suffered

Pickering, L. R.

9 Q. B. 428; Little
v. Phenix Bank, 2 Hill 425.
If the drawer has no fundS
upon deposit in the drawee bank
or subsequently withdraws them,
any delay in presentment or no

tice to him will be no defense,
as he can suffer no loss or dam
age from such delay. Industrial
Bank v. Bowes, 165 Ill. 70; First

Bank V. Linn, etc., 30 Ore.
Bell v. Alexander, 21 Gratt. 1.
Where the bank fails before
the expiration of the time allot

Nat.
296;

ted the payee in which to make
presentment, the loss falls on the
drawer.
Holmes V. Roe, 62 Mich.
Kelty v. Bank, 52 Barb.
199;
328; Bickford v. First Nat. Bank,
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Ill.

Simpson v. Pacific
238;
Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 139; Wear
V. Lee, 87 Mo. 359;
Tomlin V.
Thornton, 99 Ga. 585.
Failure of the holder to make
presentment within a reasonable
discharges
time
the
indorser
whether he has suffered loss or
not. Carroll V. Sweet, 128 N. Y.
42

etc.

19,

27

Bank

N.

E.

Miller,

763;

First

Nat.

43 Neb. 791.
Death of the payee or indorser
of a check after it has been ne
V.

gotiated

cannot affect its nego
or prevent the drawee
from safely paying it.
Brennan
V. Merchants’ & MfrS. Nat. Bank,
62 Mich. 343.
A banker as such is bound to
honor his customer's check, when
duly presented, to the extent of
the balance which the customer
then has in his hands.
Chal
(Benjamin).
Digest
mers'
266
Whether the death of the drawer
revokes the authority of the bank
to pay the check is a disputed
question.
Mr. Chalmers
states
that the authority of a banker to
pay a check drawn on him by
his customer is determined by
notice of the customer's death.
This view is supported by: Nat.

tiability

Commercial
Bank v. Miller, 77
Ala. 168. But see Raesser v. Nat.
Exchange
Bank, 112 Wis. 591.
Mr. Crawford explains:
“There
is no decision directly in point
and the Views of text writers
differ. To meet the difficulty the
original draft of the negotiable
instrument law. Submitted to the
commissioners contained a provi
Sion (which was taken from the
statute of Mass.)
as follows:
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“The death of the drawer does
not operate as a revocation of
the authority to pay a check if
the check is presented for pay
ment within ten days from the
date thereof, but it was thought
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by

the commissioners that this
would be objected to in some of
the States because Of the effect
it might have on the estates of
decedents.”

Certification of check; effect of.—Where a
check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the
certification is equivalent to an acceptance."
Sec. 189.

1—This section, which is de
of the common law,
primarily
makes
the
certifier
liable on the check.
The certi
fication of a check is equivalent
to the acceptance of a bill.
The
claratory

however, re
act of certifying,
making
sembles the
of a note
rather than the accepting of a
bill, for example: 1st. The hold
er of a check presents it to the
drawee bank and demands and
receives $500, the amount of the
check, the transaction leaves the
bank with $500 less of cash and
$500 less of liability and uncon
cerned with the fact that Peter
has paid Paul.
2nd. The holder
demands and receives not cur
rency but a certificate of de
posit, the transaction leaves the

bank with liability to the draw
er decreased but with liability to
the holder of the certificate cor
respondingly increased, the bank
is not affected by the fact that
Paul took its promissory note
instead of its currency.
3rd. The
holder requests that the check be
certified, the bank complies with
the request, the drawer's account

is debited

$500,

the bank

is reduced

the

liability

$500,

of

which

is offset by its outstanding obli
gation, and Peter is discharged
of liability as effectually as he
Was When Paul took the certifi
cate of deposit.

By the law merchant of this
country the certificate of a bank
that a check is good is equiva
lent to an acceptance.
It implies
that the check is drawn upon
sufficient funds in the hands of
the drawee, that they have been
Set apart for his satisfaction and
that they will be so applied
whenever the check is presented
for payment. It is an undertak

ing that the check is good then
good,
and shall
continue
and
binding
agreement
this
is as
as its notes of circulation,
a
certificate of deposit payable to
the Order of the depositor
or
any other obligation it can as
Sume.
The object of certifying a
check as regards both parties is
to enable the holder to use it as
money. The transferee takes it
with the same readiness and
sense of security that he would
take the notes of the bank. It is
available also to him for all the
purposes of money. Thus it con
tinues to perform its important
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until in the course of
business it goes back to the bank
for redemption
and
is extin
guished
by
payment.
Justice
Swayne, Merchants' Bank v. State
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function

lawful for any officer, clerk

Bank,

employee of a bank to certify a
check unless the amount thereof
stands to the credit of the draw
er upon the books of the bank
and providing
for the punish
ment of an offender against the
provisions of the statute.
Union
Trust Co. V. Preston Nat. Bank
(Mich.), 99 N. W. 399.

Nat.

Ill.

10

Bank

Wallace 648;
V. Provision

Drovers'
Co.,

117

106.

The certifier is liable to a
holder
without
notice notWith
standing a statute making it un

or

Effect where the holder of check procures it
to be certified.—Where the holder of a check procures
it to be accepted or certified, the drawer and all in
Sec. 190.

dorsers are discharged from
1—The

holder

of a check

pro

curing it to be certified loses in
case of the bank’s failure.
The
drawer procuring it to be certi
fied loses in case of the bank’s
failure.
Where the holder pro
cures it to be certified the draw
er and the indorsers are dis
charged.
Minot v. Russ, 156
Mass. 458; First Nat. Bank v.
Leach, 52 N. Y. 350; Metropoli

Bank V. Jones, 137 Ill.
N. E. 533. "Herein lies
the difference between the certi
fication of a check procured by
the holder and the acceptance of
tan

Nat.

634,

27

bill; in the latter case when
payment is duly demanded from
acceptor and refused and
the
notice of non-payment given, the
drawer and indorser are held;
in the case of certification, the
drawer and indorsers
are dis
charged.
Minot V. Russ, supra;
Born V. First Nat. Bank, 123
Ind. 78;
Brown v. Leckie, 43
a

liability thereon."

Ill. 497; First Nat. Bank v.
Whitman, 94 U. S. 343;
Metro
politan Nat. Bank V. Jones, su
pra; Larson v. Breene, 12 Col.

Mutual Nat. Bank v. Rot
La. Ann. 933; Nat. Com
mercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala.
168.
But if an indorser requests
Or consents to a certification
he
is not discharged.
Mutual Nat.
Bank V. Rotge, supra.
Where the drawer procures cer
tification of his own check before
delivery
he
is not discharged.
Minot v. Russ, supra; Metropoli
tan Nat. Bank V. Jones, supra;
Oyster & Fish Co. v. Bank, 51
480;
ge,

28

Ohio St. 106, 36 N. E. 833; Born
v. First Nat. Bank, supra. The
same rule applies when the payee
before delivery to him requests
the drawer to procure the check
Randolph Nat.
to be certified.
Bank v. Hornblower, 160 Mass.
401, 35 N. E. 850.
In Meuer V.
Phenix Nat. Bank, 94 App. Div.
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331,

N. Y. Supp.

88

83

(a

case

under the statute), it was held
that where a bank at the re
quest of the holder certified a
check not indorsed by the payee,
the cashier not knowing or in
quiring for whom it was being
certified, the bank was liable on
such certification, as the holder
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got title to the check by its de
livery to him without indorse
ment, though such delivery de
stroyed
negotiability.
its
See
Cullinan v. Union Surety & Guar
anty Co., 79 App. Div. 409, 80
N. Y. Supp. 58 (a case under the
Statute).

When check operates as an assignment.—A
check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any
part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the
bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and
until it accepts or certifies the check."
Sec. 191.

1—Whether, in the absence of
statute, a check operates as an
assignment of any part of the
funds in the hands of the drawee
is a disputed question. That the
check does not operate as an as
signment:
Brennan v. Merchants
& Manufacturers
Nat. Bank, 62
Mich. 343; McIntyre V. Farmers
and Merchants Bank, 115 Mich.
255;

Sunderlin
V.
Mecosta Co.
Savings Bank, 116 Mich.
281;
Millard,
Republic
Bank of the
v.

Wall. 152; First Nat. Bank
v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343;
La
clede Bank V. Schuler, 120 U. S.
Mining Co. v.
511;
Florence
Brown, 124 U. S. 385; St. Louis
etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnston,
133
10

U.

Fourth St. Bank v.

S. 566;

Yardley,

165 U. S. 634;

O'Conner
N. Y.
v. Dollar Savings
Bank, 131 Pa. St. 362; Creveling
V. Bloomburg
Nat. Bank, 46 N.
J. Law, 255; Nat. Commercial
V. Mechanics
Maginn
324;

Bank

v.

Bank,

Miller,

77

124

Ala.

172;

Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380.
That the check operates as an as

signment: Simmons Hardware Co.
v. Bank, 41 S. C. 177, 19 S. E. 509;
Fonner v. Smith, 31 Neb. 107, 28
Am. St. 510; Gordon v. Muchler,
Wyman v. Ft.
34 La. Ann. 604;
Bank,
Dearborn Nat.
181 Ill. 279;
Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26

Ia. 315; Blades v. Grant Co., Dep.
Bank, 101 Ky. 163, 40 S. W. 246;
Coates v. Doran, 83 Mo. 337; Rip
ley Nat. Bank v. Latimer, 64 Mo.
App. 321;
Raesser V. Nat. Ex
change Bank, 112 Wis. 591.
In

this case the court said that
prior to the enactment of the ne
gotiable instrument
law it was
settled in Wisconsin that the giv
ing of a check for value on an

Ordinary

bank deposit would be
construed to intend an assign
ment of the funds pro tanto as
between the maker and the payee.
Nat. Bank v. Berrall (N. J.
1904), 58 Atl. 189 (a case under
the statute).
The court said, in
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the statute af
as it had been
established in New Jersey, and
that the holder of a check has
no contract with the bank on
which it is drawn and no legal
right to exact payment;
Balti
more and Ohio R. CO. V. First
Nat. Bank (Va. 1904), 47 S.E. 837

this

case,

firmed

the

that
law

(a

case under the statute).
jurisdictions
Even
in those
where the giving of a check does
not operate as an assignment of
the fund, it has been held that
the parties may, by agreement,
create such an assignment that
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the actual intention of the par
ties will prevail, and that such
agreement may be oral or Writ

Fourth St. Bank V. Yardley,
Throop
U. S. 634;
Grain
Cleaner Co. v. Smith, 110 N. Y.
83;
First Nat. Bank V. Clark,
134 N. Y. 368. As to the liability
Of the drawee bank to the draw.
er for refusing
to
honor the
check See Atlanta Nat. Bank V.
Davis, 96 Ga. 334;
Schaffner V.
Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109;
Patterson
v. Marine Nat. Bank, 130 Pa. St.
419;
Bank of Commerce V. Goos,
ten.

165

39 Neb.

437.

Inconsistent laws repealed.—All acts and
parts of acts inconsistent with the foregoing provisions
of this act are hereby repealed.
Sec. 192.

Approved June 16, 1905.

APPENDIX.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT,

1882.

45 AND 46 VICT., CH. 61.

An

act to codify the law relating to bills of exchange, cheques,
promissory notes.

and

[18th August, 1882.]
Be it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Com
mons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, as follows:

PART I.
PRELIMINARY.
1.

2.

Short title.
This act may

be cited as the

Bills of Exchange Act,

Interpretation of terms.

In this

act, unless the context otherwise

1882.

requires

“Acceptance” means an acceptance completed by delivery

or

notification.
“Action ” includes counter-claim and set-off.
“Banker” includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or
not, who carry on the business of banking.
“Bankrupt” includes any person whose estate is vested in a trus
tee or assignee, under the law for the time being in force relat
ing to bankruptcy.
“Bearer” means the person in possession of a bill or note which
is payable to bearer.
“Bill” means bill of exchange, and “note” means promissory
note.
“Delivery” means transfer of possession, actual or constructive,
from one person to another.
235
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“Holder” means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it, or the bearer thereof.
“Indorsement” means an indorsement completed by delivery.
“Issue” means the first delivery of a bill or note, complete in
form, to a person who takes it as a holder.
“Person ” includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not.

“Value”

means valuable consideration.
“Written’’ includes printed, and “writing” includes print.

PART II.
BILLS

OF EXCHANGE.

Form and Interpretation.
3.

Bill of exchange defined.
(1) A bill of exchange is an unconditional

order in writing, ad
dressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requir
ing the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed
or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order
of a specified person, or to bearer.
(2) An instrument which does not comply with these conditions, or
which orders any act to be done in addition to the payment of money,
is not a bill of exchange.
(3) An order to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional
within the meaning of this section; but an unqualified order to pay,
coupled with (a) an indication of a particular fund out of which the
drawee is to re-imburse himself or a particular account to be debited
with the amount, or (b) a statement of the transaction which gives
rise to the bill, is unconditional.
(4) A bill is not invalid by reason—
(a) That it is not dated;
(b) That it does not specify the value given, or that any value
has been given therefor;
(c) That it does not specify the place where it is drawn or the
place where it is payable.

Inland and foreign bills.
purports
(1) An inland bill is a bill which
on the face
be—(a) both drawn and payable within the British Islands,
(b)
drawn within the British Islands upon Some person resident therein.
Any other bill
foreign bill.
purposes
For the
this act “British Islands” mean any part
the
Kingdom
Man,
United
Great Britain and Ireland, the Islands
of

of

a

of

of

is

to

or

it

of

or

is,

4.
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Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, and Sark, and the Islands adjacent to any

of them being part of the dominions of Her Majesty.
(2) Unless the contrary appear on the face of the bill the holder
may treat it as an inland bill.
5. Effect

where different

parties to bill are the same person.

(1) A bill may be drawn payable to, or to the order of, the drawer;
or it may be drawn payable to, or to the order of, the drawee.

(2) Where in a bill drawer and drawee are the same person, or where
the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to
contract, the holder may treat the instrument, at his option, either as
a bill of exchange or as a promissory note.

6. Address to drawee.

(1) The drawee must be named or otherwise indicated in a bill
With reasonable certainty.
(2) A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees whether they
are partners or not, but an order addressed to two drawees in the
alternative, or two or more drawees in succession, is not a bill of
exchange.
7. Certainty required as to payee.

(1) Where a bill is not payable to bearer, the payee must be named
or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.
(2) A bill may be made payable to two or more payees jointly, or

it

may be made payable in the alternative to one of two, or one or some

of several payees. A bill may also be made payable to the holder of an
office for the time being.
(3) Where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill
may be treated as payable to bearer.
8.

What bills are negotiable.

(1) When a bill contains words prohibiting transfer, or indicating
an intention that it should not be transferable, it is valid as between
the parties thereto, but is not negotiable.
(2) A negotiable bill may be payable either to order or to bearer.
(3) A bill is payable to bearer which is expressed to be so payable,
or on which the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
(4) A bill is payable to order which is expressed to be so payable,
or which is expressed to be payable to a particular person, and does
not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that

it

should not be transferable.

(5) Where

a

bill, either originally or by indorsement, is expressed
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to be payable to the order of a specified person, and not to him or his
order, it is nevertheless payable to him or his order at his option.
9. Sum payable.

(1) The sum payable by a bill is a sum certain within the meaning
of this act, although it is required to be paid
(a) With interest.
(b) By stated instalments.
(c) By stated instalments, with a provision that upon default in
payment of any instalment the whole shall become due.
to an indicated rate of exchange, or according to
a rate of exchange to be ascertained as directed by the bill.
(2) Where the sum payable is expressed in words and also in figures,
and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum denoted by the
words is the amount payable.
(3) Where a bill is expressed to be payable with interest, unless the
instrument otherwise provides, interest runs from the date of the bill,
and if the bill is undated from the issue thereof.

(d) According

Bill payable
(1) A bill is

10.

on demand.
payable on demand
(a) Which is expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight,
or on presentation; or
(b) In which no time for payment is expressed. .
(2) Where a bill is accepted or indorsed when it is overdue, it shall,
as regards the acceptor who so accepts, or any indorser who so indorses
it, be deemed a bill payable on demand.

Bill payable at

a future time.
is payable at a determinable future time within the meaning
of this act which is expressed to be payable
(1) At a fixed period after date or sight.
(2) On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event
which is certain to happen, though the time of happening may be
uncertain.
An instrument expressed to be payable on a contingency is not a bill,
and the happening of the event does not cure the defect.
11.

A bill

of date in bill payable after date.
Where a bill expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is
issued undated, or where the acceptance of a bill payable at a fixed
period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true
date of issue or acceptance, and the bill shall be payable accordingly.
Provided that (1) where the holder in good faith and by mistake
inserts a wrong date, and (2) in every case where a Wrong date is

12. Omission

BILLS OF EXCHANGE

ACT.

239

if the bill subsequently comes into the hands of a holder in
course,
due
the bill shall not be avoided thereby, but shall operate
and be payable as if the date so inserted had been the true date.

inserted,

Ante-dating and post-dating.
Where a bill or an acceptance or any indorsement

13.

on a bill is dated,
the date shall, unless the contrary be proved, be deemed to be the true
date of the drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be.
(2) A bill is not invalid by reason only that it is ante-dated or post
dated, or that it bears date on a Sunday.

Computation of time of payment.
Where a bill is not payable on demand, the day on which it falls due
is determined as follows:
(1) Three days, called days of grace, are, in every case where the
bill itself does not otherwise provide, added to the time of payment
as fixed by the bill, and the bill is due and payable on the last day
of grace:
Provided that—
(a) When the last day of grace falls on Sunday, Christmas
Day, Good Friday, or a day appointed by Royal proclamation
as a public fast or thanksgiving day, the bill is, except in the
case hereinafter provided for, due and payable on the pre
ceding business day;
(b) When the last day of grace is a bank holiday (other than
Christmas day or Good Friday) under the Bank Holidays
Act, 1871,” and acts amending or extending it, or when the
last day of grace is a Sunday and the second day of grace
is a bank holiday, the bill is due and payable on the suc
ceeding business day.
(2) Where a bill is payable at a fixed period after date, after sight,
or after the happening of a specified event, the time of payment is
determined by excluding the day from which the time is to begin to
run and by including the day of payment.
(3) Where a bill is payable at a fixed period after sight, the time
begins to run from the date of the acceptance if the bill be accepted,
and from the date of noting or protest if the bill be noted or protested
for non-acceptance or for non-delivery.
14.

(4)

The term “month”

Case of need.
The drawer of

in

a

bill means calendar month.

15.

a bill and any indorser may insert therein the name
of a person to whom the holder may resort in case of need, that is to
say, in case the bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment.
*34 and 35

Vict.

ch. 17.
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Such person is called the referee in case of need. It is in the option
of the holder to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may
think fit.

stipulations by drawer or indorser.
The drawer of a bill, and any indorser, may insert therein an

16. Optional

express stipulation
(1) Negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder;
(2) Waiving as regards himself some or all of the holder's duties.

Definition and requisites of acceptance.
(1) The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of
his assent to the Order of the drawer.
(2) An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the following"

17.

conditions, namely:

(a) It must

on the bill and be signed by the drawee.
signature
The mere
of the drawee without additional words
is sufficient.
(b) It must not express that the drawee will perform his prom
ise by any other means than the payment of money.
18. Time

for

be written

acceptance.

A bill may be accepted
(1) Before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise

incomplete:

(2) When it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored by a pre
vious refusal to accept, or by non-payment:
(3) When a bill payable after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance,
and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder, in the absence of
any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill accepted as of the
date of first presentment to the drawee for acceptance.
19. General

and qualified acceptances.

(1) An acceptance is either (a) general or (b) qualified.
(2) A general acceptance assents without qualification to the order
of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms varies the
effect of the bill as drawn.
In particular an acceptance is qualified which is—
(a) Conditional, that is to say, which makes payment by the
acceptor dependent on the fulfillment of a condition therein
stated:

(b) Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only of
the amount for which the bill is drawn:
(c) Local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay only at a par
ticular specified place:
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An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general accept
ance unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid
there only and not elsewhere:

(d) Qualified as to time:
(e) The acceptance of SOme
of all.

One

or more of the drawees, but not

20. Inchoate

instruments.
(1) Where a simple signature On a blank Stamped paper is delivered
by the signer in Order that it may be converted into bill, it operates
as a prima facie authority to fill it up as a complete bill for any
amount the stamp will cover, using the signature for that of the
drawer, or the acceptor, or an indorser; and, in like manner, when a
bill is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession
of it has a prima facie authority to fill up the omission in any way
he thinks fit.
(2) In order that any such instrument when completed may be
enforceable against any person who became a party thereto prior to
its completion, it must be filled up within a reasonable time, and
strictly in accordance with the authority given.
Reasonable time for this purpose is a question of fact.
Provided that if any such instrument after completion is negotiated
to a holder in due course, it shall be valid and effectual for all pur
poses in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up
Within a reasonable time and strictly in accordance with the author
ity given.
21. Delivery.

(1) Every contract on a bill, whether it be the drawer's, the
acceptor's, or an indorser's, is incomplete and revocable, until delivery
of the instrument in order to give effect thereto.
Provided that where an acceptance is written on a bill, and the
drawee gives notice to or according to the directions of the person
entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, the acceptance then becomes
complete and irrevocable.
(2) As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party
Other than a holder in due course, the delivery—
(a) In order to be effectual must be made either by or under
the authority of the party drawing, accepting, or indorsing,
as the case may be:
(b) May be shown to have been conditional or for a special
purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the bill.
But

if

16

the

bill

be

in the hands of

a holder

in due course a valid
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delivery of the bill by all parties prior to him so as to make them
liable to him is conclusively presumed.
(3) Where a bill is no longer in the possession of a party who has
signed it as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, a valid and unconditional
delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
Capacity and Authority of Parties.
22. Capacity of parties.
(1) Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is co-extensive with
capacity to contract.
Provided that nothing in this section shall enable a corporation to
make itself liable as drawer, acceptor, or indorser of a bill unless it is
competent to it so to do under the law for the time being in force
relating to corporations.
(2) Where a bill is drawn or indorsed by an infant, minor, or
corporation having no capacity or power to incur liability on a bill,
the drawing or indorsement entitles the holder to receive payment of
the bill, and to enforce it against any other party thereto.
23. Signature essential to liability.
No person is liable as drawer, indorser, or acceptor of a bill who has
not signed it as such:
Provided that—
(1) Where a person signs a bill in a trade or assumed name, he is
liable thereon as if he had signed it in his own name:
(2) The signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to the signa
ture by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as
partners in that firm.
Forged or unauthorized signature.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a signature on a bill
is forged or placed thereon without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorized signature is
wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the bill, or to give a dis
charge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party
thereto, can be acquired through or under that signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment of the
bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the ratification of
an unauthorized signature not amounting to a forgery.
24.

25.

A

Procuration signatures.
signature

but a limited

by procuration

operates as notice that the agent has

authority to sign, and the principal is only bound by
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the agent in so signing was acting within the actual

limits of his authority.

26. Person signing as agent or in representative capacity.
(1) Where a person signs a bill as drawer, indorser, or acceptor,
and adds words to his signature indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative character, he is not per
sonally liable thereon; but the mere addition to his signature of Words
describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character,
does not exempt him from personal liability.
(2) In determining whether a signature on a bill is that of the
principal or that of the agent by whose hand it is written, the con
struction most favorable to the Validity of the instrument shall be
adopted.

The Consideration
27. Value and holder for Value.

for a Bill.

by

consideration for a bill may be constituted
(a) Any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract;
(b) An antecedent debt or liability. Such a debt or liability is
deemed valuable consideration whether the bill is payable
on demand or at a future time.
(2) Where value has at any time been given for a bill the holder is
deemed to be a holder for value as regards the acceptor and all parties
to the bill who became parties prior to such time.
(3) Where the holder of a bill has a lien on it, arising either from
contract or by implication of law, he is deemed to be a holder for
value to the extent of the sum for which he has a lien.
(1) Valuable

28. Accommodation bill or party.
(1) An accommodation party to a bill is a person who has signed
a bill as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor,
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
(2) An accommodation party is liable on the bill to a holder for
value; and it is immaterial whether, when such holder took the bill,
he knew such party to be an accommodation party or not.
29. Holder in due course.

(1) A holder in due course is a holder who has taken a bill, com
plete and regular on the face of it, under the following conditions;
namely,
(a) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and
without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if
such was the fact:
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(b) That he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that
at the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice
of any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it.
(2) In particular the title of a person who negotiates a bill is de
fective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the bill, or
the acceptance thereof, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other
unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates
it in breach of faith, or under Such circumstances as amount to a
fraud.
holder (whether for value or not), who derives his title to a
a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party
to any fraud or illegality affecting it, has all the rights of that holder
in due course as regards the acceptor and all parties to the bill prior
to that holder.
(3)

A

bill through

30. Presumption

of value and good faith.

(1) Every party whose signature appears on a bill is prima facie
to have become a party thereto for value.

deemed

(2) Every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in
due course; but if in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that
the acceptance, issue, or subsequent negotiation of the bill, is affected
with fraud, duress, or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of proof
is shifted, unless and until the holder proves that, subsequent to the
alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith been given for the
bill.

Negotiation

of Bills.

of bill.
(1) A bill is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to
another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder
of the bill.

31. Negotiation

(2) A bill payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery.
(3) A bill payable to order is negotiated by the indorsement of the
holder completed by delivery.
(4) Where the holder of a bill payable to his order transfers it for
Value Without indorsing it, the transfer gives the transferee such title
as the transferor had in the bill, and the transferee in addition ac
quires the right to have the indorsement of the transferor.
(5) Where any person is under obligation to indorse a bill in a
representative capacity, he may indorse the bill in such terms as to
negative personal liability.
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of a valid indorsement.

An indorsement in order to operate as a negotiation must comply
with the following conditions, namely:
(1) It must be written on the bill itself and be signed by the in
dorser. The simple signature of the indorser on the bill, without addi
tional words, is sufficient.
An indorsement written on an allonge, or on a “copy” of a bill
issued or negotiated in a country where “copies” are recognized, is
deemed to be written on the bill itself.
(2) It must be an indorsement of the entire bill. A partial in
dorsement, that is to say, an indorsement which purports to transfer
to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or which purports
to transfer the bill to two or more indorsees severally, does not operate
as a negotiation of the bill.
(3) Where a bill is payable to the order of two or more payees or
indorsees who are not partners all must indorse, unless the one in
dorsing has authority to indorse for the others.
(4) Where, in a bill payable to order, the payee or indorsee is
wrongly designated, or his name is misspelt, he may indorse the bill as
therein described adding, if he thinks fit, his proper signature.
(5) Where there are two or more indorsements on a bill, each in
dorsement is deemed to have been made in the order in which it ap
pears on the bill, until the contrary is proved.
(6) An indorsement may be made in blank or special.
terms making it restrictive.

It

may also

contain
33.

Conditional indorsement.

Where a bill purports to be indorsed conditionally, the condition
may be disregarded by the payer, and payment to the indorsee is valid
whether the condition has been fulfilled or not.
34. Indorsement

in blank and special indorsement.

(1) An indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and a bill so
indorsed becomes payable to bearer.

(2) A special indorsement Specifies the person to whom, or to whose
order, the bill is to be payable.
(3) The provisions of this Act relating to a payee apply with the
necessary modifications to an indorsee under a special indorsement.

in blank, any holder may convert
special
the blank indorsement into a
indorsement by writing above
the indorser's signature a direction to pay the bill to or to the order
of himself or some other person.
(4) When

a

bill has

been indorsed
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35.

Restrictive

indorsement.

(1) An indorsement is restrictive which prohibits the further nego
tiation of the bill, or which expresses that it is a mere authority to
deal with the bill as thereby directed, and not a transfer of the owner
ship thereof, as, for example, if a bill be indorsed “Pay D. only,” or
“Pay D. for the account of X.” or “Pay D. or order for collection.”
(2) A restrictive indorsement gives the indorsee the right to re
ceive payment of the bill and to sue any party thereto that his indorser
could have sued, but gives him no power to transfer his rights as in
dorsee unless it expressly authorize him to do so.
(3) Where a restrictive indorsement authorizes further transfer, all
subsequent indorsees take the bill with the same rights and Subject
to the same liabilities as the first indorsee under the restrictive
in
dorsement.
36. Negotiation

of overdue or dishonoured bill.
(1) Where a bill is negotiable in its origin it continues to be nego
tiable until it has been (a) restrictively indorsed or (b) discharged
by payment or otherwise.
(2) Where an overdue bill is negotiated, it can only be negotiated
subject to any defect of title affecting it at its maturity, and thence
forward no person who takes it can acquire or give a better title than

that which the person from whom he took it had.
(3) A bill payable on demand is deemed to be overdue within the
meaning and for the purposes of this section, when it appears on the
face of it to have been in circulation for an unreasonable length of
time. What is an unreasonable length of time for this purpose is a
question of fact.
(4) Except where an indorsement bears date after the maturity of
the bill, every negotiation is prima facie deemed to have been effected
before the bill Was Overdue.

(5) Where a bill which is not overdue has been dishonoured any
person who takes it with notice of the dishonour takes it subject to
any defect of title attaching thereto at the time of dishonour, but
nothing in this sub-section shall affect the rights of a holder in due
course.
37. Negotiation

of bill to party already liable thereon.

Where a bill is negotiated back to the drawer, or to a prior in
dorser, or to the acceptor, such party may, subject to the provisions of
this Act, re-issue and further negotiate the bill, but he is not entitled
to enforce payment of the bill against any intervening party to whom
he was previously liable.
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38. Rights of the holder.
The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are as follows:
(1) He may sue on the bill in his own name:
(2) Where he is a holder in due course, he holds the bill free from
any defect of title of prior parties, as well as from mere personal
defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce
payment against all parties liable on the bill:
(3) Where his title is defective (a) if he negotiates the bill to a
holder in due course, that holder obtains a good and complete title to
the bill, and (b) if he obtains payment of the bill the person who
pays him in due course gets a valid discharge for the bill.

General Duties of the Holder.
39. When presentment

for acceptance is necessary.

(1) Where a bill is payable after sight, presentment for acceptance
is necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument.
(2) Where a bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for
acceptance, or where a bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the
residence or place of business of the drawee, it must be presented for
acceptance before it can be presented for payment.
(3) In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in
order to render liable any party to the bill.
(4) Where the holder of a bill, drawn payable elsewhere than at
the place of business or residence of the drawee, has not time, with
the exercise of reasonable diligence, to present the bill for acceptance
before presenting it for payment on the day that it falls due, the de
lay caused by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting it
for payment is excused, and does not discharge the drawer and in
dorserS.
40.

Time for presenting bill payable after sight.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill payable after
sight is negotiated, the holder must either present it for acceptance
or negotiate it within a reasonable time.
(2) If he do not do so, the drawer and all indorsers prior to that

holder are discharged.

(3) In determining what is a reasonable time within the meaning
of this section, regard shall be had to the nature of the bill, the usage
of trade with respect to similar bills, and the facts of the particular
CRS e.
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41. Rules as to presentment for acceptance, and excuses for non-pre
Sentment.
(1) A bill is duly presented for acceptance which is presented in
accordance with the following rules:
(a) The presentment must be made by or on behalf of the
holder to the drawee, or to some person authorized to accept
Or refuse acceptance on his behalf, at a reasonable hour on
a business day and before the bill is overdue:
(b) Where a bill is addressed to two or more drawees, who are
not partners, presentment must be made to them all, unless
One has authority to accept for all, then presentment may
be made to him

only:

dead, presentment may be made to his
representative:
the drawee is bankrupt, presentment may be made
or his trustee:
authorized by agreement or usage, a presentment
the post office is sufficient.

(c) Where the drawee is
personal

(d) Where
to him
(e) Where
through

(2) Presentment in accordance with these rules is excused, and a
bill may be treated as dishonoured by non-acceptance—
(a) Where the drawee is dead, or is a fictitious person or a
person not having capacity to contract by bill:
(b) Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, such pre
Sentment cannot be effected:
the presentment has been irregular, ac
ceptance has been refused on some other ground.
(3) The fact that the holder has reason to believe that the bill, on
presentment, will be dishonoured does not excuse presentment.

(c) Where, although

Non-acceptance.
(1) When a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not accepted
within the customary time, the person presenting it must treat it as
dishonoured by non-acceptance.
If he do not, the holder shall lose
his right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers.
42.

Dishonour by non-acceptance and its consequences.
(1) A bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance
(a) When it is duly presented for acceptance, and such an ac
ceptance as is prescribed by this act is refused or cannot be
obtained; or
(b) When presentment for acceptance is excused and the bill

43.

is not accepted.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is dishonoured
by non-acceptance,
an immediate right of recourse against the drawer
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for payment

neceSSary.

44. Duties as to qualified

acceptances.

a qualified acceptance,
and if he does not obtain an unqualified acceptance may treat the bill
as dishonoured by non-acceptance.
(2) Where a qualified acceptance is taken, and the drawer or an in
dorser has not expressly or impliedly authorized the holder to take
a qualified acceptance, or does not subsequently assent thereto, such
drawer or indorser is discharged from his liability on the bill.
The provisions of this sub-section do not apply to a partial accept
ance, whereof due notice has been given. Where a foreign bill has
been accepted as to part, it must be protested as to the balance.
(3) When the drawer or indorser of a bill receives notice of a
qualified acceptance, and does not within a reasonable time express his
dissent to the holder, he shall be deemed to have assented thereto.

(1) The holder of

a

bill may refuse to take

45. Rules as to presentment for payment.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a bill must be duly presented
for payment. If it be not so presented the drawer and indorsers
shall be discharged.

A bill is

duly presented for payment which is presented in accord
ance with the following rules:
(1) Where the bill is not payable on demand, presentment must be
made on the day it falls due.
(2) Where the bill is payable on demand, then, subject to the pro
visions of this Act, presentment must be made within a reasonable
time after its issue in order to render the drawer liable, and within
a reasonable time after its indorsement, in order to render the in
dorser liable.
In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be had to
the nature of the bill, the usage of trade with regard to similar bills,

and the facts of the particular case.
(3) Presentment must be made by the holder or by some person
authorized to receive payment on his behalf at a reasonable hour on a
business day, at the proper place as hereinafter defined, either to the
person designated by the bill as payer, or to some person authorized
to pay or refuse payment on his behalf if with the exercise of reason
able diligence such person can there be found.
(4) A bill is presented at the proper place:
(a) Where a place of payment is specified in the bill and the
bill is there presented.

(b) Where no place of payment is specified, but the address
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of the drawee or acceptor is given in the bill, and the bill
is there presented.
(c) Where no place of payment is specified and no address
given, and the bill is presented at the drawee's or acceptor's
place of business if known, and if not, at his ordinary resi
dence

if

knoWIm.

(d) In any other case if presented to the drawee or acceptor
wherever he can be found, or if presented at his last known
place of business or residence.
(5) Where a bill is presented at the proper place, and after the ex
ercise of reasonable diligence no person authorized to pay or refuse
payment can be found there, no further presentment to the drawee or
acceptor is required.
(6) Where a bill is drawn upon, or accepted by two or more per
sons who are not partners, and no place of payment is specified, pre

sentment must be made to them all.
(7) Where the drawee or acceptor of a bill is dead, and no place
of payment is specified, presentment must be made to a personal repre
sentative, if such there be, and with the exercise of reasonable dili
gence

he

can be found.

(8) Where authorized by agreement or
the post-office is sufficient.

usage a presentment through

Excuses for delay or non-presentment for payment.
(1) Delay in making presentment for payment is excused when the
delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder,
and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence. When
the cause of delay ceases to operate presentment must be made with
reasonable diligence.
(2) Presentment for payment is dispensed with,
(a) Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, present
ments as required by this Act, cannot be effected.
46.

The fact that the holder has reason to believe that the bill will, on
presentment, be dishonoured, does not dispense with the necessity

for presentment.
(b) Where the drawee is a fictitious person.
(c) As regards the drawer where the drawee or acceptoi is not
bound, as between himself and the drawer, to accept or pay
the bill, and the drawer has no reason to believe that the bill
Would be paid

if

presented.

(d) As regards an indorser, where the bill was accepted or
made for the accommodation of that indorser, and he has no
reason to expect that the bill would be paid if presented.
(e) By waiver of presentment, express or implied.
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by non-payment.

(1) A bill is dishonoured by non-payment (a) when it is duly pre
Sented for payment and payment is refused or cannot be obtained, or
(b) when presentment is excused and the bill is overdue and unpaid.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is dishonoured
by non-payment, an immediate right of recourse against the drawer
and

indorsers accrues to the holder.

48. Notice of dishonour and effect of non-notice.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill has been dishon
oured by non-acceptance or by non-payment, notice of dishonour must
be given to the drawer and each indorser, and any drawer or indorser
to whom such notice is not given is discharged;

that—
(1) Where a bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and notice of
dishonour is not given, the rights of a holder in due course Subsequent
Provided

to the omission, shall not be prejudiced by the Omission.
(2) Where a bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and due notice
of dishonor is given, it shall not be necessary to give notice of a sub
sequent dishonour by non-payment unless the bill shall in the mean
time have been accepted.
49. Rules as to notice of dishonour.
Notice of dishonour in order to be valid and effectual must be given
in accordance with the following rules:
(1) The notice must be given by or on behalf of the holder, or by or
on behalf of an indorser who, at the time of giving it, is himself liable
on the bill.
(2) Notice of dishonour may be given by an agent either in his own
name, or in the name of any party entitled to give notice whether
that party be his principal or not.
(3) Where the notice is given by or on behalf of the holder, it
enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and all prior indorsers
who have a right of recourse against the party to whom it is given.
(4) Where notice is given by or on behalf of an indorser entitled
to give notice as hereinbefore provided, it enures for the benefit of
the holder and all indorsers subsequent to the party to whom notice is
given.

(5) The notice may be given in writing or by personal communica
tion, and may be given in any terms which sufficiently identify the
bill, and intimate that the bill has been dishonoured by non-acceptance
Or non-payment.
(6) The return of a dishonoured bill to the drawer or an indorser
is, in point of form, deemed a sufficient notice of dishonour.
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(7) A written notice need not be signed, and an insufficient written
notice may be supplemented and Validated by verbal communication.
A misdescription of the bill shall not vitiate the notice unless the
party to whom the notice is given is in fact misled thereby.
(8) Where notice of dishonour is required to be given to any per
son, it may be given either to the party himself, or to his agent in
that behalf.
(9) Where the drawer or indorser is dead, and the party giving
notice knows it, the notice must be given to a personal representative,
if such there be, and with the exercise of reasonable diligence he can
be found.
(10) Where the drawer or indorser is bankrupt,
either to the party himself or to the trustee.

notice may be given

(11) Where there are two or more drawers or indorsers who are
not partners notice must be given to each of them, unless one of them
has authority to receive such notice for the others.
(12) The notice may be given as soon as the bill is dishonoured,
and must be given within a reasonable time thereafter.
In the absence of special circumstances notice is not deemed to
have been given within a reasonable time, unless

(a) Where the person giving and the person to receive notice
reside in the same place, the notice is given or Sent Off in
time to reach the latter on the day after the dishonour of
the bill.
(b) Where the person giving and the person to receive notice
reside in different places, the notice is sent off on the day
after the dishonour of the bill, if there be a post at a con
venient hour on that day, and if there be no such post on
that day then by the next post thereafter.

(13) Where a bill when dishonoured is in the hands of an agent, he
may either himself give notice to the parties liable on the bill, or he
may give notice to his principal.
If he give notice to his principal,
he must do so within the same time as if he were the holder, and the
principal upon receipt of such notice has himself the same time for
giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder.
(14) Where a party to a bill receives due notice of dishonour, he
has after the receipt of such notice the same period of time for giving
notice to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dishonour.
(15) Where a notice of dishonour is duly addressed and posted,
the sender is deemed to have given due notice of dishonour, notwith
standing any miscarriage by the post-office.
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50. Excuses for non-notice and delay.
(1) Delay in giving notice of dishonour is excused where the delay
is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the party giving
notice, and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence.
When the cause of delay ceases to operate the notice must be given
with reasonable diligence.

(2) Notice of dishonour is dispensed with—
(a) When, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, notice as
required by this act cannot be given to or does not reach
the drawer or indorser sought to be charged:
(b) By waiver, express or implied. Notice of dishonour may be
waived before the time of giving notice has arrived, or after
the omission to give due notice:
(c) As regards the drawer in the following cases, namely, (1)
where drawer and drawee are the same person, (2) where
the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having
capacity to contract, (3) where the drawer is the person to
whom the bill is presented for payment, (4) where the
drawee or acceptor is as between himself and the drawer
under no obligation to accept or pay the bill, (5) where the
drawer has countermanded payment:
(d) As regards the indorser in the following cases, namely (1)
where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not
having capacity to contract and the indorser was aware of
the fact at the time he indorsed the bill, (2) where the in
dorser is the person to whom the bill is presented for pay
ment, (3) where the bill was accepted or made for his ac
commodation.

or protest of bill.
(1) Where an inland bill has been dishonoured it may, if the
holder think fit, be noted for non-acceptance or non-payment, as the
case may be; but it shall not be necessary to note or protest any such
bill in order to preserve the recourse against the drawer or indorser.
(2) Where a foreign bill, appearing on the face of it to be such,
has been dishonoured by non-acceptance it must be duly protested for
non-acceptance, and where such a bill, which has not been previously
by non-acceptance,
dishonoured
is dishonoured by non-payment it
must be duly protested for non-payment.
If it be not so protested the
drawer and indorsers are discharged.
Where a bill does not appear
on the face of it to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dis
honour is unnecessary.
(3) A bill which has been protested for non-acceptance may be sub
Bequently protested for non-payment.
51.

Noting
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(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is noted or
protested, it must be noted on the day of its dishonour. When a bill
has been duly noted, the protest may be subsequently extended as of
the date of the noting.
(5) Where the acceptor of a bill becomes bankrupt or insolvent or
suspends payment before it matures, the holder may cause the bill
to be protested for better security against the drawer and indorsers.
(6) A bill must be protested at the place where it is dishonoured:
that—
(a) When a bill is presented through

Provided

the post-office, and re
turned by post dishonoured, it may be protested at the
place to which it is returned and on the day of its return
if received during business hours, and if not received during
business hours, then not later than the next business day:
(b) When a bill drawn payable at the place of business or resi
dence of some person other than the drawee, has been dis
honoured by non-acceptance,
it must be protested for non
payment at the place where it is expressed to be payable,
and no further presentment for payment to, or demand on,
the drawee is necessary.
(7) A protest must contain a copy of the bill, and must be signed
by the notary making it, and must specify
(a) The person at whose request the bill is protested:
(b) The place and date of protest, the cause or reason for pro
testing the bill, the demand made, and the answer given, if
any, or the fact that the drawee or acceptor could not be
found.
(8) Where a bill is lost or destroyed, or is wrongly detained from
the person entitled to hold it, protest may be made on a copy or writ
ten particulars thereof.
(9) Protest is dispensed with by any circumstance which would
dispense with notice of dishonour.
Delay in noting or protesting is
excused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control
of the holder, and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negli.
gence.
When the cause of delay ceases to operate the bill must be
noted or protested with reasonable diligence.
52.

Duties of holder as regards drawee or acceptor.

(1) When a bill is accepted generally presentment for payment is
not necessary in order to render the acceptor liable.
(2) When by the terms of a qualified acceptance presentment for
payment is required, the acceptor, in the absence of an express stipu
lation to that effect, is not discharged by the omission to present the
bill for payment on the day that it matures.
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(3) In order to render the acceptor of a bill liable it is not neces
sary to protest it, or that notice of dishonour should be given to him.
(4) Where the holder of a bill presents it for payment, he shall ex
hibit the bill to the person from whom he demands payment, and
when a bill is paid the holder shall forthwith deliver it up to the
party paying it.
Liabilities of Parties.
b3. Funds in hands of drawee.
(1) A bill, of itself, does not operate as an assignment of funds in
the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the
drawee of a bill who does not accept as required by this Act is not

liable

on

the instrument.

This sub-Section shall not extend to Scot

land.

(2) In Scotland, where the drawee of a bill has in his hands funds
available for the payment thereof, the bill operates as an assignment
of the sum for which it is drawn in favor of the holder, from the
time when the bill is presented to the drawee.

it

Liability of acceptor.
The acceptor of a bill, by accepting
(1) Engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his ac

54.

ceptance:
(2)

Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course:
(a) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signa
ture, and his capacity and authority to draw the bill;
(b) In the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the then
capacity of the drawer to indorse, but not the genuineness
or validity of his indorsement;
(c) In the case of a bill payable to the order of a third person,
the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse,
but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement.

Liability of drawer or indorser.
(1) The drawer of a bill by drawing it—
(a) Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and
paid according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured
he will compensate the holder or any indorser who is com
pelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceedings on

55.

dishonour be duly taken;
(b) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the
existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
(2) The indorser of a bill by indorsing it—
(a) Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and
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according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured
he will compensate the holder or a subsequent indorser who
is compelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceed
ings on dishonour be duly taken;
(b) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the
genuineness and regularity in all respects of the drawer's
signature and all previous indorsements;
(c) Is precluded from denying to his immediate or a subsequent
indorsee that the bill was at the time of his indorsement
a valid and subsisting bill, and that he had then a good
title thereto.
paid

56. Stranger signing bill liable as indorser.
Where a person signs a bill otherwise than as drawer or acceptor,
he thereby incurs the liabilities of an indorser to a holder in due
course.
57. Measure of damages against parties to dishonoured bill.
Where a bill is dishonoured, the measure of damages, which shall
be deemed to be liquidated damages,
shall be as follows:
(1) The holder may recover from any party liable on the bill, and
the drawer who has been compelled to pay the bill may recover from
the acceptor, and an indorser who has been compelled to pay the bill
may recover from the acceptor or from the drawer, or from a prior

indorser

(a) The amount of the bill:
(b) Interest thereon from the time of presentment for pay
ment if the bill is payable on demand, and from the matur
ity of the bill in any other case:
(c) The expenses of noting, or, when protest is necessary, and
the protest has been extended, the expenses of protest.
(2) In the case of a bill which has been dishonoured abroad, in
lieu of the above damages, the holder may recover from the drawer
or an indorser, and the drawer or an indorser who has been compelled
to pay the bill may recover from any party liable to him, the amount
of the re-exchange with interest thereon until the time of payment.
(3) Where by this Act interest may be recovered as damages, such
interest may, if justice require it, be withheld wholly or in part, and
where a bill is expressed to be payable with interest at a given rate,
interest as damages may or may not be given
interest proper.

at the same rate as

Transferor by delivery and transferee.
(1) Where the holder of a bill payable to bearer negotiates it by
delivery without indorsing it, he is called a “transferor by delivery.”
58.
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(2) A transferor by delivery is not liable on the instrument.
(3) A transferor by delivery who negotiates a bill thereby war
Tants to his immediate transferee being a holder for value that the
bill is what it purports to be, that he has a right to transfer it,
and that at the time of transfer he is not aware of any fact which
renderS

it

ValueleSS.

Discharge
59.

of Bill.

Payment in due course.

(1) A bill is discharged by payment in due course by or on be
half of the drawee or acceptor.
“Payment in due course” means payment made at or after the
maturity of the bill to the holder thereof in good faith and without
notice that his title to the bill is defective.
(2) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, when a bill
is paid by the drawer or an indorser it is not discharged; but
(a) Where a bill payable to, or to the order of, a third party
is paid by drawer, the drawer may enforce payment
thereof against the acceptor, but may not re-issue the

bill:
(b) Where

a bill is paid by an indorser, or where "a bill pay
able to drawer's order is paid by the drawer, the party
paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards the
acceptor or antecedent parties, and he may, if he thinks
fit, strike out his own and subsequent indorsements, and
again negotiate the bill.
(3) Where an accommodation bill is paid in due course by the
party accommodated the bill is discharged.

Banker paying demand draft whereon indorsement is forged.
When a bill payable to Order on demand is drawn. On a banker,
and the banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith
and in the ordinary course of business, it is not incumbent on the
banker to show that the indorsement of the payee or any subsequent
indorsement was made by or under the authority of the person whose
indorsement it purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid
the bill in due course, although such indorsement has been forged
Or made Without authority.
60.

61.

Acceptor the holder at maturity.

When

the acceptor of a bill is or becomes the holder of
in his own right, the bill is discharged.

after its maturity,
17

it

at or
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62. Express waiver.

(1) When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity absolutely
and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor the bill
is discharged.
The renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered
up to the acceptor.

The liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner
be renounced by the holder before, at, or after its maturity; but
nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a holder in due
(2)

course without

notice of the renunciation.

63. Cancellation.

(1) Where a bill is intentionally cancelled by the holder or his
agent, and the cancellation
is apparent thereon, the bill is dis
charged.
(2)

In like manner any party liable on

by

a

bill may

signature

be discharged

the intentional
cancellation of his
the holder or
agent. In such case any indorser who would have had a right of
recourse against the party whose signature is cancelled, is also dis
charged.
by

his

(3) A- cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mistake, or
without the authority of the holder, is inoperative; but where a bill
or any signature thereon appears to have been cancelled the burden
of proof lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made
unintentionally,
or under a mistake, or without authority.
64.

Alteration of bill.

(1) Where a bill or acceptance is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except as
against a party who has himself made, authorised, or assented to
the alteration, and subsequent indorsers.
Provided that,
Where a bill has been materially altered, but the alteration is not
apparent, and the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course,
such holder may avail himself of the bill as if it had not been
altered, and may enforce payment of it according to its original
tenour.

(2) In particular the following alterations are material, namely,
any alteration of the date, the sum payable, the time of payment,
the place of payment, and, where a bill has been accepted generally,
the addition of a place of payment without the acceptor's assent.
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for Honour.

for honour supra protest.

(1) Where a bill of exchange has been protested for dishonour
by non-acceptance, or protested for better security, and is not over
due, any person, not being a party already liable thereon, may, with
the consent of the holder, intervene and accept the bill supra protest,
for the honour of any party liable thereon, or for the honour of the
person for whose account the bill is drawn.
(2) A bill may be accepted for honour for part only of the sum
for which it is drawn.
(3) An acceptance for honour Supra protest in order to be valid

must

(a) Be written on the bill, and indicate that it is an accept
ance for honour:
(b) Be Signed by the acceptor for honour.
(4) Where an acceptance for honour does not expressly state for
whose honour it is made, it is deemed to be an acceptance for the

honour

of the drawer.

(5) Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for honour, its
maturity is calculated from the date of the noting for non-accept
ance, and not from the date of the acceptance for honour.
G6.

Liability of acceptor for honour.

(1) The acceptor for honour of a bill by accepting it engages
that he will, on due presentment, pay the bill according to the tenor
of his acceptance, if it is not paid by the drawee, provided it has
been duly presented for payment, and protested for non-payment,
and that he receives notice of these facts.
(2) The acceptor for honour is liable to the holder and to all
parties to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honour he has
accepted.
67. Presentment

to acceptor for honour.

(1) Where a dishonoured bill has been accepted for honour supra
protest, or contains a reference in case of need, it must be protested
for non-payment before it is presented for payment to the acceptor
for honour, or referee in case of need.
(2) Where the address of the acceptor for honour is in the same
place where the bill is protested for non-payment, the bill must be
presented to him not later than the day following its maturity;
and where the address of the acceptor for honour is in some place
other than the place where it was protested for non-payment, the
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bill must be forwarded not later than the day following its maturity
for presentment to him.
(3) Delay in presentment or non-presentment is excused by any
circumstance which would excuse delay in presentment for payment
or non-presentment for payment.
(4) When a bill of exchange is dishonoured by the acceptor for
honour it must be protested for non-payment by him.
68.

Payment

for honour supra protest.

(1) Where a bill has been protested for non-payment, any person
may intervene and pay it supra protest for the honour of any party
liable thereon, or for the honour of the person for whose account
the bill is drawn.
(2)
Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill for the honour
of different parties, the person whose payment will discharge most
parties to the bill shall have the preference.
(3) Payment for honour supra protest, in order to operate as
such and not as a mere voluntary payment, must be attested by a
notarial act of honour which may be appended to the protest or
form an extension of it.
(4) The notarial act of honour must be founded on a declaration
made by the payer for honour, or his agent in that behalf, declaring
his intention to pay the bill for honour, and for whose honour he
payS.

(5) Where a bill has been paid for honour, all parties subsequent
to the party for whose honour it is paid are discharged, but the
payer for honour is subrogated for, and succeeds to both the rights
and duties of, the holder as regards the party for whose honour he
pays, and all parties liable to that party.
(6) The payer for honour, on paying to the holder the amount
of the bill and the notarial expenses incidental to its dishonour, is
entitled to receive both the bill itself and the protest. If the holder
do not on demand deliver them up, he shall be liable to the payer
for honour in damages.
(7) Where the holder of a bill refuses to receive payment supra
protest he shall lose his right of recourse against any party who
would

have been

discharged

by such payment.

Lost Instruments.
69. Holder's right to duplicate of lost bill.
Where a bill has been lost before it is overdue, the person who
was the holder of it may apply to the drawer to give him another
bill of the same tenor, giving security to the drawer if required to

BILLS OF EXCHANGE

ACT.

261

indemnify him against all persons whatever in case the bill alleged
to have been lost shall be found again.
If the drawer on request as aforesaid refuses to give such dupli
cate bill, he may be compelled to do so.

Action on lost bill.
In any action or proceeding upon a bill, the court or
order that the loss of the instrument shall not be set
70.

a judge may
up, provided

an indemnity be given to the satisfaction of the court or judge
against the claims of any other person upon the instrument in
question.

Bill

in a Set.

Rules as to sets.

71.

Where a bill is drawn in a set, each part of the set being
numbered, and containing a reference to the other parts, the whole
of the parts constitute one bill.
(2) Where the holder of a set indorses two or more parts to
different persons, he is liable on every such part, and every indorser
Subsequent to him is liable on the part he has himself indorsed as
if the said parts were separate bills.
(3) Where two or more parts of a set are negotiated to different
holders in due course, the holder whose title first accrues is as

(1)

between such holders deemed the true owner of the bill; but nothing
in this sub-section shall affect the rights of a person who in due
course accepts or pays the part first presented to him.
(4) The acceptance may be Written on any part, and it must
be Written on One part only.
If the drawee accepts more than one part, and such accepted parts
get into the hands of different holders in due course, he is liable
on every Such part as if it were a separate bill.
(5) When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it without
requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be delivered up to him,
and that part at maturity is outstanding in the hands of a holder
in due course, he is liable to the holder thereof.
(6) Subject to the preceding rules, where any one part of a bill
drawn in a set is discharged by payment or otherwise, the whole
bill is discharged.
Conflict of Laws.
Rules where laws conflict.
Where a bill drawn in one country is negotiated, accepted, or pay
able in another, the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties
thereto are determined as followS:
72.
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(1) The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is de
termined by the law of the place of issue, and the validity as regards
requisites in form of the Supervening contracts, such as acceptance,
or indorsement, or acceptance supra protest, is determined by the
law of the place where such contract was made.
Provided that—
(a) Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom it is
not invalid by reason only that it is not stamped in
accordance with the law of the place of issue:
(b) Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, conforms,
as regards requisites in form, to the law of the United
Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing payment
thereof, be treated as valid as between all persons who
negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the United
Kingdom.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the interpretation of
the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance supra protest of
a bill, is determined by the law of the place where such contract is
made.

Provided that where an inland bill is indorsed in a foreign country
the indorsement shall as regards the payer be interpreted according
to the law of the United Kingdom.
(3)
The duties of the holder with respect to presentment for
acceptance or payment and the necessity for or sufficiency of a
protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise, are determined by the
law of the place where the act is done or the bill is dishonoured.
(4) Where a bill is drawn out of but payable in the United King
dom and the sum payable is not expressed in the currency of the
United Kingdom, the amount shall, in the absence of some express
stipulation,
be calculated according
to the rate of exchange for
sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is payable.
(5) Where a bill is drawn in one country and is payable in
another, the due date thereof is determined according to the law
of the place where it is payable.

PART
CHEQUES
73. Cheque defined.
A cheque is a bill

ON

III.
A

BANKER.

of exchange drawn on a banker payable on
demand.
Except as otherwise provided in this Part, the provisions of this
Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a
cheque.
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Where a cheque is not presented for payment within a
reasonable time of its issue, and the drawer or the person on whose
account it is drawn had the right at the time of Such presentment
as between him and the banker to have the cheque paid and Suffers
actual damage through the delay, he is discharged to the extent of
such damage, that is to say, to the extent to which such drawer or
person is a creditor of such banker to a larger amount than he
would have been had such cheque been paid.
(2) In determining what is a reasonable time regard shall be
had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and of
bankers, and the facts of the particular case.
(3) The holder of such cheque as to which such drawer or person
is discharged shall be a creditor, in lieu of such drawer or person,
of such banker to the extent of such discharge, and entitled to re

(1)

cover the amount from him.
Revocation of banker's authority.
The duty and authority of a banker
him by his customer are determined
(1) Countermand of payment:
75.

byto

(2)

pay a cheque

drawn

on

Notice of the customer's death.
Crossed Cheques.

General and special crossings defined.
Where a cheque bears across its face an addition of
the words “and company” or any abbreviation thereof between two
parallel transverse lines, either with or without the words “not
negotiable;” or (b) two parallel transverse lines simply, either with
or Without the words “not negotiable;” that addition constitutes
a crossing, and the cheque is crossed generally.
(2) Where a cheque bears across its face an addition of the name
of a banker, either with or without the words “not negotiable,” that
addition constitutes a crossing, and the cheque is crossed specially
and to that banker.
76.

-(a)

(1)

77. Crossing

by drawer or after issue.
cheque may be crossed generally or specially by the drawer.
Where a cheque is uncrossed, the holder may cross it gen
or specially.
(3) Where a cheque is crossed generally the holder may cross
specially.

(1)
(2)
erally

it

A
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(4) Where a cheque is crossed generally or specially, the holder
may add the words “not negotiable.”
(5) Where a cheque is crossed specially, the banker to whom it
is crossed may again cross it specially to another banker for col
lection.
(6) Where an uncrossed cheque, or a cheque crossed generally,
is sent to a banker for collection, he may cross it specially to himself.
78. Crossing a material part of checque.
A crossing authorized by this Act is a material part of the
cheque; it shall not be lawful for any person to obliterate or, ex.
cept as authorized by this Act, to add to or alter the crossing.
79. Duties of banker as to crossed cheques.
(1) Where a cheque is crossed specially to more than one bank
er except when crossed to an agent for collection being a banker,
the banker on whom it is drawn shall refuse payment thereof.
(2) Where the banker on whom a cheque is drawn which is so
crossed nevertheless pays the same, or pays a cheque crossed gen
erally otherwise than to a banker, or if crossed specially otherwise
than to the banker to whom it is crossed, or his agent for collection
being a banker, he is liable to the true owner of the cheque for
any loss he may sustain owing to the cheque having been so paid.
Provided that where a cheque is presented for payment which
does not at the time of presentment appear to be crossed, or to
have had a crossing which has been obliterated, or to have been
added to or altered otherwise than as authorised by this Act, the
banker paying the cheque in good faith and without negligence shall
not be responsible or incur any liability, nor shall the payment be
questioned by reason of the cheque having been crossed, or of the
crossing having been obliterated or having been added to or altered
otherwise than as authorised by this Act, and of payment having
been made otherwise than to a banker or to the banker to whom
the cheque is or was crossed, or to his agent for collection being a
banker, as the case may be.

Protection to banker and drawer where cheque is crossed.
Where the banker, on whom a crossed cheque is drawn, in good
faith and without negligence pays it, if crossed generally, to a
banker, and if crossed specially, to the banker to whom it is crossed,
or his agent for collection being a banker, the banker paying the
cheque, and, if the cheque has come into the hands of the payee,
the drawer, shall respectively be entitled to the same rights and be
placed in the same position as if payment of the cheque had been
made to the true owner thereof.
80.
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81. Effect of crossing on holder.
Where a
words “not
of giving a
from whom
82.

person takes a crossed cheque which bears on it the
negotiable,” he shall not have and shall not be capable
better title to the cheque than that which the person
he took it had.

Protection

to collecting

banker.

Where a banker in good faith and without negligence receives
payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or specially
to himself, and the customer has no title or a defective title thereto,
the banker Shall not incur any liability to the true owner of the
cheque by reason only of having received such payment.

PART IV.
PROMISSORY

NOTES.

83. Promissory note defined.
(1)
A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing
by
made
one person to another signed by the maker, engaging to
pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum
certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person or to
bearer.
(2)
An instrument in the form of a note payable to maker's
order is not a note within the meaning of this section unless and
until it is indorsed by the maker.
(3)
A note is not invalid by reason only that it contains also
a pledge of collateral security with authority to sell or dispose
thereof.
(4) A note which is, or on the face of
made and payable within the British Islands
other note is a foreign note.
84.

A

purports

is an inland

to be, both
note.

Any

Delivery necessary.
promissory

of to the
85.

it

Joint

payee

note

is inchoate and incomplete until delivery there

or bearer.

and several notes.

(1) A promissory note may be made by two or more makers,
and they may be liable thereon jointly, or jointly and severally
according to its tenour.
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(2)

Where a note runs

Or more persons

it is

86. Note payable

“I

deemed

promise to pay” and is signed by two
to be their joint and several note.

on demand.

Where a note payable on demand has been indorsed, it must
be presented for payment within a reasonable time of the indorse
ment. If it be not so presented the indorser is discharged.

(1)

(2) In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be
had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and the
facts of the particular case.
a note payable on demand is negotiated, it is not
overdue for the purpose of affecting the holder with
defects of title of which he had no notice, by reason that it appears
that a reasonable time for presenting it for payment has elapsed
Since its issue.

(3)

deemed

Where

to be

87. Presentment

of note for payment.

(1) Where a promissory note is in the body of it made payable
at a particular place, it must be presented for payment at that place
in order to render the maker liable. In any other case, presentment
for payment is not necessary in order to render the maker liable.
(2)
Presentment for payment
the indorser of a note liable.

is necessary in order

to

render

(3) Where a note is in the body of it made payable at a par
ticular place, presentment at that place is necessary in order to
render an indorser liable; but when a place of payment is indi
cated by way of memorandum only, presentment at that place is
sufficient to render the indorser liable, but a presentment to the
maker elsewhere, if sufficient in other respects, shall also suffice.
88.

Liability of maker.

it

a promissory note by making
Engages that he will pay it according to its tenour;
(2) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course
existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.

The maker of
(1)

89.

Application of Part

II

the

to notes.

(1) Subject to the provisions in this Part, and, except as by this
section provided, the provisions of this Act relating to bills of ex
change apply, with the necessary modifications, to promissory notes.

(2)
deemed

In applying

those provisions the maker of a note shall be
to correspond with the acceptor of a bill, and the first indors
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er of a note shall be deemed to correspond with the drawer of an
accepted bill payable to drawer's order.
(3) The following provisions as to bills do not apply to notes;
namely, provisions relating to—
(a) Presentment for acceptance;

(b) Acceptance;
(c) Acceptance Supra protest;
(d) Bills in a set.
(4) Where a foreign note is dishonoured,

protest thereof

is un

necessary.

PART V.
SUPPLEMENTARY.
90.

Good faith.

A thing is deemed to be done in good faith, within the meaning
of this Act, where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done
negligently or not.
91. Signature.

Where, by this Act, any instrument or writing is required
sign
to be signed by any person, it is not necessary that he should
signature
written
is
hand,
his
if
sufficient
it
is
but
his
own
it with
thereon by some other person by or under his authority.

(1)

In the case of a corporation, where by this Act any instru
ment or writing is required to be signed, it is sufficient if the instru
ment or writing be sealed with the corporate Seal.
But nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the
bill or note of a corporation to be under seal.
(2)

92. Computation

of time.

by this Act, the time limited for doing any act or thing
is less than three days, in reckoning time, non-business days are
excluded.
“Non-business days” for the purposes of this Act mean
(a) Sunday, Good Friday, Christmas Day:
(b) A bank holiday under the Bank Holidays Act, 1871, or
Where,

acts amending it:
(c) A day appointed by Royal proclamation
or thanksgiving day.

Any other day is

a business

day.

as a public

fast
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93.

When noting equivalent to protest.

For the purposes of this Act, where a bill or note is required to
be protested within a specified time or before some further pro
ceeding is taken, it is sufficient that the bill has been noted for
protest before the expiration of the specified time or the taking of

the proceeding; and the formal protest may be extended at any time
thereafter as of the date of the noting.
94.

Protest

when notary

not accessible.

Where a dishonoured bill or note is authorized or required to be
protested, and the Services of a notary cannot be obtained at the
place where the bill is dishonoured, any householder or substantial
resident of the place may, in the presence of two witnesses, give a
certificate, signed by them, attesting the dishonour of the bill, and
the certificate shall in all respects operate as if it were a formal
protest of the bill.
The form given in Schedule 1 to this Act may be used with neces
Sary modifications, and if used shall be sufficient.
95. Dividend warrants may be crossed.

The provisions of this Act as to crossed cheques shall apply to
for payment of dividend.

a warrant

96. Repeal.

The enactments mentioned in the second Schedule to this Act are
hereby repealed as from the commencement of this Act to the extent
in that schedule mentioned.
Provided that such repeal shall not affect anything done or suf
fered, or any right, title, or interest acquired or accrued before the
commencement of this Act, or any legal proceeding or remedy in
respect of any such thing, right, title, or interest.
97.

Savings.

(1) The rules in bankruptcy relating to bills of exchange, prom
issory notes, and cheques, shall continue to apply thereto notwith
standing anything in this Act contained.
(2) The rules of common law including the law merchant, save
in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of
this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, promissory
notes, and
(3)

affect

cheques.

Nothing

in this Act or in any repeal

effected

thereby

shall
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in

or

it,

(a) The provisions of the Stamp Act, 1870," or acts amending
or any law
enactment for the time being
force

in of

in

or restrict,
Scotland

Summary diligence

Scotland.
any
repeal
this Act or
effected thereby shall extend
or in any Way alter or affect the law and practice in
regard
summary diligence.
in

Nothing

to

98. Saving

in

of

to

to

to

to

relating
the revenue:
(b) The provisions of the Companies Act, 1862,f or acts
joint stock banks
amending it, or any act relating
or companies:
(c) The provisions of any act relating
or confirming the
privileges of the Bank of England or the Bank of Ire
land respectively:
any usage relating
(d) The validity
dividend warrants,
or the indorsements thereof.

99. Construction

with other acts,

etc.

to

in

in

judicial proceedings
Parol evidence
Scotland.
any judicial proceeding
Scotland, any fact relating
in

In

100.

a

if
it

to

to

any enactment repealed by
Where any act or document refers
this Act, the act or document shall be construed, and shall operate,
as
referred
the corresponding provisions of this Act.

bill

a

a

is to
of
of

or

of

to

a

of

in

to

of

to

in

is

of exchange, bank cheque, or promissory note, which
relevant to
any question of liability thereon, may be proved by parol evidence:
any way affect the exist
Provided that this enactment shall not
ing law and practice whereby the party who is, according
the
exchange, bank cheque, or promissory note,
tenour of any bill
debtor
the holder
the amount thereof, may be required, as
obtaining
diligence,
suspension
charge,
condition
sist
or threatened charge, to make such consignation, or
find such
depending
caution as the court or judge before whom the cause
may require.
any case where the bill
exchange,
This section shall not apply
bank cheque, or promissory note has undergone the sesennial pre
scription.

Vict.

c.

*33 and 34

t25 and 26 Vict.

c.

97.

89.

a

of

protest which may be used when the services
Form
cannot be obtained.

of

FIRST SCHEDULE.
notary
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in the
Know all men that I, A. B. (householder), of
county of
Kingdom, at the request of C.
, in the United
day
D., there being no notary public available, did on the
of
188
at
demand payment (or acceptance)
of the bill of exchange hereunder written, from E. F., to which de
Wherefore, I now
mand he made answer (state answer, if any).
presence
protest
in the
of G. H. and J. K. do
the said bill of ex
change.
(Signed)

A. B.
G. H.

J.

K.

Witnesses.
}

N. B.—The bill itself should be annexed, or a copy of the bill and
all that is written thereon should be underwritten.
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ABSOLUTE OR REAL DEFENSES,

ACCEPTANCE

111.

meaning of, 24.
definition of, 192.
kinds of,
196.
general, what constitutes, 196.
qualified, 196.
conditional, 198.
local, 198.
partial, 198.
form of, 192.

must be in writing, 192.
must be signed, 192.
may be required on face of bill, 193.
signature of drawee sufficient, 192.
must be for payment in money,
is new contract, 112-118.

192.

by separate instrument, 193.
when binds acceptor, 193.
promise deemed an, 194.
by telegraph, 193.
oral promise a sufficient, at common law,
by agent, 194, 204.
cannot take qualified acceptance,
by executor, not authorized, 204.

200.

drawee for, 195.
retention of bill amounts to, when, 195.
holder need not take qualified, 199.
effect of taking qualified, 199.
of incomplete bill, 195-6.
Where bill Over due, 195-6.
after bill dishonored, 195-6.
date of, 195-6.
time allowed
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194.
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ACCEPTANCE–Continued.
when bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 206.
when bill dishonored by non-acceptance, duty of holder,
what bills must be protested for non-acceptance, 208.
of bills in sets, 223.

206.

ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR
when bill may be accepted for honor, 214.
how made, 215.
for part of sum, 214.
for different parties, 214.
when deemed to be for honor of drawer, 215.
admits, what, 216.
contract of, 216.
maturity

of bill payable, payable after sight accepted for honor,

217.

when delay in making presentment for excused,
protest of bills accepted for honor, 217.

218.

ACCEPTANCE SUPRA PROTEST
See Acceptance

ACCEPTOR
admissions

for Honor.

Of

existence of drawer, 117.
authority to draw, 117.
genuiness of drawer's signature, 117.
capacity to draw, 117.
of infant, 117-119.
of married woman, 117-119.
of lunatic, 119.
of corporation, 117-119.
does not admit signature of indorser, 118.
not presumed to know handwriting in body of bill, 118.
liability of, 117.
demand of payment not necessary to charge, 129.
when insolvent, bill may be protested for better security,

ACCEPTOR

FOR

HONOR

contract of, 216.
dishonor of bill accepted by,
presentment for payment to,

ACCOMMODATION

218.
217.

PAPER—

notes mutually exchanged are not, 78,
loan of credit necessary to constitute,

80.
80.

212.
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PAPER—Continued.

payment of by party accommodated, 172.
no implied warranty that bill is not, 124.

ACCOMMODATION
liability of, 79.

PARTIES

bound according to their relation to the paper, 79.
right to withdraw signature, 80.
corporations cannot make, 80.
partnership as, 80.
rights of on payment of instrument, 178.

ACTION
meaning

of,

24.

right to bring under restrictive

indorsement,

89.

AGENT
authority

of, 64.
how shown,
signature by, 64.

64.

person signing as, liability of, 65, 128.
duty of to present for acceptance, 202.
cannot take qualified acceptance, 200.
right to give notice of dishonor, 151-2.
notice of dishonor may be given to, 156.
holder may require production of authority

ALLONGE,

of, to accept,

204.

84.

ALTERATION
material,

what is, 184.
to date, 184.
to sum payable, 184.
to time of payment, 184.
to place of payment, 184.
as to number of parties, 185.
as to relation of parties, 185.
as to medium of payment, 185.
as to addition of place of payment,
as to other changes, 185.
material, what is not, 185-6.
burden of explaining, 183.
effect of, 182.
as
as
as
as

instrument may be enforced according
standing, 182.
18

185.

to original tenor, notwith
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INSTRUMENTS–

AMBIGUOUS

how construed, 60-1.

DEBT

ANTECEDENT

value, 72.

constitutes

ANTE

DATING

effect of, 54.

APPLICATION OF ACT,

24-26.

ASSIGNMENT
bill is not, 188.
check is not, 232.
when bill may amount to, 189.
When check may amount to, 233.
ASSUMED NAME
liability of person signing in,

ATTORNEY'S

FEE

effect of provision

63-4.

for, 35.

BANK–
meaning of,

24.

iability of on certified check, 230.
iability of as indorsee for collection, 88.
not liable on check without acceptance or certification,

paper payable at, how presentment made, 137
paper payable at, when suit may be brought on, 139.
duty of to present bill for acceptance, 202.
branch, notice of dishonor by, 153
instrument payable at, equivalent to order to pay, 147.

BANK

232.

NOTES

origin of,

20-1.

instrument payable in, 32.
negotiability of declared, 20.

BEARER
meaning

of, 24.

instrument must be payable to, or to order, 27.
instrument payable to, when, 50.
instrument payable to fictitious person is payable to, 50.
when payee not name of any person, 50.
when instrument payable to CASH, is payable to, 52.
when instrument payable to SUNDRIES is payable to, 52.
instrument indorsed in blank payable to, 50.
-
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BEARER-Continued.
instrument payable to, continues payable to notwithstanding
ial indorsement, 86, 92.
notwithstanding
special indorsement, 86, 92.

spec

BILL

meaning of, 24.

BILL OF EXCHANGE
definition of, 187.
kinds of, 189.
foreign bill what constitutes, 189.
negotiability of declared, 17.
inland bill what constitutes, 189.
negotiability declared, 17.
not an assignment, 188.
when bill may amount to assignment, 189.
ambiguous instrument may be considered either bill or note, 60
when bill may be treated as promissory note, 190.
where drawer and drawee are identical, 190.
where drawer and drawee are fictitious persons, 191.
may be addressed to two or more drawees, 189.
but not in the alternative, 189.
may name referee in case of need, 191.

BILLS IN A

SET

constitute one bill,
origin of, 222.

222.

form of, 222.
acceptance of, 223.
payment of, 224.
discharge of, 224.

rights of holder where different parts are negotiated, 223.
liability of indorser where different parts are negotiated,

BILLS OF EXCHANGE
origin of,

223.

ACT

6-8.

text of, 235-270.

BLANKS
when may be filled, 55.
when improperly filled, 55.
improperly filled where instrument

BOHEMIAN OATS NOTES,

44.

has not been declared, 56-7.
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BONDS
payable to bearer, 50.
public or corporate, liability of person negotiating,

122, 124.

BROKER
liability of in negotiating
BURDEN OF PROOF

instrument,

128.

as to cancellation, 182.
as to title of prior party being defective,

113.

CANCELLATION.—
effect of, 182.
discharges instrument when,
burden of proof as to, 182.

172.

CAPACITY

of drawer admitted by acceptance, 117.
of prior parties, warranted where negotiation by delivery, 122.
of prior parties, Warranted where negotiation by indorsement, 125.

CARRIER, LETTER—

delivery of notice of dishonor

CASH

instruments

payable to,

CASHIER

to, 163.

52.

instrument payable to, 92.
not disqualified to act as notary, 210, 211.

CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT

are promissory notes, 226.
are deemed continuing securities, 133.
bringing suit upon, sufficient demand,

130.

CERTIFICATION
effect of, 230.

where holder procures, effect of, 231.
where drawer procures, effect of, 231.

CHECK–
defined,

226.

negotiability

of declared, 21.
difference between check and bill, 226-228.
authority to draw, does not include authority
When must be presented, 228.
effect of delay, 228.
presentment and notice necessary, 227.
certification

of

230.

to draw bill. 228.
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CHECK–Continued.
not assignment, 232.
but may be by agreement,

233.

COLLATERAL SECURITIES
effect of provision for sale of, 42.
must be tendered with instrument,

137.

holder of instrument secured not required
lateral before suing indorser, 145.

to proceed upon

col

COLLECTION
indorsement for, 88.
effect of, 88.
liability of indorser for, 88.

INDORSEMENT

CONDITIONAL

condition may be disregarded by party paying, 91.
indorsee holds subject to right of indorser, 91.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT—
provision for does not affect negotiability,
must be at Or after

CONFLICT OF

maturity,

42.

44.

LAWS

what law governs

liability of maker,

116.

CONSIDERATION
presumption as to, 71.
distinguishes contracts of law merchant from contracts of com
mon law. 71.
in case of non-negotiable notes, 71, 225.
in case of non-negotiable bills, 71.
What constitutes, 72.
antecedent debt is, 72.
or failure of a defense, 77, 78.
partial failure of, defense pro tanto, 78.
partial failure though unliquidated, 78,
absence

79.

sufficient, 72.
lack of, 72.
illegality of, 72.

CONTINENTAL CODES,
provision

as

8.

to allonge,

84.

CONTINGENCY
instrument payable on, not negotiable, 40.
happening of contingent event does not cure defect, 40.
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CONTINUING

SECURITY

note as, 132.
certificate of deposit as,

133.

CORPURA'11UN
included in word “person,” 24.
indorsement by, 68.
capacity of to indorse admitted by maker, 116.
capacity of to draw admitted by acceptor, 119.
capacity of to make note admitted by indorser, 124.
delivery of paper of, by officer for personal debt, 108.

CROSSED CHECKS,
CURRENCY, 32.
CURRENT FUNDS,

228.

32.

CURRENT MONEY—
designation of particular

DATE–

kind of,

45.

not impair Validity
to,
as
53.
mistake as to, may be shown, 53.
alteration of, 184.

of

absence

does

of instrument,

presumption

insertion of, permissible when, 54.
insertion of, wrong, 54.
instrument may be ante-dated, 54.
instrument may be post-dated, 54.
from what, law takes effect, 25, 26.

DAYS OF

GRACE

abolished, 145, 146.
retained by Bills of Exchange Act, 239.
Wisconsin Act as to, 145.
North Carolina Act, as to, 146.
Massachusetts Act, as to, 146.
effect of non-secular days upon, 25.

DEFECT

what constitutes notice of,

DEFENSES

107,

108.

nature of, 111, 112.
classification of, 111.
inherent, 112.
collateral, 112.
who liable to, 110.
when instrument subject to, 110.

45.
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DELAY
excused in presenting for payment, 142.
excused in giving notice of dishonor, 168.
excused in presenting check, 228.

DELIVERY
meaning

of term, 24.

kinds of,

59.

presumption as to, 58.
necessity to convey title, 58.
of incomplete instrument, 58.
evidence to show terms of, 59.
conditional delivery, 58-59.

contract revocable until, 58.
is negotiation of instrument payable to bearer.
Warranty Where negotiation by, 122.

ON

DEMAND, INSTRUMENT PAYABLE
instrument must be payable on or at determinable future time,

27.

instrument expressed to the payable on. 46.
when payable at sight, 46.
When payable on presentation, 46.
when no time expressed, 46.
instrument issued when overdue is payable on demand, 46.
distinction between instruments payable on demand and at sight,
46.

instrument payable on demand negotiated an unreasonable
after its issue, 103.
overdue bill is payable on, 46.
when must be presented, 131.
when interest begins to run on, 47.
when statute of limitations begins to run on, 47.
expressions equivelant to demand, 47.

DETERMINABLE FUTURE

TIME–

What is, 40.
What is not, 40.
instrument payable at, 27.
fixed period after date or sight is, 40.
on or before fixed time is, 40.
on or after event certain to happen is, 40.

DISCHARGE

OF

INSTRUMENT

by payment on behalf of principal debtor,
by cancellation, 172.

172.

time
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DISCHARGE OF INSTRUMENT—Continued.
by
by
by
by

alteration, 182.
renunciation, 180.
other act, 172.
payment by party accomodated,

172.

where principal debtor becomes holder after maturity, 172.
of one part of a bill drawn in a set, 224.

DISCHARGE
*

OF PARTY SECONDARILY

LIABLE -.

by
by
by
by
by
by

discharge of instrument, 174.
cancellation of signature, 174.
discharge of prior party, 174.
tender by prior party, 174.
release of principal debtor, 175.
extension of time, 175-176.
mere indulgence will not discharge, 176.
where holder permits statute of limitations to run against
pal debtor, 175.

DISHONOR OF

INSTRUMENT

by non-payment, 144.
by non-acceptance, 200.
liability of secondary party upon,

144.

DRAWEE–

must be named or indicated, 28.
not liable until acceptance, 188.
time allowed in Which to accept, 195.
retaining or destroying bill, effect of, 195.
bill addressed to two or more drawers, 189.
bill addressed to two or more drawees in alternative, 189.

IDRAWER–
liability of,

116.

may negative, 117.
where bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 207.
admission of, 116.
engagement of by drawing bill, 116.
when party of primary liability, 116.
instrument payable to order of, 48.
when presentment not necessary to charge, 141.
right of recourse to, 144.
notice of dishonor must be given to, 149.
notice of dishonor need not be given to, when, 168.
when released by failure to present bill for acceptance, 202.

princi
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DRAWER–Continued.
when protest necessary in order to charge, 208.
of check and bill contrasted, 227.
of check discharged if holder has check certified,
existence of admitted by acceptor,

DUE

231.

117.

DILIGENCE

what will constitute, 143, 168.
when question of law, 143.
When question of fact, 143.

DURESS
or signature obtained by,

instrument

DUSTY FOOT COURTS,
EQUITIES, 111.

105.

14.

EVIDENCE–
admissiblity

of to show agreement among indorsers,
inadmissible to vary express liability of maker, 115.

127.

EXCHANGE

paper payable in, 31.
paper payable with, 31, 35.
of accomodation paper, 78, 80.

EXHIBITION OF INSTRUMENT—
when necessary, 137.
when excused, 137.

FACULTATIVE INDORSEMENT,
FICTITIOUS PERSON.—

167.

instrument payable to Order of, payable to bearer, 50.
when drawee is, drawer primarily liable, 143.
notice need not be given to drawer where drawee is, 169.
notice need not be given to indorser Where drawee is, 170.

FIGURES

discrepancy between, and words,
marginal figures, effect of, 61.

FISCAL

60.

OFFICER

effect of instrument

FORCE AND
instrument

FOREIGN

FEAR

drawn or indorsed to, 92.

obtained by,

BILL

defined, 189.
protest of, 208.

105, 107.
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FORGED SIGNATURE
wholly inoperative, 68.
When party estopped

to allege forgery, 68.

FORGERY
what constitutes,
of,

ratification

69.

70.

FRAUD
kinds of, 105.
fraud in esse contractus, 105.
illustration of, 105.
fraud in the indictment, 105.
instrument or signature obtained by,

105.

GENERAL ACCEPTANCE

what constitutes, 196-197.

GENUINENESS
warranty

of, where negotiation

by delivery, 122.
by qualified indorsement, 122.
warranty of, by general indorser, 125.
warranty of when not implied, 123.
of signature of drawer, acceptor admits, 117.
of signature of indorser, acceptor does not admit, 118.
of handwriting in body of instrument, not admitted by acceptor,

warranty of, where negotiation

118.

GOLD

DOLLARS

note payable in, 33.

GRACE

see Days of Grace.
what instruments entitled to, 46.
when last day of, is non-secular day,

25.

GUARANTOR

person may become such, 119.
proceedings against principal are necessary to charge, 145.
not entitled to notice of dishonor, 150.

GUARANTY

conditional

guaranty,

145.

HOLDER—
meaning of term, 24.
may sue in his own name, 98.
may receive payment, 98.
rights of when bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 207.
duty of, where bill not accepted, 206.
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HOLDER-Continued.
refusal to receive payment for honor, 221.
discharges drawer and indorsers of check he procures to be

certi

fied, 231.

cannot recover of bank on check until

it

accepts or certifies the

Same, 232.

VALUE

HOLDER FOR

what constitutes, 76.
person having lien is, 77.

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
What constitutes, 100-102.
who is not, 103.
payee as, 103.
presumption as to being, 113.
in case of instrument payable On demand, 103.
Where full amount has not been paid before notice, 104.
what constitutes notice of defeat, 107.
holds instrument free from equities, 109.
may recover full face value, 109-110.
rights of persons claiming under, 111.
when burden on holder to prove that he took the instrument
due course, 113.

HOLDER OF

OFFICE

instrument

HOLIDAY

payable to Order of, 48.

instrument falling due On, 145.
when day for doing act falls on, 24.
when last day of grace is, 25.

HOMESTEAD

AND EXEMPTION

waiver of, 42,

LAWS

44.

ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION
instrument given for, 72,

105.

INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENT
acceptance of, 195.
non-delivery of, 57.
filling blanks in, 55.

INCONSISTENT

LAWS REPEALED,

233.

INDORSER–
when person deemed, 119.
signer presumed to be where character not otherwise clear, 61.

in

INDEX.
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INDORSER—Continued.
irregular,

119.

contract of, 125.
liability of joint indorsers, 127.
liability of where paper negotiable by delivery, 126.
liability of where he indorses different parts of a set, 223.
where collaterals have been received, 145.
where bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 207.
presentment necessary to charge, 129, 227.
when presentment not necessary to charge, 142.
not mere surety after dishonor, 144.
admits capacity of corporation to make note, 124.
right of recourse to, 144.
notice of dishonor must be given to, 149.
notice of dishonor need not be given to, when, 170.
notice must be given to, though he has received security, 131.
Order in Which indorsers liable, 127.
holder not required to proceed on collaterals in order to charge,
145.

parol evidence to vary liability of, 121, 126, 127.
what will discharge, 174-178.
payment by does not discharge maker, 178.
released by failure to present for acceptance when, 207.
When protest necessary to charge, 208.
of check, discharged by delay to present, 229.
of check, discharged where holder procures check to be certified,
231.

Warranties of,

125.

INDORSEMENT
meaning Of term, 24.
contract of, 84.
elements of contract, 84.
kinds of, 86.
illustrations of, 86.
special, 86.
in blank, 86.
blank changed to special, how, 87.
qualified, 90.
effect of, 90.
does not impair negotiable character
does not throw suspicion on paper, 91.

of instrument,

90.
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INDORSEMENT—Continued.
warranty where negotiation by, 122.
warranty of title in case of, 122.
conditional, 91.
rights of party making, 91.
restrictive, 87.
prohibits further negotiation, 87.
constitutes indorse mere agent, 88.
vests title in trust, 88.
authorizes indorsee to receive payment, 89.
authorizes indorsee to bring action, 89.
authorizes indorsee to transfer his rights as indorsee, 89.
for collection, effect of, 88, 125, 126.
by infant, 68.
by cashier, 92.
by corporation, 68.
by fiscal officer, 92.
how made, 84.
departure from regular form of, 84, 85.
must be on instrument, 84.
or on allonge, 84.
must be of entire instrument, 85.
must be completed by delivery, 82.
signature alone sufficient, 84.
instrument indorsed in blank, payable to bearer, 50.
of instrument payable to bearer, 91.
of instrument payable to two or more, 92.
where name misspelled, 93.
where payee or indorsee Wrongly designated in representative
capacity, 93.
presumption as to place of, 94.
presumption as to time of, 93.
striking out, 95.
effect of, 95.
when may be done, 95.
transfer without, 96.
rights of transferee, 96.
prior equities, 96.

INFANT–

indorsement

by, 68,

IN HIS OWN RIGHT—
meaning of, 174.

124.

INDEX.
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what is, 189.

INSOLVENCY
of principal

debtor, no implied Warranty
presentment, 131.

against, 123, 124.

not excuse

does

INSTALMENTS
instruments payable in, 35.
demand of each, necessary to charge indorser,

132.

INSTRUMENT
meaning of term,

24.

INTEREST
where instrument
run, 60.

does

not Specify date from

which

does not make sum uncertain, 34.
begins to run on demand paper when, 47.

INUREMENT
notice by,

152.

IRREGULAR INDORSER
who is,

119.

liability of,

119.

ISSUE
meaning of term, 24.

JOINT DEBTORS
presentment to,
notice to, 158.

140.

JOINT INDORSERS
liability of,

JOINT

127.

PARTIES

two or more persons signing

JUDGMENT NOTES,

“I

promise to pay,”

42, 43.

LAW MERCHANT
meaning of, 10.
origin of, 11.
embraced what, 11.
incorporated into common law, 12.
stages of development of, 14-16.
when governs, 25.

61.

interest

to
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LIABILITY
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
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maker, 115.
acceptor, 117.
certifier, 230.
drawer, 116.
general indorser, 125.
irregular indorser, 119.
indorser where paper negotiable

by delivery,

person signing as agent, 65, 128.
agent or broker, 128.
no one liable whose signature not on instrument,
of indorsers, order of, 127.

126.

63.

LIEN

person having, holder for value, 77.

LOST INSTRUMENT—
Suit on, 148.
protest of, 213.
presentment as to,

137.

LUNATIC

acceptor cannot show that drawer or payee is,

MAIL

119.

notice sent by, 155.
miscarriage in, does not invalidate notice, 162.

MAKER—

liability of,

-

115.

what law governs, 116.

liability to holder where part payment

made

by indorser, 173.

admissions of, 115.
proper method of signing by, 115.
effect of signing otherwise, 115.
note payable after death of, 41.
instrument payable to order of 48, 225.
demand of payment not necessary to charge, 129.

MARRIED

WOMAN

capacity of to indorse, maker admits, 116.
capacity of to draw bill acceptor admits, 118.

MATURITY

time of, 145, 146.
option to pay before, 41.
payment before, when a defense, 100.
payment before, not in usual course,

148.
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MONEY
what is, 30.
equivalents of, 30, 32.
not equivelants of, 31.
effect of particular kind specified in instrument, 45.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
statute confined to, 23.
“instrument” means negotiable instrument, 24.
must contain unconditional promise, 27.
must be for payment of sum certain, 27.
must be for payment of money only, 27.
must be in Writing, 27.
must be signed by maker or drawer, 27.
must be payable on demand or at determinable future time, 27.
must be payable to order or to bearer, 27.
drawee must in indicated with reasonable certainty, 28.
statement of transaction, negotiable character not affected by, 38.
order to pay out of particular fund, not negotiable, 38.
instrument payable on contingency, not negotiable, 40.
provision for sale of collateral, 42.
provision for confession of judgment, 42.
indication of particular fund from which re-imbursement is to be
made does not render instrument non-negotiable, 38.
nor does direction to charge to particular fund, 38.
waiver of benefits of law, 42.
option to require something in lieu of payment in money, 42.
payable on contingency of one's coming of age, 41.
happening of contingent event does not cure defect, 40.
Omissions not affecting, 45.

not dated, 45.
not specifying value given, 45.
not specifying place where drawn, 45.
not specifying place where payable, 45.
bearing seal, 45.
designation of particular kind of current money, 45.
instrument continues negotiable until discharged or restrictively
indorsed, 94.
contrast between English and French theory of, 9, 10.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
what is, 1.
states adopted in,

1.

LAW

INDEX.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW-Continued.
purpose of, 3.
Origin of, 2-3.
to what instrument applies, 23-24-26.
Controlling effect of, 23.

NEGOTIATION
what constitutes, 82.
does not include “issue”, 57.
rules governing, 82-97.
of instrument payable to bearer, 82.
of instrument payable to order, 82.
of post-dated instruments, 54.
of bills in asset, 223.
by prior party, 97.

in breach of faith, 105-107.
party secondarily liable, paying
it, 178.

instrument

may again negotiate

and indorsers released by failure of holder to negotiate
bill, when, 202.
bill must be negotiated within reasonable time, 131-202.

drawer

NOTARY PUBLIC–
may make protest, 210.
not disqualified because officer of bank holding paper, 210-211.
must make presentment in person, 210.

NOTE
meaning of term,

24.

NOTICE

when transferee receives before payment in full,

104.

NOTICE OF DISHONOR—
rules governing, 149-172.
must be given to indorser, 149.
must be given to drawer, 149.
need not be given to guarantor, 150.
must be given to indorser though he holds collateral,
may be given to agent, 156.
who deemed agent to receive, 156-7.
to partners, 158.
to joint parties not partners, 158.
to bankrupt, 158-9.
to assignor for creditors, 159.

".

131.
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NOTICE OF DISHONOR—Continued.
when party dead, 157.
holder required to give notice only to his immediate indorser,
by whom given, 150.
by agent, 151-153.
by bank as agent, 151-2.
by branch bank, 153.
by stranger not suffiicient, 151.
by drawee who refuses acceptance, not sufficient, 151.
when notice should be given, 159.
may be given as soon as instrument dishonored, 159.
where parties reside in same place, 160.
where parties reside in different places, 161.
may be sent by mail, 155.
when notice deemed deposited in post office, 163.
miscarriage in mails, does not invalidate, 163.
time in which indorser may give notice to prior parties, 163.
may be sent by telegram, 165.
may be sent by first regular mail steamer, 162.
may be delivered personally, 155.
where notice to be sent, 164.
when party adds address to signature, 164.
when party has not given address, 164.
when party lives in one place and has office in another, 164.
when party is sojourning in another place, 164.
when notice actually received is sufficient, 164.
form of, 154.
when defective, 155.
when sufficient, 154.
when misdescription does not vitiate, 154.
need not be signed, 154.
signature of notary, 209.
waiver of, 165.
to be strictly construed, 167.
before dishonor, 165-6.
after dishonor, 165-6.

what will constitute waiver of 166.
waiver embodied in instrument, 166.
waiver written over signature, 166.
when dispensed with, 167.
when cannot be given after reasonable diligence,
when delay excused, 168.

167.

150.
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NOTICE OF DISHONOR-Continued.
reliance upon directory, 168.
when need not be given to drawer, 168-9.
when need not be given to indorser, 170.
where instrument issued or negotiated when overdue, 48.
when instrument has been previously dishonored by non-accept
ance, 170.

omission to give notice of dishonor by non-acceptance,
to whose benefit notice inures, 152.

NOTICE OF

171.

EQUITIES

what constitutes, 107.

NOTING,

211.

OMISSIONS–
not affecting validity or negotiable character of instrument, 45.

OPTION

to pay before maturity, 41.
of holder to require something in lieu of payment in money, 42.

ORDER

instrument
instrument
instrument
instrument
instrument
instrument
instrument
instrument

OVERDUE

must be
payable
payable
payable
payable
payable
payable
payable

payable to, or bearer, 28.
to, 48.
to Order of drawer, 48.
to order of maker, 48.
to order of drawee, 48.
to order of two or more payees, 48.
to order of one of several payees, 48.
to order of holder of office, 48.

INSTRUMENT

payable on demand as regards parties issuing or negotiating, 46.

PARTNERS
maker admits existence of firm to which he makes note
able, 116.
presumption that note is given for partnership purpose, 108.
note of, given for individual partner's debt, 108.
presentment to, 140.
indorsement by one of, sufficient, 92.

PASSAGE OF

ACT

meaning of, 25.

PAYEES
must be named or indicated, 48-9.
may be holder in due course, 103.

pay
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PAYEES.–Continued.
instrument payable to two or more, 48.
instrument payable to one of several, 48.
when name of, not name of any person, 50.
trade or assumed name, 64.
fictitious, 50-52.
maker admits existence of, 115.
acceptance admits existence of, 117.
drawer admits existence of, 116.
maker admits capacity of to indorse, 115.
acceptance admits capacity of to indorse, 117.
drawer admits capacity of to indorse, 116.
acceptance does not admit signature of, 118.

PAYMENT
before maturity, when a defense, 100.
before maturity, not in usual course,
in due course, what constitutes, 148.
by principal debtor, 172.
by party accommodated, 172.
by party secondarily liable, 173-178.

of bills in set, 224.
in money, instrument must
in merchandise, 31.

148.

be for, 27.

option to require something in lieu of payment in money, 42.
holder in due course can recover face value, 109.
what bills must be protested for non-payment, 208.
bill protested for non-acceptance may be protested for non-pay
ment, 212.

PAYMENT FOR HONOR
who may make, 219.
how made, 219.
preference of parties offering, 220.
effect on subsequent parties, 220.
where holder refuses to receive payment, effect of, 221.
declaration before payment, 220.
rights of payer for honor, 221.

PENCIL

writing may

be in, 28.

PERSON
meaning of term, 24.
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PERSON PRIMARILY

LIABLE

who is, 24.
demand of payment not necessary to charge, 129.

PERSON SECONDARILY

LIABLE

who is, 24.
right of recourse to, 144.

PLACE

failure to specify place where drawn

does

not affect negotiable

character, 45.
presumption as to place of indorsement, 94.
of presentment, what is proper, 135.
alteration as to, 184-5.

POST-DATED

INSTRUMENT—

negotiation Of,
not invalid, 54.

54.

post-dating sight draft, effect of, 54.

POST

OFFICE

deposit in, what constitutes, 163.
deposit in post office box, 163.
deposit with carrier, 163.

PRE-EXISTING

DEBT

constitutes value,

72.

PRESENTATION
instrument

payable on, payable on demand, 47.

PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE–
when necessary, 201.
when bill payable after sight, 201.
when required to fix maturity, 201.
when bill expressly stipulates for, 201.
when bill not payable at drawee's place of business or resi
dence,

201.

not necessary when payable at day certain or at fixed time after
date,

201.

how made,
must be by
must be on
must be at

203.

or on behalf of holder,

203.

business day, 203.
reasonable hour, 203.
must be before bill is overdue, 203.
must be to drawee or some person authorized to act for him, 203.
failure of, release drawer and indorsers when, 202.
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PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE–Continued.

duty of agent to make, 202.
in case there are two or more payees not partners, 203.
in case drawee is dead, 203.
in case drawee is bankrupt or insolvent, 203.
on what days may be made, 204.
in case time is insufficient, 205.
When excused, 205-6.
drawee dead, 205.
drawee absconded, 205.
drawee fictitious person, 205.
drawee, no capacity to contract,

205.

When cannot be made after reasonable diligence,

206.

PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT—

necessary in order to charge drawer and indorsers, 129.
not necessary to charge party primarily liable, 129.
what constitutes sufficient, 133.
must be made on day of maturity, 131.
when instrument payable on demand, 131.
holder has entire day in which to make, 134.
place of,

135.

when payable at particular place, 129-130.
when instrument payable at bank, 137.
When instrument payable in instalments, 132.
to persons primarily liable as partners, 140.

to joint parties not partners, 140.
where principal debtor dead, 139.
where principal debtor has abandoned place of business, 136.
where principal debtor has changed his residence, 136.
how made to acceptor for honor, 217.
within what time check must be presented, 228.
effect of delay, 228.
when not required to charge indorser, 142.
when not required to charge drawer, 141.

-

instrument must be exhibited, 137.
when need not be exhibited, 137.
collaterals must be tendered with instrument,
when delay of, excused, 142.
waiver of, 143.
what will amount to, 143-144.
where drawee is fictitious person, 143.
When dispensed with, 142-143.

137.
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PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT—Continued.

of instrument falling due on Sunday, 145.
of instrument falling due on holiday, 145.
of instrument falling due on Saturday, 145.
not necessary when bill has been dishonored
ance,

by

non-accept

207.

of instrument issued or negotiated when overdue,
what sufficient evidence of authority

PRIMARILY

LIABLE

48.

to receive payment,

who is, 24.

PRINCIPAL

not liable unless his signature appears on instrument, 63.

PRINTED PROVISIONS–
yield to written provisions, 60.

PROCURATION
signature by,
What is, 67.

PROMISSORY

67.

NOTE

defined, 225.
negotiability

of, declared,

17.

“Bohemian Oats” notes, 44.
given for purchase price of goods, 39-40.
payable on or after death of maker, 44.
ambiguous instrument considered as bill on note, 60-61.
bill treated as, when, 190.
drawn to maker's own order, 225.
non-negotiable, 71-225.
whether import consideration, 71-225.

BROTEST

origin and meaning of term, 208.
construction of term, 167.
may be made in case of dishonor of any instrument,

must be made only in case of foreign bills, 171-208.
how made, 209.
when to be made, 211.
must be annexed to bill, 209.
must be under hand of notary, 209.
must be under seal of notary, 209.
must specify time and place of presentment, 209.
must specify fact that presentment was made, 209.

171.

133.

INDEX.
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PROTEST-Continued.
must specify cause for protesting the bill, 209.
must Specify demand made and answer given,
must specify manner of presentment, 209.
may be made by notary public, 210.
may be made by respectable resident, 210.
presentment must be made by notary himself,

209.

210.

where made, 211.
when dispensed with, 213.
when delay in making excused, 213.
for better security, 212.
both for non-acceptance and non-payment, 212.
extending noting of, 211.
before maturity, where acceptor insolvent, 212.
of lost, destroyed or wrongly detained bill, 213.
of bill accepted for honor, 217.

QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE
effect of, 199.

holder need not take, 199.
agent cannot take, 200.

REASONABLE

DILIGENCE

what constitutes,

168.

See Due Diligence.

REASONABLE

HOUR

What is, 134.

REASONABLE

TIME

what constitutes, 24.
in case of instrument payable on demand,

103.

instrument payable on demand must be presented within, 131.
when question of law, 133.
when question of fact, 133.

REFEREE IN CASE OF NEED,
RENEWAL NOTES
as payment of old, 172-173.

RENUNCIATION
effect of,

180.

how made,

REPEAL

180.

laws repealed, 233.

191.
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REPRESENTATIVE
person indorsing

CAPACITY

in may negative personal liability,

93.

RESERVATION
of rights against Surety,

175.

SATURDAY
instrument falling due on,

145.

SEAL

does not affect negotiable character, 45.
Of corporation, 46.
necessity of in protest,

SHORT

TITLE

209.

of negotiable instruments

SIGHT

law, 23.

instrument payable at, payable on demand, 46-47.

SIGNATURE
form Of, 28.
no person liable whose signature does not appear on instrument, 63.
by agent, 64.
by procuration, 67.
forged, 68.
drawee’s admitted by acceptance, 117.

SOJOURNING
meaning of,

SPOLIATION

165.

effect of, 183.

STATUTE OF

ANNE

text of, 18-20.
negotiability of promissory

notes declared by,

STRIKING OUT INDORSEMENT—
effect of, 95.
when may be done,

SUM

CERTAIN

95.

what is, 34-5.
what is not, 35.

SUNDAY

instrument falling due on, 145.
when day for doing act falls on, 24.

SUNDRIES
instrument

payable to, 52.

19.
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TAXES
agreement for payment of in note, 42.

TENDER-

-

ability and willingness at place of payment, equivalent to,
when discharges party secondarily liable,

129,

174.

TERMS
when sufficient, 53.

TIME

how computed, 24, 146.
when statute in effect, 25-26.
of indorsement, 93.

TITLE–

of act, 23.
when defective, 105.
burden of proof where title of prior party defective, 113.
warranty of where negotiation by delivery, 122.
warranty of where negotiation by qualified indorsement, 122.
where negotiation by general indorser, 125.

TRADE

NAME

person signing in,

UNCONDITIONAL

63.

PROMISE OR

ORDER

what is, 28, 29, 38.
test of, 38.
order to pay out of particular fund is not,

38.

UNDER HIS HAND–
meaning of,

209.

USAGE
regard may be had to, to determine reasonable time, 24.

USURY

implied warranty

VALUE

that note is not void for, 123.

meaning of term, 24.
what constitutes, 72.
pre-existing debt is, 72.
lien on instrument is, 77.

failure to specify

does not affect negotiability,
what constitutes holder for, 76.

VALUE RECEIVED–

words not necessary, 45.

45.
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WAIVER

of presentment for payment,

143.

what Will amount to, 143-4.
of notice of dishonor, 165.
when embodied in instrument,
When written above signature,
protest,
what includes, 167.
of
of benefits of law by obligor, 42.

166.
166.

WARRANTY

where negotiation by delivery or qualified indorsement,
of genuineness, 122.
not implied when, 123.

of capacity of prior parties, 122.
that instrument is not void for usury, 123.
not implied that paper is not accommodation paper,

not implied that principal
indorser,
general
of
of genuineness, 125.

debtor, not insolvent,

that instrument is what it purports to be, 125.
that he has good title, 125.
capacity of prior parties, 125.
that instrument is valid and subsisting, 125.
in case instrument indorsed for collection, 125-126.
on sale of municipal bonds, 122-124.

WITHOUT RECOURSE

effect of term, 90.
equivalents of term, 90.

WRITING

includes print, 24.
may be in pencil, 28.

WRITTEN

includes printed,

24.

WRITTEN PROVISIONS
prevail over printed, 60.

122.

124.

123-124.
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